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This thesis reflects on the application of public-private partnership to 
urban water supply in developing countries. While PPPs remain an 
interesting possibility for overcoming financial, quality, and efficiency 
issues common to public provision in developing region municipalities, 
this research demonstrates that management of long-term contracts 
requires technically complex administrative and regulatory inputs, 
particular institutional underpinnings, and fitting modes of adaptation in 
order to attain the goals that motivate private participation. The 
research problematizes the notion of “success” in PPP by proposing 
that institutional performance (lastingness) and instrumental 
performance (attainment of policy goals) are not one and the same, 
and that instrumental failure coupled with institutional success may be 
a far worse policy outcome than systemic failure along both 
dimensions. 
The research applies an innovative PPP framework for examining the 
conditions of institutional and instrumental performance based on 
notions of credible commitment and adaptability. Quantitative and 
qualitative analyses, in tandem, examine the effects of four variable 
classes: rooted conditions, context dynamics, regulatory settings, and 
project rules and participant capacities. These variable classes, in turn, 
are linked to the credibility of commitments and capacity for the PPP to 
adjust to external shocks, new information, and changing operating 
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contexts over time. In order to do so, the research employs a multiple 
methods approach incorporating large-N quantitative regression 
analyses and comparative case studies of water supply concessions in 
Jakarta, Indonesia; Manila, Philippines; and Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.  
The quantitative research draws on a number of data sources that 
provide information on the project rules and rooted conditions. These 
data sources include The World Bank’s Public-Private Infrastructure 
Advisory Facility’s project database, The World Bank Governance 
Indicators, Transparency International, and the Database of Political 
Institutions. A series of logistic multinomial regressions are employed to 
test links between the institutional environment and project rules and 
contract durability. The analysis suggests that corruption and low 
bureaucratic capacity, counter-intuitively, tend to have sustaining 
effects on PPPs, and that the participation of multilaterals is also 
supportive of contract sustenance. Economic shock and the 
participation of foreign partners, on the other hand, tend to be 
detrimental. 
The qualitative case comparisons that follow further investigate the 
dynamics of the variable classes on institutional and instrumental 
performance. The cases also grapple with the surprising results of the 
quantitative analysis and examine major variables less amenable to 
quantitative analysis. The case comparisons demonstrate that 
institutional settings can have different effects at different phases of a 
PPPs lifecycle and in combination with other contextual factors and 
 xi 
also show that PPP cancellation and survival are not necessarily good 
indicators of success. The cases reveal how inter-governmental 
conflict, bureaucratic torpor, and political volatility can have sustaining 
effects on low-performing PPPs: i.e., they can prevent cancellations 
that may be preferable. The cases also demonstrate the central role of 
strong, well-informed, and responsive regulation as well as the capacity 
and legitimacy problems that easily interfere with the assurance of 
credible commitment. Further, the qualitative analysis demonstrates the 
delicate and tenuous balance between adaptability needed in 
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Chapter 1. Public services and the partnership paradigm 
The partnership paradigm has undoubtedly made an indelible and 
sustained mark in public service literature and practice. Evolving and 
highly variant partnership forms involving governments, multilateral 
institutions, civil society organizations, and businesses in multitudinous 
architectures have come to serve social aims across sectors, including 
infrastructure, public health, education, enterprise development, and 
public utilities. Despite concerns about the effectiveness and efficiency 
gains used to justify private provision of traditionally government-
provided goods, alongside important concerns about democratic 
accountability, partnerships have become an important new institutional 
form in the implementation of policies of all types. 
Experimentation with public-private partnerships [PPP] in different 
forms is a response to perceived and / or real market and government 
failures, for which different service forms have been alternatively 
adopted over time. The selection of a particular delivery form – 
government, market, or hybrid – for a public service is dependent not 
only on the policy problem at hand, but also on past decisions and 
prevailing ideas, as well as available managerial, political, and physical 
resources and knowledge. Partnerships, and more specifically PPPs, 
are employed to address policy problems characterized by 
amalgamations of government and market failures. As such, they join 
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public and private sector actors in partnership to overcome inherent 
weaknesses and take advantage of inherent strengths of each. 
This thesis reflects on the application of PPP to a politically and 
materially complex good, urban water supply, in order to examine the 
institutional and political difficulties associated with contract-based 
partnerships, especially in developing regions. Traditionally, 
governments have been tasked with providing water services due to 
market failures associated with monopoly, externalities, high sunk costs 
and free-rider problems, as well as to preserve access to this life-
essential resource. Over the past twenty-five years, however, in 
response to perceived government failures including operational 
inefficiencies, rent-seeking, and over-subsidization, market 
mechanisms have been employed along a spectrum of corporatization 
to partnership to privatization, what Menard and Peeroo more loosely 
refer to as forms of “water liberalization” (Menard & Peeroo, 2011). In 
some cases post-privatization, the balance of multiple failures has 
tipped towards the market, leading to the abandonment of PPP and re-
municipalization. In fact, the past five years of scholarship and public 
commentary related to PPPs, particularly in water services, has tended 
to portray private participation in water supply as a failed experiment 
(Araral, 2009; K. J. Bakker, 2010; D. Hall & Lobina, 2006; Hukka & 
Katko, 2003; E. Lobina, 2005), despite its continued application. 
Nevertheless, while literature and commentary decrying the failure of 
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PPP is pervasive, the number of partnership contracts across sectors 
has grown over the past few years, albeit at decreasing rates. 
So, while hope for the promises of partnership keeps the movement 
buoyant, the problem of how to theoretically account for and practically 
manage the implications of market, government, and combined market-
government failures remains unresolved. This begs the need for an 
expanded idea of institutional or governance failure in the provision of 
complex goods with both public and private characteristics. 
Additionally, the practical issue of supplying water in urban developing 
regions remains enormously challenging. Certainly, we have yet to 
definitively answer the questions: do PPPs, particularly in water supply, 
work? And if so, how, where and under what conditions? 
Evidence has been accumulating to explain the emergence and 
outcomes of partnership programs, but there is much yet to be learned 
about the combinations of factors necessary to designing and 
maintaining partnerships that last, accomplish their stated aims, and 
deal with the failures that motivated their employment. While more 
“transformational,” trust-based forms of open, participatory, 
collaborative policy-making and implementation are de rigueur in policy 
discourse, the mechanics and politics of more traditional “transactional” 
contracts-based public-private partnerships remain relevant. The focus 
of this research is on the application of the PPP or private sector 
participation [PSP] model to water supply and the issues that arise 
when this institutional form is applied to a good whose delivery is 
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technically and politically complex in environments that are also 
administratively and politically exigent.  
This thesis’ aims are both theoretical and practical. On the one hand, 
the project seeks to contribute to theory on market and non-market 
failure, policy partnership, and regulation. To the first, the final analysis 
reflects upon the usefulness of broader notions of governance failure 
and suggests, via insights drawn from the comparative empirical work 
herein, some of the component parts of the concept of governance 
failure. Further, the research proposes additions to theory on 
institutional fitness related to adaptability and commitment, and the 
interplay between substantive performance and legitimacy for both 
government and business. On the practical side, the research suggests 
insights on the necessary components of workable PPPs in the delivery 
of water in complex institutional contexts by drawing on a multiple 
commitment framework. This multi-faceted question of how to sustain 
successful water PPPs is the practical path of enquiry wherein the 
theoretical contributions are seeded.  
Despite twenty years of continued application of private sector 
participation models to water utilities and a body of literature that 
advances continuously, advice regarding the suitability of PPPs to 
water services in different political, environmental, developmental, and 
other situational contexts remains polemic, with staunch protractors 
(largely neoliberal-leaning organizations like the World Bank, and 
MNDS) and detractors (including many academics, NGOs, and social 
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activists). This thesis argues that PSP models can and do work 
towards solving complex policy problems, but in limited situations. 
Indeed, whilst most PPPs remain operational, particular combinations 
of internal and external conditions, project architectures, adaptive 
capabilities, and regulatory strategies lie along the obstacle-ridden and 
shifting pathway to relational and technical performance success. The 
goal herein is to study these potential impact factors in order to identify 
multiple causal pathways to a PPP’s general success or failure. 
Further, the analysis problematizes notions of PPP “success” and 
“failure”, pointing out that different kinds of successes and failures 
happen along the way, to varying degrees.  
1.1 Dimensions of success and failure 
It is important to attend, in discussing policy outcomes, to what is 
meant by “success” or “failure”. The literature on PPPs is certainly 
varied in definitions of success. In the case of policy partnerships, 
judgment may be made on one or both of two interrelated dimensions: 
the instrumental-technical dimension and the relational. Herein, 
“instrumental” performance refers to how well a PPP attains the goals 
that motivated its selection as a service delivery form (these logics will 
be further discussed) for both the private company and government 
agency. Its assessment lies within the realm of traditional policy 
evaluation. In the case of water supply, it is typically a judgment of how 
well the PPP performs according to measures such as reduction of 
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non-revenue water [NRW], expansion of service coverage, 
improvement of water and service quality, operational efficiency, tariff 
and cost reduction, and profitability. Institutional performance, on the 
other hand, refers to the degree to which multiple parties to a PPP – 
and particularly government agencies and private companies – are 
able to work together and co-manage their interests in the utility project 
at hand, remain committed to their agreements, and sustain requisite 
political support. The clearest evidence of institutional failure is the 
early termination of a PPP.  
An early contract termination is but one way to specify project failure at 
the extreme. Indeed, a utility PPP may last despite incredibly poor 
technical or economic performance if the arrangement is beneficial to 
powerful parties. In this case, a technical failure is at hand, even if early 
contract termination does not occur. Alternatively, a privately managed 
utility might attain its performance goals and remain financially solvent, 
but may nevertheless be terminated due to political opposition or 
infighting amongst parties to the contract. These cases may be 
classified as relational or institutional failures. The term “institutional” 
reflects the importance or rules and norms that structure the 
relationship, align incentives to remain cooperative, and dissuade 
defection from agreements. Projects that are generally successful or 
failed across both dimensions are classified as “systemic” successes 
and failures. 
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Table 1. Dimensions of PPP performance 
 
Instrumental Performance 






High Systemic Success Instrumental Failure 
Low Institutional Failure Systemic Failure 
Further, a note on the renegotiation of contracts is germane, as there 
has been much attention afforded to the frequent and often tenuous 
renegotiation of PPPs (D. Hall, Lobina, & Corral, 2010). Recent data 
suggests that some 87% of water and sanitation PPP contracts are 
renegotiated (Guasch, Laffont, & Straub, 2005). These renegotiations 
can indicate potential failure; however, as Delmon points out, these are 
often erroneously cast as such. While renegotiations may cause 
serious problems such as reduced revenues and public backlash, they 
are also typical for long-term arrangements, as they allow PPPs to 
adjust to external change or accommodate new information (Delmon, 
2011). To this last point, the ability for parties to modify the terms of 
PPPs to account for changing internal and external circumstances can 
be important to systemic success, especially over long periods.  
Returning to the dimensions of failure, the research herein 
demonstrates that there are also important causal linkages between 
relational, political, and technical performance. Some instrumental 
failures are caused by coordination failures or failure to manage 
competing goals and rule interpretations. Conversely, relationships 
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may break down when technical performance problems arise. Most 
projects do not fall clearly into clear “success” or “failure” 
categorizations. Rather, projects may be “more” or “less” successful or 
problematic. And while difficult, such judgments should ideally take into 
account the closest approximation of what might have happened had 
the private sector not been engaged – i.e., whether partly “failed” PPPs 
might still be less bad, instrumentally, than they would have been were 
the utility under public management. 
1.2 Research questions 
The broad line of enquiry herein has to do with understanding why and 
how policy problems characterized by multiple failures may be 
addressed over the long term. For semi-public and public goods 
subject to market and government failure, creative solutions employ 
multiple policy tools and players from the public and private sectors. 
The prevailing knowledge gap is that we lack a research framework 
applicable to the balancing act of creating workable, long-term 
arrangements for solving multiple-failure problems. We cannot predict 
the strategies of government and private sector partners in different 
contexts and structural arrangements, as they relate to building and 
adjusting consensus over time and holding each other accountable to 
agreed strategies. In turn, we are not readily able to determine when 
PPPs are likely to be appropriate options for governments interested in 
reforming water supply programs.  
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This problem statement leads to two sets of theoretical and practical 
research questions. The central theoretical question at hand is: What is 
required to maintain a balance of competing solutions in dynamic policy 
contexts? Practically, the broad primary question is: What combinations 
of contextual conditions (socio-political factors and institutional 
endowments), policy goals, and partnership architectures (project-level 
rules, partner profiles) promote success (or failure) in water supply 
PPPs? And more specifically, what competing needs must the 
partnership accommodate?  
The sub-questions that follow include: What is required in order for the 
PPP to ensure both the flexibility necessary to accommodating 
changing circumstances and the enforcement and regulation required 
to keep parties accountable to their commitments? How do the 
institutional environment and project-based rules affect the 
sustainability of partnerships and attainment of their policy goals? How 
do service delivery architectures and regulatory mechanisms affect the 
performance and outcomes of private participation in water utilities?   
These many questions hint at a long list of variables that potentially 
affect PPPs and the intricate systems that comprise the phenomena 
under study. In order to push some few, labored steps forward towards 
better understanding these enormously complex, multi-faceted utility 
projects, this thesis attempts to focus on a set of conditions 
hypothesized to be of significance to the survival and success of PPP 
arrangements. 
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As such, this thesis comprises eight chapters:  
Chapter 1. Public services and the partnership paradigm  
Chapter 2. Literature review: Failure and partnership 
Chapter 3. Patterns in PPP survival: Statistical evidence 
Chapter 4. Pathways to survival: Three Southeast Asian cities 
Chapter 5. Jakarta: Rigidity and regulatory relegation 
Chapter 6. Manila: Adaptive regulation and balancing inconsistency 
Chapter 7. Selangor: Information and failure in PPP 
Chapter 8. Adaptation and commitment: Analyzing PPP failure 
Following this introduction, a literature review, and explanation of the 
research methodologies in the first three chapters, the following 
chapters exposit the bulk of the substantive contributions via regression 
analysis and comparative cases analysis of water utilities in Manila, 
Philippines; Jakarta, Indonesia; and Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. In 
addition to discussing the influence of proposed survival and failure 
factors for PPPs, these sections cover two interlinked themes related to 
public-private mixing in service delivery: alignment and commitment 
problems inherent to partnerships and institutional adaptation over 
time. The final chapter synthesizes the analyses and discusses the 
application of public value to the assessment of PPPs and theorization 
on institutional fitness and failure, as a whole.   
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1.3 Research focus: Success and failure in PPP 
With respect to the themes herein, the “double alignment” problem 
proposed by Menard (Ménard, 2011) suggests that, beyond questions 
of program design, partnership failures can be caused by 
organizational and institutional inconsistencies. Organizationally, there 
may exist incompatibilities between the contract (which allocates rights) 
and its governance system. Institutionally, there can be critical 
inconsistencies between the contract’s enforcement system and the 
government party’s capacity to alter the “rules of the game” while the 
contract is ongoing. This is related also to Wu’s proposed “double 
commitment” or “two-sided commitment” problem1, an organization-
level framing of broader institutional-organizational issues, which 
suggests that a helpful way to approach partnership failure is to 
examine conditions that weaken commitments of both parties to 
agreements over time. The latter notion adds an important temporal 
dimension to the study of long-term partnerships in ever-changing 
political and economic contexts.  
Overall, this theme is explored via principle-agent, institutional, and 
other economic theories to examine nested commitment and 
enforcement problems inherent to PPPs. I demonstrate these issues 
with both quantitative and qualitative research. The large-N quantitative 
research investigates the influences of project rules, project design, 
                                            
1 Personal communication, Professor Wu Xun, 2012-2013; House and Wu, 
forthcoming 
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and the institutional environment on PPP lastingness as a starting point 
to identifying important institutional and project characteristics that 
accompany double commitment and alignment problems. Following on, 
three case studies of water utilities in Southeast Asian cities 
demonstrate such problems in detail, as well as how partners have 
overcome or fallen prey to them over time.  
The cases examine how participant interests, resources, and capacities 
change over time; how pertinent institutions evolve; how the political 
and economic contexts change; and how these changes, in 
combination, interact with the modes of ensuring goal alignment and 
credible commitment to the agreements at hand. Further, the analysis 
suggests multiple ways that utilities, contracting agencies, and 
regulators can adapt to the ever-shifting internal and external 
conditions and, on the converse, what intersecting contextual changes 
result in un-survivable flashpoints.  
With respect to studying coordination and commitment over time, 
regulation and shifting regulatory arrangements are also central foci. In 
the three cases, the regulatory regimes display hybridized 
characteristics ranging somewhere on the spectrum between the 
British model of discretionary regulation and the French model of 
contract-based regulation. Discussions of regulation assume a political 
economy view that draws on capture theory in the tradition of Peltzman 
and Stigler, as well as more traditional normative models in the mode 
of public interest theory. It examines how the designs and resources of 
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the regulatory structure and its evolving functions over the life of the 
concession are influenced by (and influence) politics and competing 
interests, and how these structural changes and shifting interests in 
turn influence the PPP and partners’ strategies. 
Finally, the concluding chapter synthesizes findings from the 
quantitative and qualitative results on the courses and underpinnings of 
PPP survival and failure and reflects on institutional failure and public 
value in light of these findings. This section proposes that the cases of 
partnership failure herein may be understood as resulting from 
reinforcing commitment problems, wherein the arrangements and 
players fail to balance competing needs of adaptability and credible 
commitment. The analysis also show how failures to meet the test of 
public value are due to multiple instrumental and relational failures 
which are material, ideational, institutional and regulatory in nature. 
1.3.1 The unit of analysis: The urban water utility PPP 
The term “PPP” is bandied about widely but loosely to describe a 
varied array of arrangements for delivering public and quasi-public 
goods, which are traditionally government-provided, with some degree 
of participation by private sector actors. Public-private partnerships are 
a “broad family of approaches” (G Hodge & Greve, 2005) describing a 
spectrum of contractual or relational arrangements between 
government and private sector organizations. Indeed, the multiple 
working definitions of PPP suggest the shifting and flexible use of the 
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term to describe various forms of private participation in public 
services, and more broadly, ongoing interaction between the private 
sector and government towards some (at least partly) shared goal. 
Zhang defines a PPP as a “more or less sustainable cooperation 
between public and private actors in which joint products and/or 
services are developed and in which risks, costs, and profits are 
shared” (Zhang, 2005). Skelcher sees PPPs as partnerships that 
“combine the resources of government with those of private agents 
(businesses or not-for-profit bodies) in order to deliver societal goals” 
(Skelcher, 2005). And Hodge, et al, assert that PPPs “are 
simultaneously a form of governance, a public policy delivery tool and a 
language-game involving multiple grammars” (Graeme Hodge, Greve, 
& Boardman, 2010). 
Wettenhall points out that the field of PPP research has become 
“conceptually messy” and that many of the programs labeled as PPPs 
are not, in fact, partnerships so much as public private “mixes”: 
“There is a spectrum here. At one end is the simple division of 
functions long known as contracting out... At the other is the more 
complex and now frequently encountered arrangement whereby 
the private involvement is more extensive and may run to 
financing a project for a public authority and operating it for a 
period of years, retaining earnings to recover capital and 
operating expenses and provide a return on investment. 
Ultimately the facility so created will return to the state after the 
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project has matured. Arrangements of this sort are widely 
considered to be PPPs (sometimes expressed as ‘P3s’). As I 
have argued elsewhere, however, they often do not produce 
partnerships in the precise sense of that word. They are certainly 
‘public-private mixes’, but the degree of collaboration may fall 
short of real partnership” (Roger Wettenhall, 2010). 
Given the ambiguity of the term and its potential to mislead, it is 
important to clarify the phenomenon under study in this research and 
put into use a specific vocabulary. Wettenhall’s criticisms are taken to 
heart: the cases herein are often not partnerships in the “precise sense 
of the word”, but I utilize the term PPP, nevertheless, following common 
parlance. Further, it becomes important to draw a sectoral boundary to 
further delimit the kinds of cases under study here. 
The PPPs studies herein are long-term infrastructure contracts, which 
“emphasize tight specification of outputs in long-term legal contracts,” 
as opposed to potentially nebulous outcomes and assignments more 
common to public policy networks or knowledge-based partnerships 
(Graeme Hodge et al., 2010). Campbell describes this type of PPP as a 
project that “generally involves the design, construction, financing and 
maintenance (and in some cases operation) of public infrastructure or a 
public facility by the private sector under a long term contract” 
(Campbell, 2001; Graeme Hodge et al., 2010). Koppenjan describes 
the infrastructure PPP as “a form of structured cooperation” expressed 
in a binding agreement, in which the public and private parties “share 
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or reallocate risks, costs, benefits, resources and responsibilities” 
(Koppenjan, 2005). 
While “private provision” or “private sector participation” may more 
accurately reflect the transactional nature of the arrangements at hand, 
the terms “water PPP,” “water supply PPP,” and “PSP in water supply” 
herein to refer to long-term, contract-based arrangements that involve 
the government and private sectors in the financing, rehabilitation, 
construction, maintenance, and operation of water supply 
infrastructure, including distribution networks and treatment plants, 
wherein both public and private actors share risks, costs, benefits, and 
responsibilities. This definition, then, eliminates divestitures, 
“contracting out” in the form of simple management contracts, and non-
binding water policy networks or water supply cooperatives from the 
scope of study. Rather, the study rather focuses on concessions, 
affermage-leases, and Greenfield PPPs, but pays particular attention to 
concessions, which entail the transition of existing publicly held 
infrastructure to higher degrees of private control. This focus is 
intended to deal directly and more thoroughly with some of the 
important political factors from which Greenfields and leases are 
typically more insulated.  
The study of traditional, contract-based utility PPPs are relevant for 
several practical and theoretical reasons. For one, while the PPP 
notion has been met with increased skepticism in light of past failures, 
it is likely that government and business will both remain key players in 
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utilities delivery. We know that PPPs are certainly not a panacea for 
infrastructure reform (Noumba-Um 2010); are not necessarily more or 
less efficient or accountable forms of public service delivery (Flinders 
2010; Klijn 2010); and can be often be more important as symbolic 
constructs than as technical delivery mechanisms (Klijn 2010; Hodge, 
Greve, and Boardman 2010). We also know that engaging the private 
sector may not meet the pro-poor goals of infrastructure reform in 
developing regions (Bull and McNeill 2007).  
But PPPs remain a popular option, and long-term partnerships continue 
to be initiated. Given the typical terms of contracts, their design and 
management will be important for decades, at a minimum. As Hodge, 
et al, assert, there exist some “crucial governance challenges current 
governments are now placing on future generations through long-term 
contracts” (Graeme Hodge et al., 2010). Common assertions that 
governments will continue to hemorrhage power and authority to the 
private sector; growing knowledge about the potential of collaborative 
arrangements for addressing the complexities inherent to many 
developing locales; and financing shortfalls that plague developing 
country governments all suggest that partnerships will continue to be of 
interest to governments in providing an array of public goods, including 
water. 
That said, because we can confidently assert that PPPs are not 
universally surefire reform solutions, determining when, how, and why 
they are appropriately applied and successfully maintained is also of 
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great interest. Further, in light of the recent global financial crisis, we 
can presume that publics will “remain sensibly skeptical of overblown 
policy promises” related to private sector participation (Graeme Hodge 
et al., 2010), and that there will be sustained pressure on governments 
to justify and more adroitly manage both new and existing PPPs. 
At a more theoretical level, partnerships are hybrid institutional forms 
that straddle the market – state divide. In sundry configurations, 
partnerships attempt to overcome perceived market and government 
failures. As such, the study of failed partnerships lends insight into 
forming a broader notion of institutional failure. Where markets failed to 
sufficiently supply water, governments established public utilities. 
Where these utilities were perceived to be inefficient or ineffective, 
there was a turn to liberalized forms to overcome perceived 
government failures. Now, in the era of cancelled partnerships and re-
municipalization, we are positioned to ask: what kinds of failures are 
these? And further, how well does the current body of economic and 
policy theory account for identifying and solving them? 
Finally, practically and methodologically speaking, after twenty years of 
application of the transactional PPP model in water supply, the body of 
evidence and data available over a sufficiently long time period allows 
for the elucidation of practical lessons about the sustenance of long-
term partnerships. And the technical, cultural, and political facets of 
water supply makes the field of research an interesting testing ground 
for the application of mixed methods in public policy research. 
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The variables that lead a partnership to fail or succeed are potentially 
infinite, but identifying factor combinations that promote relational 
success or failure (lastingness) and instrumental success or failure 
(attainment of policy goals) and contrasting how these factors differ 
across operating contexts and phases in a project’s lifecycle is a step 
forward. Undoubtedly, the two are interdependent. Over the course of 
long-term PPP arrangements, the degree of implementation success 
will almost certainly affect relational success. And the same may be 
expected for the opposite – the health of the partnership relationship 
will likely so, too, determine the implementation record. Nevertheless, it 
is also quite possible that a poor-performing PPP with respect to 
improved service, expanded coverage, inefficiencies, etc., may be 
maintained over the long-term when the arrangement is mutually 
beneficial to the parties involved. So then, this study deals with both 
implementation and relational performance, and the institutional, 
political, and temporal issues that affect each. 
Further, the study deals only with governance in water supply PPP, and 
there are presumably innumerable cases of partnership models that 
succeed or fail in different environments. Despite the study’s limitation 
to one sector (and a limited set of PPP models), the research 
contributes to the nascent body of literature in institutional / governance 
failure, particularly since water supply is characterized by a significant 




Chapter 2. Literature review: Failure and partnership  
The wave of water liberalizations in the 1990s and early 2000s marked 
one of several historical paradigm shifts in urban water provision. While 
most urban water supply systems remain in the hands of governments, 
the approach of the 21st century saw a huge upswing in 
experimentation with forms of PSP and privatization. Despite common 
assertions, that water PSP has proven disappointing, it is inconclusive 
whether or not arrangements involving the private sector can, indeed, 
be more effective than municipal provision, and if so, where.  
There exist numerous early examples of private-sector provision of 
water firms in pre-industrialized cities. By the late 19th century, 
however, many growing cities in industrializing states turned 
responsibility for water supply over to municipal or regional 
governments. Indeed, through the early 20th century, the provision of 
clean water was generally made the business of the state. Along with 
other major infrastructure like transport and power, water supply was 
considered a critical resource for modernization and industrial 
development. So, too, was its importance to public health recognized, 
making water supply a social concern.  
Bakker characterizes this paradigm shift as the rise of a “state 
hydraulic mode” characterized by “near-complete public control of 
water resources development, and allocation to strategic sectors by the 
state on the basis that water is a ‘public’ rather than ‘tradable’ good, 
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whose provision is best undertaken as a service by the state rather 
than a business by the private sector” (K. Bakker, 2003). The state 
hydraulic paradigm was reinforced by the economic justification for 
state intervention in the “textbook” cases of market failure. In water, 
more specifically, these include conditions of natural monopoly and 
negative externalities. 
This paradigm held until the early 1990s. Accompanying a host of 
marketization reforms in the developing world, multinational 
development agencies promoted private participation in infrastructure 
in order to promote efficiencies and fill funding gaps. In the decade 
between 1990 and 2000, a quarter of total investment in infrastructure 
was financed by private capital, and infrastructure investment quickly 
became the fastest growing segment of private investment in 
developing economies (Harris, 2003). Three emergent typical models 
of PPP in water emerged: the Dutch model of a corporatized public 
company; the French model of delegated, contract-based private 
management, wherein government would remain responsible for 
assets and the private sector would provide service regulated via 
contract; and the British model of large scale divestiture and full 
privatization with discretionary government regulation (Delmon, 2011). 
2.1 Market failure, government failure, and something else? 
These shifts – from private to public to public-private provision – may 
be understood as functions of developing ideas in the field of 
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economics and public policy about market and government failure, and 
the measures proposed to deal with these problems. Indeed, the notion 
of market failure has been a prominent underpinning of public policy 
since its genesis in welfare economics of the 1920s. Market failure 
occurs “where the pursuit of private interest does not lead to an 
efficient use of society’s resources or a fair distribution of society’s 
goods” (Weimer & Vining, 2005). Pigou’s seminal work on market 
failure underpinned modern welfare economics, and suggested that, 
where markets yielded inefficient or inequitable outcomes, 
governments should intervene to correct those failures (Pigou, 1924).  
In water supply, the classic market failures of natural monopoly, 
incomplete markets, and positive externalities drove the adoption of 
public delivery. With respect to natural monopoly, the networked nature 
of water supply and the massive capital investments required create 
huge economies of scale, making provision most efficient with one 
supplier. The monopoly power associated with the provision of a good, 
however, requires high levels of control in order to tamp down 
monopolists’ power to overcharge consumers. This is particularly 
salient in the case of water, an essential good, and thus became an 
important justification for the delegation of responsibility to government, 
who would presumably serve the desires of the citizenry impartially 
and, thus, control the price of water. Water supply’s classification as a 
merit or semi-public good with positive externalities is another 
important justification for public provision. As the critical public health 
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benefits associated with the provision of clean water became 
recognized, so too did the problems associated with under-
consumption by private citizens. The negative externalities (waterborne 
disease, poor sanitation, filth, decreased productivity, mortality, etc.) 
would justify government provision to ensure “efficient” levels of 
investment and consumption. 
Despite the rapid ascent of welfare economics in the field of public 
policy, criticisms also emerged, citing over-reliance on the market-
failure approach (Bozeman, 2002; Mitchell & Simmons, 1994; Wolf, 
1979; Zerbe & McCurdy, 1999). Over the past twenty years, notions of 
government failure have challenged prevailing assumptions about who 
should be responsible for many public services, including water supply. 
Public choice theory and transaction cost literature defined by key 
Peltzman and Stigler on regulatory capture (Peltzman, 1976; Stigler, 
1971); Buchanan and Tullock on economic approaches to 
understanding bureaucracies (Buchanan & Tullock, 1965); and 
Niskanen on the application of rational choice to government 
(Niskanen, 1971), challenged scholarly assumptions of imperfect 
markets existing alongside competent, functional governments; notions 
of objective regulation; and “heroic assumptions” (B. Dollery, 2009) 
about the state. The political economy literature, drawing on public 
choice, socialist Marxian theory, welfare economics, and other political 
theory, further examined the interactive influences of the political, 
social, and economic systems on the performance of the state, and 
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similarly challenged the idea of an instrumental, rational, objective 
state.  
Dollery provides a good review of the government failure literature, 
writing that, “government failure can be defined as the inability of a 
public agency or public agencies at any level of government to secure 
desired economic, social, or other policy objectives” (B. Dollery, 2009). 
Contrary to this expanded view of failure, however, much of the 
scholarship on government failure focuses on the same goal as does 
market failure – that of economic efficiency. Dollery reviews a long list 
of factors to which government-caused inefficiencies may be attributed 
or defined, including those derivative of the government’s monopoly 
status in service provision (Friedman, 2009); multiple, conflicting goals; 
the absence of incentives for bureaucrats to properly implement 
policies; bureaucratic rent-seeking (Brian Dollery & Wallis, 2001); 
suboptimal enforcement of judicial, legislative and higher-level 
administrative directives; and destructive competition for political 
power, tax revenues, and control (Boyne, 1998). Le Grand proposes 
that government policy tools of provision, taxation and subsidy, and 
regulation may all be inefficient – the first due to monopoly, the second 
where government action increases prices above competitive levels or 
subsidizes prices below market levels, and the third in the case of 
regulatory capture or informational problems (B. E. Dollery & 
Worthington, 1996; Le Grand, 1991). 
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Others, however, expand the idea of governance failure to include 
other goals of society, such as distributional equity, human rights, 
democratization and social justice. Bailey’s ideas about government 
failure draw on Hirschman’s concepts2 of “exit” and “voice” (Hirschman, 
1970) to suggest that failure may be understood as the inhibition of 
citizen exit and voice due to legal and institutional barriers to 
preference revelation, information asymmetries, socioeconomic 
characteristics of the population, and non-excludability of public 
services (Bailey, 1999; B. Dollery, 2009).  Boston et al suggest that a 
more useful theory beyond the efficiency-leaning public choice 
approach must take into account ideas and values afford more 
attention to “ensuring that the decision-making arrangements are open, 
democratic, and fair” (Boston, Martin, Pallot, & Walsh, 1996). Certainly, 
these notions of government failure could be corroborated empirically 
across sectors worldwide. Experiences of inefficiency, corruption, 
inequitable distribution, and generally poor performance were widely 
documented in a range of public services, including water supply. In 
turn, these justifications were used to promote mixed governance 
systems that employed markets and government, including PPPs.  
                                            
2 In Exit, voice, and loyalty: Responses to decline in firms, organizations, and 
states (1970), Hirschman proposes that individuals within organizations 
(firms, governments, societies, etc.) who perceive a decrease in value of their 
membership may either withdraw from membership (exit) or attempt to 
address the perceived problems via suggestion or complaint (voice). 
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Broader notions of governance, policy system, and institutional failure 
have been broached by scholars in fields ranging from political science 
to economy to environmental management to anthropology in order to 
address the remaining gaps left by both market failure and government 
failure theory, especially in light of problems associated with mixed 
modes of governance. Xun and Ramesh offer a good starting point in 
their proposition of the “duality problem” – that notion that market and 
government imperfections co-exist, interact, and give rise to one 
another in many policy programs. These multiple imperfections may not 
be overcome completely, but appreciation of their existence and 
interaction can allow policy makers to develop better policy mixes, or 
combinations of market and government mechanisms, in order to solve 
policy problems (Xun Wu & Ramesh, 2013). 
A variation on this policy tool-based proposition re-couches the idea of 
market-versus-government failure as institutional or governance failure. 
While there is agreement that institutions matter to solving collective 
problems, there is far less agreement on which institutions – market, 
government, or community / network – work best in different contexts, 
particularly for the delivery of goods with both public and private 
characteristics. In Acheson’s study of resource management problems, 
he argues that market, government, and local-level management 
structures can all fail under certain conditions. Further, he describes 
increasing consensus that the cause of many societal management 
problems is institutional. However, there is no developed body of 
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literature on institutional failure, and the definition of institutional failure 
is in itself a challenge, as different criteria may be used to measure 
failure, including efficiency, equity, flexibility, and political accountability 
(Acheson, 2006).  
Acheson proposes several other pertinent points about institutional 
failure. First, he suggests that that there exist no universal solutions to 
collective action problems: each structure may fail in different contexts, 
with multiple causal factors. To this point, he says, “For private-property 
institutions to work, a set of conditions are required that are not 
commonly found in reality. Property rights are often incomplete, so 
externalities abound. Even if private-property rights are secure and 
markets are efficient, poverty, economic competition, and problems 
associated with slow-growing resources can lead to overexploitation. 
State efforts to manage resources founder because of a wide variety of 
problems, ranging from rent seeking, winning majorities, and 
deliberately introduced design flaws to agency problems and outright 
corruption. Governments of industrialized countries often are stymied 
by problems stemming from poor science and top-down management. 
Local-level management is often a precarious enterprise, at best. 
Efforts to manage resources at the local level are likely to fail if 
communities do not have the right set of characteristics” (Acheson 
2006).  
Secondly, he points out a negligence of factor interdependence and a 
dearth of research into how various complex factor combinations may 
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lead to institutional failure. To this, he argues, “If we are going to modify 
and extend our understanding of institutional failure, we need to see 
such resource management institutions as parts of complex socio-
environmental systems, and the success or failure of those institutions 
needs to be considered as the result of a complex of factors working in 
tandem” (Acheson 2006). It is, thus, a challenge of this research project 
to contribute to theory on governance and policy failure through 
analysis of the water supply PPPs under study – systems with multiple 
government and private sector activities (i.e., policy mixes) whose 
undertaking is dependent upon the coordination and cooperation of 
public agencies, political actors, the legal system, private companies, 
and the public within complex political-economic systems. 
2.2 Water is special 
The literatures on public, government, and governance/institutional 
failures – and thoughts about how one might ameliorate them – are 
also entwined with the classification of goods and services in general. 
Water is particularly interesting with respect to determining who should 
supply it and how, since it exhibits qualities of a normal economic good, 
a merit good, and a partially public good. It has qualities of a normal 
economic good, in that it has value, and consumption can be 
excludable and rival. It is certainly subject to market failures 
(particularly in urban environments), including natural monopoly and 
externalities, which have been already reviewed. On the other hand, 
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water is also essential and even recognized as a basic human right; 
thus, responsibility for supply is typically relegated to government, and 
society is often called to ensure that water be provided even to those 
who cannot pay for it.  
Savenije, Shirley, and others offer useful reviews of the complexity of 
water, both in classification and provision. Savenije, who ultimately 
argues that water is not just an ordinary economic good, nevertheless 
describes the main reasons it might be classified as such: “‘‘There is a 
demand for it, there are operators that make it available (supply), it has 
a value. The price should reflect the value in order to achieve efficient 
use of the resource. A water market is an effective instrument to reach 
efficiency of allocation’’ (Savenije, 2002). But he also argues that 
certain qualities make it “special”, namely that it is essential, fugitive (in 
flux and flow), bulky and expensive to transport, systemic in nature, 
and non-substitutable. For these reasons, it is not amenable to normal 
market trade and allocation. 
Shirley explains that water reforms, particularly those dealing with PSP 
in countries with weak institutions, are complicated by four 
characteristics of water, namely, that it is “essential to life, local in 
supply, dull in innovation, and mysterious in information” (M Shirley, 
2007). Its life-essentialness means that debates over control of, access 
to, and value of water are more politically charged than those over 
other public services such as transportation or energy. Due to its 
material and symbolic importance, the normative context of water 
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supply is usually far more politically contentious than that of other 
infrastructure projects (Bull & McNeill, 2007).  
The local nature of water exacerbates this, since local politicians are 
responsive to immediate interests (rather than the broader set of 
national and international interests) and since local interests compete 
intensively over water supply. Water is “dull” in that urban water supply 
is highly capital intensive with large fixed costs, often bringing marginal 
costs below average costs. This requires that prices be set so that a 
small return on investment is accrued only over a long period.  As such, 
water investments have generally lower, and often riskier, returns. 
Finally, water is mysterious, in that subterranean piping networks are 
not easily visible, making accurate assessment and valuation of 
existing networks very difficult (M Shirley, 2007). Indeed, these 
information problems lead to high levels of uncertainty and difficulties in 
regulation and renegotiation in contracted PPPs. 
Another complication is that, in many locales, supply systems are 
comprised of interconnected but fragmented amalgamations of private 
and public supply channels that resemble “archipelagos” more so than 
“networks” (K. J. Bakker, 2010). As Bakker points out, particularly in 
developing cities, “government and private networks coexist and 
compete with formal types of provision. So definitions of ‘public’ and 
‘private’ are more complicated than we often realize, and this 
complexity is associated with the diverse types of technologies used for 
supplying water”.  
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2.3 Models of water provision  
The modes of water supply provision over time by private, public, and 
public-providers are derivative from shifting ideas about the good itself, 
the severity of associated market and government failures, and the 
social and institutional environments in which these ideas and failures 
exist. Bakker describes three models of urban water management – 
private, state, and community-run – each subject to their own particular 
logics and ideas. 
Table 2. Governing Nature: Three Models 
 Government Private 
Corporation 
Community 
Primary goals Safeguard public 
interest 
Conformity with 








Property rights Public (state) 
property 





















Hierarchy Contract Community 
norms/sanctions 
Key incentives Voter/taxpayer 
opinion 
Price signals Community 
opinion 












































Source: (K. J. Bakker, 2010) 
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The topic of this thesis is another set of water provision forms – PPPs – 
which typically exhibit qualities from the first two models above. PPPs, 
which incorporate both public and private regulated components are 
complicated due to struggles over control and the boundaries between 
public and private control required for successful collaboration. 
Private sector participation in the delivery of public and quasi-public 
goods is certainly not a contemporary phenomenon. Partnerships in 
infrastructure have been employed for over four hundred years (Roger 
Wettenhall, 2010). What is new, however, is a growing preference for 
private financing, the application of complex contracts, and changed 
assumptions regarding governance and accountability (Graeme Hodge 
et al., 2010). Shift to private provision during the 1980s and 1990s can 
be attributed to a concurrent shift away from statist politics towards a 
neoliberal paradigm. Neoliberal principals suggested that government 
should play an indirect regulatory and supportive role in the provision of 
social and private goods, but that delivery should primarily be managed 
by the private sector within competitive, free markets. This idea was 
captured in the 1992 Dublin Principles born of the International 
Conference on Water and the Environment, which states, “Water has 
an economic value in all its competing uses and should be recognized 
as an economic good. Within this principle, it is vital to recognize first 
the basic right of all human beings to have access to clean water and 
sanitation at an affordable price. Past failure to recognize the economic 
value of water has led to wasteful and environmentally damaging uses 
 34 
of the resource. Managing water as an economic good is an important 
way of achieving efficient and equitable use, and of encouraging 
conservation and protection of water resources” (ICWE, 1992).  
The most recent wave of public-private mixing in infrastructure has 
origins in the UK government’s Private Finance Initiative [PFI] of the 
early 1990s, during which time the Conservative government 
introduced a private financing scheme for infrastructure development. 
Wettenhall describes the emergence of the program: “The essential 
idea was that a private company or consortium would design, finance, 
build and operate a motorway, bridge, tunnel, school, hospital or prison 
subject to public specifications, recovering its costs and gaining its 
rewards over a period of time, after which the facility would revert to the 
state” (Roger Wettenhall, 2010). In its inception, the PFI was not 
conceived as a partnership: the partnership concept emerged as a 
linguistic tool and “ideological project” (Ruane, 2002) to downplay the 
PFI’s conservative roots and emphasize a commitment to 
transformative, inter-sectorial cooperation (Roger Wettenhall, 2010).  
The symbolic power of the partnership concept is not insignificant, 
particularly since use of the term to describe projects characterized by 
public-private mixing but not partnership, per se, confuses general 
understanding of the arrangements themselves. Also, inappropriate 
forms may have been selected for water delivery, thus setting reform 
programs up for failure. Indeed, some scholars (Bull & McNeill, 2007) 
have proposed that many of the PSP initiatives in water supply were 
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driven by multilateral organizations swept up in an ideological project of 
promoting “partnerships”, sometimes indiscriminately and over-
ambitiously. Since the PFI gained traction and attention in the 1990s, 
municipal, state, and national governments worldwide have 
experimented extensively with PPPs in pursuit of a menu of anticipated 
benefits, including improved operational efficiency, decreased costs, 
technical advances, and improved performance (J. Hall, 1998; G 
Hodge & Greve, 2005; Klitgaard & Treverton, 2004; Sheshinski & 
Lopez-Calva, 2003).  
2.3.1 Water PPP forms 
Water PPPs include partial divestitures, concessions, lease contracts, 
management contracts (often referred to as affermage in the water 
sector), and Greenfield projects, all of which entail a different set of 
rights, controls, and remuneration modes. Herein, I employ use of the 
World Bank’s specification for each type, as documented in the 2006 
Approaches to Private Participation in Water Services: A Toolkit 
(Delmon, 2006) as well as in the World Bank’s Public-Private 
Infrastructure Advisory Facility’s Private Participation in Infrastructure 
glossary (PPIAF website). 
Under management and lease contracts, the private partner takes over 
the management of the utility, while ownership and investment 
decisions remain with the government. A lease gives a company the 
right to operate and maintain a public utility for a lease fee, and the 
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private operator assumes operational risk. Under a management 
contract, the operator will manage the facility and collect revenue on 
behalf of the government in return for a management fee, and 
operational risk remains with the government.  
In Greenfield projects, the private sector partner builds and operates a 
new facility for the period specified in the contract. At the contract’s 
close, the facility may return to the public sector. Greenfield models 
include ‘build, lease, and transfer’; ‘build, operate, and transfer’; and 
‘build, own, and operate’. In the concessions model, the private partner 
takes over management of the utility for a given period and also 
assumes significant investment and operational risk. These models 
include ‘rehabilitate, operate, and transfer’; ‘rehabilitate, lease or rent, 
and transfer’; and ‘build, rehabilitate, operate, and transfer’. Delegated 
arrangements such as concessions and Greenfield projects typically 
require capital investment for network maintenance and expansion, 
whereas service contracts may require maintenance of existing assets, 
but leave usually major investment and expansion responsibilities to 
the state (Boehm & Polanco, 2003).  
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Concessions, Greenfields, and management contracts and have 
become ubiquitous in water supply. A review of 757 water and 
sanitation PPPs in the World Bank’s Private Participation in 
Infrastructure Database [PPIAF], excluding 29 divestitures, shows that 
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Greenfield projects and concessions comprise the majority of projects, 
with nearly 300 of each type. The years 1991-1994 saw private sector 
investment commitments of over US$8.3 billion, rising to $14.6 billion in 
the following four-year period, then tapering to $12.2 billion in 1999-
2002, and $10.6 billion in 2003-2006 (PPIAF 2012).  
As of 2013, operational projects include 245 concessions, 132 
Greenfields, and 75 management and lease projects. Less than fifty 
projects of the overall 757 are fully concluded, while 170 are still in the 
construction phase. Of particular interest, here are the 62 projects that 
are either failed or distressed. 



































Concession 292 245 9 4 9 25 292 
Greenfield  315 132 159 8 2 14 315 
Management and lease contract 121 75 2 34 1 9 121 
Divestiture 29 27 0 0 0 2 29 
Total 757 479 170 46 12 50 757 
Source: PPIAF Database, as of June 2013 
2.4 Contested logics of water partnership 
These various private sector arrangements saw a significant increase 
through the late 1990s, and continue to be employed largely based on 
standard infrastructure PPP justifications. The employment of PSP is 
generally based one or more of four logics: efficiency, finance, quality, 
and distance. In essence, PPPs have been expected to introduce 
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competition and new knowledge into water distribution systems that 
would, in turn, spur innovation and promote technical, service, and 
efficiency gains. Further, the introduction of private capital was 
expected to relieve overburdened governments of their capital 
shortfalls. Finally, some governments, weary of continued criticism over 
the quality and reliability of public services, see PPP as a way to 
insulate themselves from political opposition by putting forward a 
different target for public ire over low quality service. 
Proponents suggest that private participation will spur an inflow of 
private capital, financially alleviating over-burdened governments, and 
that competition-based commercial incentives will correct inefficiencies 
and keep costs and prices down (Bull & McNeill, 2007). Conventional 
advice in the early and mid-2000s held that successful attainment of 
these goals depended on “getting the incentives right” for private sector 
actors, reforming governance process (including regulation), and 
transferring risk to the private sector. These reforms were expected to 
“unleash the efficiency of the private sector” while simultaneously 
safeguarding public interest (E. Lobina, 2005). Further, PSP was 
expected address government side incentive problems associated with 
soft budget constraints and absence of the threat of bankruptcy (J. Tan, 
2012). Amongst multilateral organizations involved in water supply, the 
World Bank has shown to be particularly inclined towards private sector 
participation. Since the structural adjustment era of the 80s and 90s, 
and in less strong terms since, the Bank has actively and vigorously 
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promoted ‘Private Participation in Infrastructure’ [PPI] arrangements for 
water supply (Bull & McNeill, 2007). 
On the other hand, detractors argue that PPPs consistently fail to meet 
the logics of financing, efficiency, and improvement. Outcomes in 
efficiency, service quality improvements, network expansion, and 
effective attainment of reform goals subsequent to the implementation 
of public private partnerships in water have indeed been mixed 
(Bloomfield, 2006; GA Hodge, 2004; Zhang, 2005). Some scholars and 
evaluators have posited that private participation in water supply and 
sanitation yields direct efficiency gains and performance improvement 
(Estache, 2006; Galiani, Gonzalez Rozada, & Schargrodsky, 2009; 
Marin, 2009), while others cite examples of worsened performance 
(Prasad, 2006).  
Hart, et al, make another contribution linking incentives and incomplete 
contract theory to raise concerns about efficiency and quality outcomes 
associated with PPP. They discuss how an agent (in this case, a utility 
or public service manager) may invest time in two kinds of activities: 
those that enhance efficiency and improve the quality of services and 
those that cut costs to the manager as well as service quality, within 
the letter of the contract. Government employees have limited 
incentives to engage in either, as the government can “hold up” the 
employee without sufficient reward. PPP, however, encourages both 
the first, good kind of investment and the second, quality-cutting kind 
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(Hart, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997). The severity and importance of each 
kind of activity determines whether PPP is helpful or harmful. 
The unrelenting necessity to raise infrastructure funds also compels 
cash-strapped governments to seek private partners (Brown, 2007; 
Johnson, McCormally, & Moore, 2002). Some scholars caution that 
these arrangements can straddle weaker governments with excess risk 
and long-term, inflexible financial obligations (Bloomfield, 2006; 
Flinders, 2005; E Lobina & Hall, 2003). Vining and Boardman challenge 
the wisdom of PPP to raise funds, arguing that it generally only 
changes the government’s schedule of payment but likely will not 
reduce costs overall (Vining & Boardman, 2008). 
Another concern about PPP is the conflicts that arise between profit-
seeking and social justice. Results of studies on distributional effects 
are widely varied from improvement with respect to equity (Galiani, 
Gertler, Schargrodsky, & Sturzenegger, 2005; Marin, 2009) to marked 
deterioration (Bayliss, 2002; Birdsall & Nellis, 2003; Fuest & Haffner, 
2007; Gleick, Wolff, Chalecki, & Reyes, 2002). Profit-driven private 
operators may tend to “cream” the market, bypassing the poorest 
consumers and exacerbating service gaps between the rich and poor 
(Bull & McNeill, 2007; Foster & Irusta, 2003). Bull and McNeill, for 
instance, show through a series of case studies of water supply PPPs 
in Latin America, that PPP proponents’ expectations for pro-poor 
service expansion, “win-win” arrangements, and generally increased 
investment have gone largely unrealized. McKenzie, et al, find that 
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private participation in Latin America expanded networks in all cases, 
with benefits to the poor depending on initial coverage patters (i.e., if 
coverage was patchy to begin with, higher and middle classes 
benefited foremost from expansion). They also found that prices rose in 
half and fell in half, attributing the differences to the competition and 
regulation facing the private firm and the criteria used to award the 
contract (McKenzie, Mookherjee, Castaneda, & Saavedra, 2003).  
While PPPs have become increasingly common mechanisms for 
service delivery (Bovaird, 2004; Johnston & Gudergan, 2007; R 
Wettenhall, 2003), it is not yet known what combinations of 
fundamental elements are required to sustain productive partnerships 
that would fulfill the logics of finance, efficiency, and quality, yet alone 
how well these partnerships might arrive at these aspirations.  
2.5 Theory on institutions and dynamic inconsistency  
Reflecting on the market, government, and institutional failure literature, 
and considering the questions at hand, the analysis herein assumes a 
political-economy approach to understanding the emergence and 
performance of public-private partnerships, particularly in urban water 
systems, with a noticeable influence of theory derivative of the 
institutional economics school of thinking. Institutionalism offers a 
useful lens through which to understand competing rule systems at 
play and also offers a similarly helpful vocabulary. That said, fieldwork 
experiences immediately revealed the importance of power and 
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competing interests amongst parties to the contracts under study. 
Indeed, politics and power are prime in the analysis, though they are 
understood as operating within and iteratively shaping nested, 
interactive rule sets at the national, local, and project levels. 
The lens applied in this research employs the microeconomic notion of 
dynamic inconsistency to study the problems of commitment over time 
in long-term policy partnerships. The approach marries economic 
theory, institutionalism, and political theory to examine issues of goal 
alignment, coordination and adjustment, and the rules and resources 
required to ensure commitment and coordination of parties to a water 
supply agreement over time.  
Economic analyses of PPPs deal typically with the issues of delineating 
the optimal division of labor between public and private spheres and 
conditions under which different organizational arrangements are most 
efficient (Trani, 2008). Several strands of literature within institutional 
and microeconomic theory are particularly applicable to the 
phenomenon at hand. These, namely, are principal-agent theory, 
information asymmetry, transaction cost theory, incomplete contracting, 
and dynamic inconsistency. 
Principal-agent theory focuses on issues that arise when principals 
delegate responsibility to agents, who act on their behalf. These agents 
may or may not act in accordance with their principals’ desires, 
depending on their own interests and incentives (Laffont & Tirole, 
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1993). Information asymmetries inevitably exist, and monitoring and 
oversight of agents’ activities are costly. In the context of water supply 
PPP, for example, the government and its water agency is the agent of 
the principal citizen-public (in the context of democracies). The private 
sector operator is, in turn, the agent of the government and its water 
agency. Multiple principal-agent relationships exist between the 
government as agent for citizens3, private operators as agents for the 
government, managers as agents for their shareholders, and regulators 
as agents of the consumer public. So too, do associated conflicts of 
interest and potential moral hazards (e.g., in the case of a government 
administrator who interferes unnecessarily or not at all for fear of an 
operator’s potential to behave adverse to the government’s wishes).  
The goal for the principal in any principal-agent relationships is to 
constrain potential acts of opportunism by the agent – what Williamson 
defines as “self-interest seeking with guile” (O. E. Williamson, 1979). 
Possible solutions may be rule-based and contractual, organizational, 
or technological, or they may rely on self-enforcement and reputation.  
Organizationally, one alternative is to subsume the entire transaction 
into the “firm” via vertical integration (O. E. Williamson, 1979), making 
                                            
3 As an interesting converse, derivative of public choice theory, one 
justification of PPP runs opposite to the agency dilemma. Related to concerns 
about the government’s over-responsiveness to public pressure to keep water 
prices low, PPP could be justified by the expectation that it would depoliticize 
water supply management by further separating political leaders from utility 
managers, allowing for more professional management. PPP could, then, 
break the negative practice of subsidizing losses in return for a conflicting 
policy goal of maintaining an efficient, working water system. 
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the incentives for defection lesser and granting the principal-cum-
manager greater direct control. In water supply, this would equate to a 
government municipalizing water service. Alternatively, if contracted 
rules are used to control agents acting at an arms’ length, the principal 
must deal with the issue of enforceability: information asymmetries 
inevitably exist with respect to agents’ activities, and monitoring and 
oversight (i.e., regulation) is costly.  
A principal can limit an agent’s opportunism through the design and 
imposition of incentives and assumption of monitoring costs. A principal 
might pay the agent to spend resources (bonding costs) to ensure that 
the agent will not take harmful actions or make certain that the principal 
will be compensated should the agent do so (Hill & Jones, 1992). 
Alternatively, a principal might ensure the compliance of an agent or 
partner via specified, enforceable contracts with stable terms, 
measurable outputs, and credible punishment in case of non-
cooperation (De Palma, Leruth, & Prunier, 2009).  
As Grossman and Hart point out, however, contracts are necessarily 
incomplete, because it would be far too costly to create contracts 
complete enough to deal with all states of the world (Grossman & Hart, 
1986). Due to incompleteness, parties must engage in ex post 
renegotiation. This inevitability influences the incentives to undertake 
relationship-specific investments ex ante, and ex post contracting costs 
become high due to the absence of competition. What matters, then, is 
the allocation of property rights and how that arrangement protects 
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parties against expropriation of investments; i.e., what matters is who 
holds power in ex post bargaining. The combined costs of monitoring 
and oversight, bonding, and associated residual losses are “agency 
costs” – a form of transaction cost – which can be reduced by certain 
rules and norms, alignment of interests, and the particular incentives in 
place. But, transaction costs are inevitably incurred under incomplete 
contracts and conditions of asymmetric information: the relative 
transaction costs of direct provision and outsourcing are an important 
determinant in the choice between public and private supply (Pérard, 
2009). 
Transaction cost theory, as it applies here, deals with costs associated 
with managing information asymmetries between parties, measurement 
and enforcement of agreements (including contracts), and the risks of 
hold-up of specific assets. Specific assets are those that cannot be 
redeployed to alternative use without loss of value (O. Williamson, 
1983). The “holdup problem” occurs when one partner in an exchange 
purchases specific assets (equipment, land, etc.) with high sunk costs. 
The investment may only be recouped over the long term, but once it is 
made, the second party has increased bargaining power and is 
incentivized to exploit this power ex post by renegotiating (or simply 
ignoring) the terms of the initial agreement in order to drive 
recompense downwards to the level of marginal operating costs. For 
example, a government may refuse to pay promised tariffs in full after a 
private partner has built a Greenfield project. The more specific an 
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asset, the more at risk it is of hold up, leading partners to either avoid 
the transaction altogether, under-invest, or seek other means of 
ensuring compliance with the original agreement. In water supply 
PPPs, as with other major infrastructure partnerships which require 
large capital investments, this equates to the risk that a government 
might renege on its commitment to pay the private partners, once a 
sunk investment in a distribution network or treatment plant is made.  
Finally, the enforcement of agreements is in and of itself costly, 
particularly in conflicts where one party has high concentrated potential 
benefits and losses. The potential of hold-up and the informational and 
policing costs associated with mitigating ex post opportunism via 
contracted terms, ex ante, poses serious challenges to and 
simultaneously depends upon establishing the credible commitment 
required to promote cooperation. Search and information costs, too, 
may be high, especially considering problems associated with 
measurement, reliability, and accuracy. 
Further, several studies have attended to the institutional 
underpinnings required to support PPPs. These “institutional 
endowments” (Levy & Spiller, 1994) include a supportive legal and 
political framework that incorporates “freedom of contract” as well as 
sufficient monitoring, oversight, and enforceability. These endowments 
include the country’s legislative and executive institutions (selection of 
legislators and executives, mechanisms for law and regulation making 
and implementation, relationships between arms of government); 
 48 
judicial institutions (mechanisms for appointing judges, the structure of 
the judiciary, mechanisms for resolving disputes amongst private 
parties and the state); customs and behavioral norms; the “character of 
contending social interests” (the balance, roles, and importance of 
social forces and ideologies); and national and institutional 
administrative capacities (Stern & Holder, 1999). Further, PPPs require 
investment protection and supportive banking laws, authority to enter 
into PPPs, sectoral legislation, a competent judiciary, and social 
legitimacy (Tecco, 2008).  
2.5.1 Dynamic inconsistency and the “selves” of partnership: Another 
way to skin the cat 
A more intuitive, but lesser-utilized lens through which to examine PPP 
failure is the microeconomic concept of dynamic inconsistency. In 
behavioral economics, time inconsistency refers to the idea that 
temporal inconsistencies in players’ preferences over time create 
problems of commitment, which, in turn, undermine the stability of 
relationships and choices. In other words, the most preferable t1 choice 
for an actor currently at t0 but looking forward to t1 may change once 
the player is at t1. In fact, the actor at t1 is unlikely to make a choice 
consistent with the one he specified at t0, even when his preferences 
have not changed (Strotz, 1955). Recognizing this, an actor may limit 
available future choices in advance by restricting his own future agency 
to deal with a pre-determined risk of time inconsistency.  
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Game theory offers a similar notion of dynamic inconsistency, which 
refers to shifts over time in players’ optimal strategies in iterative 
games. Kydland and Scott’s seminal paper proposes that a policy 
exhibits dynamic inconsistency when the optimal policy choice in future 
time periods is not a continuation of the policy planned initially (Kydland 
& Prescott, 1977). They argue that time-consistent discretionary policy 
is often suboptimal due to the effects of current policies on the future 
state and the influences of policy announcements on stakeholders’ 
actions. They propose that, in fact, discretionary policy is optimal only 
“for situations in which current outcomes and the movement of the 
system’s state depend only upon current and past policy decisions and 
upon the current state.” Indeed, this is a rarity in dynamic political-
economic systems: more often, decision-makers and policy consumers 
are cognizant of the likelihood of future outcomes and choices, and use 
these predictions in making their own strategic choices.  
As Kydland and Scott point out, policy-making “is not a game against 
nature but, rather, a game against rational economic agents” (Kydland 
& Prescott, 1977). The point is that decision-makers possess ideas 
about what other parties will likely do in response to sets of actions, 
and these ideas influence their current actions. This brings up the crux 
of the matter: that in repetitive games, including PPPs, inconsistencies 
in actors’ future actual preferences and strategies, as they relate to 
current preferences and promised strategies, are somewhat 
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predictable, since decisions along the way inevitably shape the current 
material state and stakeholders’ ideas about other participants.  
For example, a government may commit to a post-privatization water 
tariff increase to allow a private operator to recoup costs and earn a 
reasonable rate of return. Once the company makes investments in the 
network, the government can renege (i.e., hold-up assets) and 
implement lower tariff rates that are more politically acceptable. An 
experienced water operator will likely acknowledge this possibility 
before it happens and pre-emptively under-invest, change promised 
plans, or seek to strengthen the mode of enforcing government 
commitment. 
So then, as with contract and principle-agent theory, dynamic 
inconsistency is entwined closely with issues of credible commitment, 
since the commitment of each party to an agreement may be 
undermined due to the possibility that the “other” partner will renege (at 
least in part) on their agreement. As Basar and Olsder argue, “for a 
solution to be time consistent, the players should have no rational 
reason, at any future stage of the game, to deviate from the adopted 
policies” (Basar & Olsder, 1999). In water PPPs, this rarely holds. More 
often, as with the cases herein, there is a pattern of dynamic 
inconsistency, often directly derivative from plural commitment 
problems, even despite the ex ante efforts parties undertake to 
safeguard the credibility of commitments. 
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2.5.2 Nestedness and plurality in commitment  
The credible commitment of a party to an agreement reduces the risks 
of future defection and, thus, the ex ante and ex post transaction costs 
of partnership and exchange. So, too, should it promote the stability 
and reinforcement of cooperative agreements over time, lessening the 
likelihood of sub-optimal dynamic inconsistency. As such, it is of central 
importance to the avoidance of failure in multi-organizational policies. 
In much of the literature, the concept refers to “a situation in which 
politicians (and, more specifically, the government) ‘tie their own hands’ 
against future discretionary use of state institutions for political or 
private gains” (Corduneanu-Huci, Hamilton, & Ferrer, 2013). But in 
policy partnerships, there are other actors – particularly the private 
sector partners – whose credible commitment matters. Paradoxically, 
however, and despite prevalent focus on the use of contracts to ensure 
operator commitment to a PPP, the credibility of private side 
commitment is often insufficiently dealt with.   
Shepsle proffers that commitments are made credible in one of two 
ways: motivational or imperative. A commitment is motivationally 
credible if the players want to honor the commitment at the time of 
performance. In this case, the agreement is “incentive compatible” and, 
thus, self-enforcing. On the other hand, a commitment is imperatively 
credible when the actor cannot act otherwise, either because their 
compliance is coerced, or their discretion is impeded (D. C. North, 
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1993; Shepsle, 1991). To this, I add that commitment depends on 
capacity – i.e., whether a party can do what it agrees to do. 
As such, ensuring the credibility of commitments requires one or a 
combination of two conditions: the consistent alignment of mutual 
interests throughout the duration of the commitment, or coercion. In 
most situations, credible commitment requires something of both, or at 
the very least, supportive rules that structure the process of aligning 
incentives. It is difficult to imagine a utopian agreement wherein all 
parties’ interests remain completely harmonious through its duration, 
making the imposition of coercive devices altogether needless. 
Typically, parties to an agreement juggle a mix of interests within and 
outside of the partnership, which shift over time, change in relative 
intensity, and interact with each other, outcomes, and expectations. In 
other words, in the face of time inconsistency, it is imperative credibility 
that likely matters most, particularly since it is the most controllable 
from a policy standpoint.  
So then, the rules specific to the agreement at hand (specified via 
contract) as well as rules at higher institutional levels that determine 
processes of contract adjustment, enforceability, penalties for non-
compliance, the availability of information, the capacity for government 
and company to appeal in the case of non-cooperation, etc., are 
impactful on the maintenance of credible commitment. In the case of 
the government and its private operators, principal-agent problems may 
be dealt with via specified, enforceable contracts with stable terms, 
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measurable outputs, and credible punishment when the agent does not 
cooperate (De Palma et al., 2009). But North reminds us that formal 
rules are only a part of the institutional framework, and that their 
effectiveness relies on supplementary informal norms that reduce 
enforcement costs (D. C. North, 1993). 
In public-private policy partnerships, the private sector and public 
sector participants have markedly different interests, and their 
managers are also subject to different incentives, both with respect to 
their effects and relative power. Indeed, much of the literature on 
economic regulation is focused on the modes of constraining 
opportunism within the private sector, particularly when private 
companies act as agents for the state through PSP arrangements. But 
the government, too, must be held accountable. If the potential for the 
government agency to renege on the agreement is high, the private 
partner will fail to fully invest due to the threat of hold-up. The arbitrary 
use of state power may compromise the property rights of the private 
partner, and the anticipation of defection will either undermine the 
agreement completely, or at least, seed responsive opportunism.  
Paradoxically, this is the double-edged sword of a strong state: a 
government powerful enough to protect property rights and enforce 
contracts is also likely strong enough to abuse power and co-opt 
citizens’ and private organizations’ resources. This threat is central to 
public-private partnership, particularly in cases where the specificity of 
assets is high and investments are large (as in infrastructure) and 
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where government quality is low. As such, in order to secure property 
rights, the coercive power of the state must be constrained, and the 
opportunistic behavior of the private sector must be curbed. So, too, 
must players’ choices be limited upfront. 
Doing so, however, is no easy feat, particularly considering the 
incompleteness of contracts and the supporting institutions required to 
establish imperative credibility. Institutional economics and law 
theorists have shed light on the many overlapping devices and 
institutions required to safeguard commitment. Mechanisms used to 
make government commitments credible include external independent 
enforcement and mutual monitoring; constitutional limits on power; a 
guardian judiciary; use of a third parties; and reputation (Corduneanu-
Huci et al., 2013). More generally, in an extensive review of legal 
institutions, Hadfield emphasizes the importance of multiple 
enforcement mechanisms for all kinds of contractual agreements, 
including self-enforcement and reputation, organization, and contract 
law. She and others also note the significance of power and cost 
requirements associated with available alternatives, and necessary 
consideration of the quality of supportive institutions such as procedural 
and constitutional law, regulation, the judiciary, contract and property 
law, and supportive organizations (Hadfield, 2005; Rubin, 2005).  
Ross, et al, also discuss the relational aspects of commitment, noting 
that asymmetries in commitment “result in unsatisfactory relationships 
because the more committed party is vulnerable to opportunism by the 
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less committed party. The less committed party is more willing to 
abandon the relationship and less willing to reciprocate sacrifices made 
by the committed party” (Delerue-Vidot, 2006; Ross, Anderson, & 
Weitz, 1997). When commitments are made credible and balanced, 
participants develop self-reinforcing relational social norms, which, in 
turn, further reduce opportunism (Gundlach, Achrol, & Mentzer, 1995). 
In addition to notions about coercion and enforceability, Scanzoni 
suggests three relational dimensions of commitment: an input 
component, an attitudinal component, and a temporal dimension 
(Scanzoni, 1979). The first two reiterate the importance of legal, 
reputational, organizational, and relational mechanisms. But the last 
point – temporality– is where the notions of dynamic inconsistency in 
game theory and time inconsistency in behavioral economics lend 
valuable contributions. Reliance solely on transaction cost theory fails 
to fully account for the temporal, reiterative dimension of commitment. 
In summary, with respect to credible commitment, it is generally 
proposed that an intricate web of institutions affects the enforceability 
of contracts and transaction costs of renegotiation; that relationships 
and informal norms matter; and that commitment problems can result in 
dynamic inconsistency. The gaps remaining are three-fold, particularly 
in the context of PPP. First, the discussion is typically one-sided, 
focusing either on the government’s credible commitment to a policy or 
rule, or an agent’s credible commitment to a principal. The bi-
directional and compounding nature of commitment problems in PPPs 
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are not fully appreciated. Secondly, neither is the predictability of the 
resulting dynamic inconsistency recognized. Finally, the nestedness of 
commitment problems, as a function of the network of relationships and 
obligations of participants in multi-player policy games is neglected. 
The important question is one of degree: i.e., “How credible is a set of 
commitments, considering others held by each player?” versus, more 
simply, “Is a commitment credible?” 
2.5.3 The multiple commitment problem  
Multi-member policy programs and, more specifically, public-private 
partnerships, involve organizations with multiple and often competing 
commitments. The proportionality of these commitments, the degree of 
alignment between the agreement and members’ other commitments, 
the incentives structured by rules, and the credibility of commitments 
affect where and when they will likely fail or succeed. 
In cooperative arrangements that straddle the public-private divide, 
there are multiple sets of principal-agent relationships, and nested 
constellations of potential commitment problems. Whilst PPPs often 
incorporate multitudinous players, we can think about the double 
commitment problem with a simplified model of two main groups of 
actors: a government agency and a private company in a contracted 
partnership with the agency. The primary actors have potentially 
conflicting interests that are influenced by their own goals and 
mandates and their responsibilities to other parties. The government is 
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committed to an agreement with the company, as well as to a mandate 
to serve its citizen public. The company is committed to an agreement 
with the agency, as well as to its shareholders to earn profits and 
distribute dividends. Commitment problems arise for each where the 
agreement betwixt the two is at odds with obligations each holds to 
other parties (i.e., the public and the shareholders), where their own 
interests are no longer served by the terms of the agreement, or where 
the situation changes due to external shock or players’ expected and 
actual strategies. 
Simply put, the “multiple commitment” problem is typical in policy 
partnership (to a pronounced degree in water supply) because both 
parties exhibit predictable dynamic inconsistency derivative of 
insufficient credibility of commitment and shifting preferences over time 
– i.e., the commitment problems are both motivational and 
comparative. They occur for different reasons in different PPPs, and 
can be overcome to a degree, but they are inevitably present. This 
multiple commitment problem also may result from a system or 
partnership “outgrowing” its contract, or failing to adjust to changes that 
make either major alteration to agreement terms or even termination 
preferable to the status quo.  
These problems of credible commitment give rise to positive 
transaction costs. The possibility that one party to the arrangement 
may defect from their committed strategy due to other sets of goals at 
odds with the agreement at hand usually necessitates monitoring, 
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oversight, and enforcement. These activities are costly. As such, the 
costs of these activities must be weighed against the benefits of 
performing them. We have seen that, for well-organized interest 
groups, the costs of a strategy may be well worth their undertaking 
where benefits are concentrated. On the other hand, for less organized 
groups, the costs of cooperation needed to undertake monitoring and 
oversight may be expensive, and benefits are usually dissipated. As 
such, they have less incentive to engage in these activities. This is a 
clear issue in PPPs, where the public may be less apt to demand 
oversight of a program due to the low concentration of benefits. 
In water partnerships, two additional issues further problematize 
credible commitment: the nature of water supply itself, which was 
discussed in the beginning of this chapter, and competition from 
parties’ other commitments. To the first issue, the life-essentialness of 
water means that debates over control of, access to, and valuation of 
water are more politically intense than those over other public 
infrastructure sectors that employ PPP, such as transportation or 
energy. The local nature of water aggravates this, since local politicians 
are responsive to immediate local interests (rather than the broader set 
of national and international interests that national politicians deal with) 
and since local interests compete intensively over water supply. The 
“dullness” of water requires that prices be set so that small returns are 
accrued only over long periods, making water investments riskier. 
Finally, the huge information problems facing water service valuation, 
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estimation, monitoring and oversight (particularly due to subterranean 
piping networks) lead to high levels of uncertainty, difficulties in 
oversight and enforcement, and difficult negotiations and 
renegotiations. 
Thus, the nature of water supply magnifies the multiple commitment 
problem. The predictable dynamic inconsistency – doubly applicable to 
both players – is something like this: a government will promise a 
private partner a certain degree of income, reward, or safeguarding in 
return for the operator’s promises of investment, service expansion and 
improvement, and or efficiency gains. Despite attempts to ensure 
credible commitment of both parties post-contract, the company knows 
that the government can renege on the promise of guaranteed 
revenues, and they often do. The threat to future income deters 
investment, and the operator fails to perform to promised standards. An 
alternative scenario is one in which the company promises to attain 
performance improvements under a certain tariff structure for an initial 
time period, but then demands higher tariff rates once it has taken over. 
The government, holding the ultimate responsibility to keep taps 
running, renegotiates and accepts wither lower service standards or 
higher tariff rates. In either case, what results is an inconsistency and 
policy failure: a ratcheting down of each players’ commitments, 
sometimes to the point of little to no improvement upon the policy 
problem at hand. 
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2.6 Sustainability and PPP in urban water supply 
The literature on PPPs proposes that some set of fundamental 
institutional endowments such as clear property rights and rule of law 
are likely prerequisite to partnership success and sustenance (Menard 
& Peeroo, 2011), and that particular legal and organizational forms may 
be better or worse fits for particular functions and services (Skelcher 
2010). Further, it has been suggested that critical barriers to success 
may include unreasonable tariff ceilings; unattainable expectations for 
investment returns; incentive distortions limiting pro-poor network 
expansion, leading to political fallout (van den Berg 2000); 
management culture mismatches; opportunism; and poor regulation. 
While most water supply PPP studies focus on resolving questions 
about effects on private investment, efficiency, and service 
performance, few seek to elucidate the constellations of conditions that 
cause utility partnerships to succeed or fail, both with respect to the 
goals the PPP was originally intended to serve and durability to term. 
These outcome sets have interrelated causal relationships. Indeed, 
failures may be caused by multiple combinations of factors that are 
often, but not always, related to performance, in whatever way this may 
be measured. Further, few discuss these arrangements in the context 
of dynamic inconsistency and credible commitment.  
We have much to discover about the combinations of factors that 
contribute to project survival (Bloomfield 2006; Johnston and Gudergan 
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2007), the preservation of multi-party commitment over time, and 
institutional adjustment. Case studies have been helpful to isolate 
specific mixtures of factors important to individual failures and 
successes, but the lessons drawn are often difficult to generalize. 
Others give general but broad advice about supporting partnerships. A 
few studies are exceptional, however, offering more telling accounts of 
PPP failure. Hall, Lobina, and Corral explain that in the early 2000s, 
privatizations became increasingly unpopular due to tariff increases 
and failure to meet expectations for service expansion and efficiency 
gains. They also became far less attractive to private companies 
because of less than expected returns and losses due to currency 
exposure and political risks (D. Hall et al., 2010). 
Philippe Marin’s review of 65 cases of large water PPPs in the World 
Bank PPI database affords a set of water PPP-specific insights about 
the immediate, project-level conditions leading to early termination. He 
describes his findings: “Most cases of early termination of contracts 
involved significant noncompliance with contractual obligations by one 
or both sides, followed by a degradation of the partners’ relationship to 
the point that ending the partnership was the chosen solution. A 
significant proportion of these PPPs were terminated after having been 
in place for many years; their termination usually reflected difficulties in 
adapting the contract over time to changing conditions” (Marin, 2009).  
This speaks directly to the problem of dynamic inconsistency and weak 
commitment. There remains a need to expand this set of observations 
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to understand the factors at multiple levels of analysis that lead 
partners to elect strategies of defection over cooperation and lend 
particular to the historical paths PPPs take towards success or 
distress. In other words, the question is what project, local governance, 
and higher level rules and conditions promote imperative commitment 
and the alignment of interests, but also allow for systemic adjustments 
needed to deal with changing circumstances.  
This research looks at project, local, and national level factors that 
structure the balance between responsiveness and commitment. These 
relate to the operating context, project rules, higher-level institutions, 
and modes of enforcement. 
2.6.1 Project governance and participants 
At the project level, participant interests, ideas, and resources; rules 
governing the relationship; norms of participation; and organizational 
culture are all expected to matter. The primary organizing tool in these 
transactional PPPs is the contract, which sets the terms of cooperation. 
While hope for the concessions model was high during the rapid 
spread of its application in the 1990s, a number of concessions 
encountered serious problems attributed to contracting shortfalls. 
Returning to the very central issue of design, Van den Berg attributes 
the disintegration of many concessions to inherent design flaws that 
favored higher income consumers over the poor. She elaborates, “A 
skewed concession—which disadvantages a major constituency of 
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stakeholders—is not a good long-term business for anyone” (Van den 
Berg, 2000). For a fair number of concessions, which typically entail 
contract periods of twenty to thirty years, regulators and 
concessionaires have come under pressure to revise initial tariff 
structures and contract terms. But as van den Berg also argues, this 
process is “contentious and risky”, potentially leading to termination, 
diminished regulator credibility, or legal complications – all which may 
be avoided by more adroitly balanced contracts (Van den Berg, 2000).  
In contract design and negotiation, private sector negotiators have 
stronger incentives, and often capacities, to conduct negotiations 
because of their profit and salary motives, in contrast to public sector 
actors, whose direct rewards are far weaker (Lobner, 2009). This may 
lead to agencies being outdone with respect to negotiating favorable 
contract terms. To the private sectors’ detriment, however, the 
information required to forecast demand and the costs of maintaining 
and expanding the water system is often unreliable or non-existent. As 
such, assumptions on which contracts are built are often very 
uncertain. Many contract problems have had their genesis in 
overambitious and ultimately unworkable commitments which caused 
financial problems later on (Van den Berg, 2000). Other design 
problems stem from ambiguously defined responsibility, authority, and 
performance measurement terms, and mistaken assumptions 
underpinning tariff calculations. 
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But Lobina rejects the idea that PPP failures in water can be solely 
attributed to poor contract design and emphasizes that understanding 
success or failure demands an investigation of the “dynamic process” 
of interactions between profit-seeking, risk-avoiding private operators, 
governments balancing a mix of political and fiscal objectives, local 
political movements, and multilateral organizations pursuing their own 
goals. Further, she explains that the outcomes of these interactive 
processes “are strongly affected by the unequal distribution of 
resources and skills between the parties and by the limited competition 
in this sector. It is these dynamics, it is argued, which explain the actual 
(mis)allocation of risk, the (in)effectiveness of governance, and the 
content (and constant revision) of the contracts themselves, as well as 
the actual outcomes” (E. Lobina, 2005). 
In her treatment of concessions contracts and subsequent relationship 
dynamics, Lobina highlights a constellation of potential problems, 
including:  
1. Restricted competition due to overwhelming market power of a 
few major TNCs and non-competitive bidding processes;  
2. Misallocation of political and performance risk4, shielding private 
investors (e.g., guarantees that unduly shield operators, leniency 
                                            
4 As Lobina describes, “Performance or operating risk may be identified as the 
variety of risks associated with the commercial provision of water supply and 
sanitation services, such as failing to meet the agreed service targets or 
facing declining revenues as a result of decreasing consumption. Political risk 
may be defined as the risk faced by a commercial water operator due to 
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in renegotiations, weak application of performance bonds) and 
protecting governments from dealing with political risks;  
3. Insufficient or weak regulation attributable to pronounced 
information asymmetries, lack of transparency, corruption, low 
capacity, and weak accountability; 
4. Problematic assumptions at the planning stage, including poor 
forecasting, unreasonably set initial tariffs, and neglected 
transaction costs; 
5. Inability to politically, operationally, and managerially weather 
processes of dynamic pricing; and 
6. Limitations of the private sector in delivering services to the poor 
and contributing to broader development. 
Organizational studies aimed at understanding the managerial and 
partnership dynamics that influence a PPP’s success focus on project-
level structures and processes. The alignment of goals, cross-
organizational communication, and construction of appropriate 
incentives are common themes. Bovaird contends that “one of the key 
issues in PPPs is the extent to which they can overcome inherent 
conflicts of interest between their partners” (Bovaird, 2006). Grimsey 
and Lewis focus on the importance of unambiguous operating rules 
and contract management skills (Grimsey & Lewis, 2007). Jacobsen 
                                                                                                                  
undue governmental interference, such as in the case of breach of contract, 
expropriation, restrictions to currency transfer, or war and civil disturbance.” 
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and Choi identify other success factors including a clear vision, joint 
commitment, open communication and trust, willingness to 
compromise, expert advice and review, and clear delineation of 
responsibilities (C. Jacobson & Choi, 2008).  
The participants in a concession are typically generally arranged in the 
following structure, with specific responsibilities and risks defined by 
the contract design: 
Figure 1. Concessions relationships 
 
Source: (Delmon, 2006) 
Sub-optimal partner selection can also pose serious problems, 
particularly where goals are significantly misaligned, or where partners 
have limited ability to control opportunism. This issue harkens back to 
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instances of non-competitive bidding (E. Lobina, 2005) that can lead to 
the selection of an private operation unprepared to deliver services or 
attain performance goals. Further, the particular reform aims relate to 
the process of partner selection: if the intention is to shore up fiscal 
deficits, awards may be granted to bidders with the highest up-front or 
periodic transfer but who may not be able to meet the efficiency goals. 
This practice can seriously compromise the attainment of other 
rationales for selecting PPP (Bull & McNeill, 2007).  
Another important issue is that of culture and local understanding. In 
her work on Latin American concessions, Post points out that local 
private sector partners were more successful due to relatively greater 
flexibility, resilience, and knowledge of local conditions. Furthermore, 
they were more apt to engage in  “relational contracts” that allowed for 
direct negotiation in the face of unforeseen circumstances and were 
better able to maintain bargaining relationships with host governments 
during periods of economic or political turbulence (Post, 2009). 
While private participation has been suggested as a means to 
overcome government incompetence and inefficiency, it has also been 
argued that bureaucratic quality is as important to the successful 
implementation of PPP. Banerjee, Oetzel, and Ranganathan point to 
the role bureaucratic quality plays in promoting private infrastructure 
investment (Banerjee, Oetzel, & Ranganathan, 2006). And Kettl argues 
that PPP sustainability is dependent on a high level of government 
effectiveness. He points out that “government’s relationships with the 
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private sector are not self-administering: they require rather aggressive 
management by a strong, competent government ” (Kettl, 1993). As 
such, high bureaucratic effectiveness should generally leads to greater 
success in the sustainability of public-private partnerships. The problem 
is that low effectiveness is a detriment to and reason for PPP. 
2.6.2 Operating context 
Indeed, PPP agreements must be considered in the context of their 
municipal and national business, political, social, and legal contexts. 
The credibility of commitments, determined by enforcement capacity, 
rule clarity, and availability of reliable information, is hypothesized to be 
dependent on certain characteristics of the broader operating context. 
In addition to an “enabling” institutional environment at the meta-level, 
the creation and implementation of project-specific governance 
mechanisms should be geared towards ensuring that “public interest 
can be protected despite the delegation of authority to business 
concerns” (Skelcher, 2010). This goal alludes to government’s 
balancing of commitments to the public and the PPP operators. 
Skelcher points out the inherent tension present between the need to 
protect the public interest when authority for a public service is 
delegated to a private party, and the need to constrain state coercion 
and interference in order to preserve the entrepreneurial and innovation 
gains expected from the participation of a private sector partner 
 69 
(Skelcher, 2010). He points to four kinds of governance structures that 
influence PPP operation: legal, regulatory, democratic, and corporate.  
So then, it is expected that maintaining this balance and credibility of 
commitments whilst accommodating change requires some set – or 
multiple alternative sets – of project governance endowments as well 
as project-specific management and oversight systems. While 
commentary and common sense suggest that “good governance” is 
important to PPP performance and sustainability, this research further 
examines the linkages between partnership survivability and corruption, 
political stability, public opinion, amongst other contextual factors. 
Koppenjan points out a number of factors important to PPP formation, 
which may also play an important role in sustainability. These include 
degree of complexity and physical requirements for the delivery of the 
good; political-administrative commitment; process management; 
“interaction, joint image building and the creation of trust”; and formal 
arrangements (Koppenjan, 2005). As for the influence of the local 
governance environment, it becomes simultaneously important to 
attend to governance capacity at the meso- and micro-levels.  
The influence of corruption is another factor of interest. Corruption is 
defined by Bardhan as “…the use of public office for private gains, 
where an official (the agent) entrusted with carrying out a task by the 
public (the principal) engages in some sort of malfeasance for private 
enrichment which is difficult to monitor for the principal” (Bardhan, 
 70 
1997). Recent attention has been paid to the active role private sector 
actors and citizens play In the supply side of corruption (Heineman Jr & 
Heimann, 2006; X Wu, 2005). In the early days of utility PSP, it was 
expected that efficiency and operability gains would limit rents available 
for exploitation by corrupt officials (Boycko, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1996). 
Now, however, scholars have recognized that PPPs may sustain or 
exacerbate already-corrupt regimes, providing new opportunities for 
graft (Martimort & Straub, 2009; Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Stiglitz, 2002). 
Further, opportunities for post-tender corruption are especially available 
in longer-term contracts due to windows of opportunity available at 
points of adjustment (Iossa & Martimort, 2013). 
Corruption has also been studied with respect to harmful effects on 
foreign direct investment and local private investment in utilities (Davis, 
2004; Hammami, Ruhashyankiko, & Yehoue, 2006). Hammami, et al, 
suggest that “strong control over corruption protects investors from 
possible opportunistic behavior associated with corrupt government 
officials, which could endanger the PPP venture” (Hammami et al., 
2006). Surprisingly, however, Banerjee, et al, find the opposite: that 
countries with higher levels of corruption can attract greater private 
participation in infrastructure (Banerjee et al., 2006).  
To date, however, there are few large-N empirical studies of the role 
corruption plays in the sustainability of PPPs. It is highly plausible that 
the many uncertainties and costs spawned by corruption adversely 
affect established partnerships, but organizational and instrumental 
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outcomes are not convincingly known. So then, this research tests how 
corruption influences the durability of PPPs. 
Financial crises also impact the availability and cost of capital as well 
as demand, particularly in industrial sectors. Delmon points out that, 
“the complete inability to access investment is generally short-lived; 
however, large increases in the cost of money (debt or equity) can 
threaten the financial viability of the project and its value for money for 
the government. This increased cost of money arises from (1) reduced 
liquidity, and the subsequent reduction in supply of money; and (2) 
increased perception of risk and therefore increased credit risk, 
resulting in lenders and equity investors demanding larger margins to 
cover that credit risk.” Crises can also make it difficult for projects to 
remain financially viable unless tariffs are increased or government 
subsidizes resultant shortfalls (Delmon, 2011). Indeed, many of the 
failures of PPP in Latin America and Asia have been attributed to 
problems associated with the Argentine dollar and Asian Financial 
crises. In 2003, water multinational Suez announced that it would adopt 
a new strategy of withdrawal from developing countries, unless they 
could be protected from currency risk and finance investment from local 
profit (D. Hall et al., 2010). 
2.6.3 Regulatory structure and environment 
Regulation is another central theme in partnership research, and is 
obviously germane to enforcing commitment and overcoming market 
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and government failures. Two archetypes in infrastructure regulation 
are contract regulation and discretionary regulation. The first sets out 
specific terms of service and remuneration over a finite (but often long) 
period, planning for a range of future contingencies and relying on legal 
instruments to ensure commitment to the agreement. The second 
involves the establishment of a government unit tasked with 
establishing tariffs and service standards open-endedly. The regulatory 
agency enjoys wide discretion under a framework of guiding principles. 
Gómez-Ibáñez describes the strengths and weaknesses of each. 
Concession contracts offer specific commitments to a commercial 
contract and application of efficiency inducing market forces via 
competition for the market. Unfortunately, contracts are inevitably 
incomplete, and enforcement is dependent on the integrity of the 
judicial system. Discretionary regulation, on the other hand, allows the 
government flexibility to respond to changing circumstances, but there 
is greater risk of regulatory capture, the government must guess at 
questions of market efficiency, and regulation is difficult due to 
information asymmetry (Gómez-Ibáñez, 2003).    
Quality regulation, whether discretionary, contractual, or hybridized, is 
deemed important to ensuring that partnerships “operate efficiently and 
optimize the resources available to them in line with broader policy 
objectives” (Jamali, 2004; Zouggari, 2003). The economic regulation of 
water utilities includes the oversight of water pricing, the level and 
schedule of investments, quality standards and service obligations, and 
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the rate of earned returns (Stern & Holder, 1999). Further, the 
legitimacy of PPPs rests on the retention of some public control over 
pricing and service quality.  
Regulation is widely deemed a critical component to successful PSP, 
since water supply is highly capital intensive, involving huge sunk 
assets; essential and thus highly political; and subject to natural 
monopoly market failure due to inherent economies of scale. 
Regulatory effectiveness is contingent on three necessary conditions: 
that information asymmetries are reduced; that high-powered 
incentives motivate manager to comply; and that parties provide 
credible signals of commitment supported by credible enforcement 
provisions (Mary Shirley & Ménard, 2002). But the monitoring, 
enforcement, and adjustment requirements of good regulation are 
complex technical activities that require sufficient resources, skills, and 
information to be effective. Thus, government regulatory capacity is 
key. 
Grimsey and Lewis maintain the importance of creating the “right 
regulatory environment” – one with clear rules and low regulatory risk 
(Grimsey & Lewis, 2007). Regulatory systems are aimed at ensuring 
provision at the minimum necessary price whilst supporting investment 
by allowing operators to earn reasonable rates of return (Levy & Spiller, 
1994). Delmon suggests that service quality and value depends on a 
regulatory structure that gives the regulator “sufficient latitude to 
supervise the activities of the project company without unreasonably 
 74 
restricting competitiveness or the ability of the project company to 
operate or finance its activities within the context of the market” 
(Delmon, 2011, 185). 
In order to do so, Pongsiri proposes that a sound regulatory framework 
ensures protection from expropriation, specifies a predictable 
arbitration process, ensures contract enforcement, and allocates cost 
recovery and profit proportionally to assumed risks (Pongsiri, 2002). 
Levy and Spiller are more extensive, proposing the following aspects 
as critical underpinnings of effective regulatory frameworks: 
independence from the judiciary, long-term credibility of legislation, 
“scope for flexibility without arbitrariness”, and administrative 
competence (Levy & Spiller, 1994). And Stern and Holder propose six 
“core elements” which will affect the governance properties of 
regulation: clarity of roles and objectives; autonomy; participation; 
accountability; transparency; and predictability (Stern & Holder, 1999). 
Central to all of these proposals are rules that protect the private 
partner from arbitrariness or expropriation, structure predictable 
processes, and prevent excessive political interference; as well as 
important conditions such as competence and credibility of the 
regulator and the availability of good information. 
Laffont and Tirole, in theorizing on the new economics of regulation, 
define the regulation problem as a control problem under conditions of 
incomplete information. Regulation is seen as a principal-agent 
relationship, wherein the agent (the regulatee) enjoys a distinct 
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informational advantage over the principal (the regulator) with respect 
to exogenous variables like cost and demand, as well its own activities. 
This approach points out presence of trade-offs between productive 
efficiency and potential rent extraction in the face of this kind of 
apparent informational advantage (Laffont & Tirole, 1993) – an 
advantage often particularly serious in developing regions. 
Indeed, technical capacity and information problems are rife in 
developing countries, making both discretionary and contract-based 
regulation difficult. While regulation by contract can successfully deal 
with monopoly market failure and help avoid regulatory capture, this 
approach often fails in the developing world, due to information 
problems and severely incomplete (or unfair) contracts (Jensen, 2009). 
Weak rule of law, corruption, high monitoring costs, insufficient 
technical capacity within the bureaucracy, a weak judiciary, and 
inconsistent enforcement of property rights – all often observable in 
developing economies – undermine the successful regulation of utility 
contracts. Tecco points out that there are few examples of technically 
strong regulators in the water sector in developing regions: most are 
inexperienced, weak, and vulnerable to political interference and 
macroeconomic shocks (Tecco, 2008). And further, Pérard 
demonstrates that regulatory agencies that are purportedly 
“independent” are often not functionally independent due to over 
centralization and political interference (Pérard, 2008). 
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Wu, et al, point out that difficulties associated with water regulation in 
developing countries hinge on two intrinsic conflicts. For one, while 
contracts are useful tools to constrain government discretion, contract 
incompleteness also calls for more extensive use of discretionary 
power. And further, although renegotiation can undermine efficiency 
gains that may be delivered through competitive bidding, the costs of 
termination (both economic and political) in the face of non-negotiation 
are high (X. Wu, Batac, & Malaluan, 2011). 
Another dilemma in utility regulation, particularly in developing 
countries, is the need to balance predictability and stability with 
flexibility to external changes, internal feedback, or problems 
associated with incompleteness. Regulatory apparatuses, particularly 
pure contract or hybrid contract regulatory arrangements, that are too 
rigid may be so restrictive that they are unable to deal with shifting 
conditions and, thus, fail relationally or technically. Amongst others, 
Selznick proposes the notion of responsive regulation, wherein the 
challenge is “to maintain institutional integrity while taking into account 
new problems, new forces in the environment, new demands, and 
expectations” (Selznick, 1994). 
2.6.4 Institutional endowments and meta-level political conditions 
Stable rule of law and a sound property rights regime have been shown 
to promote private investment in infrastructure (Banerjee et al., 2006), 
as has political stability. Indeed, political volatility has been 
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demonstrated to negatively influence private participation in public 
enterprises, both with regards to initial investment decisions and long-
term commitment to partnerships (Banerjee et al., 2006; Bergara, 
Henisz, & Spiller, 1998; Zhang, 2005).  
Political instability also increases political risk, as does resistance from 
strong interest groups like unions or activist organizations. In this 
regard, labor union strength is generally expected to correlate 
negatively with foreign direct investment and the political sustainability 
of partnerships, particularly if resistance is acute. Furthermore, 
powerful unions can drive up operating costs beyond financial 
sustainability if project companies are strong-armed into ceding to 
unexpected wage and other labor-related demands. 
The potential roles of government accountability and citizen voice are 
not as clear-cut, however. On the one hand, high levels of public 
participation and government responsiveness can build legitimacy, 
bolstering private participation and averting injurious allegations of 
government misconduct. On the other hand, increased voice may 
overwhelm established partnerships where public sentiment is opposed 
to private participation. To this last point, higher levels of civil rights 
have shown to discourage infrastructure investment due to higher costs 
of garnering public approval (Banerjee et al., 2006). 
Another issue cited broadly in the literature is the role of public 
perception. As Bakker asserts, “Privatization is a process of expansion 
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of the market that creates new property relations and in so doing 
generates new society-nature relations. As such, it is inherently 
ideological and not solely technical” (K. J. Bakker, 2010). Indeed, many 
of the South American PSP failures have been at least partly attributed 
to public opposition and common perceptions of increased 
unemployment, climbing prices, and corruption. Other perception 
problems include the idea that PPPs have been imposed on local 
governments by outside organizations, especially multilateral 
development banks (Bull & McNeill, 2007). 
High-profile cases of opposition, perhaps most notably exemplified in 
the Cochabamba water protests of 2000, suggest that underlying 
ideologies regarding the acceptability of private participation in public 
services and public confidence in government and industry are 
important. Indeed, political resistance has been recognized as an 
central factor in private investment failures in many countries (Finger, 
Allouche, & LuÌs-Manso, 2007; Grimsey & Lewis, 2007; D. Hall, Lobina, 
& de la Motte, 2005). Along this line of reasoning, a general distrust of 
the private sector should make PPPs less sustainable, whereas 
neoliberal ideological leanings would be expected to support private 
participation. A public’s general confidence in government could 
conceivably be influential in either direction. 
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2.7 Analytical framework and research overview 
Despite all of these important contributions, there is a scarcity of 
generalized analyses based on large-N or medium-N analytical studies 
that examine what impacts pre-existing conditions, local operating 
environments, and project arrangements have on PPP durability. As 
such, the purpose of this paper is not only to contribute to the ongoing 
and enormously important debate of whether PPPs can significantly 
improve water utility performance, efficiency, and equity in access, but 
also to provide insights into how political, institutional, material, and 
governance conditions and project-level particulars affect a PPP’s 
survivability once the privatization decision has been made. 
The theoretical constructs used to understand the phenomena at hand 
include concepts from microeconomics, political economy, institutional 
analysis, public management, and regulatory theory. The broadest 
framework employed is institutional in nature: the quantitative analysis 
attempts to capture the effects of institutional endowments and formal 
rules, including those setting bid processes, project forms, and 
participation, on project survival. But political and management factors 
remain important, as do notions of value. Thus, interests and attributes 
of important stakeholders and dynamic shifts in regulation and project 
management are attended to in comparative case study in order to 
investigate the ongoing strategic interplay of actors over time. 
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The project employs a multiple commitment problem framework, which 
places the notion of dynamic inconsistency as a central these. As such, 
there is an examination of the interplay of rules, interests, strategies, 
and material and political conditions on the degree of policy 
inconsistency and commitment failure. This framework is used to 
examine sets of variables that are pertinent to stakeholders’ capacity to 
adapt to change; to meet obligations or renege; and, ultimately, 
succeed or fail instrumentally and institutionally. Four variable classes 
under examination include the project rules and capacities; regulatory 
setting; rooted conditions; and context dynamics. 
The regression analysis attends mostly to the effects of exogenous 
variables (high-level institutional and political conditions), rules 
(contract forms, terms of participation, etc.), and participant 
characteristics on project survival. The qualitative case component 
following focuses more deeply on the action arena (the project itself 
and its local context) and the strategies adopted by stakeholders, 
including how they provide and measure value, confer legitimacy and 
seek support, and manage operational capabilities – all in response to 
shifting exogenous conditions. The case studies examine in richer 
detail the attributes of the community and interactions amongst parties 
to the PPP over time that support or degrade the balance of 
commitments and alignment of interests. 
Within this framework, the research examines factors that are expected 
to influence the health of a PPP at three levels of analysis: 
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• Meta-level: level of the institutional environment (national level 
political factors; legal and business environment; ideology of the 
polity); 
• Meso-level: level of the operating community (local regulation; 
public participation; local environmental, financial, and material 
conditions); 
• Micro-level: level of the project (organization, allocation of risk 
and responsibility, duration, ownership structure, management 
processes, relationships between government and company). 
The organizational studies and management literatures have attended 
to the particular contractual forms and organizational cultures required 
to maintain different types of partnerships and prevent premature 
project cancellations. This discourse primarily centers around the 
appropriate allocation of risk, contractual safeguards, and interactions 
between and management of participants in the partnership (Zhang, 
2005). Herein, however, I propose additional linkages between the 
broader governance environment, project characteristics, and PPP 
durability and performance. While commentary and common sense 
suggest that good governance is important to PPP performance and 
sustainability, this research seeks to make clearer the relationships 
between both aspects of performance of water PPPs and corruption, 
political stability, regulation, bureaucratic effectiveness, availability of 
information, and public opinion over time.  
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The research employs a mixed methods design, using a large-N 
econometric study and a small-N qualitative component in concurrent 
explanatory research. The purposes of employing mixed-methods are 
three-fold: 
1. Application of both quantitative and qualitative methods serves 
the purpose of “triangulating” results by (a) validating in case of 
convergence or (b) driving further inquiry in case of divergence; 
2. Employing both balances generalization with precision; and 
3. Quantitative study informs the qualitative comparative analysis. 
The application of multidisciplinary, multi-method approaches to 
examining PPPs is supported by established scholars in the field. 
Hodge, et al, argue that PPPs have multiple technical, social, and 
discursive facets that are all important: “In terms of the LTIC arena, for 
instance, legal contracts certainly form the basis of the agreements 
between parties. But both the manner in which government decisions 
to enter such contracts are made as well as the content of such 
contracts are clearly not simply legal matters. They are social and 
inherently political matters of public importance” (Graeme Hodge et al., 
2010). Where large-N quantitative study tenders the potential to identify 
important general patterns, particularly related to technical issues, 
thicker quantitative research affords insights regarding the less precise 
political and ideational factors at play. 
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In order to study the multitudinous variables that may have an effect on 
a PSP utility’s performance, we turn to theory and observation to 
identify variables whose constellational arrangements are hypothesized 
to impact participants strategies, the credibility of commitments, and 
outcomes. These include rules, conditions, and attributes of 
stakeholders at multiple levels of analysis that can be categorized 
along two dimensions: (1) the degree to which they are under control of 
project decision-makers (within the government and project companies) 
and (2) the degree to which they are relatively static or dynamic. These 
factors are pertinent to shaping the imperative and motivational 
credibility of parties’ commitments to the PPP, as well as the degree 
and direction of commitment competition facing players over time.  
Table 6. Summary, variable classes 
 
Degree of control 
Under direct control of 
decision-makers 
Decision-makers have 







e Relatively static, slow to 
change 
Project rules and 
participant capacities 
Rooted conditions: existing 






Context dynamics: political 
support, force majeure, 
macro-economy, national 
regulation, fiscal space 
The factors under the direct control of decision-makers, which may 
include the project rules, internal and bilateral relationships, strategies, 
management processes, and immediate regulatory apparatuses, are 
the most maneuverable policy and management levers. These may 
influence the motivational credibility of commitments as parties 
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negotiate their interests and manage inter-organizational relationships 
with them and through them, and they can also influence imperative 
credibility of commitments via the rules in place (including contract, 
norms, local agency and government laws, and regulation). The factors 
over which decision-makers have limited or no control also may affect 
motivational and imperative credibility; however, they are factors that 
must be adapted to, rather than re-calibrated in order to promote 
balanced, credible commitments on all sides over time.  
The four variable classes are described more specifically in section 4.1 
Framing for comparison: Qualitative methodology . Performance 
outcomes of the PPP derive directly from the combinations of these 
variables. Some variables will always hold neutral, objective values; 
some variables may be subjectively assessed as more or less ‘good’ or 
‘bad’, independent of the values of other variables; and some variables 
may be assessed as more or less desirable, depending on other 
variables. This last point underlines the purpose of comparative case 
study. Further, only some of these fall under direct control of decision-
makers: this limited set comprises variables that are viable policy levers 
amenable to manipulation by governments and companies. 
The thesis’ quantitative component aims to identify the significance, on 
average, of rooted conditions and project rules and capacities on PPP 
sustainability and institutional performance. As such, it attends to 
factors at all three levels. The qualitative component further 
investigates the multiple combinations of factors that lead to the 
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continuance or premature demise of water PPPs, as well as the 
influence of these factors on technical-instrumental performance. The 
logic is that underlying mechanisms at work, which may involve 
multiple causal paths, are not likely apparent in large-N econometric 
study. While the econometric analysis allows for the identification of 
variables that tend to influence a partnerships’ sustainability – as 
average effects that are (optimally) statistically independent – and give 
an indication of their causal direction, the details of how so and in what 
combinations factors are particularly detrimental or healthful are issues 
better suited to in-depth comparative qualitative study. Comparative 
case study accommodates the complexities at hand, particularly 
considering the reality that many theoretically important variables are at 
least somewhat endogenous and may have quite different specific 
effects in various combination with other variables. 
Furthermore, there are a host of project-level variables – both static 
and dynamic in nature – that are of key interest, but for which data is 
unavailable or unattainable for the full large-N data set. For some of 
these factors, however, case study is feasible. These variables include 
the constellation of rules governing the PPP; contract components; the 
processes and practices by which the PPP is managed; more highly 
contextualized local socio-political conditions; the roles of various 
stakeholders in designing, implementing, and evaluating the PPP; the 
legal framework governing the PPP; and the technical capacities of and 
relationships amongst participants.  
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The method employed for the qualitative research is comparative case 
analysis. Following Rihoux and Ragin’s methodological direction 
(Rihoux & Ragin, 2008), the case studies are transformed into general 
configurations, or combinations of factors, that are posited to produce a 
particular outcome of interest – in this case a PPP’s relative 
performance and relational success or failure over time. The logical 
foundations of comparative case analysis here are underpinned by the 
“method of difference” in most-similar system research design, used to 
identify causal factors by systematically matching and contrasting 
cases. I employ most-similar case comparisons, as the cases exhibit 
different outcomes with similar conditions: they display sufficient 
homogeneity to allow for comparison, but also sufficient heterogeneity 
in the dependent variables (relative instrumental and institutional 
success) to allow for identification of configurative effects of 
independent variables on credibility of commitment and, ultimately, 
performance and sustainability. The cases presented in Chapters 5, 6, 
and 7 include the following: 
Table 7. Research cases 




Jakarta Utility concession Distressed 
1996 - 
present 






Philippines Maynilad I Utility concession Cancelled   1997-2005 
 Maynilad II Utility concession Operational 2006 - present  
 Manila Water Utility concession Operational 1997 - present 
Selangor, 




















 Sungai Lolo  Treatment plant concession Distressed 
2007 - 
present 
As a thought device, the performance outcomes of these cases may be 
roughly mapped according to institutional (relational) and instrumental 
(technical) performance. It must be understood, however, that over the 
long-term, instrumental and institutional performance changes; thus, so 
would the projects’ mapped placement. The performance coordinates 
are in constant flux. Further, it must be acknowledged that precisely 
mapping out institutional performance is difficult due to data and 
measurement problems and the unavoidable subjectivity inherent to 
assessments of failure and success. Nevertheless, the figure below 
visually demonstrates this component of the research logic. 
Figure 2. Mapping institutional and instrumental performance 
























Manila Water (1999) 
Selangor (2007) 
Aetra (2013)       
Failure 















Palyja (2013)     
Maynilad I (1999)  
Selangor (2014) 
Source: Author’s compilation 
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The analytical constructs proposed and employed are hypothetically 
linked as mapped in Figure 3. 
Figure 3. Linking analytical components 
 
Source: Author’s compilation 
Performance outcomes are hypothetically determined by the credibility 
of commitments, adaptability of the system, system capacity to balance 
flexibility and consistency, and coordinated capacity to deliver on 
promised commitments. In other words, participant capacities 
determine whether parties can do what they promise, and rules and 
factors affecting motivational commitment affect whether they will. In 
turn, these hinge on the four variable classes previously specified, 
categorized according to the degree of control and pace of change. 
Certainly, there is feedback amongst analytical components: for 
example, performance undoubtedly affects motivational credibility over 
time. So would imperative credibility affect participant interests. In the 
following chapter, we look to general statistical patterns in project 
survival to uncover some of the relationships betwixt the first and third 
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analytical components, leaving the second to interpretation via case 
study in chapters to follow.  
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Chapter 3. Patterns in PPP survival: Statistical evidence 	  
The quantitative analysis herein is based on both descriptive and 
inferential statistics, and focuses on the dimension of relational 
performance. The question at hand is one of identifying what factors 
contribute to early termination. The quantitative research is also 
somewhat inductive, intended to lend focus to subsequent qualitative 
research and further structure to the large set of factors that PPP 
literature suggests matters. The complex and configurative nature of 
PPP success and failure; caution regarding the reliability of data used 
in quantitative analysis (exposited further herein); and data limitations 
that fail to fully capture project histories, the specific regulatory 
apparatuses, or relationships amongst actors over time, all signify that 
quantitative analysis is suited to informing subsequent case research. 
Further, these apparent research weaknesses compel additional 
research in order to triangulate results and strengthen validity, 
especially for those results that run counter to theoretical and 
commonsense expectations. 
Through the literature review, I have presented existing research on the 
influences of operating context, the institutional environment, project 
rules and governance, and regulatory mechanisms on the selection of 
PPP, and performance outcomes. Ultimately, this researcher’s 
aspiration would be a large-N quantitative analysis of theorized 
relationships between these reviewed independent institutional, 
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structural, and project factors and dependent factors that reflect both 
instrumental performance outcomes and partnership sustainability 
outcomes. Unfortunately, however, the quantitative analysis herein is 
limited to relational performance for two primary reasons.  
Firstly, data on technical performance outcomes such as network 
expansion, reduction of non-revenue water, tariff reduction, and service 
quality is not currently available nor easily constructed across the large 
data set. For some projects, this may be so because data is not 
recorded at all for standard metrics; for some, reported outcomes are 
dubious; and for others, measured performance outcomes are not 
made public. Secondly, there is a significant comparability problem for 
indicators such as coverage, for which measurement can differ grossly 
depending on the definitions and assumptions used by the assessor. 
Problems associated with measurement are well documented (Alegre, 
2006; Komives, Whittington, & Wu, 2001; Lambert & Hirner, 2002), with 
stark conflicts of assessment evident even within projects (as is the 
case in Jakarta, for instance), much less across them for indicators 
such as NRW, expansion, and service quality. 
Data on early termination, on the other hand, is readily available. 
Further, termination is a clear binomial outcome: a project either 
reaches its full contracted term, or it is prematurely cancelled. Distress, 
while less clear-cut, is also binomial. An existing project is either 
classified “distressed” because one party has requested termination or 
the project is currently in international arbitration, or it is not. While an 
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operational or concluded project may neither be financially healthful nor 
technically successful per se, it is, nevertheless, a surviving project. A 
large data set – compiled by The World Bank’s Private Participation in 
Infrastructure Facility [PPIAF] – covers over 700 water and sanitation 
PPPs in low- and middle-income countries, each of which is classified 
as “under construction,” “operational,” “concluded,” “canceled,” or 
“distressed.” The most extreme relational outcomes – survival or early 
termination – are amenable to immediate quantitative analysis. 
It bears mentioning, however, that the analysis is limited to a set of 
broad strokes that suggest patterns of relationships between 
institutional factors, actor characteristics, project structures and a 
PPP’s chance of survival, but makes only tentative claims about direct 
causal relationships. This is because my own epistemological 
standpoint is that factors causing failure are configurative and 
temporally determined: their impact on project outcomes likely depends 
on the presence of and values assigned to other factors over time. As 
such, any one factor may or may not be significant depending on the 
settings of other factors and the sequencing of their impact. A PPP’s 
current operational status certainly does not mean that it will not ever 
fail, relationally or instrumentally. But an investigation of the factors that 
lead to the most extreme cases of failure – i.e., early termination or 
international arbitration – is helpful as a guide in identifying what should 
be particularly paid attention to in detailed case study.  
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The first part of this chapter reviews the quantitative methodology. In 
the second section, descriptive statistics are used to illustrate patterns 
in PPP survival or early termination via descriptions of the central 
tendencies of cancellation or project survival for different sets of PPPs, 
with groups differentiated by region, project structure, and participation. 
In the third section, regression analysis is used to examine the 
significance and effects of particular project and institutional factors on 
early demise or survival through the early- and middle-ages of a 
project’s life cycle. 
3.1 Quantitative methodology 
In order to identify causal factors in the broader governance and 
ideological environments and within the project structure that contribute 
to the cancellation or survival of PPPs in water, the quantitative 
research portion utilizes (1) descriptive statistics, i.e., measures of 
central tendencies for “failure”, and (2) a series of logistic regression 
models of PPP survival and cancellation. In the logistic regression 
models, the dependent binary variables include: (1) cancellation, (2) 
survival to 10 years, and (3) survival to 5 years. The models employed 
test the link between these dependent variables and the set of factors 
identified above, including observed project-level, country-level, and 
city-level contextual factors. Further, employing models that use 
dependent variables of cancellation and survival to 5- and 10-years for 
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different project types reveals differences in the impacts of particular 
conditions across project phases as well as for different types of PPPs. 
3.1.1 Quantitative data 
To test hypothetical relationships between governance, structure, rules, 
etc. and PPP sustenance, I draw from a number of data sources to 
examine combinations of macro-level governance and political 
indicators and project-level characteristics. PPP project data is drawn 
from The World Bank’s Private Participation in Infrastructure [PPI] 
Database, which provides project details for more than 3,800 
infrastructure projects including over 700 water and sewerage projects, 
in 150 low-and middle-income countries. Data include general 
activities, contractual arrangements and partnership structure, sources 
of investment, and primary investors (PPIP, 1984-2008).  
While projects cannot always be definitively classified because of the 
spectrum of potential contractual arrangements, the database 
characterizes each project as one of four general sub-types: 
management and lease contracts, concessions, Greenfield projects, 
and divestitures. Because divestitures typically involve onetime 
transactions (Savas, 2000) as opposed to partnerships requiring 
ongoing management, this study does not include divestiture project 
data. Taking Van Ham’s and Koppenjan’s definition of PPPs as those 
partnerships that exhibit “cooperation of some sort of durability 
between public and private actors” (Van Ham & Koppenjan, 2001), I 
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consider only those projects in the PPI Database whose contract 
periods are 5 years or longer and whose forms demonstrate ongoing 
interactions of an operational nature. This group of projects includes 
concessions, Greenfields, and management and lease projects. There 
is a particular emphasis on concessions and utilities for reasons 
already cited, i.e. the private sector’s assumption of risk, noted political 
vulnerability, and the management and political complexities of 
transitioning existing services to the private sector.  
The PPI Database has been used to either directly select or derive (via 
secondary calculation by the author) the following variables that define 
project characteristics (Table 8), structure (Table 9), actors (Table 10), 
and outcomes (Table 11). 
 




Country Country Country 
Region Region East Asia and the Pacific [EAP], Europe 
and Central Asia [ECA], Latin America and 
the Caribbean [LAC], Middle East and 
North Africa [MENA], South Asia [SA], Sub-





Year of financial closure and the project’s 
“start” year 
Project age Ago_2012 Years since project inception, up to 2012 
Termination year TermYear
  




=1 if project was specified as awarded by 
direct negotiation, =0 otherwise 
Source: PPIAF Database, August 2013 
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Table 9. Project structure variables 
Variable Variable Code Variable Description 
Contract 
period 
Contract_Period Intended contract period 
Type of PPP 
contract 
PPI_Type  Concession, Greenfield project, 





=1 if management or lease contract, =0 
otherwise 
Concession Concession  =1 if concession, =0 otherwise 
Greenfield Greenfield  =1 if Greenfield, =0 otherwise 
Utility Utility =1 if project is a utility, =0 otherwise 
Sewerage Sewerage =1 if project involves sewerage, =0 
otherwise 
Source: PPIAF Database, August 2013 
Table 10. Project actor variables 
Variable Variable Code Variable Description 
Foreign 
company 








MultPart Are there multiple private partners? =1 if 
yes, =0 otherwise 
Water 
majors 
WaterMajors =1 if project involves a major multinational 
water company (Suez, Veolia, Vivendi, 
SAUR, RWE, Bechtel, United Utilities, 
Biwater, Thames, Berlinwasser, Agueas de 
Barcelona) , =0 otherwise  
Multilateral 
support 
MLS =1 if project involves a foreign company, =0 
otherwise 
Source: PPIAF Database, August 2013 
Table 11. Project outcomes variables 
Variable Variable Code Variable Description 
Project 
status 
Project_Status Canceled, operational, concluded, or 
distressed 
Canceled Canceled Designates cancellation status, =1 if project 
was canceled, =0 otherwise 
Distressed Distressed Designates distressed status, =1 if project is 
distressed, =0 otherwise 
Survival to 
5 years 
Yrs_5 Designates early survival, =1 if projects with 
contract periods of at least 5 years survived to 
the five year milestone, =0 otherwise 
Survival to 
10 years 
Yrs_10 Designates early survival, =1 if projects with 
contract periods of at least 10 years survived 
to the ten year milestone, =0 otherwise 
Source: PPIAF Database, August 2013 
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To test the effects of the broader operating environment, I utilize 
variables that proxy the quality of governance and provide information 
on other relevant economic, social, and political factors. These 
institutional environment factors are listed in Table 12 in brief as in the 
Appendix in detail.  
Table 12. Institutional environment variables, summary 
Variable and 
code 





Index measuring the extent to which 
citizens are able to participate in selection 
of governments as well as independence of 







Index measuring perceptions of the 
likelihood that the government in power will 
be destabilized or overthrown by 








Index measuring quality of public service 
provision and the bureaucracy, competence 
and political independence of civil servants, 







Index measuring of the incidence of market-
unfriendly policies such as price controls or 
inadequate bank supervision, as well as 
perceptions of the burdens imposed by 




Rule of law 
WBGI_RuleLaw 
Index measuring the extent to which agents 
have confidence in and abide by the rules 




Control of corruption 
WBGI_CorrControl 
Measures perceptions of corruption, 
conventionally defined as the exercise of 








Index measuring corruption in the public 
sector (the abuse of public office for private 
gain). The CPI Score ranges between 10 
(highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). 
Transparency 
International 
Per capita GDP GDP per capita based on purchasing power 




GDPpCap_PPPInt international dollars. Indicators 
Legal structure and 




Index ranges from 0-10 where 0 
corresponds to ‘no judicial independence’, 
‘no trusted legal framework exists’, ‘no 
protection of intellectual property’, ‘military 
interference in rule of law’, and ‘no integrity 
of the legal system’ and 10 corresponds to 
‘high judicial independence’, ‘trusted legal 
framework exists’, ‘protection of intellectual 
property’, ‘no military interference in rule of 









Scores the degree to which a country's laws 
protect private property rights and the 
degree to which government enforces those 
laws. Scores range from 0 to100, where 
100 represents the maximum degree of 






Binary variable that denotes whether a 
project was subject to a major financial 
crisis (e.g., Asian Financial Crisis, 
Argentine Dollar Crisis, etc.) after financial 
closure; =1 if so, =0 otherwise 
Compiled by 
author 
Labor Union Power 
LaborUnionPower 
 
Measures statutory protection and power of 
unions as average of seven dummy 
variables which equal one: (1) if employees 
have the right to unionize; (2) if employees 
have the right to collective bargaining; (3) if 
employees are legally bound to bargain 
with unions; (4) if collective contracts are 
extended to third parties by law; (5) if the 
law allows closed shops; (6) if workers, or 
unions have a right to appoint members to 
the Boards of Directors; and (7) if workers’ 








Freedom of the 
Press Index 
FH_FreedomPress 
Index computed by adding component 
ratings on laws and regulations, political 
pressures and controls, economic 
influences, and repressive actions. Scale 






Index combines two dimensions of 
democracy – competition and participation. 







Finally, a set of variables from the World Values Survey describes the 
ideational environment of the citizenry, at the national level. 
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Table 13. Idea variables 
Variable Variable code Variable 
description 









measured on a 
scale from 1 (a 
great deal) to 4 
(none at all) 
World Values Survey 
(World Values Survey 
Association 2009; European 
Values Study Group and World 
Values Survey Association 
2006) 
(Time-series: 1990-2008, n: 
147, N:81, N:8, T:2) 
(Cross-section: 1996-2008 











measured on a 
scale from 1 (a 
great deal) to 4 
(none at all) 
World Values Survey 
(World Values Survey 
Association 2009; European 
Values Study Group and World 
Values Survey Association 
2006) 
(Time-series: 1981-2008, n: 
221, N:93, N:8, T:2) 
(Cross-section: 1996-2008 
(varies by country), N: 87) 
Note: n: Number of country-year observations; N: Number of countries covered; 𝑁: 
Mean number of countries per year N; and 𝑇: Mean number of years per country 
These institutional and ideational variables are matched with the 
projects in the PPI Database to create a cross-sectional data set, with 
the project as the unit of analysis. However, many of the institutional 
environment variables are cross-sectional: measures are available year 
over year for a period of time for each country. It was necessary, 
nevertheless, to compress the combined project-institutional 
environment data set into a cross-sectional set due to the absence of 
information on temporal changes for each project (aside from the 
outcomes of conclusion or termination). As such, where time series 
data was available for any institutional environment variables for a 
country over the project’s time period (i.e., the year of financial closure 
to the year of cancellation, conclusion, or the present), the values of 
that institutional variable were averaged over the project time period 
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and recoded for that data point (the project). For variables recorded for 
only one year (e.g., ideational variables), that year’s observation was 
used. While not methodologically optimal, this is acceptable, 
particularly since societal norms and ideas are known to change slowly. 
Thus, changes over time for institutional environment variables are 
minimal. 
The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators database (D 
Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2003) captures six key dimensions of 
governance in over 200 countries year by year from 1996 to present. 
Using 40 data sources from 30 organizations, and updated annually, 
the indicators assign values to the following: voice and accountability; 
political stability and lack of violence; government effectiveness; 
regulatory quality; rule of law; and control of corruption. The data used 
to construct these indicators is a compilation of the perceptions of a 
diverse group of respondents, collected via surveys and other cross-
country assessments. The higher the value recorded for each indicator, 
the better the country’s performance according to the WGI index 
rating5. The recorded values for each project are the average of the 
WGI over the duration of the project.  
                                            
5 For details on the construction of the WGI database, see 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp 
 101 
Data characterizing the strength of labor unions is sourced from the 
Quality of Government Dataset6, which in turn sources data for this 
particular variable from the Regulation of Labor Database covering 84 
countries over the period of 1997-2002 (Botero, Djankov, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2004). For projects whose start year was 
before 1997 (for which data is unavailable), 1997 values were used. 
Data reflecting public perceptions of government and the private sector 
are obtained from The World Values Survey (Inglehart, 2000), the only 
data source to be utilized in which values are not updated annually. 
Observations utilized are those recorded for the survey results 
published in 2000. While not available year by year, broad consensus 
on the slow nature of ideological change leads me to believe that these 
variables, if recorded annually, would not likely exhibit significant 
variability over the short term. These variables indicate the average of 
citizen responses indicating their confidence in government and major 
companies on a scale of 1 (a great deal) to 4 (none at all).  
Finally, gross domestic product [GDP] data is introduced as a control 
variable in determining the effects of corruption as widely 
recommended in the literature on measuring corruption. This data is 
taken from The World Bank’s World Development Indicators reports, 
updated annually (World Bank, 2009). Other variables of interest, for 
                                            
6 The University of Gothenburgs’ Quality of Government Institution manages 
this database, available in full at http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/ 
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which data sourcing and coding are undetermined, include an 
economic shock or financial crisis affecting a project. This information, 
a simple binary coding of 1 in case of a shock post-project closure and 
0 otherwise, was compiled by the author through a historical review. 
3.1.2 Quantitative models 
The quantitative models employed in the regression analyses test 
significance of independent institutional, structural, ideational, and 
material variables on project survival and cancellation via a set of 
logistic regression models. In these models, the dependent variables 
are binary. In the instance of cancellation, 1 indicates that a project is 
terminated prior to its intended contract period, whereas 0 indicates 
that it has either come to full term, or has not yet been cancelled 
(where projects’ targeted contract conclusion has not yet occurred). 
Similarly, in the survival models, an assignment of 1 to the dependent 
variable indicates that the project has survived at least to the 5-year or 
10-year marks. 
The selection of these two survival periods are based on the notion that 
an initial contract “settling-in period” can be particularly contentious, 
and survival through that time may depend on factors slightly different 
that those associated with longer-term survival. The water PPP data in 
the PPIAF reveals that 54.35% of the projects that are cancelled are 
terminated within the first 5 years (see Table 14. Duration to Project 
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Cancellation), and the average duration of the 46 cancelled projects up 
to the point of cancellation is 5.67 years.  
Table 14. Duration to Project Cancellation 
Duration until 
Cancellation 
Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percentage 
1 3 6.52 6.52 
2 6 13.04 19.57 
3 4 8.70 28.26 
4 6 13.04 41.30 
5 6 13.04 54.35 
6 5 10.87 65.22 
7 4 8.70 73.91 
8 3 6.52 80.43 
9 1 2.17 82.61 
10 3 6.52 89.13 
11 3 6.52 95.65 
13 2 4.35 100.00 
Total 46  100.00 
Source: Author’s compilation from raw data in PPIAF, 2013. 
The underlying regression equation for cancellation (survival) is: 
E[Yi] = λ ( αij Vij + δikXik + βil Zil ) 
where Yi is an observable binary outcome (e.g., survival or 
cancellation) variable identifying whether a project was cancelled 
before its conclusion (or alternatively whether the project lasted to the 
specified milestone); λ is the logistic function; Vij is a vector of j project  
architecture (structure and membership) variables; Xik is a vector of k 
institutional environment variables; Zil is a vector of idea variables; and 
αij, δik, and βil are vectors of parameters to be estimated. And 
1 if project was cancelled (or lasted to at lease the 5- 
or 10- year mark in survival models)  
Yi =    
  0  otherwise
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For modeling cancellations and survival to the 10-year mark, the data 
sample is limited to those projects that have at least a 10-year contract 
period and also started before 2005 (i.e., those projects whose start 
date were at least 7 years past) so as to minimize bias towards non-
cancellation that would otherwise occur if younger projects were 
included in the sample. Similarly, models estimating the propensity for 
survival to the 5-year mark draw on the data set of projects that started 
before 2005, and which also have at least a 5-year contract period. The 
multiple models employed are described in detail below, in the chapter 
section, 3.3 Modeling early termination and survival.  
3.2 Describing PPP experiences: Emerging patterns 
Descriptive statistical illustration is the first step in summarizing 
patterns that emerge in sustenance of water PPPs. The data presented 
here describe the central tendencies for the regional and contract type 
distributions of water PPPs, as well as for the conclusion and early 
cancellation or distressed status of different sets of PPPs, defined by 
such variables as contract type, region, and project structural factors. 
As of August 2013, 757 projects water and sanitation PPP projects 
were recorded in the PPIAF database. The vast majority, over 80%, are 
concessions contracts and Greenfield projects. In the former 
arrangement, companies assume long-term responsibility for the 
operation, maintenance, and sometimes expansion of existing water 
supply, treatment, and distribution facilities; whereas in the latter, the 
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private company builds and operates a new facility for the period 
specified in the project contract. 
Figure 4. Water PPP projects by type 
 
Compiled from data source: PPIAF Database, August 2013 
The majority of water PPPs are in East Asia and the Pacific and Latin 
America and the Caribbean. Concessions (136) are the most prevalent 
project type in Latin America, whereas and Greenfields (244) lead in 
Asia, seconded by 144 concessions contracts. It bears noting, 
however, that most of EAP’s projects are in China. Removing the large 
number of Chinese projects from consideration (374), most of East 
Asia and the Pacific’s projects (32 of 51, or 62.7%) are concessions. 
Figure 5. Projects by region and project type 


























The inception (financial closure) of water PPP projects grew quite 
steadily until 2007, with a peak of 81 new water project launched in that 
year. Regional distribution data shows, however, that this 2007 peak is 
largely attributable to a huge proliferation of water PPPs water and 
wastewater treatment plant concessions and Greenfields in China, 
which grew steadily through in the 2000s up until 2007.  
Figure 6. Annual project closures by region 
 
Compiled from data source: PPIAF Database, August 2013 
Figure 7. Annual project closures by region, China 








































Separating out data from China shows that, despite the overall peak in 
2007, the regional distribution of PPP commencements are 
concentrated in the late 1990s and early 2000s, with projects starting at 
a rate of about 20 per year in Latin America between 1996 and 2002, 
and vacillating between 3 to 8 per year in Asia (other than China) 
between 1994 to 2005.  
A look at water investments shows that water PPP investment 
commitments peaked earlier in 1997 at US$9.97 billion (current USD), 
with investment commitments steadily declining subsequently, 
reflecting a decreasing industry and government enthusiasm for PPP 
as a solution to water financing problems over time. Investment 
commitments7 have been highest, overall, in East Asia and the Pacific, 
with a total sum of US$30.58 billion (current USD) committed, followed 
by Latin America US$29.93 billion. The remainder – US$8.74 billion 
from the rest of the world – brings the sum total of committed 
investments globally to US$69 billion. 
                                            
7 It bears mentioning that these figures are committed investments – 
investments promised upon financial closure or during later project periods. 
They are not necessarily actualized investments. 
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Figure 8. Annual water PPP investments by region 
 
Compiled from data source: PPIAF Database, November 2013 
 
Of the 757 water projects recorded as of August 2013 (PPIAF), a total 
of 479, or 63%, are still operational. Only 6% of the projects have come 
to full conclusion under the initial contract terms, and 22.5% are only in 
the development and construction phase. This leaves the remaining 
8.2% as distressed or cancelled – statuses designated herein as 
relational failures. 
It is these patterns of cancellation and distress – and on the converse, 
survival – that are of distinct interest in this section of the research. 
Only 50 water project contracts have been cancelled, and twelve are 
currently in distress. These 62 are treated herein as relational failures. 
In contrast, the 479 operational and 46 concluded projects are 
considered non-failed. A remaining 170 are currently under 

















analyses to follow, as their nascence precludes any meaningful 
assessment of survivability.  
Of the 62 failed projects, the majority (nearly 55%) are concessions 
contracts. The second highest amount of failures by project type 
category is in Greenfield projects, which represent 32% of cancelled or 
currently distressed contracts. These percentages do not, however, 
reflect cancellation / distress rates for project types, as these two 
categories – concessions and Greenfields – also represent the vast 
majority of total projects. 
































Concession 245 9 4 9 25 292 
Greenfield  132 159 8 2 14 315 
Management and lease contract 75 2 34 1 9 121 
Divestiture 27 0 0 0 2 29 
Total 479 170 46 12 50 757 
Compiled from data source: PPIAF Database, August 2013 
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Figure 9. PPP projects by type and status 
 
Compiled from data source: PPIAF Database, August 2013 
The PPP project failure rate patterns differ slightly along project type 
categories, and more so along regional lines. The highest rate of 
cancellation or distress has been amongst concessions contracts, 
which exhibit a failure rate of 11.6%, followed by cancellations in 
management and lease contracts at a failure rate of 8.3%.   
Table 16. Projects cancelled or distressed by type 
 Cancelled Cancelled or Distressed 
Greenfield 4.4% 5.1% 
Divestiture 6.9% 6.9% 
Concession 8.6% 11.6% 
Management and Lease 
Contracts 
7.4% 8.3% 
Total Projects 6.6% 8.2% 
Compiled from data source: PPIAF Database, August 2013 
Latin America has seen the highest regional rate of failures with over 
12% of projects being cancelled or currently in distress. The East Asia 
and Pacific region has suffered only a 6.6% failure rate; however, the 
































positive. Of the 425 projects in East Asia and the Pacific, 374 were in 
China alone, and only one of these was cancelled. This overwhelming 
success rate may be attributable to the unique political-administrative 
structure in China as well as the high proportion of treatment plant 
projects (versus more politically vulnerable utilities PPPs). It also 
makes the East Asia and Pacific record appear more successful that it 
actually is: eliminating China’s projects from consideration, the 
cancellation rate of Asia’s projects jumps to a much higher 39.2% – a 
rate that significantly exceeds that of Latin American cancellations. 
More strikingly, over half of the projects in Asia outside of China have 
been cancelled or are currently distressed. These project are in four 
other countries (8 in Malaysia, 2 Philippines, 2 Thailand, 1 Vietnam). 
Table 17. Projects cancelled or distressed by region 
 Cancelled Cancelled or Distressed 
EAP 4.9% 6.6% 
China only 





LAC 10.2% 12.4% 
ECA 4.7% 4.7% 
MENA 4.2% 4.2% 
SA 0.0% 0.0% 
SSA 11.1% 11.1% 
Total Projects 6.6% 8.2% 
Compiled from data source: PPIAF Database, August 2013 
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Figure 10. Project cancellations by year and region 
 
Compiled from data source: PPIAF Database, August 2013 
Nevertheless, the 62 cancelled or distressed projects under review 
represent only 8.2% of the total PPP projects recorded, and removing 
the 170 under construction from calculation, this number still represents 
only 10.5% of post-construction projects. This relatively low failure 
percentage appears quite benign, especially in comparison to scholarly 
and journalistic reports of the “failure of water privatization.” Let us 
remember, however, that this low relational failure metric does not 
necessarily reflect issues of technical performance.  
Further, even specific to the relational performance dimension, the 
number is misleading. This is because many of the cancelled and 
distressed projects have been large, high-value projects. As such, the 
failures represent a much larger percentage of overall financial 
commitments to water PPP. In 2005, the PPIAF found that the 11% of 
the projects either distressed or cancelled represented more than 37% 
















percentage has fallen only slightly to 29.8% of total investments 
resulting in cancellation or distress (calculated from PPI data, 2013). 
Table 18. Investment commitments and failed project commitments by 
region 










EAP $30,576 $11,600 37.9% 
ECA $3,915 $8 0.2% 
LAC $29,933 $9,016 30.1% 
MENA $3,964 $0 0.0% 
SA $470 $0 0.0% 
SSA $392 $9 2.3% 
Total $69,250 $20,633 29.8% 
Compiled from data source: PPIAF Database, November 2013 
Overwhelmingly, the largest percentage of cancelled commitments has 
been associated with the cancellation or distress of concessions 
contracts. Cancelled or distressed concessions account for 44.6% of 
the overall investment commitments for all concessions contracts.  












Concession $42,934 $19,134 44.6% 
Divestiture $9,680 $134 1.4% 
Greenfield $15,225 $1,355 8.9% 
Management 
and Lease 
$1,412 $10 0.7% 
Total $69,251 $20,633 29.8% 
Compiled from data source: PPIAF Database, November 2013 
Utility concessions and management and lease contracts have 
received special attention with respect to PPP failure, as distribution 
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systems are often most susceptible to political problems associated 
with tariff increases and performance with respect to network 
expansion, service quality, and efficiency gains. Utility failures also 
receive much media, public, and political attention, as they are the 
most direct public experience of water supply failure. Only 10.7% of 
total utilities are cancelled or distressed. About 58.2% of the water 
utility PPPs in the PPI Database are concessions, 11.9% of which are 
cancelled or distressed; and 31.1% of utilities PPPs are management 
and lease contracts, 10.1% of which are failed.  
Table 20. Cancelled or distressed utilities by type and region 
 EAP LAC ECA MENA SA SSA Total 
Greenfield 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Divestiture 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 
Concession 5 16 1 0 0 0 22 
Management and 
Lease Contract 
1 4 1 1 0 3 10 
Total 7 21 2 1 0 3 34 
 
Compiled from data source: PPIAF Database, August 2013 
That concessions and management contract failure rates are not much 
different is interesting: recent proposals that management and lease 
contracts may preferable over concessions for PSP in water distribution 
systems hold water then, with respect to the financial impact of 
cancellations, but not necessarily to suggestions that concessions are 
cancelled more often. Nevertheless, because of the greatly different 
financial implications of cancellation between the two, there is merit to 
suggestions that forms which transfer less ownership to government 
may be preferable (Gunawansa & Bhullar, 2013). 
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Table 21. Percentage of utilities cancelled (of total utilities of type) 
 Cancelled Cancelled or Distressed 
Greenfield 0.0% 0.0% 
Divestiture 8.7% 8.7% 
Concession 9.7% 11.9% 
Management and Lease 
Contract 9.1% 10.1% 
Total Projects 9.1% 10.7% 
Compiled from data source: PPIAF Database, August 2013 
3.2.1 Difference in means of failure rates  
Another helpful step towards identifying factors for consideration in 
regression analysis and comparative case study is examining the 
differences in mean failure rates of project sets, defined by participation 
and structure. The comparative tables below demonstrate differences 
in means of failure rates for “treatment” cases (projects for which a 
specified participation element or structural characteristic is present) 
and control cases (projects for which a characteristic is absent). 
The participation conditions tested include the participation of a French 
or English company, driven by the fact that the two countries are known 
for polar, archetypal operating models. Other participation conditions 
include the engagement of multiple private companies, support from a 
multilateral organization, and the participation of a “Big Water” 
company – i.e., one of the major foreign multinational water companies: 
Suez, Saur, Vivendi, Veolia, Thames, RWE, Aguas de Barcelona, 
Bechtel, Berlinwasser, and United Utilities 
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Table 22. Difference in means of failure rates: Structure and membership 
All projects Overall failure rate: 8.19%  
 Mean failure rates   
 Treatment Control Difference 
in means 
Ratio of means 
(trmt / cntr) 
Foreign partner 11.36% 5.43% 5.93% 2.09 
Multiple operators 16.30% 5.58% 10.72% 2.92 
Big Water 20.92% 4.97% 15.95% 4.21 
French partner 16.22% 6.66% 9.56% 2.44 
UK partner 21.74% 7.77% 13.97% 2.80 
Multilateral 
support 
21.88% 6.93% 14.95% 3.16 
Concessions Overall failure rate: 11.64%  
 Mean failure rates   
 Treatment Control Difference 
in means  
Ratio of means 
(trmt / cntr) 
Foreign partner 16.54% 7.88% 8.66% 2.10 
Multiple operators 20.24% 8.17% 12.07% 2.48 
Big Water 23.94% 7.69% 16.25% 3.11 
French partner 22.64% 9.21% 13.44% 2.46 
UK partner 0.00% 11.97% -11.97% 0.00 
Multilateral 
support 
28.57% 10.33% 18.24% 2.77 
Utilities Overall failure rate: 10.69%  
 Mean failure rates   
 Treatment Control  Difference 
in means  
Ratio of means 
(trmt / cntr) 
Foreign partner 18.18% 4.57% 13.61% 3.98 
Multiple operators 21.11% 6.58% 14.53% 3.21 
Big Water 22.62% 6.41% 16.21% 3.53 
French partner 19.35% 8.59% 10.76% 2.25 
UK partner 12.50% 10.60% 1.90% 1.18 
Multilateral 
support 
18.37% 9.29% 9.07% 1.98 
Utility  Overall failure rate: 11.89%  
concessions Mean failure rates   
 Treatment  Control  Difference 
in means  
Ratio of means 
(trmt/ cntr) 
Foreign partner 23.61% 4.42% 19.19% 5.34 
Multiple operators 21.67% 7.20% 14.47% 3.01 
Big Water 29.55% 6.38% 23.16% 4.63 
French partner 27.59% 8.97% 18.61% 3.07 
UK partner 0.00% 12.36% -12.36% 0.00 
Multilateral 
support 
25.00% 10.30% 14.70% 2.43 
We can see by the difference in means of failure rates several 
elements of particular interest. For the sample at hand, the mean 
failure rate for projects involving a foreign partner is 11.36% – a 5.93 
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percentage point difference than the failure rate for projects not 
involving a foreign partner. This difference in means jumps to 8.66 for 
concessions projects, 13.61 for utilities, and 19.19 for utility 
concessions. The participation of multiple private sector companies 
shows a similar pattern. Companies involving multiple private operators 
in this particular sample fail at a rate 10.72 percentage points higher 
than those with single private partners for all projects. The percentage 
point different in failure for multiple and single private partners is 12.07 
for concessions, 14.53 for utilities, and 14.47 for utility concessions. 
The mean failure rate for projects with specified support from a 
multilateral institution such as The World Bank or IMF are also higher 
than the failure rate for projects that do not involve a multilateral. For all 
projects, the difference in mean failure rates is 14.95. For concessions, 
it is 18.24, and for utility concessions, it is 14.7. 
There appears, then, that some project characteristics associated with 
the composition of participating parties to a PPP, projects’ contractual 
forms, and regional influences may promote failure. But testing these 
possibilities necessitates isolating the effects of other pertinent factors 
with correlations to the characteristics at hand. For example, perhaps 
multilateral institutions are more apt to become involved in more 
difficult projects: in this case, the higher failure rate for projects 
involving multilateral support may be reflective of the projects 
themselves rather than the participation of the multilateral. In order to 
further isolate and test these influences, I employ regression analysis 
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that incorporates multiple variables defining the project space and 
institutional environment. 
3.3 Modeling early termination and survival 
The regression analysis relies on the logistic (logit) model, a binomial 
model of institutional “failure” and “success” that tests the influence of 
project architecture, participation, national-level governance factors, 
and ideas on project outcomes. The model is described in the first part 
of this chapter, 3.1.2 Quantitative models. The binomial dependent 
variables are coded as follows: 
Canceled  =1, for projects that were cancelled prior to their 
stipulated contract period; and =0, otherwise 
Yrs_5 =1, for projects that survived to the 5-year 
milestone; and =0, otherwise 
Yrs_10   =1, for projects that have survived to the 10-year 
milestone; and =0, otherwise 
For regressions with a dependent variable of Yrs_5, only those projects 
initially intended to last at least 5 years were included in the sample. 
Similarly, for regressions with a dependent variable of Yrs_10, only 
those projects initially intended to last at least 10 years were included.  
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3.3.1 Data limitations 
Several issues inherent to the data require attention, as they are cause 
for concern with respect to their application in regression analysis and 
also warrant caution in the interpretation of results. First, there are 
problems with the reliability, accuracy, and geographical breadth of the 
data set itself that must be acknowledged. For one, designation of the 
private partners as foreign or local may be problematic for many of the 
observed projects. This is because, where a local company was 
established by a foreign multinational, the company was recorded as 
non-foreign for some observations – but a local subsidiary of a major 
international water company is typically quite different (and far more 
“foreign”) than a truly “homegrown” company. The project database 
was reviewed project-by-project to correct as many of these potential 
mischaracterizations; nevertheless, the potential remains for some 
projects to be mistakenly designated as involving only local private 
partners. Also, data is incomplete with respect to the variable “direct 
negotiation”; thus, it is used and interpreted cautiously. For many 
projects, the mode of contract award (open tendering, direct 
negotiation, closed tender, etc.) is unspecified.  Project awards are only 
coded as directly negotiated where they have been specifically 
recorded as such. However, there may be additional projects awarded 
by direct negotiation, but for which the observation for that particular 
data point is missing.  
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Another issue relates to the limited availability of data for many of the 
projects’ home countries. Some institutional indicators that would have 
been interesting to test were, nevertheless, insufficient with respect to 
geographic breadth or timeliness. For example, the Quality of 
Governance Database’s ‘Professional Public Administration’ variable 
(Dahlström, Lapuente and Teorell 2010) was of interest to mark the 
degree of professionalization versus politicization of the bureaucracy; 
however, recorded values were available for only 52 countries – many 
of which are economically developed and, thus, not applicable to the 
set of projects at hand. This same issue made the use of labor union 
strength and the set of ideational variables problematic, as tradeoffs 
existed between using the variables available for a limited number of 
countries (which would have, thus, excluded many of the projects in the 
PPI database) and taking advantage of the project and outcome data 
within the full set of projects. The problem of limited geographical 
breadth for some variables is further exacerbated by the inclusion of 
others with the same limitations, as the combination results in ever-
smaller intersection sets. 
A third problem with the data poses a threat to the internal validity of 
the regressions: the quality of institutional environmental factors 
themselves. Whilst critics have pointed out some important concerns 
over the Worldwide Governance Indicators, including problems of 
cross-country comparability and imprecision due to inconsistencies in 
underlying data sources (Arndt & Oman, 2006; Knack, 2006); questions 
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over the distinction between indicators and general governance 
(Langbein & Knack, 2010); bias towards rich countries and business 
opinion (Kurtz and Shrank 2007); and measurement problems (Arndt & 
Oman, 2006; Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2004; 
Kurtz & Schrank, 2007), they are nevertheless one of the most 
comprehensive, “carefully constructed”  sets of governance indicators 
available for use across a large, geographically disbursed data set of 
PPPs (Arndt & Oman, 2006; Daniel Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 
2007). In this case, they are sufficient to use in regressions intended to 
structure and inform further case study, but their application requires 
caution in interpretation. Further, the WGIs are accompanied by explicit 
margins of error that demonstrate the “unavoidable degree of 
uncertainty” associated with measuring governance (Daniel Kaufmann 
et al., 2007). 
A final problem with the data, which proved most challenging from an 
analytical and model-building standpoint, is that of high multicollinearity 
amongst institutional environment variables. As is a common indication 
of the presence of high multicollinearity, deleting or adding variables to 
the model equations led, in some cases, to marked changes in 
coefficient estimates. This red flag was a reason to further test for 
multicollinearity in order to lead to a greater appreciation of the 
limitations in interpreting data – as well as the possibility that some 
non-significant variables in terms of p-values could not necessarily be 
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and Feldman’s two-fold advice on testing for the potential for high 
multicollinearity, I inspected the matrix of bivariate correlations for 
institutional variables and also regressed each independent variable on 
the others (Berry & Feldman, 1985). 
Doing so revealed the likelihood of high multicollinearity in several 
variables, particularly related to governance indicators and control of 
corruption. As the inclusion of these variables was driven by theory, 
however, removing them altogether would be imprudent. As such, 
multiple models including and omitting problematic variables are used 
to balance the sometimes-competing goals of minimizing 
multicollinearity problems, best fitting the model to the data, and 
demonstrating the significance of particular independent variables on 
survival or cancellation. 
By examining pair-wise correlations to reveal high bivariate correlations 
and also by regressing independent variables on others to uncover 
linear relationships evidenced by high R2 values, it is determined that 
problems associated with high multicollinearity are potentially 
significant where the following independent variables are combined in 
theoretical models. First, a set of variables – some of which were 
ultimately eliminated from the models presented hereafter – exhibited 
high correlations with others.  
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Table 23. High variable correlations 
Independent variable Highly correlated variables 
FH_FreedomPress WBGI_VoiceAcct (-.88)           WBGI_PolStab (-.86) 
FH_IPolity2  WBGI_VoiceAcct (.89)     
HF_PropertyRights WBGI_ControlCorrupt (.83)     WBGI_GovEff (.83) 
WGBI_RegQual (.88)              WBGI_RuleLaw (.92) 
FI_LegalStrucPropRights WBGI_RuleLaw (.80) 
TI_CPI WBGI_ControlCorrupt (.90)     WBGI_GovEff (.89)  
WBGI_RegQual (.83) 
WBGI_ControlCorrupt  HF_PropertyRights (.83)         TI_CPI (.90)          
WBGI_GovEff (.90)                 WBGI_RuleLaw (.88)             
WBGI_RegQual (.84) 
WBGI_GovEff  HF_PropertyRights (.83)         WBGI_RuleLaw (.87)           
WBGI_ControlCorrupt (.90)     WBGI_RegQual (.83) 
TI_CPI (.89) 
WBGI_RuleLaw  WBGI_VoiceAcct (.82)             WBGI_GovEff (.87)                
WBGI_ControlCorrupt (.88)      HF_PropertyRights (.92)        
FI_LegalStrucPropRights (.78) 
WBGI_PolStab FH_FreedomPress (-.86)        WBGI_RuleLaw(.75) 
WBGI_RegQual HF_PropertyRights (.89)         TI_CPI (.83) 
WBGI_ControlCorrupt (.84)     WBGI_GovEff (.83) 
WBGI_VoiceAcct (.76)            
WBGI_VoiceAcct FH_FreedomPress (-.86)       FH_IPolity2 (.89)      
HF_PropertyRights (.76)        WBGI_RegQual (.76)                  
Another set of variables had R2 values of nearly 1.0 when regressed 
upon other independent variables. By performing regressions on 
multiple potential independent variables, several were removed from 
consideration due to their linear or near-linear relationships with 
combinations of other theoretically important variables. Additionally, 
these tests revealed potential problems of multicollinearity associated 
with the combined use of institutional variables in the logistic models. 
These red flags were used to both inform the design of tested models, 
indeed eliminating some variables from use altogether, and also lend a 
dose of caution in the interpretation of results. Further, multiple model 
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“groups” (see Sigma, Theta, Kappa, etc. below) were used to improve 
the robustness of results, given the known concerns about how 
multicollinear variables might destabilize the coefficients associated 
with their correlated independent variable estimates. 
Table 24. Independent variable regressions with multicollinearity 
Regressand Regressors R2 
hf_propertyrights van_indexdemoc     ti_cpi           fh_rulelaw 
wbgi_goveff             wbgi_rulelaw       wbgi_voiceacct 
.99 
fh_ipolity2 fh_rulelaw                fh_freedompress .90 
fh_ipolity2 fh_freedompress .86 
fh_ipolity2 wbgi_goveff              wbgi _rulelaw         wbgi_regqual   
wbgi_controlcorrupt  ti_cpi                      wbgi_polstab    
wbgi_voiceacct         van_indexdemoc    fh_rulelaw  
1.00 
Fh_rulelaw Fh_ipolity2               fh_freedompress .92 
icrg_qog wbgi_controlcorrupt  wbgi_goveff           wbgi_polstab    
wbgi_rulelaw            wbgi_regqual         wbgi_voiceacct     
fh_ipolity2                 fh_freedompress    fh_rulelaw 
.88 
wbgi_goveff wbgi_rulelaw   wbgi_regqual      wbgi_controlcorrupt     
ti_cpi wbgi_polstab   wbgi_voiceacct   van_indexdemoc     
fh_rulelaw 
.96 
wbgi_goveff wbgi_rulelaw     wbgi_regqual       wbgi_controlcorrupt     
ti_cpi wbgi_polstab  wbgi_voiceacct    van_indexdemoc     
fh_ipolity2 
1.00 
3.4 Testing institutional and ideational environment 
In order to demonstrate the effects of the institutional and ideational 
environments on project survival and cancellation, three sets of models 
including independent factors of theorized importance were 
constructed. Whilst a comprehensive model including all pertinent 
factors would be most desirable, this option was regretfully dispensed 
upon countless tests that yielded extreme coefficient estimate 
instabilities associated with the data problems above (especially 
multicollinearity) and the number of variables included. As such, 
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multiple variations of three general model sets with more limited 
independent variables were utilized. These model sets are summarized 
as follows, according to their included variables. 




Focuses on the influence 
of project architecture 
(membership, form) 
concession            
management_lease   mls  
foreigncompany         multpart     














stability, regulatory quality, 
property rights protection).  
econshock            ti_cpi  
gdppcap_pppint   wbgi_goveff         
wbgi_polstab      wbgi_regqual 
fi_legalstrucproprights 
hf_propertyrights 
foreigncompany   multpart  
directnegotiation  mls 
Iota Models: 
Ideas 
Focuses on ideas and 
values held by national 
citizenry about 
government and business. 
wvs_privown        wvs_confgov 
wvs_confmajorcompanies 
Each model was also applied to cancellation and survival to the five- 
and ten-year marks, and many are additionally applied to the full set of 
projects as well as subsets of project type (concessions, utilities, utility 
concessions, Greenfields, etc.). The regression results and discussion 
of each follows. 
3.4.1 Sigma models 
The Sigma models focus on the influence of project-level rules and 
conditions on survival. Project-level rules define the architecture of the 
PPP (project type) as well as the participants (multiple private partners, 
multilateral financial support, foreign company). These also include 
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rules specifying the project structure (i.e., concession, management 
and lease, and Greenfield), mode of award (e.g., directly negotiated or 
competitively tendered), and whether it involved a foreign company or 
multilateral institution. Finally, the models control for historical 
occurrence by isolating the year of project initiation. The notion is that, 
over time, policy learning occurs across the water sector, and projects 
initiated later benefit from lessons learned in previous projects. 
Naturally, this learning cannot be assumed, but the possibility may be 
controlled for. 
Table 25. Sigma models of survival and cancellation 
 All Projects 
  Yrs_5 Yrs_5 Yrs_10 Yrs_10 Canceled Canceled 
foreigncompany -.189 -.113 .304 -.149 .763** .620 
multpart -.195 -.050 .602** -.009 .808** .521 
mls -.303 -.332 -.040 -.062 .515 .662 
directnegotiation -1.225** -1.448** -2.046*** -1.281** .523 1.090* 
concession .000 0.0353 .536** .434 .139 .052 
management_lease .402 .473 1.143*** .551 -.127 -.282 
ago_2012 -- -.084 -- .538*** -- .202*** 
_cons 3.305*** 4.225 -.336 -5.833** -3.071*** -5.445*** 
Observations 397 397 378 378 397 397 
Pseudo R2 .025 .035 .074 .358 .067 .130 
*p<.1; **p<=.05;***p<=.01      
Note: Logistic regression; sample: all water projects except divestitures and contracts 
beginning after 2005. For survival to 5 and 10 years, samples are further limited to 
projects whose contract terms were at least 5 and 10 years or more, respectively. 
The Sigma model suggests a number of interesting significant 
variables. For one, a project’s award by direct negotiation (versus 
competitive tender) is significant to survival to the 5- and 10-year 
milestones, with a strong negative impact. This result, while cautiously 
interpreted, suggests that projects that are directly awarded without 
competitive tendering tend to be prematurely terminated, though 
significance is weaker in the cancellation model. This result supports 
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common advice afforded to governments in selecting most efficient 
operators and corroborates the logic of “competition for the market”. 
It is less clear what the Sigma model tells us about participation. 
Foreign ownership is positively significant to cancellation, which jibes 
with patterns evident in the descriptive statistics, but appears to have 
no real significance to survival overall. The impact of multiple private 
partners, on the other hand, is subject to a seemingly contradictory 
result for 10-year survival and cancellation – one that is discussed 
alongside the coefficient for historical occurrence.  
The apparently paradoxical result of positive coefficients for multiple 
participants and historical incidence (ago_2012) on both 10-year 
survival and cancellation may be attributable to the distribution of the 
duration until cancellation. This applies to later model results as well, 
thus warranting special attention. In the sample set, the majority of 
cancelled projects were terminated by the 5-year milestone. The mean 
duration until cancellation is 5.674 years for the 46 projects in the 
cancellation set.8  
This distribution suggests that, typically, there is a contentious settling-
in period for PPPs. Further, the distribution justifies the selection of a 5-
year survival milestone as an important survival marker. The high 
percentage of cancelled projects that met their end within five years 
                                            
8 Set limited to projects commencing before 2005 and with contract periods of 
5 years or more. 
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also offers one possible explanation for some of the results that 
demonstrate coefficient sign alignment 10-year survival and 
cancellation and opposing signs 5- and 10-year survival – discussion 
related to this latter point will follow.  
The Sigma results suggest that projects with multiple private partners 
are more apt to be cancelled overall, but are also more apt to survive to 
ten years. One of the only explanations available is that, if projects do 
survive settling-in, multiple private partners may either promote survival 
or, alternatively, preclude exit. The latter possibility may be due to the 
additional complications of negotiating a termination with multiple 
private sector parties – complexities that may grow over time. 
Also, the positive significance of historical incidence on both 10-year 
survival and cancellation suggests that older projects were more apt to 
be terminated, but only after long periods of trial and adjustment. This 
would, indeed, fit with the narrative of increasing sector pessimism over 
PPPs as a viable delivery mode, and the tendency for increasingly 
wary governments and businesses to abandon PSP experiments 
earlier in the project lifetime, over time. 
3.4.2 Kappa models 
The results of the Kappa models give rise to the most surprising results 
of the quantitative analysis (as well as some that are easily made 
sense of) and demonstrate differing impacts on projects overall and 
concessions as a limited set. The Kappa models focus on project 
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architecture, including membership, structure, and method of award, 
and the institutional environment in which the PPP operates. The 
interpretation of results related to the latter warrants several words of 
caution associated with previously catalogued data problems, 
particularly related to multicollinearity and data reliability, as well as to 
definitions of independent variables themselves. The variables related 
to the institutional environment include perceptions of corruption, 
government effectiveness, political stability, regulatory quality, and the 
quality of the property rights regime. The weakness affecting 
interpretation, however, is that indicator data are available at the 
national level only, and the quality of national-level governance may 
differ from that at the local level. While this affects the validity of the 
inputs, the data is nevertheless useful for capturing broad institutional 
tendencies and is, nonetheless, the best dataset available for large-N 
analysis of the institutional environment.  
Secondarily, high degrees of multicollinearity, especially between the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators for regulatory quality and 
government effectiveness and the Transparency International 
corruption perception index, destabilize the coefficients assigned to the 
independent variables in the results. Theory and the threat of omitted 
variable bias prompt their inclusion, however. In order to manage the 
tradeoff, several different forms of the models are presented with 
variables iteratively dropped to extricate the robustness of coefficient 
results. At best, the models give coefficient signs that indicate a factor’s 
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positive or negative average impacts on cancellation, but the models 
cannot be used to accurately predict cancellation by themselves. 
Nevertheless, we turn to the results to discuss results, some of which 
confirm theory and some that defy it. 
The influences of external shock and membership on survival and 
cancellation are generally unsurprising. For one, in line with the Sigma 
results, the incidence of an economic shock is negatively significant to 
survival in several models, and consistently significant, positively, to 
cancellation. Indeed, the occurrence of a financial crisis following 
project commencement is the most consistently significant factor 
positively influencing cancellation, with stronger impacts on 
concessions than on projects overall. Also, the method of award by 
direct negotiation in these models confirms the negative impact on 
survival and positive on cancellation. 
As for participation, the financial involvement of a multilateral is 
positively significant to 10-year survival in concessions. That this 
stands in contrast to the pattern evident in the descriptive statistics 
(which showed that more projects with multilateral support are 
cancelled as compared to projects without multilateral support) is 
actually unsurprising. One potential explanation is that multilateral 
institutions, which were by and large supportive of water PSP in 
developing countries in the 1990s and early 2000s, supported projects 
in regions with complex institutional environments, which would make 
cancellation more likely. I.e., the results show that higher rates of 
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failure for MLS-supported projects are attributable to other problematic 
local conditions, some of which may have actually encouraged the 
engagement of a multilateral institution. But the more complex and 
fragile concessions may have also benefited from the dissemination of 
knowledge across projects, as multilaterals developed technical 
assistance programs to support the particular project form. 
The participation of a foreign company is positive to cancellation for 
concessions and negative to 5-year survival for all projects. While the 
results are less robust and inconsistently significant, it is nevertheless 
an interesting variable for further case study, especially given 
corroborative patterns in descriptive statistics. That cancellation is 
associated with participation of a foreign partner suggests that culture 
may matter to the preservation of long-term relationships between 
company and local government. 
Also, a partial disparity to the Sigma model and counter to patterns in 
descriptive statistics, these results show that the inclusion of multiple 
private partners appears to be positively significant for 5- and 10-year 
survival of concessions, though it is insignificant to cancellation overall. 
One potential explanation is that managing the dissolution of a PPP is 
more difficult when contracts involve multiple private partners, thus 
creating a lock-in effect once the privatization decision is made. 
Another possible explanation is that participation of multiple private 
partners can introduce more balance into the competing standpoints 
stressing a PPP. 
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With respect to the institutional environment, the security of property 
rights is positively significant to 10-year survival for both property rights 
indicators (hf_propertyrights and fi_legalstrucpropertyrights), with 
stronger results for the sample limited to concessions only. This result, 
which falls in line with expectation, suggests that for longer-term 
survival, the government’s capacity to protect property rights becomes 
important, and particularly so for concessions. The higher coefficient 
signs associated with the legal structure of property rights suggests 
that judicial independence, legal enforceability of assigned rights, ability 
to utilize the legal system, and integrity of the legal system are 
important to longer-term concession survival. On the other hand, labor 
union strength is altogether insignificant. Whilst the conclusion cannot 
be drawn that labor unions never impact PPP survival, on average 
strong labor unions do not appear to negatively influence PPPs on the 
whole. 
Four major surprises in the quantitative analysis with respect to the 
institutional environment are interesting for guiding further comparative 
case research. One of the most unexpected results is that the quality of 
regulation appears to be consistently negatively significant to 5-year 
survival but positively significant to 10-year survival and cancellation. 
The first cautionary comment in interpreting these seemingly 
paradoxical findings is that this variable is one of the weakest with 
respect to definitional specificity, and can be misleading in 
interpretation, as national-level regulatory conditions may not translate 
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directly to conditions at the local level. The Worldwide Governance 
Indicator measure of “quality of regulation” refers to national-level 
regulatory quality with respect to the legal ease and clarity of doing 
business. This is not to be confused with the quality of water supply 
regulation specifically, as the metric refers more generally to the 
overarching regulatory and business development climate in a given 
country. That said, it does link up to the general level of regulatory 
coherence and capacity, and captures respondents’ perceptions of the 
ability of government to formulate and administer sound regulations 
that permit private sector development. The second cautionary 
comment is that high degrees of multicollinearity between the WBGI 
quality of regulation indicator (wbgi_regqual) and hf_propertyrights 
(.89) and ti_cpi (.77) destabilize the reliability of individual predictors 
associated with each.  
Nevertheless, it bears discussion, as it touches on the impact of the 
broader regulatory regime within which water regulation resides. While 
it does not signify the quality of water regulation, per se, or the degree 
of local control over monopoly market failure, the indicator does attend 
to government capacity for administering and designing effective 
regulation. Considering these concerns, the tentative interpretation is 
that the overall degree of governmental capacity for developing 
coherent regulation and effectively applying regulatory tools affects 
projects negatively in the short run but positively in the medium run. 
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One possible explanation for the unexpected results with respect to 
coefficient signs is that, in early years, strong regulatory regimes can 
over-stress young projects in the settling-in phase. Because of the 
incompleteness of contracts and information problems hindering well-
informed bidding, regulation applied in the early years may impede 
needed adjustments and pressure new projects beyond their breaking 
points. At this point, there exist tradeoffs between enforcing terms of 
the agreement and allowing adjustments that may be necessary to 
creating long-term working relationships, especially as new information 
becomes available in the process of working together. As projects 
mature, however, regulation can promote survival by keeping parties 
accountable to their commitments and balancing interests. That strong 
regulation is also positively impactful to cancellation overall may be due 
to the distribution of data, wherein the majority of projects are cancelled 
in early years. Regardless, this puzzle is an interesting question for 
qualitative research.  
The apparent impact of political stability also runs counter to 
expectation. The results for political stability are robust and consistent 
for 10-year survival, indicating a surprising negative relationship 
between increased political stability and survival. The indicator is also 
significant positively in one cancellation model. This paradoxical result 
may be due to one of two possible explanations that have to do more 
with a government’s capacity in periods of political instability. For one, 
with less stable political systems, political swings may destabilize the 
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bureaucracy, making an agency that has already turned over 
operations (after the PSP decision has been made) less capable of 
managing re-municipalizations, which come with political fallout and 
high coordination costs to get a public agency up and running again. 
Furthermore, political swings may be create more opportunities for in-
fighting within the government and political parties contending for 
power, weakening the government’s ability to dissolve a contract 
(which comes with its own political costs and new expectations). 
Alternatively, less stable governments may be less adept at making 
evaluations that would otherwise lead to termination.  
Thirdly, government effectiveness is one of the biggest surprises, 
especially with respect to its impact on longer-term survival. In most 
models, the coefficients are significant for both projects in general and 
concessions only. The signs align with expectations for 5-year survival 
(positive) and cancellation (negative). In other words, more effective 
governments are likelier to see PPPs survive the early years and less 
likely to experience cancellation. The coefficient for 10-year survival is 
negative, however, which both runs counter to theory and presents 
something of a logical dilemma for reconciling this with the results for 
early survival and cancellation models.  
Keeping in mind problems of multicollinearity that necessitate 
interpretive caution, one possibility is that, as with regulation, these 
shifts can also be explained by temporal dynamic changes in projects’ 
lifecycles. More effective governments may be better armed to deal 
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with the early-phase pressures of PPP, making increased effectiveness 
positive to early survival. But for survival to the median-term, increased 
government effectiveness has a negative relationship. This strange 
result – again, to be interpreted cautiously due to scale problems (i.e., 
measurement of effectiveness at the broad national level versus 
municipal level) – indicates that government effectiveness also 
problematizes later-term survival. This may be for one of two possible 
reasons. For one, stronger government agencies may be better 
equipped to objectively evaluate performance outcomes. Where they 
are lesser than expected, effective bureaucracies are more capable of 
negotiating terminations and managing political forces that inhibit 
cancellation. Also, more capable governments may perceive the 
possibility of re-municipalization as a surmountable task, whereas less 
capable governments may see cancellation after several years as an 
unworkable prospect. The sign alignment of cancellation and 10-year 
survival for concessions may also be attributable to the distribution of 
cancellations weighted towards the early years. It again brings up 
questions about dynamic shifts following a “settling in” period, and also 
whether increased government effectiveness and confidence in 
managing potential re-municipalization may give agencies the strength 
to pressure low-performing companies to the point of exit, or 
alternatively facilitate desirable cancellations in later years. 
Finally, corruption behaves surprisingly. Whilst one would expect 
corruption to problematize partnerships and contribute towards early 
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contract termination, the opposite is demonstrated in regression 
outcomes: the coefficients associated with the Transparency 
International Corruption Perceptions Index (ti_cpi) are negative and 
significant to 5- and 10-year survival, with stronger results for the 
sample delimited to concessions only. They are also positively 
significant (but not consistently), to cancellation. In the TI corruption 
perceptions index (CPI), a higher score (ranging from 0 to 100) 
indicates less corruption or greater perceived “cleanliness”. This 
suggests that higher levels of corruption (lower CPI scores) can, in fact, 
promote survival, and lower levels of corruption (higher CPI scores) 
may promote cancellation. Thus, the negative significance of corruption 
to survival indicates that the cleaner a country is, the less likely a PPP 
is to survive. Further, while one Kappa model indicates the positive 
impact of corruption (i.e., a higher corruption score / less corruption is 
negatively related to survival) on 10-year survival for all projects, the 
significance of corruption to that milestone is more consistent for the 
project set limited to concessions only. 
The upshot is that countries where government is rife with corruption 
may be more apt to sustain water PPPs, whereas cleaner countries 
may be more likely to experience early contract termination. One 
possible explanation is that government officials can benefit from PSP 
arrangements, regardless of whether they are instrumentally effective. 
Direct personal benefits associated with upholding PPPs may support 
their preservation even where cancellation is preferable. 
 138 
For cancellation, the major influencing factor is simply the occurrence 
of an economic shock and the level of government effectiveness. The 
latter matters, also, for concessions above and beyond the influence on 
projects overall, suggesting that the management requirements of a 
concession are more dependent on government effectiveness, 
especially for the short term. This last point become apparent when 
comparing both the coefficient sizes for concessions and projects 
overall for survival to 5 years, and the sign change for survival to 10 
years. Whilst effectiveness remains important to 10-year survival, its 
sign change to negative suggests a dynamic shift and also hints at the 
supporting role effectiveness plays in surviving an early settling-in 
period. Other factors whose significance to cancellation is less 
consistently demonstrated, but which remain salient for case study are 
corruption, regulatory quality, political stability, and participation of a 
foreign company.  
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Table 29. Kappa models, institutions and participation, cancellation, all 
projects 
 All Projects 
  Cancel Cancel Cancel Cancel Cancel Cancel 
econshock 1.446*** 2.671*** 1.902*** 1.982*** 2.307*** 2.706*** 
ti_cpi .007 .554 -.110 .108 -- .633 
wbgi_goveff -1.640 -3.242** -- -- -1.937* -2.637 
wbgi_polstab .535 .357 .056 -.057 .289 .311 
wbgi_regqual 1.930** 2.024 2.125 -- 1.224 1.240 
gdppcap_pppint -.000* -.000 -.000 -.000 -- -.000* 
fi_legalstrucproprights -- .253 .032 .049 .342 .307 
hf_propertyrights -- -.016 -.028 .006 -.014 -.008 
foreigncompany .525 .428 .368 .371 .526 .170 
multpart .474 .321 .399 .508 .407 .490 
mls .085 .055 .385 .261 .138 .164 
directnegotiation .986* .694 .599 .305 .295 .844 
laborunionstrength -- -- -- -- -- 1.855 
_cons -2.018* -4.333 -.212 -3.151* -4.131* -5.663 
             
Observations 359 264 264 264 266 256 




Table 30. Kappa models, institutions and participation, cancellation, 
concessions only 
  Concessions only 
  Cancel Cancel Cancel Cancel Cancel Cancel Cancel 
econshock 3.258*** 4.562*** 2.693*** 2.765*** 3.636*** 3.809*** 4.195 
ti_cpi .528 1.049* -.139 -.017 -- -- 1.017 
wbgi_goveff -5.996*** -6.943*** -- -- -4.047** -4.345** -5.836* 
wbgi_polstab 2.420** 2.040 .932 .749 1.977 1.884 2.323 
wbgi_regqual 2.896** 2.115 2.077 -- 1.651 -- 1.787 
gdppcap_pppint -.000* -.000 -.000 -.000 -- -.000 -.000 
fi_legalstrucprop -- .102 -.137 -.096 .145 .252 -.235 
hf_propertyrights -- -.003 -.043 -.002 -.019 .039 .002 
foreigncompany 1.213* 1.215 1.075 1.084 1.144 1.215 .992 
multpart -.040 -.738 -.422 -.369 -.585 -.685 -.445 
mls -1.723 -1.789 -.581 -.639 -1.224 -1.316 -1.313 
directnegotiation .691 .483 -.375 -.514 .254 .123 .551 
laborunionstrength -- -- -- -- -- -- .537 
_cons -3.666** -5.627 1.139 -1.739 -2.874 -5.111 -3.992 
              
Observations 187 151 151 151 151 149 149 
Pseudo R2 .291 .286 .190 .184 .240 .248 .278 
*p<.1; **p<=.05;***p<=.01 
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3.4.3 Iota models 
The Iota models test the significance of broad societal ideation on the 
lastingness of water PPPs. As an interpretive note, higher values for 
the variables on confidence in government and in major companies 
actually means less confidence – i.e., the highest confidence score is 
1, and the lowest is 4. This makes interpretation slightly more difficult, 
but some interesting conclusions may be drawn.  
For one, the effects of broadly held citizen ideas about the competence 
and legitimacy of government and business appear to have no effect 
on the early years of a PPP. Certainly, there have been high-profile 
cancellations in the face of extreme political opposition (e.g., the 2000 
“water war” in Cochabamba, Bolivia). Nevertheless, these results 
suggest that, on average, a society’s confidence in business and 
government – only two measures of societal ideals, an unspecific to 
water per se – have no generalizable impact in a PPP’s early years. 
Later, however, these ideas, particularly confidence in major 
companies, do become important. 
Table 31. Iota models, Ideas 
  Yrs_5 Yrs_5 Yrs_10 Yrs_10 Canceled Canceled 
wvs_confgov .292 -1.673 2.131*** 2.251*** .344 -.030 
wvs_confmajorcompanies -1.537 -1.533 -3.446*** -3.708*** 2.442** 6.187*** 
_cons 6.314 11.691 3.732 4.182* -9.253*** -18.484*** 
Observations 289 154 283 153 289 154 
Pseudo R2 .009 .100 .179 .188 .055 .273 
*p<.1; **p<=.05;***p<=.01     
Logistic regression model; sample: water projects except divestitures and contracts starting 
after 2005. For survival, samples are limited to projects with contract terms of over 5 and 10 
years, respectively. 
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The higher score a country has for confidence in major companies, the 
more likely it is to be cancelled and the less likely it is to survive to ten 
years. Remembering that higher scores (from 1 to 4) are associated 
with decreasing confidence, this result aligns easily with expectation. In 
other words, a country with a score of 4, indicating no confidence in 
business, is less likely to see a water PPP last 10 years and more likely 
to experience cancellation. Conversely, a country with higher levels of 
confidence in government (i.e., scores closer to 1) is on average less 
likely to survive to 10 years than one with low levels of confidence in 
government (i.e., scores closer to 4). This makes sense: countries with 
low levels of confidence in their governments would tend to be more 
conducive to privatization. Interestingly, it is confidence in big business 
that appears to matter more overall, ideationally, than a society’s 
feelings about the capability of government.  
3.5 Driving qualitative research 
The results of the set of quantitative analysis are not intended to be 
strictly predictive in a precise mathematical sense. Rather, they serve 
as explanatory starting points, pointing out the typical directional 
influence and relative impact of multitudinous project-level, institutional, 
and cultural factors. More so, these results are useful guides for detail-
rich qualitative study. Quantitative results suggest which factors are 
significant, but comparative case study addresses shortcomings 
associated with three kinds of problems associated with sole reliance 
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on regression analysis: measurement problems, interaction problems, 
and cross-sectional data limitations. 
Firstly, there exist limitations associated with validity of the models and 
variable measurements themselves within the regression analyses that 
warrant triangulation via qualitative study. For one, there are high 
degrees of multicollinearity amongst important institutional factors such 
as corruption, government effectiveness, rule of law, etc., which exist 
alongside the threat of omitted variable bias that might result from 
leaving them out of the analyses altogether (in addition to the fact that 
they are variables of interest in and of themselves). There is 
additionally a degree of uncertainty about the variable measurements 
themselves for those variables whose values are dependent on highly 
specific definitions: slight variances between countries in their 
definitions of metrics may change the values assigned them. For 
example, there exist limitations in defining and measuring such 
concepts as democratization, voice and accountability, security of 
property rights, or quality of governance. Because these notions might 
be defined and measured in innumerable ways, limitations on their 
reliability as independent variables must be acknowledged. 
Secondly, regression analyses suggest how particular project-level and 
institutional variables influence cancellation independently, controlling 
for other independent factors. Practical experience, theory, and 
fieldwork all point out, however, that interactions and relationships 
between variables may be more important to explaining PPP 
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outcomes. There may some factors that are significant generally, but 
that may or may not lead to early determination depending on the value 
of other factors. For example, a contract awarded in an environment of 
rampant corruption may be more or less apt to last depending on the 
freedom of the press or the participation of a foreign partner versus a 
local partner – or both. Or, an effectiveness bureaucracy might be more 
apt to promote sustenance of good contracts and early termination of 
poorly designed contracts, depending on the voice and accountability 
of the citizenship, degree of corruption, political stability, etc. Whilst 
interactive terms may be used in regression, it is difficult to know how 
or when to start and stop instrumenting combined variables since many 
are influential on many others, and the coefficients on multiple 
instruments are difficult to interpret.  
Finally, due to data limitations, in their application to cross-sectional 
data, these regressions cannot capture the influence of changes in 
project-level and institutional factors over time on the health of the 
PPP. While the data capture factors like political stability averaged over 
the life of the project, the details related to timing and degree of political 
shifts and their impacts on the health of the PPP at particular 
milestones is lost in the flattening of information into a cross-sectional 
dataset. Optimally, measurements over time would be available for 
every independent variable, as would some kind of measurement of the 
“health” of the PPP at different time points. This data is not, however, 
available. As such, we turn to qualitative research to mine a richer story 
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of the influence of time-dependent, interrelated, and nebulously defined 
factors on PPP health over time. 
That said, the regression analysis provides results that motivate 
several key areas of focus for qualitative case study. One task is to 
triangulate the results that demonstrate the significance of economic 
shock, direct negotiation, participation of foreign companies and 
multiple partners, and the legal underpinning of property rights. The 
second is to better understand the differences in factors affecting early 
and later period survival; the undecided role of corruption on PPP 
preservation; the impact of regulation at national and local levels; the 
influences of government effectiveness and political stability; problems 
associated with foreign partnership; and the possibility that PPP 
survival can mean instrumental success or failure in different situations. 
I.e., might it be the case that some later projects that should be 
cancelled but are not, and if so, what bars exit or necessary adjustment 
in the later years of a PPP?  
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Chapter 4. Pathways to survival: Three Southeast Asian 
cities 
Whilst the quantitative component of this research project suggests 
several interesting findings about the average, independent effects of 
project structure and institutional environment on water PPPs, herein I 
present a set of Southeast Asian urban water utility cases in order to 
elaborate the ‘how and why’ of relational and performance success and 
failure; compare the effects of proposed determinants over several 
cases; and shed light on the dynamics of commitment problems that 
relate to the institutional environment and project structure. 
Additionally, comparative case study allows for the investigation of the 
configurative effects of multiple conditions on performance outcomes 
and project sustainability.  
In this chapter, the comparative case method is employed to contrast 
water utility concessions in the Southeast Asian cities of Manila, 
Philippines; Jakarta, Indonesia; and Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Jakarta 
and Manila have two distribution concessions each, and Kuala Lumpur 
[KL] currently has four concessions for water treatment and distribution 
in a disaggregated value chain arrangement. Jakarta and Manila each 
have two clearly defined operations, which are treated as separate 
concession cases but are discussed together, as they operate within 
the same political, social, and institutional environments, and also 
interact directly with each other. Kuala Lumpur, on the other hand, is a 
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messy bundle of arrangements with one distribution concession, and is 
more meaningfully understood as one case.  
4.1 Framing for comparison: Qualitative methodology  
The qualitative methodology is generally discussed in the second 
chapter; however, more detailed comments on the methodology, and in 
particular, the case selection and comparative structure are warranted 
here. These, too, are tied directly to comments made at the close of the 
previous chapter on efforts to deal with shortfalls inherent to regression 
analysis, as well as to the theoretical discussions in the second 
chapter. My own research philosophy and epistemological standpoint 
suggests that comparative analysis begs the use of an organizing 
framework to specify comparable components across cases, but that 
unique cases that may be difficult to fit into the strictest requirements of 
most-different or most-similar research design can also yield valuable 
information that may inform future research and project design.  
Some cases are more easily and directly comparable to others. 
Comparison is easily made sense of, for example, between the 
concessions within Jakarta and Manila, each, as well as between the 
two cities as a whole. But all of the case projects, including Kuala 
Lumpur, display sufficient homogeneities in general project structure 
and institutional factors to allow for comparison: ultimately, they are all 
water distribution concessions in cities with political and cultural 
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similarities. Further, all three are major capital cities in the geographical 
area where concessions cancellations have been most pronounced.9 
The facets under study draw on the analytical models presented in 
Chapters 1 and 2. Institutional and instrumental performance outcomes 
are understood as functions of commitment, adaptability, and 
capability. These factors determine if participants can meet their 
obligations, if they will choose to do so, and how they will do so over 
time in changing political, institutional, economic, and social contexts. 
In turn, imperative and motivational commitment, adaptability, and 
capability depend on project- and local-level rules and capacities; 
rooted conditions; and context dynamics.  
4.2 Informing the PPP comparative framework 
The selection of specific comparators is guided by inputs from three 
general sources: established academic and practice-based literature on 
PPPs, the large-N regression analysis presented herein, and first-hand 
fieldwork experience. The selection of cases is both pragmatic and 
responsive to methodological guidance on case selection for 
comparative social science research. Within the research framework, 
the cases themselves are built largely on primary research, including 
in-depth interviews and reviews of documentation obtained from 
                                            
9 39.2% of concessions projects in East Asia Pacific (not China) have been 
cancelled, and 52.9% are either distressed or cancelled. This compares to 
global averages of 6.6% and 8.2%, respectively. 
 153 
government, business, and media sources. Interviews are listed in 
Appendix 1, and document sources are noted both in in-text citations 
and in the bibliography.  
The sample of interviewees was either representative or referred: 
where access could be gained to managers from the granting 
agencies, concessionaires, regulatory offices, and NGOs (as in Jakarta 
and Manila), the sample of interviewees was representative of the 
major sectors involved in the PPP deals. In Kuala Lumpur, however, 
access to key officials was denied, despite the author’s best attempts. 
As such, the sample was restricted to the national regulator, a 
legislator, and a businessperson central to the deals who spoke on the 
condition of anonymity. Whilst this sample of interviewees is clearly the 
weakest, validity was strengthened by triangulating participants’ 
accounts with other sources, including news media, and government 
reports. Detailed interview notes were taken during all discussions. 
These were immediately typed, dated, and annotated by the author, 
and stored in both hard and soft copy for future reference. The Manila 
and Jakarta cases also benefit from pre-existing research: some of the 
data herein draws on published academic research.   
In order to compare and contrast these projects, the framework 
introduced earlier in Chapter 2 was constructed to specify the particular 
points of comparison. The selection of the four variable classes that 
comprise the base comparative framework draws in part on the PPP 
structuring framework suggested by Vives, Benavides, and Paris (Vives 
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et al., 2006), as well as on other frameworks in water PPP literature. 
Vives, et al., suggest that research on PPPs map out: (1) local 
conditions, the components of a country’s business climate that have 
an impact on conditions for investment decision making; (2) project 
modalities, the spectrum of arrangements that may be applied; and (3) 
tools, the risk mitigation instruments available for use. These three 
facets are encompassed in the author-constructed variables classes  
“rooted conditions” and “project rules”.  
But primary research and literature review suggest that these, while 
critical, may be inadequate to explain the demise or sustenance a PPP, 
for they fail to attend to some critical interactions and components of 
the action arena, including the interests of and relationships amongst 
participants themselves, participant capacities and strategies, 
outcomes over time, regulatory systems, rule conflicts, and ideas. 
The results derivative from logistic regression models associated with 
utility concessions, in particular, are another important input, as 
discussed in 3.5 Driving qualitative research. Considering regression 
analysis results, several factors come to be of particular interest for 
comparative case study, with the intention of providing more detail as 
to why and how they are important, not only independently, but also 
interactively. These include the incidence of corruption, regulatory 
quality, government effectiveness, political stability, the occurrence of 
economic shocks, involvement of foreign partners, and the legal 
environment and rule of law. 
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Another set of comparative factors includes those that were observed 
to be obviously important during fieldwork, but were not observable or 
amenable to analysis in the large-N quantitative research. These 
include changes in the political system throughout the duration of the 
contract, the quality of contract design, specific regulatory mechanisms 
in use and their evolution over time, the quality and availability of 
information, the financial and technical capacity of the private sector 
partner, organizational and regulatory adaptation to feedback and 
change, and actors’ interests, relationships and norms of interaction. 
Synthesizing the PPP structuring framework, literature, and the author’s 
grounded research and logic, the potential rules, conditions, and 
stakeholder attributes may be mapped across three levels of analysis: 
conditions at the meta-level; the governance environment at the meso-
level; and project conditions at the micro-level. 
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 Meta level (nation / culture) 
Meso level (local 
community) 
Micro level (organization / 
project) 
Rules Rule of law Legal authority for water supply 
Contract / project structure (PPP 
type, duration) 





Participant / ownership rules 
 Democratization Contract adjustment and adjudication rules 
Price structure rules (cost recover, 
cost inputs) 
 Voice and accountability   
Price-setting / adjustment rules 
(process, authority) 
     Remuneration rules 
     Reporting, monitoring and oversight rules 
     
Performance standards and 
obligations (including capital 
investment, O&M, etc.) 
     Contract award method 
     Risk allocation (demand, operational, financial) 
     Government guarantees / financial support 
              
Conditions Government effectiveness Company financial health 
 Political stability Company technical capacity  
   
Complexity of the 
project and information 
about the current state 
  
 Economic shocks 
Environmental 
degradation / quality of 
water resources 
  
 Degree of corruption 
              
Stakeholder attributes and 
resources   
Involvement of a  
foreign partner 
 Public attitudes about government Involvement of a multilateral development agency 
 National leader attitudes about PPP 
Local leader attitudes 
about PPP 




towards the private 
sector 
Capacity of regulator Capacity of granting agency in negotiation / contracting  
   





       
Interests 
Interests of state / 
national elected 
officials 
Interests of the 
citizenry Interests of the granting agency 
   Interests of the local elected officials Interests of the private company 
 157 
It is apparent in this variable map that multitudinous factors are at play 
in describing the actors involved in PPPs as well as in defining the 
business, political, and administrative landscapes within which they 
operate. In detail, the imminently different “values” observed for each 
variable, for each case, yields a picture of highly differentiated, unique 
circumstances and projects. The variable set is too extensive, however, 
as a case framework and fails to capture the temporal aspect of 
performance. The challenge is, thus, to trim this large variable set into 
a more parsimonious and practical, albeit broader, set of comparators 
whilst preserving the richness of each case and incorporating time. 
This, in turn, is a step further towards a manageable framework that 
allows the research to draw out some generalizable lessons about 
managing hybrid institutional structures and, more specifically, PPPs.  
So then, mapping the nested rule sets requires understanding the 
national, state, and municipal legal-institutional frameworks in which 
the contracts are located. Therein, the legal framework includes the 
legal designation of authority over water issues; structuring rules that 
determine the degree of decentralization, allocate power and 
resources, and define accountability structures; and the characteristics 
of the property rights regime. At the meso-level, the regulatory rules in 
place determine regulatory timing and order; the scope of oversight and 
directive authority; independence; and rules governing the availability 
and asymmetry of information available for monitoring and oversight.  
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And the contract preparation terms and contract itself set the operating 
rules of the game, including the method of the bid award; scope of 
responsibility and terms of remuneration for service; the terms and 
responsibilities associated with project and operating finance; pricing 
rules; investment, production, and coverage requirements; specification 
of how to deal with liabilities and assets existing prior to PPP; reporting 
structures; monitoring and information rules; and conflict resolution 
processes. Within the contract and regulatory structure, rules 
particularly apply to the critical finance and pricing questions. These 
may determine how the project will be financed; allocate responsibility 
to government and the private partners in terms of financing capital 
expenditure (CapEx) and operating and maintenance expenditures 
(O&M); set the formulae and underpinning assumptions for pricing; set 
the contract currency and specify the bearers of currency, demand, and 
revenue risks; set the schedule and process for pricing adjustment; and 
set terms for the application of subsidies or other financial policy tools.  
As important as these rules, however, are the interests and 
characteristics of the actors operating (and conflicting) within them, and 
the material, political, macroeconomic, and capacity-related conditions 
they deal with. Indeed, some of these conditions are set by and/or 
interact with the rule sets, whilst some are entirely external. For 
example, related to the contract preparation, terms, and regulatory 
oversight, there are important conditions that are determined by and 
feed back into the rules, such as the degree of complexity (e.g., is the 
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tariff structure easily understood?) and accuracy (e.g., were the bid 
assumptions accurate? Were bids realistic?), as well as the availability 
of information (e.g., Are there rules requiring external auditing? Is there 
a clear reporting process with strictly set definitions? Was there 
sufficient technical, financial, and social analysis prior to contracting?). 
There are also important conditions external to the contract, including 
the will and interests of parties to the contract (e.g., were all parties 
interested in PPP? Were there intra-government conflicts?), as well as 
the capacity of the awarding agency and regulator. Further, there are 
important conditions related to politics and participation, including the 
degree of corruption and political interference, the involvement of 
consumer citizens, the balance of negotiating power between parties, 
and the robustness of plans to address other important related issues 
such as poverty and the environment. 
Finally, linkages must be drawn between the rules and conditions – 
both stable and dynamic – that define each case over time, and the 
outcomes with respect to collaboration and performance. These 
outcomes include the stability of relationships amongst stakeholders 
(particularly parties to the contracts), effects on tariffs (price changes) 
and cost recovery, efficiency gains or losses, reductions in non-
revenue water, collected revenues, and service quality, coverage, and 
regularity. To account for these many inputs, the following general 
framework is employed: 
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Table 32. Comparative variable classes 
Project Rules and Capacities 
Relatively static 
Direct control over 
Meso- and micro-levels  
Project rules, including the contract rules 
and parts of the regulatory system 
(operating model; allocation of risk and 
responsibility; method of contract award; 
terms of remuneration; ownership of 
assets; governance and conflict 
management rules; currency of trade; 
application of risk mitigation tools 
(guarantees, risk insurance) 
Participants’ technical capacities 
Regulatory settings and 
targets 
Dynamic 
Direct control over 
Micro-level  
Periodically changing rules related to 
tariffs, investment, contract management 
and enforcement, and operating plans 
Operating period targets 
Organizational rules  
Rooted Conditions  
Relatively static, slow to change  
Limited control  
Meta- and meso-levels 
Institutional conditions such as rule of law, 
national regulatory capacity, property 
rights regime, corruption 
Physical infrastructure condition and 
scope of work; availability and quality of 
inputs and information 
Stakeholder attributes, such as 
government capacity, corporate culture, 
and political ideology 
Context Dynamics  
Dynamic  
Limited control over  
Meta- and meso-levels 
Fiscal space (financial markets, 
availability of credit) and macroeconomic 
factors (crises, currency fluctuation) 
Availability, proximity, and quality of raw 
inputs (raw water, power, etc.) 
External shocks, force majeure 
Higher-level legal / institutional 
arrangements 
Public, consumer, and labor sentiment  
4.2.1 Case overview and selection 
In selecting cases for comparison, Berg-Schlosser and de Meur advise 
that cases must have sufficient variation and sufficient areas of 
homogeneity to allow for comparison. They suggest that “an area of 
homogeneity… must be defined that established boundaries within 
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which cases are selected. Cases must parallel each other sufficiently 
and be comparable along certain specified dimensions.” But also, “a 
maximum of heterogeneity over a minimum number of cases should 
also be achieved” (Berg-Schlosser & De Meur, 2009). One might select 
dissimilar cases with similar outcomes to elucidate the confounding 
factors that lead to their similar outcomes (a most-different design); or 
choose cases with many similarities, but different outcomes, in order to 
tease out the factors that lead to their different end states (a most-
similar design) (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994). 
There is, indeed, variation in the “successfulness” of the cases 
presented hereafter, as well as variation across a set of independent 
variable classes suspected to influence PPP implementation in 
configurative – rather than independent – ways. But, there are also 
broad similarities in all of the cases that allow for meaningful 
comparison of the impacts of proposed independent variables on the 
degree of collaborative and performance success. The clear similarity 
across the board is the structure of the contracts and the function they 
are intended to serve – the PPP cases under study all involve urban 
water utility concessions. The cases situated in Jakarta and Manila are 
particularly comparable given the similarity in their structures, and 
Kuala Lumpur is comparable to these also due to similarities in the 
position of economic and political importance the city holds as it’s 
nation’s largest city and capital. Further, in line with Shirley and 
Menard’s case selections (2002), the cities under study all held water 
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as key priority, were all experiencing high growth at the time of 
inception, and all had similar problems of poor quality and high NRW. 
Finally, case selection was driven by practical considerations – 
financial and time-related – that limited fieldwork to Southeast Asia. 
This tighter geographical constraint actually improves the comparability 
of the cases, however, as there exist general regional similarities that 
make cases more directly comparable. 
Five utility concession cases10 in three Asian cities are presented. The 
capital cities of Manila and Jakarta are two of Asia’s megacities, with 
agglomerated urban populations of approximately 11.86 and 9.63 
million in 2011, respectively (United Nations, 2012). Both cities are 
densely populated, with charged political environments, high levels of 
perceived corruption in business and government, and complex 
geospatial conditions. While Kuala Lumpur proper is a smaller city of 
approximately 1.6 million, the Greater Kuala Lumpur / Klang Valley 
area, including Kuala Lumpur’s suburbs and adjoining cities (which are 
also served by the concession operators), boasts a population of 
approximately 5.7 million as of 2010 (Ministry of Federal Territories, 
2011). It is also its nation’s capital and largest city, and is thus subject 
to a similarly charged political and business atmosphere as Jakarta 
and Manila. 
                                            
10 One of these cases – Selangor / Kuala Lumpur – is actually a bundle of four 
concessions involving water treatment plants and the distribution system. 
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Returning to the case selection specified in Chapter 3, along with 
notions about pure success / failure and partial collaborative and 
performance-related success / failure discussed in Chapter 1, the 
cases to be described hereafter are summarized by their outcomes.  














The Manila Water 
concession suffered 
technical failure in early 
years, but has adjusted and 
leveraged relational success 
into overall success. 
Maynilad I Water utility 
concession 
System failure / 
early termination 
The first Maynilad 
concession was terminated 








This second take with a new 
private operator has become 













failure, leading to 
system failure  
The KL bundle is a pure 
performance failure and 
near-pure relational failure, 
but falls just short of pure 
failure due to support from 










pure failure  
Palyja, the troubled Western 
Jakarta concession, 
demonstrates clear 
relational failure and low 
technical outcomes.  









Once on the brink of failure, 
Jakarta’s Eastern 
concession is moving 




Many actors have interests in water service, including users, taxpayers, 
local and national governments, regulators, private partners, 
employees and labor unions, bankers, donors, and NGOs. Water PPPs 
are action situations defined by participants and their positions, 
decision outcomes, participants’ control, and the information available. 
These actors possess different information processing capabilities and 
choice processes, preferences and interests, and resources (power) 
(Ostrom, 2005). In water supply, stakeholders include the government 
agency, elected politicians, the water companies, users, taxpayers, 
bankers, and workers.  
While interest sets generally hold across the cases to follow, the 
allocation of power and degree of alignment of powerful actors’ goals 
(as opposed to the particular rules in place) is an important factor in 
determining a PPP’s institutional sustainability and the motivational 
credibility of participants, though rules certainly mitigate the negative 
effects of misalignment. On the other hand, rules appear more 
important to performance-related success, but high imperative 
credibility can be frustrated by low motivational credibility. Further, 
interests may become intertwined, mutated, and unclear in the face of 
corruption, and political and financial power are key – sometimes over 
and above the rules at hand – to understanding performance outcomes 
and the sustenance of PPP arrangements, particularly when 




Chapter 5. Jakarta: Rigidity and regulatory relegation 
The Jakarta PSP experience is a story of two concessions with 
tumultuous histories and divergent paths. One has evolved to become 
a potentially workable, albeit tenuous, long-term arrangement, despite 
limited success in early years; and the other has remained highly 
problematic relationally and technically, but has nevertheless 
languorously survived due to generous initial contract terms and 
political bolstering at the highest government and international levels. 
The case is most interesting because, despite ambiguous instrumental 
success and apparent relational and institutional failures, the contracts 
have lasted for over fifteen years, held barely together by a 
combination of upper-most political support, bureaucratic torpor, and 
legal and financial barriers on the exit of participants. 
Indonesia’s capital city boasts a population of over 10 million residents 
in its densely packed city proper and thrice the amount in the greater 
metropolitan area. Its resident population has grown rapidly over the 
past few decades, more than doubling since 1975 in the city proper, 
and quadrupling to an enormous 28 million in the greater conurbation of 
“Jabodetabek”, which includes Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang and 
Bekasi (Badan Pusat Statistik, 2011). As Indonesia’s capital region and 
most important economic center, Jakarta’s infrastructure is critical to 
the country’s overall industrial and economic growth.  
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The capital city is located in the low basin of the Ciliwung River. Only 
barely above sea level in most places and well below in others, the city 
is subject to a host of challenging water management issues including 
flooding, water pollution, high water loss, and land subsidence. While 
the city is not short of raw water, it has long suffered poor management 
of the supply system, yielding persistently low levels of piped water 
service, dismally low sanitation, waterways clogged with garbage and 
pollutants, and regular flooding. In the mid-1990s, the national 
government introduced water supply concession contracts in the capital 
city in order to improve the poorly performing service as part of 
President Suharto’s ambitious development program aimed at rapidly 
transforming Jakarta into a “city of the future” and “gateway of the 
nation” (Kusno, 2011). 
Understanding the introduction of concessions projects and 
subsequent outcome of the Jakarta PPPs requires an appreciation of 
the broader social, political, and business climate of Indonesia. Indeed, 
making sense of the PPP choice in the first place, the selection of 
private companies, and the follow-on development of working 
relationships, emergent regulatory structures, and service outcomes, 
hinges on an understanding of the critical political and business 
structures and players and significant political and economic changes 
in that period of recent Indonesian history. 
After gaining independence from The Netherlands in 1945, and up until 
the drastic political shift of the 1998 Reformasi (reform) movement, 
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Indonesia was ruled by only two powerful political regimes: the twenty-
year rule of Indonesia’s first president, Sukarno, and the thirty-two year 
rule of his General and dictatorial successor, President Suharto. After 
liberation, political instability following the introduction of a fairly robust 
parliamentary democracy gave way in a few short years to an 
increasingly authoritarian government – one that promised stability but 
devolved into near-complete autocracy. Sukarno’s “Guided Democracy” 
was a period of highly personalized authoritarian rule (he suspended 
parliamentary democracy altogether in 1959), intense patrimonialism, 
and rampant corruption (Robertson-Snape, 1999).  
The regime crumbled in 1965, when the military leader General 
Suharto deposed Sukarno and began his three-decade presidency, 
promising an end to KKN – “Korrupsi, Kollusi, Nepotisme”11. In fact, 
however, Suharto ultimately replaced it with a highly corrupt military 
authoritarian order, which afforded great personal benefits to Suharto 
family and cronies. Vaughn describes the “New Order” as providing 
political stability and fast paced economic growth, but “at the price of 
corruption and repression” (Vaughn, 2011).  
Suharto’s regime put the military in a position of political primacy under 
the pretense of a constitutional democratic framework. In fact, it was a 
classic “neopatrimonial” system comprised of a purportedly rational 
administrative apparatus and an extensive patronage network 
                                            
11 In English, “corruption, collusion, and nepotism.” 
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(Erdmann & Engel, 2006). The naissance of the Jakarta concessions 
was situated in these last years of Suharto’s regime, and one can make 
sense of the grossly incomplete contracts via an understanding that 
government contracts were awarded in a political economy tinged with 
blatant cronyism. 
In 1958, Jakarta was granted special administrative status as the 
capital city district, Daerah Khusus Ibukota12 Jakarta [DKI Jakarta], with 
governmental status akin to that of the provinces (DKI Jakarta, 2012). 
The city administration is headed by a Governor who oversees the 
governance of its five kotas (municipalities) and one regency, as well 
as the public agencies serving the city. Jakarta is also home to the 
nation’s central government: as such, its water politics are intense and 
subject to political interests at the local, national, and international 
levels.  
Jakarta’s water supply comes from surface water sources, drawing 
80% of its raw water from the Jatiluhur Water Reservoir on the Citarum 
River, which is currently operated by state-owned Perum Jasa Tirta II 
[PJTII]. Most of the remainder is purchased from the Perusahaan 
Daerah Air Minum [PDAM] (water agency) of a neighboring state, 
Tangerang. The water utilities, formerly of the government and now of 
the private concessionaires, buy raw water from PJTII and Tangerang 
to be treated in their own plants.  
                                            
12 “Special Capital City District” in English 
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Jakarta has had a piped distribution system since the Dutch colonial 
era. After gaining independence in 1945, responsibility for water 
service was transferred from the colonial government to a local 
government-owned company, Perusahaan Daerah Pelayanan Air 
Minum Jakarta Raya [PAM Jaya] (Nugroho, 2011). Over the course of 
the next forty years, PAM Jaya was unable to expand the network 
sufficiently to serve the rapidly growing population, and could not 
generate the revenues needed to properly maintain the piping system. 
By 1997, PAM Jaya was intermittently servicing only about 43% of the 
city (Harsono, 2003; Iwanami & Nickson, 2008) with non-potable, 
expensive water. Production costs and tariffs were high compared to 
other cities in the region (Andrews & Yniguez, 2004), and non-revenue 
water had climbed up to between 57% (Harsono, 2003; Achmad Lanti, 
2007) and 58.5% (Iwanami & Nickson, 2008).  
Problems in PAM Jaya prior to PPP have been largely attributed to low 
technical capacity, corruption, and mismanagement. Nugroho, for 
instance, attests that PAM Jaya suffered from politically appointed 
managers prone to abuse of power, whose actions tended to benefit 
the bureaucracy and politicos rather than the general public (Nugroho, 
2011). By the early 1990s, during which time the Suharto government 
was ardently promoting marketization and foreign direct investment, the 
Jakarta government realized that their insolvency and poor 
performance limited the ability to attract private capital for infrastructure 
development. Facing their record of high water losses and poor service 
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and their position of low bankability, DKI explored the possibility of 
privatizing state enterprises, including water supply.  
Another reason to overhaul the water sector dealt with land subsidence 
due to over-abstraction. Because service quality was low and prices 
high, residents and commercial users tended to depend on extracted 
groundwater. The Jakarta local government, through the imposition of a 
groundwater tax and the granting of licenses, regulates abstraction of 
groundwater, but enforcement and oversight have traditionally been 
weak. Over-abstraction was lowering the groundwater tables and 
causing land subsidence at a rate of 2.8 cm per year (Achmad Lanti, 
2007) as well as causing saltwater intrusion in aquifers (Andrews & 
Yniguez, 2004). 
Former Jakarta Water Supply Regulatory Body [JWSRB] and PAM 
Jaya employees described the mixed motivations cited for employing a 
PSP scheme as “lack of financing and inefficiency” within PAM Jaya 
and encouragement from The World Bank, which was actively 
promoting PPPs in infrastructure in developing regions at the time. In 
1991, the Bank funded a US$92 million water supply development loan 
matched with a loan from Japan’s Overseas Economic Cooperation 
Fund. The loans were accompanied by mounting pressure to privatize 
(Ahmad Lanti, Ali, Kretarto, Nugroho, & Zulfikar, 2009). 
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5.1 Suharto’s legacy 
In 1992, UK company Thames Water entered Indonesia for the first 
time. French water multinational, Suez, had been operating a number 
of smaller water treatment plants in Indonesia, via its subsidiary Ondeo, 
and viewed Thames as a threat to their share in a potentially lucrative 
market (Ahmad Lanti et al., 2009). Thames soon began discussions 
over a concession deal with Suharto’s son, Sigit Harjojudanto, and his 
company, PT Kekar Pola Airindo [KPA]. Sigit and PT KPA had no water 
experience (Harsono, 2003), but alliance with a member of the Suharto 
family was a critical step towards securing a major infrastructure 
contract13. The companies agreed to an 80-20% ownership split, with 
Thames holding the majority stake and KPA gaining the minority share 
in the newly formed joint venture, Thames PAM Jaya [TPJ], at no cost 
(Ahmad Lanti et al., 2009).  
Catching wind of the proposed deal, Lyonnaise des Eaux (later 
renamed Suez) maneuvered to encourage a split concession that 
would divide the city into two service areas split by the Ciliwung River, 
along the lines of similar arrangements in Paris and Manila. Lyonnaise 
hired a French engineer, Bernard Lafrogne (who had also worked on a 
                                            
13	   Harsono describes this in his paper, quoting Teten Masduki of Indonesia 
Corruption Watch as saying, “Every multinational company cooperated with 
the Suharto cronies. You name it, electricity, oil, water, almost every 
business, it was an oligarchy of corruption. They bought the political 
protection.” And Peter Spillet of Thames explained, “At the time, any company 
dealing with Indonesia would have to deal with almost some element of the 
Suharto family because of the way the government was set up”. 
 
 173 
World Bank project in Indonesia and as a consultant from PAM Jaya) to 
manage a new deal. More importantly, Suez linked up with the 
enormously powerful Anthony Salim, a close Suharto crony and one of 
Indonesia’s wealthiest business men (Harsono, 2003). Salim had had 
previous relationships with a Suez competitor, Generale des Eaux, in 
the construction of water treatment plants elsewhere. Understanding 
the political sensitivity of a proposed division of the spoils, Salim 
proceeded cautiously so as not to upset the Suharto family (Ahmad 
Lanti et al., 2009), but when Lyonnaise successfully convinced the 
Suharto regime to employ a dual concession model, the Salim Group 
signed a deal with Lyonnaise / Suez to establish Joint Venture PT 
Garuda Dipta Semesta, which would be shortly renamed PT PAM 
Lyonnaise Jaya [Palyja].  
It would be apparent later, in the early months of each concession, that 
the local partners – Sigit Harjojudanto in Thames and Anthony Salim in 
Suez – were to be minimally involved in operations. Sigit was not 
present at negotiations, making an appearance only at the contract 
signing, and the business was entirely managed by Thames (Harsono, 
2003). Iwa Kartiwa, President of PT Garuda Dipta Semesta and a 
representative of Salim Group, admitted that he almost never 
participated in the management of Palyja (Harsono, 2003).  
Because water supply was a mandate of the public agency, and private 
ownership of water systems was expressly prohibited, legislation was 
required to pave the way for privatization. In 1994, Suharto pushed 
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forward the issuance of a new Regulation No. 20, which permitted 
private company ownership of water supply systems for up to 95% 
foreign ownership, overturning previous Laws 1/1967 and Law 11/1970 
which had expressly prohibited it (Sakti, 2012).  
Shortly thereafter, in the summer of 1995, Suharto instructed Minister 
of Public Works, Radinal Moochtar, to divide Jakarta into two equal 
concession areas divided by the Ciliwung. Immediately, the central 
government issued direct letters of invitation to Thames and Lyonnaise 
in June and August of 1995, respectively, which were further put into 
code via a Minister of Public Works Decree 249/KPTS/1995 (Nugroho, 
2011) to engage in negotiations for the east and west concessions.  
PAM Jaya officials were blindsided by the decision to privatize – that 
they were left “speechless at the news” (Harsono, 2003). The agency, 
which would participate directly in the new project companies as the 
granting agency, staff, and, initially, regulator, had been left entirely out 
of preparatory discussions. Nevertheless, the central government 
signed Memoranda of Understanding with Thames and Lyonnaise, 
coded in DKI Governor Decree 1327/95 in October, 1995, commencing 
the formal concessions relationships (Ahmad Lanti et al., 2009; 
Nugroho, 2011) without PAM Jaya’s participation. 
5.2 The contracts: Ambiguity, imposition, and deferment 
Following the 1995 deal, the project companies entered into long 
feasibility studies and nearly two years of protracted negotiations at the 
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highest levels of government with DKI administrators, the Ministries of 
Finance and Public Works, and participants from The World Bank. 
PAM Jaya was conspicuously sidelined, left to carry on normal 
operations during the transition, and limitedly included in negotiations. 
PAM Jaya was further isolated by higher-level government actors, as 
the agency’s officials were observed to have made attempts to subvert 
and complicate negotiations in order to demonstrate their active 
resistance (Interview, Lanti, 2013). In July 1996, in response to a 
recognized conflict between the emerging deals and the law prohibiting 
foreign ownership in the water sector, the Minister of Home Affairs 
issued a decree removing water from the list of businesses in which 
foreigners could not invest (Harsono, 2003; Ahmad Lanti et al., 2009).  
During negotiations, several sticking points delayed the process, 
particularly over access to information and risk allocation. For one, the 
companies insisted on exclusive financial management, and disagreed 
with PAM Jaya’s request for access to revenue and performance data.  
Secondarily, the companies bargained relentlessly for payment in US 
dollars (Harsono, 2003; Ahmad Lanti et al., 2009).	  	  
One year later, in June and August 1997, two 25-year contracts 
referred to as Cooperation Agreements [CA] were signed with TPJ, 
covering three service zones in the East, and Palyja, covering the 
same amount in the West, with effective dates of February 1998. The 
CAs stipulated the ultimate goal of universal coverage, full cost 
recovery, and reduction of NRW to 20% by 2023. The companies were 
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guaranteed a healthy 22% internal rate of return over the course of the 
concessions, which, while not directly specified in the contracts, was 
accepted as part of the submitted feasibility studies upon which the 
proposals and contracts were based (Nugroho, 2011).  
As for negotiation conflicts, the companies were forced to concede on 
the currency debate and agreed to accept payment in rupiah (Ahmad 
Lanti et al., 2009). On the other hand, PAM Jaya – despite its role as 
the regulator via contractual oversight – would not be guaranteed 
access to financials. Furthermore, the contracts did not include a 
system of penalties for failure to meet performance goals, nor did they 
specify monitoring and oversight processes. 
At the start of the contracts, PAM Jaya’s capital assets, including 
plants, the piping network, equipment, and offices14, would be turned 
over to the concessionaires (to be returned at the contract’s end), and 
the companies took on 3,000 PAM Jaya staff as seconded employees. 
They also agreed to assume and pay off PAM Jaya’s $231 million 
foreign debt out of revenues. PAM Jaya would take on the 
responsibility to ensure closure of private wells (at the time, 70% of 
drinking water in Jakarta came from wells) in order to promote use of 
piped water (Harsono, 2003; Ahmad Lanti et al., 2009).  
                                            
14 Thames and Suez executives later came under fire for renting expensive 
office space in central Jakarta. 
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One of the most interesting features of the contract, which would 
ultimately lead to major long-term financial problems, was the 
implementation of a “dual tariff instrument” by which the water charge 
owed by government to operators is separated from the water tariff 
owed by customer to government. The concessionaires would be 
responsible for collecting customer payment, but revenues would be 
deposited directly into an escrow account. Operators, in turn, receive a 
flat rate per cubic meter of water delivered and billed paid out from 
escrow (interview, Lanti 2013).  
Jensen points out that this dual instrument offered two main 
advantages: it would balance revenues between concessionaires, 
given differences between zones in land use and socioeconomic 
characteristics, and it would allow the government greater flexibility in 
levying tariff increases (Jensen, 2005). Theoretically, by making poorer 
customers equally profitable, this would also prevent operators from 
expanding only into higher-income areas (Interview, PAM Jaya 2013).  
The water charges are based on confidential contracted cost-plus 
formulae that account for planned operating and capital expenditures 
and a fixed 22% IRR over the lifetime of each concession. The charges 
increase yearly based on an indexation formula15 linked to the dollar–
                                            
15 This index water charge increase has been frozen since 2010. That year, 
Aetra signed a new agreement that specified a flat 1% per annum water 
charge increase. Palyja’s water charge was frozen by the DKI government 
upon the recommendation of a national auditor (field interviews in Singapore, 
2013). 
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rupiah exchange rate and inflation, essentially transferring currency 
and cost-recovery risks entirely to the government (V. Bakker, Kooy, 
Shofiani, & Martijn, 2006). Planned five-year comprehensive rate 
rebasing reviews allow for adjustments to the rate base to 
accommodate changing input costs, new capital expenditures, and 
other adjustments required to ensure the guaranteed returns. So then, 
the water charge itself is contract-based, and adjustments depend on 
negotiation between PAM Jaya and the operators.  
Tariff rates, on the other hand, are not governed by contract, and 
neither the operators nor PAM Jaya are authorized to implement 
adjustments. Tariffs follow a complex differentiated tariff schedule, with 
seven tariff groups and multiple subgroups, set by the Governor of 
Jakarta and approved by DKI Jakarta’s legislative council, or “dewan 
perwakilan rakyat daerah” [DPRD]. By contract, PAM Jaya would be 
held financially responsible, however, for any losses resultant from 
delays in tariff approval (Ahmad Lanti et al., 2009). Nevertheless, when 
the contract was signed, there was an assumption that tariff revenues 
would consistently exceed the total water charges owed (Nugroho, 
2011), allowing PAM Jaya to pay down huge foreign and Ministry of 
Finance debts and fund PAM Jaya operations. This has not, 
unfortunately, been the case: the water charge rose above the average 
tariff in late 1998 and remained above so until 2003, creating serious 
financial problems for PAM Jaya (Interview, JWSRB 2012).  
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In addition to the disparity between tariff revenues and water charges, 
the CAs exhibit additional weaknesses that created imbalances in the 
favor of the concessionaires. Perhaps most importantly, there are 
major information and authority problems associated with enforceability 
of the aims of the PPPs. Despite discussions of creating performance-
based contracts, Jakarta’s early CAs were almost entirely indicative 
rather than punitive, and subsequent efforts to impose sanctions due to 
non-performance have been infrequent and largely unsuccessful.  
The original CAs set forth targets for volume of water billed, volume 
produced, as well as goals for coverage and service quality – but these 
standards were not tied to the payment of the water charge or a system 
of penalties. In fact, with an eye on preserving the financial viability of 
all parties, the only target with specified repercussions for failure was 
water volume billed and collected. If collection fell below 70%, PAM 
Jaya could terminate. Palyja was unable to meet targets until 2001, but 
the government made no meaningful moves to cancel the contracts 
(Jensen, 2005). With profits delinked from revenues, companies were 
not incentivized to minimize risks inherent to cost-recovery.  
With respect to expansion and capital investment, the contract 
specified that signatory parties would jointly decide investment 
amounts, but that operators alone could decide how to allocate 
investments. In both the original and revised CAs, firms retained the 
right to adjust prior-approved spending plans if revenues were too low 
to service the water charge obligations (Jensen, 2005). As such, the 
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companies were given wide latitude to change capital investment plans 
or undercut investment commitments during each rebasing period and 
could not be meaningfully held to task for missing commitments. On the 
converse, the companies could not rely on PAM Jaya to make due 
payments, compromising operators’ financial viability. 
Even if PAM Jaya had a system of penalties for nonperformance at its 
disposal, the information needed to utilize it would have been 
unavailable. By contract, PAM Jaya was afforded no access to 
operators’ financial or operational information, nor were audit systems 
put in place. With this extremely limited transparency, the agency had 
little to work with in levying sanctions (Ahmad Lanti et al., 2009). Lastly, 
companies were required to go public with bidding only on sub-
contracts worth US$5 million or more. Allegations of lucrative related-
party transactions would become a growing and lasting concern over 
the years to follow (Interview, Ali 2012). 
5.3 Early shock: The Asian Financial Crisis 
In June of 1997, rapid Thai Baht devaluation set off the currency 
devaluation contagion that would become the Asian Financial Crisis. In 
a few short months, the rupiah was devalued 30%, falling from 
2300Rp/$ in July 1997, to 14000Rp/$ in February 1998. Inflation rose 
over 100%, and unemployment spiked. With this enormous 
devaluation, the value of operators’ rupiah investment commitments 
also fell, from US$610 to $160 million. The currency crisis led to a 
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severe economic crisis, political tensions, and violent ethnic-based riots 
through late 1997 and early 1998. The early months of 1998 saw revolt 
by a public angered by the Suharto regime’s role in breaking the state-
owned banks and hastening the country’s economic collapse.  
Amidst this upheaval, in February 1998, the concessionaires took over 
operations, and tariffs immediately increased by 15%. Only three 
months later, in May 1998, the entire political system in which the PPPs 
germinated drastically shifted. After Lieutenant General Subianto, 
Suharto’s son-in-law, ordered four student protesters shot, national 
outrage reached a fever pitch. Suharto was forced to resign, and along 
with him crumbled his regime. Government leadership fell to the new 
President, Habibie, and Jakarta’s Governor Sutiyoso. 
The regime’s toppling provided a window for dissolution of the 
concessions. During week after Suharto’s resignation, PAM Jaya 
resumed control of operations as private operators fled the country, 
incidentally leaving the water operations with insufficient chemical 
supplies to remain in operation by local managers (Achmad Lanti, 
2007). With approval from Jakarta’s new Governor Sutiyoso, PAM Jaya 
Director General Rama Boedi moved to cancel the contracts, which he 
pointed out to be illegal and corrupt (Harsono, 2003). On May 23, 1998, 
Boedi invited Kartiwa, President of the Suez consortium, Lafrogne, and 
Fachry Thaib, President of Thames Airindo (PT Kekar Thames Airindo / 
TPJ) to a tense meeting to announce the cancellation. After a heated 
argument, representatives signed the concessions over to PAM Jaya.  
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Their control of the water system lasted only one week. Foreign 
executives who had fled during the riots quickly returned to Jakarta to 
negotiate for the agreements to remain intact. With help from their own 
national governments, Suez and Thames convinced the new Habibie 
administration to uphold contracts if they would agree to separate 
themselves from Suharto-associated partners and renegotiate terms. 
The new government, fearful of chasing off foreign investment and 
keen to avoid costly litigation, agreed (Harsono, 2003). 
Upon separation, Sigit Suharto was paid a “recovery cost” for his share 
in the Thames Airindo company estimated at $700,000. Thames claims 
costs of buyout to Suharto partners were “negligible” (Harsono, 2003). 
Salim Group’s 60% share in the Suez alliance was estimated at about 
$3.2 million. The companies changed their names from KTA to PT 
Thames PAM Jaya [TPJ] and from GDS to PT PAM Lyonnaise Jaya 
[PALYJA], and ownership shifted to 95% stakes held by parent 
companies in Europe and 5% to local contractors. The renewed 
companies immediately faced huge challenges, however, following the 
financial crisis. Demand fell as consumer ability to pay plummeted; the 
resultant credit crisis made it nearly impossible to acquire financing for 
planned investments; and previously dollarized construction and import 
costs became unaffordable. Riots continued, some over the water 
tariffs, and the Governor announced that tariffs would be frozen and 
could not be adjusted until 2000, at the earliest (Jensen 2005). 
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5.3.1 Partial recovery from the flashpoint 
This initial critical flashpoint proved surmountable, but the deals would 
only limp along, eternally damaged relationally, structurally, politically, 
and financially for the next ten years. Political proponents of the deals, 
still hopeful for their potential improvement of water services and 
mindful of the negative impact termination would have on attracting 
foreign investment, entered into a drawn-out contract renegotiation with 
the operators – a process that would last three years. The companies 
were not necessarily hurried to push for a faster process, as the new 
contracts would likely reduce benefits for the private sector. 
Negotiations were also difficult in the face of political pressures and 
employee relations. PAM Jaya’s seconded employees went on strike, 
demanding better employment terms.  
During the renegotiation period, both operators and PAM Jaya suffered 
from the intense financial pressure. The significant rupiah devaluation 
hampered planned investments, as the operators had taken out foreign 
currency loans to finance planned capital expenditures (Iwanami & 
Nickson, 2008). While the government froze tariffs for the first three 
years of the PPP, inflation rose 120%. As all parties struggled to 
recover, PAM Jaya also grappled with its growing deficit. In December 
1999, Jakarta DPRD requested an audit by the national auditor, BPKP, 
to assess the shortfall. Auditors found that operating costs (especially 
related to high expatriate salaries and high-value real estate rental) 
were excessive (Ahmad Lanti et al., 2009). This would be used to 
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justify tariff freezes and as a negotiating tool in the decade-long battle 
to follow, starting with the closure of new restated contracts.  
In April 2001, the City Council approved a tariff increase of 35% 
(except for the two poorest consumer segments) (Jensen, 2005). The 
Governor agreed to tariff increases also in January 2002 and 2003, 
neither of which were actually implemented. As contract renegotiation 
progressed sluggishly, plans also began for a rate rebasing for the 
second contract period of 2003-2007. The rebasing process, which 
involved outside consultants including the Asian Development Bank, 
was scheduled for completion in 2002. By 2001, operators had 
increased connections from 429,000 to 620,000, missing the target for 
that year of 711,000. They failed to meet other targets as well. The 
operators blamed currency devaluation and higher costs. PAM Jaya 
argued back with the auditor’s report on high operating costs 
associated with expensive foreign executives and their expensive office 
spaces (see Harsono 2003). 
In October 2001, the operators finally signed Restated Cooperative 
Agreements [RCAs] with PAM Jaya that incorporated some significant 
changes to the original CAs. The RCAs also improved on some of the 
initial contractual ambiguities over performance measurement, 
termination conditions, and penalties. Whereas the original CAs only 
stipulated targets for volume sold and water quality, the RCAs added a 
Standard of Service Performance scheme which stipulated that 
performance would be additionally measured by number of 
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connections, production capacity, service coverage ratio, volume of 
water sold, nonrevenue water, timely report submission, water quality 
and pressure, and service standards such as response time, repair 
time, and new connection time (Iwan, 2008; Iwanami & Nickson, 2008; 
Ahmad Lanti et al., 2009; Nugroho, 2011).16 PAM Jaya could levy 
penalties for missed targets and standards, which would be paid 
directly into a penalties account. Where outstanding monies were owed 
by PAM Jaya to the operators, the operators could elect instead to 
offset penalties against outstanding debt (Iwan, 2008). Termination 
conditions would include force majeure, failure of one or both parties to 
meet contractual obligations and to remedy failure in a reasonable time 
period, and failure to adjust the contract to address changes in law that 
materially affect concession (RCA; (Jensen, 2005).  
Some changes were in the operators’ favor. The RCA allowed 
operators to sell surplus assets and cut about 400 seconded PAM Jaya 
staff previously protected by the CAs. The new contracts also 
transferred seconded employees from “dual” status to singular 
employment by the operators (Lanti 2009). The deal also cut PAM Jaya 
further out of the water supply chain, as raw water would be purchased 
directly from operators, rather than via PAM Jaya as middleman.  
                                            
16 In their paper, Iwanami and Nickson cited the RCA directly in reference to 
these standards. The RCA was not made available directly for this research, 
despite repeated requests for a copy made to PAM Jaya, the Jakarta Water 
Supply Regulatory Body, and the operators. 
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To deal with the deficit, which greatly increased the risks of PAM Jaya 
default and operator non-performance, technical targets and financial 
projections were revised, resulting in a proposed immediate 35% tariff 
increase and a 20% reduced water charge (starting January 2003) as 
the starting point for the water charge for the remainder of the contract. 
The concession shortfall would be audited by the national government 
auditor, BPKP (Ahmad Lanti et al., 2009). 
In PAM Jaya’s favor, the companies (and their parent MNCs) ceded 
their full control over the escrow accounts, granting PAM Jaya 
signatory status and, thus, joint control over account withdrawals. In 
original CA, PAM Jaya would have to compensate operators when they 
failed to impose closure on ground wells and operators could change 
technical targets also; the RCA eliminated this responsibility. Also, in 
the initial deals, PAM Jaya would be responsible to compensate 
operators for the remainder of the book value of assets, but operators 
were not responsible for the condition of assets to PAM Jaya. After the 
RCA, it was agreed that the operators would plan for the asset value to 
be zero at the termination of the contract, and a performance bond was 
issued to the operator, to be returned at the end of the concession 
(Ahmad Lanti et al., 2009). Nevertheless, perceived imbalances 
remained coded into the new contracts. For example, failure to achieve 
NRW targets would result in penalties whose financial cost to the 
operators were minimal in comparison with the resultant estimated 
financial losses to the system (Interview Ali 2013). 
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Perhaps the biggest improvement, however, was the creation of the 
Jakarta Water Supply Regulatory Body [JWSRB], which was 
established by Governor’s decree in November 2001, with a mandate 
to “protect the interest of the consumers and also the interest of the 
Parties in the RCA between PAM Jaya and the two concessionaires” 
(Iwanami & Nickson, 2008). The JWSRB would independently review 
and recommend tariff rates to the Governor and mediate disputes 
between PAM Jaya and the operators (Harsono 2003). Water charge 
rates would remain formulaic, contract-based calculations, with 
changes left up to bilateral negotiations between the operators and 
water agency. 
Following the 2001 RCAs, the parties settled into a “transition period” 
during the last year of the first five-year rate base period, which was set 
to end in December 2002. During this time, the parties hoped to build 
trust, determine “real and reasonable” costs, and strengthen 
cooperative efforts (Ahmad Lanti et al., 2009), but the poor conditions 
of water supply, timing problems, and the history of contentious 
relationships challenged any kind of lasting transformation in the 
pattern of partnership. Services for the urban poor had not markedly 
improved. Whilst meters had been installed, and many families were 
being billed, most still purchased water from vendors. An estimated 
70% of the population had inadequate water supply (Lanti et al. 2009), 
and the public complained about being charged for poor – or 
nonexistent – service.  
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In this environment, the operators and PAM Jaya began the rebasing 
process for the second rate period, which was set to conclude in 
December 2002, putting new rates into effect for January 2003. The 
partners would have to come up with a new workable water charge and 
recommendations for a water tariff. Further, they would have to get 
used to the participation of a new player – the JWSRB. After months of 
delays, the rebasing process finally commenced towards the end of the 
transition period, in late 2002. Meeting the rebasing deadline was a 
near impossibility – indeed, negotiations would stretch through to the 
end of 2004, and ultimately stall. 
5.4 Slow burn: Rate rebasing and slide into deadlock 
The 2001 RCAs had attended to the process for water charge 
adjustments, and also commented on tariff adjustment – an issue of 
distinct importance to the operators even with the protection of the dual 
tariff instrument, as water charge payment depended on the tariffs 
collected. Each month, collected tariffs are deposited into an escrow 
account. On the first of every month, the concessionaires submit their 
billed and collected water volumes to PAM Jaya, to be paid out at the 
water charge rate. Full payment depended, naturally, on the availability 
of funds. The growing deficit made the probability of full water charge 
payment evermore unlikely. As such, tariff adjustment was deemed by 
operators as critical a process as was charge rebasing.  
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The RCAs specified that PAM Jaya would submit a proposal for tariff 
adjustment to the JWSRB, who would then evaluate the proposal and 
make a final recommendation to DKI. The water charge would continue 
to be based on an indexation formula: a revised base water charge 
would be adjusted for inflation, foreign exchange fluctuation, and 
variation of interest rates throughout each five-year rate base period, 
thus protecting investors from inflation and currency risks (Ahmad Lanti 
et al., 2009). Every five years, a water charge rate rebasing would allow 
for the imposition of new base rates, which would take into 
consideration average tariffs; financial requirements of JWSRB, PAM 
Jaya, and DKI; incurred and projected operating and capital 
expenditures; outstanding debts to operators; operators profitability; 
and minimum coverage ratios (Ahmad Lanti et al., 2009). Whilst 
progress towards targets and standards were used to evaluate the 
prudence of projected expenditures, they were not used punitively to 
alter the rates. Nor was the water charge utilized as an efficiency-
incentivizing tool. 
The rebasing process involves feasibility studies, investment 
evaluations, and the creation of new financial projections – all of which 
are assessed, disputed, and negotiated by PAM Jaya, the operators, 
and JWSRB. A good many disputes have arisen since the first rebasing 
over measurement issues, expansion plans, service and expansion 
priorities, and the prudence of projected costs. Indeed, the proliferation 
of disputes over nearly every input in the rebasing considerations 
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prevented progress, drawing out renegotiation well into the start of the 
second rate period. 
The process also challenged the role of the new regulatory body, which 
struggled to find its place in the process, particularly considering its 
relegation to an advisory group with influence on tariff rates only. Even 
the government parties conflicted over their roles in rate renegotiation. 
According to a former JWSRB member, DKI initially told the JWSRB to 
“mind their own business” at first, and the Body had no idea how to 
handle regulatory issues or manage the influence and higher relative 
strength of other government actors (Interview, Ali 2013). 
In the meantime, in April 2003, DKI approved a tariff increase of 40% 
(Jensen, 2005; Ahmad Lanti et al., 2009), bringing the tariff rate above 
the water charge for the first time. Despite this hopeful sign, water 
charge negotiations failed to progress over the following months. In 
November, the Ministry of Public Works and Governor introduced an 
Independent Combined Expert [ICE] team of consultants hired to move 
rebasing along. The team, which included representation from JWSRB, 
was tasked with independently conducting a rate rebasing exercise. 
Both operators refused to cooperate with the ICE. Suez did not engage 
consultants, while Thames refused to participate altogether, 
withholding requested information and stonewalling the commission. 
Despite the problems they had with PAM Jaya, the companies 
demonstrated their preference for internal dispute resolution (Jensen, 
2005),  
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Again, in an effort to alleviate mounting pressure, DKI approved 
another tariff increase of 30% in January, 2004 (Jensen, 2005; Ahmad 
Lanti et al., 2009). The following month, the ICE presented rebased 
tariff and water charge recommendations, which were refused by PAM 
Jaya and the operators alike. The Jakarta DKI and the Ministry of 
Public Works met for the following weeks to attempt yet another round 
of water charge and tariff evaluations and negotiations, to no avail. 
Nevertheless, in September 2004, the Jakarta Governor instructed 
PAM Jaya to renew negotiations again with the operators, this time 
engaging JWSRB (Lanti 2007). This would be JWSRB’s first 
opportunity to get a foothold in tariff and water charge determination. 
Amid negotiations, the operators agreed to allow PAM Jaya to pay 
down debts in installations and without interest, pending the imposition 
of an Automatic Tariff Adjustment [ATA] mechanism that would better 
guarantee sufficient revenue to pay the charge (Lanti et al. 2009).  
In October 2004, by Governor’s Decree (No. 2459/2004), DKI Jakarta 
announced the [ATA] scheme, with effect from January 2005, for a five-
year period.  Every six months, the tariff would be adjusted to cover a 
sum of the water charge (indexed according to the RCA) plus the 
financial needs of PAM Jaya (debt repayment, local operations, 
JWSRB) plus a “reserve” component intended to service past shortfalls 
in payment and a needs “TBD (To Be Determined)” (Ahmad Lanti et al., 
2009). This would allow the provincial government to pay arrears to 
operators and pass water charge increases automatically to 
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consumers. The latter component (TBD) also points to persistence of 
contract ambiguity even after the RCAs and later tariff mechanisms 
were implemented, and another failure to establish a precise, explicit, 
and enforceable tariff agreement. Further, while the ATA was – by 
name and definition – intended to be formulaic and automatic, the 
Regulatory Body asserted its obligation to assess proposed 
adjustments for customer affordability prior submitting its own proposal 
to the Governor “so that tariff adjustment awarded is not always as high 
as requested by the concessionaire” (Ahmad Lanti et al., 2009). This 
commitment also belied the subjectivity and bias with which the 
JWSRB and PAM Jaya entered into negotiations with operators. 
Finally, in December 2004, Palyja signed a new contract with PAM 
Jaya (Bakker et al. 2006), containing a revised base water charge 
(Lanti 2007). TPJ, however, failed to come to a new agreement, and 
negotiations spilled over into 2005. By this time, connections had 
increased to 709,000, marking a total increase of 280,000, which fell 
just below the original contracted target for 2001. It had taken 
companies twice as long as expected to make the new connections, 
and NRW remained over 50%. Indeed, questions remained over what 
the government was fighting so hard to save. 
The ATA was implemented in both semesters of 2005 
(correspondence, JWSRB 2013). In November, 2005, both operators 
agreed to JWSRB’s recommendations on a rebased water charge, 
applied retroactively to July 2004 (Achmad Lanti, 2007). The ATA was 
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implemented again in January 2006 (personal correspondence with 
JWSRB, 2013). These steps forward were tempered by renewed 
political protests by city councilors, which in turn delayed the raising of 
the water charges. Again, tariffs were frozen. Later that year, the 
Minister of Public Works sent a critical letter to DKI about the 
concessions, citing that, since the third ATA, tariffs had risen to 
Rp6,000/m3  (US$.70/m3)– the highest rate amongst large Southeast 
Asian cities (Ahmad Lanti et al., 2009). 
5.4.1 Thames’ Retreat and Localization of the East 
Frustrated by the constant conflict, each operator’s parent company 
began to consider retreats from the Jakarta market. In 2006, Suez 
reduced its share of the west concession to 51%, selling 30% to local 
company Astratel Nusantara and 19% to Citigroup. Suez stated that 
the decision was motivated by efforts to improve management 
performance by engaging local partners (Lanti 2009), but it had also 
announced a general move to refocus business in the European 
market, and was clearly frustrated by the problems in Jakarta. Thames, 
on the other hand, echoing the companies exit from other developing 
region markets, decided to exit completely, selling its 95% share hold 
 194 
to Indonesian Acuatico, a company known for rehabilitating and 
reselling troubled companies (Interview, Ali 2013).17  
Even in this transition, disputes arose over the foreign operators’ 
moves to offload shares to local companies. RCA provisions stipulate 
that sales of over 51% stakes must be declared in writing to PAM Jaya 
as the First Party to the contract. The JWSRB got involved, 
recommending that Palyja be permitted to sell its 49% upon formal 
notice to PAM Jaya. The Body also voiced concerns over Astratel’s and 
Citigroup’s inexperience in the water sector. Palyja ignored the 
commentary and ruling and sold its shares without government notice. 
JWSRB conceded that this was not, in fact, a contractual requirement, 
and the issue was dropped (Ahmad Lanti et al., 2009).  
Despite being required to gain approval from DKI and PAM Jaya for its 
complete divestment, TPJ also did not initially seek government 
approval for its sale to Acuatico. By contract, the selling party (TPJ) 
was required to demonstrate to PAM Jaya that the purchasing party 
possessed an acceptable level of expertise in the water sector. City 
Council expressed doubts over the new investors’ commitment to 
meeting water targets, suggesting that the company would be too 
focused on profits. The Governor proposed that the sale be postponed 
and requested JWSRB to prepare Terms of Reference for due 
                                            
17 The remaining 5% of TPJ held by local partners was sold to PT Alberta 
Utilities. 
 195 
diligence to assess the proposed sale. The process mandated that an 
independent party (with inputs from JWSRB, the World Bank, PAM 
Jaya, and the Ministry of Public Works) assess the objectivity and 
appropriateness of the share price and the capabilities of prospective 
investors. Following the due diligence process, and with the support of 
the JWSRB, the Governor approved the sale to Acuatico, pending the 
inclusion of several contract amendments to the RCA, most importantly 
a reduction in guaranteed IRR from 22% to 15.84% (Interview, Ali 
2013). The company changed its name from TPJ to Aetra, and the shift 
marked a new period for Jakarta water PPP.  
In retrospect, a member of the first two JWSRB panels commented on 
the benefits associated with Aetra’s takeover, particularly as they 
related to the soured relationship with Suez and Palyja. Whereas 
Thames and Palyja used to collude in order to present a united 
operator front in rebasing and other contractual negotiations, the shift 
to Aetra broke down that bond, allowing for the possibility of 
benchmarking and a greater sense of competition between the 
operators, particularly since the locally owned company was not as 
culturally aligned with the European multinational. Further, the 
departure of Thames was welcomed, as they were perceived to be 
weaker in performance, corrupt, and overly protected by the UK 
government. Finally, by convincing Acuatico to reduce the guaranteed 
IRR before the sale, PAM Jaya and DKI softened the way for 
renegotiating a fairer contract (Interview, Ali 2013). 
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5.5 Foreign retreat 
The birth of Aetra marked another big shift in Jakarta’s water scape, as 
it represented the first time a truly “local” water company could be 
tested. The potential for an improved relationship with the east 
concessionaire could be leveraged in negotiations with Palyja, which 
was still primarily guided by Suez. As per the instructions of the City 
Council during approval of the share sales, PAM Jaya began 
negotiations with Aetra for a revised contract. The implications were 
critical, as changes could be used also in the slow negotiations with 
Palyja over the water charge and service targets. 
Amid these shifts and developments and a conflation of additional 
events, political dissent over water was amped up again. For one, in 
January 2007, the ATA was implemented for the fourth and last time. 
The coincidence of this tariff adjustment period and the shift of TPJ to 
Aetra marked a window of opportunity for further pushing proposed 
changes to the water charge and tariffs. The JWSRB proposed that the 
charge be considerate of performance, rather than be based solely on 
a cost-plus formula. Also fueling dissent, a 2007 audit showed the PAM 
Jaya assets had fallen from Rp1.49 trillion to Rp204.46 billion (Sihite, 
2012) – a measure decried by advocacy groups and media as the 
result of corrupt and illegal sales of government assets (interview, Reza 
2013). While this was used to further vilify Palyja, companies countered 
that the outcome was simply an issue of the proper accounting of 
depreciation, as per requirements in the RCAs (interviews, Aetra and 
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Palyja, 2013). In response to mounting pressure, newly elected 
governor, Fauzi Bowo, froze the tariffs again (Interview, Ali 2013).  
As the second rate period came to an end, the relationship between 
PAM Jaya and Palyja fell into a steady state of distrust, avoidance, and 
a frustrating pattern of tit-for-tat legal action. As the parties moved into 
the scheduled rebasing period for the third five-year period of 2008-
2012, the longstanding conflict had become a practically accepted 
normal state of affairs. While PAM Jaya’s relationship with Aetra was 
more hopeful, particularly given the seeding of a new agreement on 
performance targets and standards, it was nevertheless untested and 
cautious.  
The second rebasing exercise (for the third rate period) involved only 
PAM Jaya and the operators; the JWSRB was altogether excluded. 
Nevertheless, once the water rates were agreed upon and presented to 
DKI, JWSRB blocked approval by making an alternative 
recommendation. None of the stakeholder parties expected a speedy 
resolution, particularly given the futility of past negotiations, so the 
previous period’s water charges – the same base established in 2003 – 
were utilized by default, and talks plodded on. Performance targets 
were also reduced for the third rate period: the backlog of payments 
owed to operators limited PAM Jaya’s power to demand adherence to 
the previously restated targets. 
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One of the only meaningful outcomes following the second rebasing 
was the imposition and enforcement of a penalties ruling in 2008, 
whereby operators were held to task for missed targets in previous 
periods. Operators agreed to pay a total Rp210 billion – 165 billion from 
Palyja and 150 billion Aetra – for having missed their 2004-2007 
targets (interview, JWSRB 2013). Thereafter, PAM Jaya showed a 
renewed zeal in unseating the concessionaires. The agency head, 
Maurits Nepulpo, engaged the national auditor, BPK, for further 
investigation of company expenditures in 2008, launching an internal 
campaign for stronger oversight over the next few years.  
PAM Jaya’s ability to hold concessionaires to task appeared to be 
improving somewhat, even with a weakened JSWRB. In 2010, a 
dispute arose between Palyja and PAM Jaya over water quality. Palyja 
had failed to reach their target on potable water, and PAM Jaya called 
for the imposition of a financial penalty stipulated by contract. 
Unfortunately, another ambiguity became a point of contention: the 
contract specified a rupiah penalty amount but no rules on the 
frequency of monitoring and enforcement of sanctions. In stark contrast 
to PAM Jaya’s request for frequent oversight, Palyja argued that the 
oversight and sanctions (where applicable) be applied only annually. 
The two parties finally agreed on a twice-monthly monitoring schedule. 
Nevertheless, information presented by each operator was not audited 
by a third party, and was neither necessarily timely. 
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By the end of 2010, the PAM Jaya shortfall had risen to Rp 610 billion, 
and outstanding customer bills were had climbed to Rp 530 billion. The 
agency had negative equity of Rp 985 billion, and recorded assets 
shrank to Rp 204 billion (Megarani, 2012). At the same time, Aetra and 
Palyja were recording profits, despite the fact that water charges had 
remained frozen. This situation caused PAM Jaya to push for further 
management of the growing deficit via changes to the water charge 
structure, changes to the expansion and customer classification 
strategies of the operators, and changes in JWSRB’s mandate. With 
respect to the first, a coalition of government actors including the 
JWSRB proposed to shift the financial model to a single tariff 
instrument in 2009. This was rejected by the central government, 
presumably under pressure from the French government (Interview, Ali 
2013).  
Additionally, PAM Jaya began to promote a strategy of “balanced 
expansion,” contrary to the PPP’s original intent of extending water 
supply to the poor (Interview, Palyja 2013). As Palyja and TPJ / Aetra 
had extended services to poorer areas of the city, so too had the 
proportion of consumers paying lower tariff rates grown. Since the 
tariffs rates for these segments were well beneath the water charge, 
expanded coverage to the poor further exacerbated the deficit. Thus, 
PAM Jaya encouraged operators to balance expansion in lower 
segments with expansion in higher consumer segments, and also 
encouraged the operators to make sure that consumers were being 
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charged at the appropriate rates. Indeed, consumer reclassification 
would be come an important strategy for PAM Jaya and Aetra, whose 
relationship became increasingly cooperative. 
Finally, new regulations in 2009 and 2011 gave JWSRB more power to 
monitor and enforce groundwater extraction, with the hopes of driving 
more industrial and higher income consumers with wells into using the 
city’s water supply system. While new regulations somewhat 
strengthened JWSRB’s role in monitoring groundwater extraction, their 
regulatory power in the interim rate period did not grow; rather, the 
body was increasingly marginalized by both the operators and PAM 
Jaya, who showed an increasing preference to deal directly with each 
other, to the exclusion of the regulatory body.  
In retrospect, both PAM Jaya managers and JWSRB leaders have 
reflected that the power of the JWSRB has had more to do with the 
particular roster of regulators and their industry and political 
connections, than did the contracts or organization itself. In 2011, 
Governor’s Regulation #118 changed the roles of PAM Jaya and the 
JWSRB, further subsuming the regulatory body under the thumb of the 
water agency, particularly by requiring that the budget and operating 
plans of JWSRB be submitted to PAM Jaya for approval. Though the 
JWSRB technically continued to report to the Governor’s office, they 
would now have to communicate with the Governor via PAM Jaya, 
apparently because the past Governor, SS, wanted to limit his own 
dealings with the water supply issue  (Interviews, JWSRB 2013). 
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Recommended by the state audit office, BPKP, the move relegated the 
JWSRB to an even lesser position.  
In April 2011, PAM Jaya came closer to closing a new revised contract 
with Aetra on rates and targets, signing an initial Memorandum of 
Understanding that stated the basic principles on which a new Master 
Agreement would be built upon. In the meantime, the Jakarta Financial 
Development Comptroller recommended that operators’ profits be 
targeted to an IRR of 14.8%. Palyja balked, maintaining their 
contractual right to a 22% IRR (Interview, Ali 2013). The pressure 
associated with the entrance of Aetra became an increasing nuisance 
to Palyja. While the company was frustrated by experiences with the 
government, managers had become quite used to the status quo and 
had, in fact, managed to stay profitable despite the arrears owed by 
PAM Jaya (Interview, Palyja 2013). A June 2011, letter from the 
Chairman and CEO of Suez, Gerard Mestrallet, to Indonesian Minister 
of Economic Affairs, Hatta Rajasa, included Mestrallet’s request for 
Rajasa’s help with “serious difficulties” Palyja was experiencing in 
negotiations with PAM Jaya. After a July meeting between the French 
Prime Minister and Indonesia’s President, the Deputy Coordinating 
Minister for Economic Affairs, Infrastructure Coordination and Regional 
Development, Luky Eko Wuryanto, warned that the central government 
was worried about the renegotiation between PAM Jaya and Palyja. 
Luky said [translated], "If there is no progress in the negotiations, they 
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will be taken over by the central government" (Chandra, Aprilia, & 
Megarani, 2012).  
Despite these warnings, PAM Jaya’s resolute leader, Maurits 
Napitupulu, continued to press issues with PSP, in general, and Palyja, 
in particular. Maurits was quoted, “With Aetra, there has been good 
progress. In contrast, with PT Palyja is still stagnant” (Megarani, 2012). 
By this point, PAM Jaya’s shortfall had grown to Rp 610 billion, and its 
equity had fallen to negative Rp 985 billion (Chandra et al., 2012). In 
contrast, Palyja recorded Rp 230 billion in net profits in 2011 and Rp 
216 billion in 2010 (Palyja Annual Report, 2012), and a reported a total 
net income of Rp 1 trillion since 1998. Aetra recorded profits of Rp 142 
billion and Rp 140 billion in 2009 and 2010, respectively (P. Jacobson, 
2011), but the relationship between Aetra and PAM Jaya was 
improving, and wrangling Palyja became Napitupulu’s priority target.  
In late 2011, Napitupulu lay blame on Palyja for charging the agency 
for water delivered to non-paying consumers. Citing a previously 
unenforced 1993 city ordinance, which required network disconnection 
in cases of non-payment after 30 days, Napitupulu called Palyja to task 
for not providing evidence of termination of service for delinquent 
customers, consumer payment of arrears, or reconnections (Interview, 
Ali 2013). PAM Jaya and Napitupulu hoped this would alleviate the 
shortfall and also keep Palyja accountable for managing risks 
associated with tariff collection (Interview, PAM Jaya, 2013). Palyja 
resisted cutting services to the 200,000 delinquent customers, 
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however, and Napitupulu froze the company’s escrow account 
(Interviews, JWSRB and Ali 2013), which held an outstanding Rp 170 
billion owed to Palya for the period of August 2010 to December 2011 
(Megarani, 2012). 
On 22 December 2011, after delivering year-end notes that highlighted 
the huge potential debt of Rp 18.2 trillion that would be due at the close 
of the contracts, PAM Jaya director Maurits Napitupulu was suddenly 
and unexpectedly removed from office.18 Critics of the decision 
suggested that Maurits was too strong of a challenger to operators, and 
that the threat of an increasingly powerful water agency motivated 
companies to solicit high-level diplomatic support to remove the agency 
director from office (Megarani, 2012).  
While perceived as generally more reserved in his opposition to PSP, 
the incoming PAM Jaya head, Sri Widayanto Kaderi, decided to uphold 
the escrow freeze. The dispute over disconnections would be a point of 
discussion over the next year. PAM Jaya pursued the issue as an 
opportunity to gain some traction on their financial shortfall and, 
perhaps, push Palyja towards exiting altogether. Palyja executives, on 
the other hand, argued that disconnecting customers for non-payment 
was unfair to the poorest users, who would be subject to reconnection 
fees that were often difficult for them to afford. At that time, the 
reconnection rate for terminated users was a low 4% (Global Water 
                                            
18 His term had been set to expire in 2014. 
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Intelligence, 2012). While Palyja implored PAM Jaya to increase the 
water charge for inflation in line with the contracted water charge 
formula, the agency refused and instead raised its operating fees 
(payable from the escrow account) by 70% over the past eighteen 
months (reported early 2013) (Interview, Martin 2013). Since the water 
charge and escrow monies associated with non-paying customers 
(approximately Rp 200 billion) were frozen, Palyja invested only about 
half (US$10 to 12 million) of the planned US$20 million over the period 
from 2011-2012 (Interview, Martin 2013).  
The conflict over non-paying customers was partly resolved in 2012 by 
the adoption of an amended penalty system, but irreversible damage to 
the already-tenuous relationship had been done, and preparations for 
the third rate period were marked by wariness over the possibilities for 
another five-year operating period as well as increased pressure from 
the improving tenor of the Aetra contract. Nevertheless, in May 2012, 
Palyja presented its rebasing proposal for the third rate period, set to 
begin in 2013.  
The following month, PAM Jaya signed a new Master Agreement with 
Aetra, which included technical targets and standards, including a 
reduction of NRW to 35% in the first five years (a higher NRW targeted 
/ lower standard than that of the original contract); full assumption of 
PAM Jaya liabilities; and yet another open-ended mandate to create an 
“Amended Restated Corporation Agreement” (Interviews, JWSRB, 
Aetra 2013). Most importantly, however (to both PAM Jaya and Palyja), 
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the Aetra agreement stipulated that PAM Jaya’s shortfall would zero 
out at the close of the contract19, that tariffs would not increase, and that 
the current water charge base rate would only be increased at a fixed 
low annual rate for the remaining ten years of the contract. The 
agreement also projected Rp 1.6 trillion in capital investments 
(Interview, Kaderi and Lintong 2013). 
Whereas it was previously escalated according to the water charge 
formula, from 2012 onwards, it would be increased annually at a fixed 
1.5% (Interview, Hutasoit 2013). Aetra would be allowed to reclassify 
customers’ rate categories and adjust the definitions of customer 
classifications by joint agreement with PAM Jaya in order to generate 
sufficient revenues and increase the average tariff rate, but there would 
be no increases in the tariff schedule itself (Interview, JWSRB 2013). 
Attendant necessary changes to the primary contract were incomplete, 
but Aetra’s relationship with PAM Jaya appeared promising.  
Surprisingly, Palyja expressed less concern that would be expected 
over the Aetra agreement, as management believed the competitive 
stress to be short-term. While Aetra’s plan aimed for a 5% reduction in 
NRW in the first year, it actually rose, and by early 2013, they had 
already requested for an economic opener due to increased charges 
                                            
19 In order to meet this requirement, extensions are allowable for unplanned 
expenses (eg, new regulation for increased staff salaries). 
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associated with staffing costs of seconded workers.20 A growing 
concern that Aetra’s technical and financial performance might be 
lower than promised appeared to weaken the legitimacy of the Aetra 
Master Agreement and, in turn, PAM Jaya’s negotiating position with 
respect to Palyja. As Operations Director, Luc Martin, commented, “It’s 
all just a game – they will renegotiate in a year. The tariff has been 
frozen for the past seven years and is intended to stay for ten more. 
How can the system sustain seventeen years of frozen tariffs?” 
(Interview, Martin 2013). Nevertheless, pressure in the immediate term 
certainly made the potential for change in Palyja’s favor even less 
likely. 
Amidst the shifts associated with the developing agreement with Aetra 
and the deteriorating Palyja contract, there emerged a new water 
supply governance organization, the Jakarta Water Resource Council 
[JWRC]. Established in 2010, it became officially coded in Law #7 of 
2012, with a mandate of creating a water master plan for Jakarta. 
Engaging former JWSRB regulators, the organization was proposed as 
a potential replacement for the JWSRB’s role as the water regulator. 
The government participants realized that the weak legal system could 
not effectively support regulation by contract (Interview, Ali 2013). Still, 
the JWSRB continued to operate with a new incoming board, and 
                                            
20 Staffing costs increased for seconded workers by 50% in 2011, and 60% in 
2012. 
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neither would be centrally involved in the decisions over Aetra and 
Suez / Palyja. 
In step with its worldwide retreat from developing markets and in 
response to ever-growing problems with PAM Jaya, Suez was poised 
to exit Jakarta by mid-2012. In October, Suez announced that it would 
sell its 51% stake in Palyja to Manila Water, whose success in the 
Philippines was acknowledged, and whose strategic plans included 
expansion to other Southeast Asian markets. Confidential bilateral 
negotiations between Suez and Manila Water were held as the rate 
rebasing process commenced, and Palyja stated that Manila Water 
would agree to accept the outcome of rebasing negotiations if the 
rebalancing process was concluded before the share sale (Interview, 
Martin 2013). Given the stagnancy of past negotiations on rebasing, 
Suez focused its energies primarily on the Manila Water deal.  
It is not clear to what extent the set of proposed terms associated with 
the Suez – Manila Water negotiations (or those incorporated in the 
Aetra agreement, for that matter) differ from the original contracts, as 
all of the Master Agreements have been kept confidential. Fieldwork for 
this dissertation confirmed that the contracts themselves are 
proprietary, and parties are quite sensitive about keeping the specific 
terms private. There is conflicting information on whether DKI even has 
full access to the contracts between PAM Jaya and the 
concessionaires. In a March 2013 Jakarta Post interview, Deputy 
Governor Basuki “Ahok” Tjahaja Purnama claimed that an unspecific 
 208 
“they” were reluctant to share the entire contract with the city (Dewi 
2013), though JWSRB members assured that the city government did, 
indeed, have access to the contract (communications with Pak Harri 
Baskoro, JWSRB, April 2013). 
Suez would not be allowed to sell off its shares without government 
approval, and it was unclear how Suez or Manila could agree on a sale 
price and to new contract terms with PAM Jaya simultaneously. A 
sequencing problem was obvious: Manila Water was hesitant to 
formally commit to any rate discussions with the government, since it 
was not yet a party to the agreement, and PAM Jaya would approve 
the sale only if Manila Water accepted a changed contract (Interview, 
JWSRB 2013).  
Concerned over of the lack of transparency and limited control over the 
transfer terms, local government agents protested the sale. In an 
interview with The Jakarta Post, PAM Jaya Managing Director, Sri 
Kaderi, stated, “Manila Water does not have the reliable finances to 
support our plan to rebalance the contract, and it will not make the 
price for water supply in the city to be affordable for the poor” 
(Sonhadji, 2013). Former JWSRB member and JWRC head Firdaus Ali 
was less disapproving, as the opportunity would allow Jakarta to be rid 
of the “hassle” of longstanding high-level protection of French business 
interests. But he also expressed skepticism, commenting, “We save 
ourselves from the mouth of the lion by going to the crocodile” 
(Interview, Ali 2013). 
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Suez and Manila Water signed a share price agreement in October 
2012, which included two closing conditions: approval by the Asian 
Development Bank, and written confirmation of consent from the 
Jakarta government (Domingo, 2012). In April 2013, Jakarta’s Vice 
Governor, Basuki Purnama, threatened to cancel the contracts 
altogether. At a city hall meeting, he decried, “We will never approve 
the sale of shares to Manila Water because contract rebalancing is not 
being done, while PT Aetra has. If Palyja is unwilling to do so, then 
there is no need for negotiation” ("Basuki threatens to report Suez 
Envrionment," 2013). Basuki claimed that he proposed three options to 
Suez and Manila Water: split ownership in three equal parts between 
Manila Water, DKI, and PAM Jaya; enter formal arbitration in 
Singapore (and forcefully take over anyhow, in the event of a loss); or 
nationalize all of Palyja’s assets by force. He claimed that Suez elected 
the first, but no news or comment suggested resolution. By the summer 
of 2013, failing to secure PAM Jaya’s approval, the deal stalled, and 
Manila Water retreated from Jakarta.  
In early 2013, the local government, led by a dynamic newly elected 
Governor, Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, proposed a government buyout of 
Suez’ stake in Palyja. Whereas the Rp 330 billion shortfall with Aetra 
was cautiously expected to shrink to zero by 2016 (Interview, PAM 
Jaya, 2013), there was no plan to work down PAM Jaya’s shortfall with 
Palyja of approximately Rp 380 billion (Interview, PAM Jaya 2013). The 
Jakarta Post reported in 2013 that, if the city maintained the water 
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contracts, the government would still owe an estimated Rp 18.2 trillion 
(US$ 1.87 billion) in 2023 (Dewi, 2013). In comparison, the termination 
penalty for both projects was estimated somewhere around Rp 8.2 
trillion (Nugroho, 2011) to Rp 9 trillion (Elyda & Dewi, 2013).  
5.6 Mixed performance outcomes 
Whilst impossible to establish a counterfactual (i.e., had PAM Jaya 
never been privatized), the service and tariff outcomes of the Jakarta 
PPPs have not met the expectations expressed at the outset. More 
importantly, the deals have left the local government with a staggering 
debt, in part due to naïveté in the initial contracting phases and later 
political resistance to necessary tariff increases that would allow for 
payment on the ever-increasing water charge. But the private 
operators, too, have ratcheted down performance targets and 
standards with every negotiation. Despite lower-than-expected 
revenues and huge outstanding payments, the deals appear to have 
been sufficiently generous at the outset so as to justify their staying put, 
even with partial non-payment. It begs the question whether, in this 
case, the firm might prefer low rates of payment with highly favorable 
contract terms over steady payment on what is likely a more 
appropriate water charge. Regardless, the risk of non-payment was 
sufficient to discourage expansion and service improvement to targeted 
levels. The companies remained profitable, the government assumed a 
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massive debt, and the service extension and quality increased 
fractionally with respect to initial projections. 
Upon writing in late 2013, PAM Jaya lawyer Iskandar Sonhadji reported 
to local media that the company’s current losses caused by water 
concessions had reached at least Rp 590 billion (approximately US$50 
million) (Jakarta Post, 2013). On the other hand, Aetra posted net 
profits of Rp 142 billion (US$16 million) in 2010 and a profit of Rp 71.13 
billion in the first half of 2013, slightly lower than the Rp 74.95 billion in 
the first half of 2012 of last year. Palyja reported Rp 231 billion 
(US$25.5 million) in 2011, and Rp 216 billion (US$24 million) in 2010, a 
steady increase over years since its profit of Rp 77 billion (US$8.6 
million) in 2006 (Palyja Annual Reports 2010, 2011). Whilst the 
disparity is marked, it is worth noting that reported profits are based on 
assumptions that unpaid water charges will be paid by PAM Jaya – a 
supposition that is not assured. Thus, given the persistent problem of 
non-payment and cash flow problems, these are optimistic earnings 
reports.  
From January 2007, up to the time of writing in 2014, the average tariff 
rate was Rp 7025 per cubic meter (approximately US$0.76 in 2007 and 
US$0.62 in 2014). This stands well above that of other larger 
Indonesian cities, but many public utilities are heavily subsidized. 
Nevertheless, by 2008, Jakarta’s average tariff was also higher than 
that of most major Southeast Asian cities, including Kuala Lumpur 
(US$0.45 in 2007 and US$0.42 in 2008) (IB-Net Database), Bangkok 
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(US$0.31)(The World Bank, 2008), and Manila (US$0.51-0.59 in 2008) 
(IB-Net Database), and by 2012, it remained high compared with 
Manila (US$0.32-0.45), Bangkok (US$0.37) (Metropolitan Waterworks, 
2011), and Kuala Lumpur (US$0.46) (Malaysia Water Guide 2012).  
In 2013, Aetra’s average tariff rate was Rp 7800, and their water 
charge was Rp 8800, though the JWSRB asserted that these would fall 
to Rp 7100 and Rp 5998 per cubic meter, respectively, upon 
implementation of the new Master Agreement, bringing the tariff above 
the charge (Interview, JWSRB 2013). In the same year, Palyja’s 
average tariff rate was Rp 7200, and their water charge was Rp 6240 
(Interview, Kaderi and Lintong, 2013). Tariffs thus increased 
approximately three-fold since the 1997 contract awards, at which time 
the average water tariff was Rp 970. This rate had been immediately 
increased to Rp 1740 in 1998, and rose steadily thereafter (PAM Jaya). 
But the Indonesian rupiah experienced high inflation during that period 
as well: hypothetical inflation-adjusted average 1997 and 1998 average 
tariff rates were approximately Rp 5200-5400 and Rp 5100-6100, 
respectively, in 2014 terms. The actual 2014 average rates, then, were 
115% to 137% of the pre-PPP inflation-adjusted average tariff rates. 
The 1996 national mandate for full cost recovery in water utilities does 
not explain the increase over pre-concession levels: unlike most other 
Indonesian PDAMs (water agencies), Jakarta had been operating at 
cost-recovery levels since at least 2001, where production costs held at 
about an average of US$0.11 per cubic meter, and average revenues 
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were at about US$0.29 per cubic meter. A likelier answer is in the 
agency’s commitment to a generous water charge formula which has 
been consistently ratcheted upwards, the concessionaires’ lower than 
expected performance related to reducing non-revenue water, and the 
inability of the regulator to apply pressure that would allow users to 
recoup any efficiency gains that might have reduced the average costs 
of producing water over time. 
That said, the longstanding tariff freezes have decidedly affected the 
level of profitability for the companies, just not enough to motivate 
company-initiated contract termination. Rather, companies have 
compensated by reducing their improvement and expansion plans. 
Palyja has cited the longstanding tariff freeze as a prime interference in 
their efforts to improve efficiency and expand the network. Between 
2007 and 2011, the tariff remained the same while cumulated inflation 
during the same period exceeded 35% and the labor costs rose 
significantly as the DKI regional minimum wage increased 70% over 
the same time period (Palyja annual report 2011). Given this, the city 
had weakened power to enforce the attainment of standards in the face 
of high uncertainty over their ability to pay the water charges owed. 
Generally, the two companies have made performance gains during 
the concession period up until the time of writing, though they have 
fallen well short of the service improvement and efficiency expectations 
initially announced during the concession award period. Though water 
was meant to by totally potable by 2007, it must still be boiled in 2014. 
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In the latest renegotiations, operators and PAM Jaya restated an 
expectation for full potability to be met by the end of the concession 
period. Water pressure also remains low and service is intermittent, 
particularly for consumers who live at the periphery of the distribution 
network. Many residents, particularly in poorer neighborhoods, remain 
dependent on private water vendors. Often, these vendors purchase 
water from the network at social concession tariff rates to resell at 
grossly inflated prices.  
Expansion and efficiency gains have also been lesser than expected at 
the outset, but the companies have achieved many of the targets that 
were significantly reduced in 2001, 2003, and 2008, during rate 
rebasing and contract renegotiation periods. Essentially during 
negotiations, targets for non-revenue water, production, and coverage 
were revised downwards to meet performance. PAM Jaya conceded to 
these revised targets in return for favorable contractual revisions and 
also adjustments to the water tariff and charge deficit. Furthermore, 
disputes over the terms of measurement have caused problems. For 
example, the coverage ratio reported by operators was higher than that 
estimated by regulators on several occasions, as operators assumed a 
household population of 7.6 whereas regulators applied the statistics 
bureau’s figure of five people per household – a difference that put 
company coverage ratio estimates well above the regulator’s. 
The sharpest revision was in 2001 during the RCA negotiations. But 
again, in 2009, the JWSRB issued a report criticizing the operators for 
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missing most of their targets and pointing out PAM Jaya’s acceptance 
of weaker targets for the following five-year operating period. In that 
year, the companies paid PAM Jaya penalties of Rp800 million each for 
NRW losses that cost an estimated Rp 250 billion. In response to 
criticism, PAM Jaya reported that the agency had negotiated additional 
compensation from Palyja and Aetra of Rp 165 billion and Rp 183 
billion, each, and that penalties for the future operating period were 
being increased to Rp 50 million to Rp 80 million for each NRW 
percentage point over the target. It is not apparent, however, that this 
penalty system has been successfully implemented. 
As of 2013, one of the biggest concerns is that NRW still remains high: 
this is a persistent problem facing the efficiency and affordability of 
water supply in Jakarta, and has been one of the most significant target 
misses over the duration of the concessions. At the end of the second 
operating period, in 2008, both operators fell well below the NRW goals 
set. TPJ missed its revised 38.6% target, reducing NRW only to 
53.23%, and Palyja missed its 35.35% target with actual performance 
at 46.19% (the original CA had specified a target of 30% by 2008 
(Interview, Ali 2013)). As targets were again reduced during the second 
rebasing period, and as the companies looked to improve their NRW 
reduction programs, the gaps between targets and actual performance 
closed during the third operating period. In 2009, Palyja actually 
exceeded its NRW goal of 44%, reducing NRW to 43.9% and easily 
met the adjusted NRW goal of 41.62% set for the third operating period 
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(2008-2012) with a reported NRW of 37.9% in 2013. Aetra nearly met 
its target, having lowered NRW to approximately 43% in 2013, down 
from over 58% in 1998 (Nugroho, 2011). These rates were well above 
the initial CA’s NRW target of 30.28% and the RCA’s target of 30% set 
for 2013, but were in line with the subsequently revised targets.  
Targets have been revised downwards to meet performance for 
distribution volume, production capacity, and service coverage as well. 
In the first operating periods, as each company began to fall well short 
of their initial 2002 targets for number of connections and coverage, the 
targets were reduced in negotiations so that they would be aligned with 
the trajectories of their actual performance. For example, the initial 
2002 service coverage goals for TPJ and Palyja of 70% were adjusted 
to 62% and 45%, respectively, and were met (or at least nearly) with 
actual performance of 62.17% and 44.17%, respectively (K. J. Bakker, 
2010; Barraqué, 2010). Similar patterns hold for the number of 
connections. 
Table 34. Jakarta service expansion targets and performance 
 Number of connections Service Coverage 
 TPJ / Aetra Palyja TPJ / Aetra Palyja 
Baseline (1998) 231,600 209,895 30-52 33-38 
Original target (2002) 361,607 395,522 70 70 
Revised target (2002) 335,413 301,048 62 45 
Actual (2002) 336,550 312,879 62.17 44.17 
Revised target (2008) 403,030 391,980 75.5 61 
 





Sources: PAM Jaya, Palyja and TPJ / Aetra annual reports and websites, Interviews, 
(K. J. Bakker, 2010; Barraqué, 2010; Nugroho, 2011) 
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5.7 Problems: Regulation, contract design, information, and 
culture  
The general outcome in Jakarta has been a ratcheting-down of 
performance targets over time, despite increasing tariffs and water 
charges that are apparently sufficient to recover costs and generate 
reasonable profits. The concessions have devolved into stasis with 
respect to Palyja, and hopes are more promising, but nevertheless 
cautious for the Aetra concession. Despite public contestation over the 
large deficit that DKI Jakarta has accumulated, the agency, PAM Jaya, 
is quite apparently locked into the deals, now rendered incapable of 
managing the fiscal and technical requirements of a remunicipalization: 
even if the concession is judged “failed,” cancellation does not appear 
to be a viable option. Thus, the local agency and the public it serves 
have neither the option of exit, nor voice. With respect to the latter, the 
companies are not directly responsive to opposition, as they are 
protected by contract and hold monopoly provider status in their 
respective operating areas. To the former, it is quite possible that the 
problem-ridden Palyja and tentative Aetra concessions are preferable, 
with respect to service performance, than remunicipalization to a long-
dormant public agency.  
These outcomes are due to clear dynamic inconsistencies – persistent 
failures of both government and the private operators to uphold their 
commitments to the deals at hand – and the ultimate losers have been 
the citizen-public. The rapid and gross deterioration of the credibility of 
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each party’s commitments are due to reasons that are motivational and 
imperative in nature. Major design flaws born of the original, ill-
conceived concessions contracts have been altered during 
renegotiations, but not enough to consider the agreements “fixed”. 
These flaws have born operating period outcomes (i.e., growing water 
charge deficits, poor definitions that leave measurement terms up for 
debate, perceived imbalanced in favor of operators, etc.) that have, in 
turn, corroded trust and undermined the working relationships between 
parties to the contracts. This has further reduced opportunities for 
parties to overcome some of the inherent design flaws and information 
problems via cooperative evaluation and mutually beneficial 
adjustment. Furthermore, the considerable insufficiency of the 
regulatory mechanism, near-complete lack of transparency regarding 
contract terms, and limited technical capacity of regulators all serve to 
weaken the imperative credibility of commitments.  
Many of Jakarta’s problems – and the apparent diminishment of 
imperative credibility over time – are attributable to weaknesses in both 
contract-based and discretionary regulation. Jakarta’s regulatory model 
combines elements of the typical French model of regulation by 
contract and the English model of discretionary regulation. Whilst the 
Jakarta regulatory model is a hybrid form, constraints on the 
Regulatory Body place the model far closer to the French pole than the 
English. Obviously, when the primary mode of regulation is contractual, 
the contract design is critical. This has been Jakarta’s Achilles heel: the 
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contracts and their iterations have failed to specify the details regarding 
responsibilities, standards, penalties, terms of measurement, and 
modes of adjustment and conflict resolution. To add insult to injury on 
the discretionary front, there has been almost a total lack of consistent 
external oversight (never mind enforcement) over the duration of the 
contracts. Neither the boundaries of authority, nor aspects of oversight, 
nor standards to which parties are to be held were clearly defined or 
commonly interpreted and accepted by stakeholders.  
Three major problems regarding discretionary regulation have become 
apparent. First, the regulator has no independent, de facto authority on 
water pricing, targets or performance. Thus, there is no real power to 
keep the operators sufficiently accountable, much less drive efficiency 
gains. Regulators have been sidelined by the operators and agency: 
the JSWRB’s degree of authority and power over time is far more 
dependent on the political and bureaucratic ties of its members rather 
than on designed authority or professionalization. Secondly, there is a 
clear lack of capacity amongst regulators to accurately and reliably 
assess the feasibility and prudence of investments, tariffs, service 
goals, and actual performance. And lastly, there are serious information 
problems hindering any kind of meaningful monitoring and oversight, 
regardless of the board’s technical capacity over time. 
The Jakarta Water Supply Regulatory Body was established years after 
the initial PPP agreements, via the RCAs in 2001, and first convened to 
participate in the negotiations at the close of the first operating period in 
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2002. Four boards have served so far (2002-2004; 2005-2007; 2008-
2011; 2012-present), and their capacity, authority, and power have 
varied greatly over time as a function of the particular roster of 
regulators and the state of the relationship between the companies and 
PAM Jaya with the JWSRB. The RCA defines the JWSRB’s roles as 
“arranging coordination among the relevant government authorities 
agencies in relation to the implementation of this agreement” (but not 
directly enforcing implementation of the agreement); monitoring 
enforcement of the closure of groundwater wells; monitoring tariff rates 
and estimating average tariffs; monitoring water provision to 
consumers; and mediating disputes between PAM Jaya and the 
operators (Interviews, JWSRB 2013; Iwanami & Nickson, 2008). 
The Body has no independent statutory authority, however, with 
respect to enforcing contracts and performance standards, setting 
tariffs and charge rates, or ruling in disputes. Rather, with respect to 
rates and charges, it serves only in an advisory capacity to the 
Governor, who ultimately approves tariff rates. Further, the JSWRB is 
limitedly influential in dealing with the problem of gaps between the 
charge and average tariff, as their recommendatory responsibility 
applies only to the tariff schedule. Since the charge is formulaic, with 
adjustment subject to bilateral negotiations between the agency and 
operators (though the state auditor has occasionally reviewed the cost 
determinants that comprise the charge), the JWSRB has no authority to 
address the shortfall. The Body’s influence has been limited to the 
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authority informally afforded them as middleman during the first rate 
rebasing exercise, variable attention paid by the Governor’s office to 
recommendatory calculations, and implementation of the Automatic 
Tariff Adjustment for the few years of its effect.  
The JWSRB was called upon, however, as a resource in the resolution 
of early disputes between the operators and PAM Jaya – particularly 
when JWSRB members held political clout and connections to other 
governmental and legal bodies that could be used to creatively 
influence participants. Only once over the past fifteen years has there 
been an agreement between PAM Jaya and operators during the 
rebasing processes: otherwise, relationships have been contentious. 
During the first rebasing period, the JSWRB was engaged to move 
negotiations forward, but with limited success. Their power and role in 
mediations has been almost wholly dependent on the authority 
voluntarily conferred by the parties to the contract (especially since the 
body is, itself, established via the contracts). As such, both PAM Jaya 
and the operators have habitually marginalized the JWSRB: the Body 
was altogether excluded from the second rebasing exercise and has 
been circumvented since. PAM Jaya officials confirmed in 2013 
interviews that they viewed water charge setting and the imposition of 
rewards and penalties as solely PAM Jaya and company matters: the 
JWSRB’s only job would be to assist in the event of disputes, and only 
upon the request of contract parties (Interviews, Kaderi and Lintong, 
2013). 
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Some attempts have been made to strengthen the role of the regulator: 
DKI Governor’s Regulation 54 of 2005 restated its mediation role and 
referred to JWSRB as an “independent” professional body (Ahmad 
Lanti et al., 2009), but did not establish legally binding status to its 
decisions. The ruling did little to bolster the JWSRB’s diminishing role, 
largely because of the departure of a few regulators with political clout 
(Interviews, 2013). Another 2006 series of meetings involving 
government and civil society leaders marked an attempt to strengthen 
the oversight role of the JSWRB, as they discussed how to improve 
monitoring and the imposition of a penalties system for non-
performance, but aside from the decision not to implement the ATA 
scheduled for the second semester of 2006 (Interview, personal 
correspondence, JWSRB 2013), efforts to fortify JSWRB were short-
lived. By the third operating period starting in 2008, the JWSRB was 
relegated to the background of ever less productive negotiations. 
Further, the JWSRB’s power to arbitrate has been limited by the fact 
that no mediation process or mechanism was specified in the contracts, 
thus opening up new disagreements over the modes of dispute 
resolution. 
Even if the JSWRB had been granted statutory authority to enforce its 
rulings, its decisions and recommendations suffer from major 
information asymmetries and questions over the Body’s technical 
capacity, which undermine its legitimacy. Operators are not obligated to 
provide regular audited information to the regulators. State audits have 
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been conducted, but regular oversight by PAM Jaya or JWSRB is 
dependent on performance data supplied directly by operators. 
According to former head regulator Achmad Lanti, the first few 
regulatory boards could not reliably ensure that costs utilized for the 
water charge were reasonable or efficient: during his tenure over the 
first two operating periods, the JWSRB sent a team out twice to 
evaluate company costs. Upon determining that costs were inflated, the 
companies no longer cooperated with requests for information, and the 
Body could do nothing to require the submission of financial 
information, much less implement an audit process. There have been 
numerous disputes between the reported performance of operators 
(e.g., number of connections) and assessments by the JWSRB, but the 
latter’s judgments have had limited weight since almost all of the data 
employed to assess performance is granted by the concessionaires, at 
their discretion.  
In addition to the issues of authority and information, the JWSRB’s 
members have had variable degrees of training and experience with 
technical regulation, in part derivative of its limited resources. Early 
JWSRB Chair Lanti referred to the Body’s experience of “learning by 
doing” (Achmad Lanti, 2007; Ahmad Lanti et al., 2009). Lanti also 
acknowledged difficulties including the Body’s inability to evaluate the 
“fairness” of claimed expenses by operators, limited access to 
operational and financial information, limited ability to evaluate how 
expenditure should correlated to performance, lack of benchmarking 
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with peer operators, and difficulties in determining whether tariffs would 
be sufficiently high to pay for service improvement and expansion 
(Interview, Lanti 2013; Achmad Lanti, 2007). Further, rather than 
performing independent technical assessments of planned 
expenditures, appropriate tariffs, etc., during the first rate rebasing, the 
JSWRB instead encouraged the operators and PAM Jaya to simply 
“meet in the middle” of their positions on performance and rates 
(Interview, JWSRB 2013). 
PAM Jaya officials have thus positioned themselves as the primary 
regulator of the contracts. Agency managers suggested that JWSRB 
independence and perceived mission depends more on who is in office 
than on the organizational structure itself. While the agency hoped that 
JWSRB might lend more technical advice and assistance with 
benchmarking, they also asserted that the Body should “leave 
decisions to us,” and claimed that JWSRB “hasn’t done their job yet” 
(Interviews, PAM Jaya 2013). As of writing, there was a stark difference 
in perceptions about the agency’s responsibility to JWSRB. PAM Jaya 
sees their responsibility as solely to provide information; the Body, on 
the other hand, believes the agency requires JSWRB approval 
(Interviews, JWSRB and PAM Jaya, 2013). This only serves to 
reinforce that the JWSRB’s role and regulatory mission have never 
been clear.  
A number of major design flaws and oversights – not least amongst 
them the dual tariff instrument – have had unintended consequences 
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for the aspect of regulation by contract as well. Ultimately, the contracts 
have failed to promote efficiency gains to the fullest extent, and have 
also left major questions unanswered with respect to targets, penalties, 
and power to set the rules of the game. In this case, the extensive 
incompleteness of the CAs and RCAs has been a major ongoing issue. 
PAM Jaya has also long complained that the contracts were “unfair” 
and unevenly allocated risk (Interviews, PAM Jaya, Ali, 2013). The 
JWSRB also suggested that later attainment of targets did not 
necessarily reflect the contracts’ ability to effectively compel service 
improvement near to the highest levels attainable: they believed, 
instead, that the targets were easy for companies to achieve as 
contracts were renegotiated downwards (JWSRB Interview, 2013). To 
support this claim, they pointed out that Aetra had been able to achieve 
many of its targets for the 2008-2012 period, operating with the 2003 
water charge.  
PAM Jaya, too, acknowledged that agency managers had little to no 
experience in contract management, which put them at a major 
disadvantage over the course of the concessions. The companies, with 
access to superior legal counsel, have been able to adeptly out-
negotiate their government counterparts in many of the multitudinous 
points of dispute over contract terms, penalties, targets, and 
measurement. PAM Jaya managers also suggested that operators, 
specifically Palyja, was able to “bully” the agency via legal tools and by 
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leveraging national and international-level political connections to push 
their agendas (Interviews, PAM Jaya 2013).  
As previously discussed, many disputes centered on the assumptions 
used to measure and estimate performance with respect to coverage 
and access. Others have centered on the details of penalty imposition. 
For example, a 2010 Palyja – PAM Jaya dispute over water quality 
arose when the company failed to reach target on potable water. The 
contract required imposition of a penalty with a specified dollar amount, 
but no specified plans with respect to frequency of monitoring and 
imposition of the penalty itself. Palyja suggested an annual review, 
whereas PAM Jaya suggested ongoing monitoring: the parties finally 
agreed on a twice-monthly schedule after protracted negotiations. 
Another ongoing point of dispute was over who could change targets, 
and when (Interview, Ali 2013). 
A final issue is that the system of financial remuneration exhibited 
major weaknesses in motivating service performance and efficiency 
improvements.  While water charges were set to increase every 
semester regardless of performance (aside from the collection rate), 
tariffs were based on performance, consumer affordability, and 
efficiency-driving measures (Nugroho, 2011). Whilst this exerted some 
pressure, as increased tariff revenues would improve the likelihood of 
timely water charge payment, it was only indirect. If anything, it did 
more to cause problems for the government: when performance targets 
were not met for the period between 2005 to 2009, for example, JWRB 
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did not recommend a tariff increase to DKI (Nugroho, 2011), 
exacerbating the growing debt owed by government to the operators. 
A final issue has to do with motivational credibility, goal misalignment 
over time, and the deteriorated working relationships between 
operators – particularly Palyja and PAM Jaya. The relationships in 
Jakarta remind us that the organizations involved in PPP are 
collections of actors who, individually, have “favorites” and personal 
alliances, maintain grudges, and possess mixes of rational and 
irrational ideas and attitudes about other participants. And collectively, 
these actors nurture and maintain institutional memories and strong 
ideas about “the other side.” In interviews, it was a clear theme 
amongst government-side managers from PAAB, PAM Jaya, and 
JWSRB that relations with Suez have been problematic from the start, 
and have only deteriorated. Multiple people commented on the 
difficulties Jakarta government managers had working with the French 
foreign professionals – even above problems with Thames prior to 
TPJ’s localization into Aetra (Interviews, PAM Jaya, JWSRB, Ali, 2013), 
suggesting that some kind of cultural barrier was insurmountable over 
the years of partnership.  
Further, the PPP began as a partnership forced upon an unwilling 
government agency, with many PAM Jaya managers who carried on 
with the agency post-privatization, bringing along long-held 
resentments in dealings with operators during the concession’s early 
and middle-ages. Outside of theses contentious beginnings) and 
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cultural mismatches, a few intentional human resource decisions 
further exacerbated the government-company divide. The issue of 
seconded employees has caused lasting problems for both operators. 
In the early days of the concessions, 80% of operator employees had 
been seconded from PAM Jaya. Many problems arose due to worker 
perceptions of different treatment: seconded employees alleged that 
their salaries were lower21 and that they were subject to unfair 
terminations. Companies, however, counter that the original CAs 
ensured over-employment of seconded staff (many of whom were 
allegedly hired prior to PPP via nepotistic connections), with contract 
terms that made it difficult for operators to terminate their employment.  
Aetra management, too, developed a promising relationship with PAM 
Jaya and within its own ranks after taking over in 2006. The company 
shifted the class of many of its employees, moving to a situation 
wherein approximately 60% were seconded and 40% direct. Managers 
said that seconded employees were never proud of being part of TPJ – 
that it had been an “arranged marriage” that never worked – but that 
transitioning fully to Aetra changed the culture in a way that significantly 
improved company operations (Interview, Hutasoit 2013). Also, a 2007 
“re-engineering process” made significant changes amongst the senior 
management, removing expensive “bules” (foreigners) from senior 
positions. Reflecting on the Thames days, senior Aetra manager 
                                            
21 Lintong Hutasoit, long-time TPJ / Aetra manager attests that many were 
actually higher (Interview, 2013). 
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Hutasoit suggested that the UK company had sent “mediocre”, 
inexperienced British managers to Jakarta, and that local managers 
proved better able to deal with the local complexities of Jakarta and the 
cultural aspects of working with Indonesian government counterparts. 
He quipped,  “Why ask expertise from London when it’s more 
complicated here? They should be hiring me to tell them how to run a 
water company” (Interview, Hutasoit 2013). 
5.8 Adaptation and inflexibility 
The story of Jakarta is, in essence, a story of controversial and 
contested deals that, despite consistent opposition over time, have 
defied the threat of early termination. The two concessions were 
markedly different in their standing at the time of writing: Aetra’s 
managers had been able to craft fairly productive working relationship 
and secure pricing adjustments agreeable to both the concessionaire 
and PAM Jaya, though instrumental outcomes would remain to be 
seen. On the other hand, Palyja remained in a ten-year stalemate with 
the local government – a holding pattern resulting from inflexibility on 
both sides and deteriorated relationships, that frustrated a government 
keen on termination, but was nevertheless profitable enough to warrant 
continuation on the company side. Aetra, on the other hand, had 
managed to repair relationships enough to bolster motivational 
credibility of commitment, but had yet proven whether their revised 
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Master Agreement would be sufficient to secure the imperative 
credibility of the operator to meet performance standards.  
The Palyja concession, whilst unsuccessful at meeting the 
requirements and goals intended for it in the beginning (again, it 
remains unclear how much of this failure is due to government 
interference or company non-performance), had been bolstered by 
contravening political and business interests at the highest levels for 
over fifteen years. This, indeed, is a case where contract sustenance 
cannot necessarily be considered a success. It is apparent that major 
technical and partial political failures occurred, but that vested interests 
ensured that these deals would remain intact. Lacking a strong 
regulator, these political and technical failures (which otherwise should 
likely have resulted in termination of at least the Palyja contract) were 
insufficient to push the contracts to cancellation due to contravening 
local political constraints on transparency; unclear delineation of local-








Chapter 6. Manila: Adaptive regulation and balancing 
inconsistency  
Like Jakarta, Manila privatized its water services in the late 1990s via 
the award of two concessions contracts that split the capital city in half. 
The 1998 contracts represented the world’s largest water PPP 
arrangement, with projected investment needs of US$7 billion and a 
service area supplying 11 million residents (Dumol, 2000). In the 
1990s, Manila’s water services were characterized by low connectivity, 
unreliable service, gross inefficiencies, and huge water losses due to 
leakage and theft. By the mid-1990s, the local water agency, Manila 
Waterworks and Sanitation Services [MWSS], owned a deteriorated 
network, which it operated with huge financial losses. It was saddled 
with approximately US$800 million in debts to multilateral institutions 
including the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, and the Japan 
Bank for International Cooperation (FDC, 2009), and was dependent 
on heavy government subsidization to maintain operations (X. Wu et 
al., 2011). 
These poor financial conditions and warnings of a looming water crisis 
motivated the national administration to privatize the city’s water 
services in order to harness the technological capacity of the private 
sector and infuse much-needed capital into network improvement and 
expansion. After a tenuous start, the concessions have emerged as a 
successful example of water PPP. But the PSP enterprise has certainly 
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not been without its problems. Over fifteen years up to the time of 
writing, the Manila concessions have exhibited patterns of dynamic 
inconsistency, resulting in different outcomes for each concession and 
fluctuating public assessments of “failure” and “success” over time. 
Manila Water, the East operator, stabilized after initial difficulties and 
became a regional market leader in water services, with an eye to 
overseas expansion. The other operator, Maynilad, would walk a 
rockier path through early contract termination, two years of re-
municipalized ownership, and finally a second more successful 
concession. By and large, the PSP experiment has been far more 
stable and successful than Jakarta’s, particularly over the last ten 
years, and a much more empowered and technically capable 
regulatory body has emerged to hold both the government and private 
sector accountable to commitments. 
For both concessions, initial inconsistencies were rooted in poor 
assumptions and strategic missteps during bidding, which led to 
operator over-commitments for tariff reduction and NRW reduction. 
Over time, however, the water agency, operators, and Regulatory 
Office [RO] have learned and adjusted to create sustainable 
arrangements that have yielded a long run of fairly good performance, 
despite ongoing conflicts, including recent arbitration following the third 
rate rebasing.  
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6.1 Manila concessions and the Philippine political economy 
The Philippines political system may be characterized as a 
neopatrimonial democratic republic, wherein a robust democratic 
political system exists alongside an informal system of accepted 
political patrimony. The country inherited many of the American 
structures of government following nearly fifty years of American 
colonial rule lasting until the mid 20th century, including three branches 
of government and a strong Presidency within the Executive branch. A 
single Presidential term of six years may be served, resulting in low 
post-election political pressure for the highest levels of office. It is within 
the Executive branch that national water policy is set, and under which 
the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority [NAWASA] was 
established during a period of water nationalization shortly after Filipino 
independence.  
During the Marcos era, responsibility for water services was 
decentralized to local government units at the province, municipality, 
and barangay (neighborhood or city district) levels, under Local Water 
Utilities Administration [LUWA] units. In Manila, the capital region, 
water services would remain the purview of the national government. 
NAWASA the Metropolitan Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage 
System [MWSS] under the Marcos government in 1971, and the 
agency would retain its reporting obligation directly to the central 
government via a Board of Trustees nominated by the President’s 
office.  
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The political sphere in the Philippines is tightly intertwined and largely 
controlled by powerful family business groups, resulting in highly 
particularist policy making that often serves the interests of family 
conglomerates (Hutchcroft 1998). Indeed, business and are dominated 
by small number of powerful families, commonly referred to as 
“dynasties,” who serve in corporate roles and political office generation 
after generation. This has particular implications for PPPs, as they 
have inevitably involved these same family conglomerates. For one, 
public familiarity with the companies means that they are subject to 
more media and NGO scrutiny, intensifying the politicization of PPP 
deals. Further, the health of the PPP is tied to national economic health 
via impacts on large parent companies that represent key players in the 
domestic economy (Jensen, 2009) – a reality that affected Manila’s 
water PPPs. 
Philippine judicial institutions are active in the Philippines’ litigious 
business environment, as legal remedies are commonly sought for 
commercial disputes, and legal tools are often to apply pressure in 
contract disputes. Describes Sicat, “litigious interference helps to buy 
time and uses delays as a framework for harassment or changing the 
rules of project implementation. The use of temporary restraining 
orders (TROs) is often the vehicle of choice. Issued by a judge to 
withhold the continuation of a projected activity, it could have a deadly 
impact on the pursuit of specific contracts, including those that involve 
public investments in infrastructure and major industrial projects 
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pursued in the private sector” (Sicat, 2007). Unfortunately, also, 
corruption is commonplace and sustained by political interference, lack 
of a monitoring framework, and huge backlogs in case resolution 
(Espanol, 2007). 
Corruption has long been an issue of central concern, however. A 
tough legislative stance on pervasive corruption has had important, and 
sometimes adverse, effects on government decision makers. Whilst 
corruption at every level remains part of the business and political 
fabric, tough laws (e.g., the 1960 Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) 
have incentivized many officials, fearful of being accused of partiality or 
corruption, to delay decisions in order to garner higher-level support 
and approval. The resultant inflexibility can inhibit contract amendment 
and adjustment (Jensen, 2009). 
6.1.1 Ushering in PSP 
Prior to PSP, MWSS was serving only two thirds of Manila’s residents 
with water, and less than 10% with sewerage. NRW had reached 60%, 
and consumers had intermittent service of an average sixteen hours 
per day. The urban poor were particularly suffering, and many relied on 
water vendors who charged up to thirteen times the per cubic meter 
cost of MWSS (Xun Wu & Malaluan, 2008). Further, depletion of 
groundwater was leading to land subsidence.  
In addition to growing recognition of the crisis level of provision, a 
number of other factors ushered in PPP. Certainly, the global trend 
 237 
towards privatization of infrastructure in the developing world in the 
1990s did not miss the Philippines: the government was riding a 
seemingly successful wave of experiments with power supply PPPs in 
the early 1990s (Kumar & Brock, 2012). In 1995, the International 
Finance Corporation [IFC] facilitated a technical assistance program 
aimed at improving Manila’s water services (Carroll, 2012). At the time, 
IFC was heavily involved in marketization of infrastructure across the 
developing world, and the influential development partner encouraged 
the government to employ PSP. The Asian Development Bank – also a 
proponent of PSP – offered a technical assistance loan of $582,000 in 
1995 to develop a plan for Manila (X. Wu et al., 2011).  
From a legal standpoint, the Water Crisis Act of 1995 gave President 
Ramos a one-year window to address the predicted water emergency, 
thus giving him legal authority to privatize municipal water companies. 
The business potential within the Philippine market was not lost on 
water multinationals who, with their national governments, further 
cultivated interest in privatization. A 1994 offer to purchase MWSS by a 
consortium of UK’s Biwater and a Malaysian firm was refused on the 
grounds that the agency was not legally saleable, nor was the 
government ready yet to start an open bidding process, which it was 
intent on facilitating (Dumol, 2000). Other governments supporting 
expansion of their home companies entered discussions. The French 
government, in indirect support of its major water multinationals, gave 
the government a US$1 million grant for the planning process prior to 
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the open bid. A French consulting firm and the IFC managed the 
planning process (Xun Wu & Malaluan, 2008). Indeed, the later 
selection of a French partner for at least one concession agreement 
was unsurprising. 
Unlike Jakarta, the government entered the concessions with a fairly 
well-planned, albeit rushed process, which benefitted from financial and 
technical support of The World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and 
other development experts. While the government was forced to move 
quickly, the bidding and selection process, regulatory structure, and 
contract terms were generally well planned and fairly specific, and 
preparations for transitioning MWSS to private ownership were 
administered. Adroitly, in preparation for the entrance of private 
operators, the government raised tariffs by 38% and cut staff 30% in 
1996 (X. Wu et al., 2011). These moves would jump start efficiency 
driving and cost recovery measures that would accompany PPP and 
soften the changes that would follow.  
In order to allow for benchmarking and infuse a sense of competition 
into water services throughout the concession period, the city would be 
split into two service zones, East and West, which were required to be 
awarded to two different companies. This choice was not undisputed, 
however, as it would complicate the division of staff and assets (Dumol, 
2000). Nevertheless, two approximately equal sized service areas were 
opened for bid in late 1996.  
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The terms of the bid proposals and subsequent contracts charged 
concessionaires with operational responsibility for the full concession 
25-year period as well as the capital investments required to expand 
services to nearly full coverage. The terms also set targets for service 
expansion to 85% by 2001 and 96% by 2006; water and service quality 
improvements; and reduction in NRW. In return for retention of all water 
revenues, the winning operators would absorb the remaining 
operational manpower of MWSS, assume MWSS debts, and pay out 
yearly concession fees to the parent agency to fund MWSS and a 
Regulatory Office, which amounted to a projected US$1.2 billion in over 
the concession period. 
6.2 Concession bidding and selection 
The rules for bid submission required that project companies comprise 
a local sponsor with majority control, paired with multinational with 
proven expertise (X. Wu et al., 2011). Four local-multinational teams 
were pre-qualified as bidders for the concessions: International Water 
(United Utilities and Bechtel) and Ayala (Philippines’ oldest and largest 
family conglomerate); Lyonnaise des Eaux and Benpres Holdings 
(another large conglomerate controlled by the Lopez family); 
Compagnie Generale des Eaux and Apoitix; and Anglian Water and 
Metro Pacific Corporation. Bidders were required to submit a technical 
proposal and bid rate, which would be applied for the first concession 
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period upon award. Bidders were required to bid for both zones, but 
could only be awarded one (Xun Wu & Malaluan, 2008). 
While the bidding process required a technical bid, winners were 
ultimately selected based on lowest tariffs. These initial tariffs were 
intended to remain in place (subject to annual formulaic indexed 
adjustments) until the initial rebasing planned for 2003. 
Bids were opened in January 1997 in a very public award meeting. The 
East zone was awarded to Manila Water, a consortium of the Ayala 
Corporation, United Utilities, and Bechtel, who submitted a surprisingly 
low tariff bid of PHP2.31 – nearly a quarter of the pre-concession 
average rate of PHP8.46 (Xun Wu & Leong, 2013). In fact, the Ayala 
group submitted bids significantly lower across the board, but because 
bid rules precluded the same operators from winning both concession 
areas, the second lowest West zone bidder, the Benpres – Lyonnaise 
group, was awarded the West concession. 
Table 35. Manila Concession Bid Submissions 
MWSS Average Rate per Cubic Meter  PHP 8.56 
 Percent Bid Peso Bid 
(PHP) 
WEST   
Ayala – International Water 28.63 2.514 
Benpres – Lyonnaise 56.59 4.969 
Aboitix – Compagnie Generale des Eaux 56.88 4.994 
Metro Pacific - Anglian 66.90 5.874 
EAST   
Ayala – International Water 26.39 2.317 
Benpres – Lyonnaise 62.88 5.521 
Aboitix – Compagnie Generale des Eaux 64.51 5.663 
Metro Pacific - Anglian 69.79 6.128 
Source: Dumol, 2000 
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In February, MWSS signed two 25-year concession agreements with 
Maynilad, the consortia including Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux of France 
and Benpres Holdings of the Philippines, and Manila Water, the joint 
venture of British United Utilities, Bechtel, and Ayala Corporation, for 
the West and East zones, respectively. The companies’ low bid rates 
assumed significant and rapid efficiency gains. That actual 
performance in the few years following the commencement of the 
contracts was far below projected levels, and that operators would 
immediately request significant rate increases begs whether operators 
ever intended to hold fast to the bid rates. The extremely low bids 
became a major source of tension between MWSS, the new Regulatory 
Office [RO] and concessionaires within a few years. Fabella (2006) 
suggests that the companies may have underbid due to other real 
estate interests. 
Nevertheless, the operators began with low initial tariffs of PHP2.32 in 
the East zone and PHP4.97 in the West. These tariffs would be 
adjusted regularly for shifts in the consumer price index and annually, 
as needed, for unexpected financial impacts via an Extraordinary Price 
Adjustment [EPA] mechanism. The EPA was designed to deal with 
changes in operator obligations, changes in law affecting cash flow, 
extraordinary currency fluctuations, problems with MWSS commitments 
that would affect financial projections, or force majeure (Xun Wu & 
Malaluan, 2008). 
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In planned subsequent five-year rate rebasing exercises (the first 
scheduled for implementation in 2003), tariffs would be adjusted to 
account for planned capital and operating expenditures and companies’ 
earnings of reasonable returns, not to exceed an appropriate discount 
rate [ADR]. Assessments during rebasing would review real and 
projected expenditures as well as performance (only coverage was 
contractually scheduled). On reviewing actual expenditures as costs to 
be recouped by operators via the tariff, regulators would be able to 
disallow the claiming of components of the Opening Cash Position 
[OPC] during rebasing, should they be deemed inefficient or imprudent. 
The hope was for consumers to reap expected efficiency gains via 
successively lower tariff rates. 
In order to oversee the contracts and facilitate rate adjustments, a 
Regulatory Office was immediately established within MWSS and 
would be funded via concession fees. In early planning prior to contract 
award, the government and planning partners had recognized the 
benefit of a fully independent professional regulator. Establishing one, 
however, would have required legislative action leading to an 
anticipated year-long delay. As such, the government decided, instead, 
to establish the “semi-autonomous” MWSS Regulatory Office [RO] via 
contract (Dumol, 2000; Xun Wu & Leong, 2013).  
MWSS Trustees would appoint a Chief Regulator and four regulators 
supervising technical, economic, financial, and legal divisions. Each 
regulatory board would serve a term of three years. Their decisions 
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would be subject to approval of the MWSS Board of Trustees, who 
were politically appointed, thus exposing regulation to potential of 
political interference (Kumar & Brock, 2012). An Appeals Panel was 
also established to deal with disputes related to regulatory decisions. 
For each concession, three members would be appointed prior to the 
start of a Rate Rebasing period. The panels would consist of one 
member appointed by the concessionaire, one by the RO, and one by 
either the President of the International Chamber of Commerce or by 
the two other selected members (Xun Wu & Malaluan, 2008). This 
panel was more (but not entirely) removed from the threat of political 
interference, adding another safeguard to the integrity of regulatory 
judgments 
6.2.1 Next-Best Regulation 
The RO’s roles would be to oversee Concession Agreement clauses on 
rates, including regular adjustments, rate rebasing, and Extraordinary 
Price Adjustment; monitor service commitments; oversee audit and 
reporting; rule on cost allocations and the application of audited 
financial information in rate setting; prosecute and defend in appeals; 
and manage complaints or inputs from community stakeholders 
(Lazaro, 2002). In the beginning, its actions were largely limited to 
monitoring performance, adherence to the contract, and the routine 
processes for tariff adjustment. The first rate rebasing, however, would 
result in a growing role for the RO.  
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Nevertheless, its influence would be constrained by its relationship with 
the President-appointed MWSS Board and its lack of independent 
legislated authority (by law, MWSS maintained sole responsibility to set 
tariff rates). Its ruling on tariffs were technically recommendatory and 
subject to Board of Trustees Approval. So, too, was their budget and 
hiring decisions (Lazaro, 2002). Additionally, the RO was afforded 
limited formal training. Aside from a seminar facilitated by a US utility 
research center upon contract commencement in 1997, the RO had to 
rely on its own resources to learn the processes and methods of 
technical regulation (Interview, MRSS-RO, 2013).  
That said, rules on participation safeguarded what independence the 
RO Board and staff sought to preserve actively from the beginning, 
though they would also constrain the recruitment of knowledgeable, 
experienced regulators. For one, the contracts specified that previous 
employees of MWSS or the concessionaires were ineligible to serve as 
regulators. This rule marked the tradeoff between preserving 
independence at the expense of forgoing access to a wide pool of 
experienced potential regulators. As such, technical capacity would 
remain a central concern of the RO (Interview, MWSS-RO and Alikpala, 
2013). While the MWSS could appoint regulators, they could not 
directly dismiss them, thus restraining the influence MWSS could exert 
once a regulator was in place. Further, the decisions of the Appeals 
Panel would be final (Xun Wu & Malaluan, 2008). Finally, MWSS was 
contractually bound to cooperate with the concessionaires and adhere 
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to decisions of the Appeals Panel and RO: failure to do so would be 
grounds for contract termination at the agency’s fault. 
6.3 Early problems and the test of regulator legitimacy 
On the heels of the Asian Financial Crisis, early 1998 brought the first 
significant challenges to the RO. These challenges also allowed them 
opportunities to solidify their role in managing the Manila concessions 
and, thus, afforded them legitimacy as a force to be reckoned with. 
While the concessionaires’ bid rates made PPP politically saleable, the 
operators soon discovered that they were overly optimistic, mainly due 
to two unforeseen events: a drought affecting the availability of raw 
water and the Asian Financial Crisis. As in Jakarta, the crisis led to 
rapid currency devaluation that nearly doubled operators’ assumed 
debt burdens and grossly increased financing and input costs (Xun Wu 
& Malaluan, 2008).  
In March, both concessionaires applied for tariff increases under the 
Extraordinary Price Adjustment [EPA] mechanism, citing the impacts of 
the Crisis upon earnings. At the time, regulators recall that they were 
“learning by doing” – they were grappling with the contract, the 
technical aspects of economic regulation, and the boundaries of their 
own roles in contract management (Interview, Lanti, MWSS-RO, 2013). 
Despite limited experience and developing ideas about how the RO 
should operate, the first regulatory board saw the event as an 
immediate opportunity to set the tone for regulation.  
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The following tariff adjustment debate centered primarily on the 
appropriate discount rate (ADR) used as the upper limit on earned 
returns. In early 1998, Manila Water requested an EPA to PHP3.23 per 
cubic meter based on tariff calculations using an ADR of 18% as well 
as on a strategy of front-loading of loss-recovery associated with the 
financial crisis and drought. The RO pointed out that the contract 
disallowed front-loading of costs associated with EPA, and ruled that 
Manila Water must instead recover losses over the remainder of the 
contract. Further, the RO calculated a much lower 5.2% ADR implied in 
the original bid and granted a PHP.04 increase.  
Naturally, Manila Water appealed to the Appeals Panel in September 
1998, arguing that their initial low ADR was based on “unleveraged 
equity” (i.e., the incurring of zero debt) and that the ADR should, in fact, 
be based on the market-based weighted cost of capital, which had 
increased significantly post-crisis, using internationally accepted 
methods. The debate highlighted a major source of ambiguity22 in the 
contract on the precise determination of the ADR and, thus, the 
earnings guaranteed to the operator over the course of the concession.  
The Panel ruled in favor of Manila Water, but its decision was made 
smoother by a mid-arbitration revision of the requested increase and 
                                            
22 The ambiguity of contract revolved around interpretation of the words “may” 
and “shall”. The Panel decided that the “shall” in the terms of referring to 
market drivers held more weight than the “may” in the section stating that the 
“Regulatory Office, at its sole discretion, may consider the Concessionaire’s 
rate of return, either stated or implied in its bid, in determining the Appropriate 
Discount Rate” (Concession Agreement, 1997). 
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ADR. During arbitration, Manila Water had revised its request, with RO 
participation, to a much lower PHP.52 per cubic meter based on a 
revised 9.3% ADR. The Panel ruled that the ADR should, indeed, be 
market-driven and approved the upward adjusted ADR. Nevertheless, 
the episode confirmed the RO’s commitment to consumer protection 
and legitimized the body for all contract parties and the scrutinizing 
public (Xun Wu & Leong, 2013). 
The validation of a strong RO would not serve Maynilad well in the 
coming years, as it struggled to deal with huge shortfalls following the 
Financial Crisis and their own expansion missteps. Maynilad and its 
parent, Benpres Holdings controlled by the Lopez clan, were seriously 
affected by the crisis. Because capital expenditures were expected be 
much lower for the more established West zone, Maynilad had 
inherited an overwhelming 90% of the foreign-denominated MWSS 
debt, payable via the concession fee. The justification was that the 
East, a less populous and less developed area, would require far more 
per capita investment by Manila Water (Xun Wu & Malaluan, 2008). 
Maynilad’s inherited US$800 million debt virtually doubled following the 
Crisis (Finger et al., 2007), and debt service rose above their total 
revenues (Kumar & Brock, 2012).  
Adding further pressure, the company had immediately pursued an 
aggressive network expansion and NRW reduction strategy that sunk 
large amounts of capital but failed to attain intended efficiency gains 
that would have otherwise also boosted earnings. Manila Water, on the 
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other hand, scaled back on committed investments in response to the 
crisis, taking a more conservative stance. By 2000, Maynilad’s 
operating expenses were a third higher than its bid projections, and 
their production cost per cubic meter was PHP9.06, versus Manila 
Water’s PHP4.71 (Finger et al., 2007). Finally, Maynilad’s local owner, 
Benpres, was in financial duress, suffering losses of P353 million in 
2000, which also crippled its borrowing capability. That year, the 
company was unable to close a term loan that might have cushioned 
the company during the difficult post-crisis period.  
In October 2000, Maynilad also requested an accelerated EPA to front-
load the recovery of foreign exchange losses. The RO, worried about 
violating its restriction from being involved in contract adjustments, 
rejected the request but granted a lesser increase of P.26 that would 
allow the company to spread recovery over the remainder of the 
concession. In March 2001, Maynilad declared force majeure on 
grounds that its concerns were not being addressed by MWSS or the 
RO, and the company halted concession fee payment.  
Conscious of potential political fallout associated with cancellation, 
MWSS scrambled to save the deal. In October, 2001, MWSS and 
Maynilad agreed to amend their contract. Contract Amendment 1 
allowed for an additional P4.71 increase for Maynilad that would 
accelerate foreign exchange loss recovery over 18 months. It also 
relaxed targets for both operators to reduce capital expenditure 
requirements; adjusted the ADR upwards; and, most importantly, 
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granted concessionaires a foreign currency differential adjustment 
[FCDA] that would allow companies to recover currency losses during 
the remainder of the contracts. Manila Water benefitted with a resulting 
tariff increase from P5.10 to 9.37 per cubic meter – one freely gained 
without suffering political or reputational damage. The amendment 
process was not enough to forestall contract termination for Maynilad, 
however, as the firm was unable to overcome its internal operations 
and finance difficulties, and MWSS was criticized for giving up too 
much (X. Wu et al., 2011). 
6.3.1 Rebasing and learning 
Under these disputatious circumstances with Maynilad, the RO initiated 
the first rate rebasing exercise in March 2002, with a goal of 2003 
implementation. The rebasing was intended to reset rates to permit 
Concessionaires to recover their allowed returns on investments [ADR] 
whilst meeting targets and incentivizing efficiency gains. Whilst an ADR 
technical assistance loan aimed at building the RO’s technical capacity 
was awarded in 2001, training did not commence until after rebasing 
started. Thus, the team required the assistance of consultants for 
technical reasons and to ensure credibility of outcomes. 
An external expert committee from the University of Philippines 
conducted the exercise to evaluate rate inputs and expansion plans, 
determine the appropriate ADR for future cash flows, and recommend 
tariff base rates. The consulting team studied the Concession 
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Agreements and developed a framework for deciding rates based on 
two facets: the efficiency and prudence of actual and planned 
expenditures; and the fairness of the ADR for future cash flows. To the 
first issue, there had been no details put forth as tests for determining 
the efficiency and prudence of investments. The team developed a 
working test for efficiency of revenues, which considered unmet 
revenues resulting from underperformance in NRW, and a test for 
costs, which compared actual performance against bid targets. Their 
working test for prudence assessed whether there were any 
unnecessary or excessive expenditures or transactions where prices 
were not objectively determined (i.e., related party transactions that 
would imply corruption) (Interviews, MWSS-RO, 2013). Planned and 
actual expenditures that were deemed inefficient or imprudent would be 
included in a set of Opening Cash Position Disallowances (i.e., costs 
that could not be included in the negative cash position left to be 
recovered). The ADR was set using a standard market-based discount 
framework.  
The exercise also necessitated clarification of some contract 
ambiguities associated with service obligations, measurements, and 
the information requirements necessary for informed rebasing. 
Maynilad, who was simultaneously negotiating a contentious 
termination, refused to submit important technical and financial 
information for use in tariff setting deliberations. The consulting team 
recommended reductions in planned operating and capital expenditure 
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for both operators, as well as disallowances of PHP8.8 billion for 
Maynilad and PHP643 million for Manila Water (Xun Wu & Malaluan, 
2008). The striking difference indicated a judgment of relative 
inefficiency of Maynilad’s operations and differences in opinions on the 
prudence of past investments for Maynilad, in particular. Following on, 
the team suggested a rebased rate of PHP24.00 for Maynilad against 
their requested PHP34.72, and PHP17.00 for Manila Water against a 
requested PHP19.54 (X. Wu et al., 2011). 
Manila Water accepted the outcomes, but Maynilad disputed PHP2.77 
billion of their disallowance, which had been made against revenues 
due to failures to meet non-obligatory targets. The company argued 
that disallowances should be made only on costs and also disputed the 
committee’s comparison of actual and bid figures, considering the 
impact of the Financial Crisis (Xun Wu & Malaluan, 2008). The RO 
upheld the recommendation, and regulators said that, subsequently, it 
became much more difficult to deal with the distressed company 
(Interviews, MWSS-RO, 2013).  
The consultants and RO reflected on the rebasing exercise to identify 
several problems, including insufficient definitions for measuring targets 
(specifically coverage); the absence of a key efficiency metric – NRW – 
in stated service obligations; and insufficient information. Out of these 
discussions came the imposition of a new monitoring and oversight 
program, which required operators to regularly report attainment of key 
performance indicators [KPI] and business efficiency measures [BEM], 
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including NRW, billed volume, daily production volume, collection 
efficiency, and customer service improvements (Interviews, RO and 
Millan, 2013; Maynilad KPI reports, 2011-2013). 
The process revealed several additional weaknesses, including 
unspecified rules for negotiation, which led to long delays in conflict 
resolution, and threats to RO credibility due to exposure to politicians 
who might influence the Board of Trustees (X. Wu et al., 2011). But it 
also exposed some strengths of the system, particularly the benefits of 
benchmarking and the RO’s willingness and ability to exert pressure on 
concessionaires to drive efficiency gains. This marked a shifting role for 
the RO, from contract oversight to more discretionary action during 
rebasing and between periods via oversight of the KPI and BEM 
reporting system (Xun Wu & Leong, 2013). The concessionaires also 
supported the imposition of continuous monitoring program that would 
allow for incremental adjustments and minimize the likelihood of big 
surprises during rebasing periods (Interviews, MWSS-RO, Millan and 
Santos, 2013). 
6.4 Remunicipalization and rebid 
The situation with Maynilad deteriorated further, but mostly for financial 
reasons, as both Maynilad and Manila Water had actually made good 
progress with respect to service expansion in the first five years. While 
Maynilad’s NRW actually rose in the first five year period, the company 
expanded coverage from 58% in its service area prior to PPP to 78% in 
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2002 and 84% in 2003 (Kumar & Brock, 2012). Manila Water’s 
coverage expanded to 82% from 67% overall before PPP (MWSS-RO 
Annual Report, 2002). Both concessionaires’ reduced the staff per 
thousand connections from 9.8 to 4.1, water availability rose to 21 
hours daily from the MWSS average of 17, and water quality improved 
to satisfy the Philippine National Standards for Drinking Water by 1998 
for Manila Water and by 2000 for Maynilad (MWSS-RO Annual Report, 
2002). But whereas Manila Water turned profits starting in 1999, 
Maynilad suffered losses of US$75-95 million in its first five years, and 
the company could just barely service its inherited debt (Finger et al., 
2007), leaving no leftover capital to further reduce NRW, expand the 
network, or deliver service obligations. 
In December 2002, Maynilad filed a noticed of contract termination, 
which claimed that MWSS had breached contract by failing to 
cooperate during rebasing and requested reimbursement of US$303 
million for capital investments (X. Wu et al., 2011). MWSS responded 
with a citation of Maynilad’s breaches of contract, and the case went to 
international arbitration. Insiders suggest that Benpres wanted to get 
out of the agreement but also wanted to avoid paying the huge penalty 
fees associated with early termination (Xun Wu & Malaluan, 2008). In 
November 2003, the Appeals Panel ruled that neither party was at 
solely at fault, but also declared that Maynilad owed unpaid concession 
fees, due immediately.  
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The following week, Maynilad filed a bankruptcy notice. They had 
accumulated unsecured liabilities of PHP17.4B as compared to its 
recorded assets of PHP2.4B (X. Wu et al., 2011). As a plan for 
rehabilitation, Maynilad proposed a restructuring of concession fees 
and loans, renewal of capital expenditure targets, and implementation 
of rebased rates. MWSS opposed the plan, however, citing that the 
CAs specified corporate rehabilitation as terms for concessionaire 
termination, and pointed out the finality of Appeals Panel decisions. 
The RO agreed, ruling in favor of MWSS, but the agency surprisingly 
entered into direct negotiations with Maynilad to orchestrate a re-
municipalization (Xun Wu & Malaluan, 2008). 
In March 2004, Maynilad filed notice to courts that an agreement with 
MWSS had been made for second contract amendment that would 
specify a “debt-for-equity swap” but avoid a total termination. MWSS 
would convert PHP6.8 billion of the unpaid concession fees into equity, 
and the remaining unpaid fees would be recouped by drawing US$50 
million from a US$120 million performance bond put up by Benpres 
and Ondeo at the concession’s start (which the Supreme Court had 
ordered by forfeited) (Kumar & Brock, 2012). MWSS said this was done 
to avoid the agency paying a termination fee and avoid having to fully 
take over operations, which would potentially disrupt service, but critics 
suggested that this arrangement was a move to bail out the politically-
influential Lopez family (Xun Wu & Malaluan, 2008) 
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The Decision required approval from the National Economic 
Development Authority, who, following the May 2004 national elections, 
instructed MWSS to withdraw consent to Amendment 2. Over the 
following months, two more proposed rehabilitation plans failed to meet 
the test of stark political and public opposition. Contract termination, 
which incidentally preserved the debt-for-equity swap arrangement, 
was initiated in June 2005 (Xun Wu & Malaluan, 2008). MWSS would 
assume ownership with a takeover price of 84% interest in the 
company amounting to US$22.7 million and an additional infusion of 
$31 million in direct financial assistance. MWSS had to assume short-
term loans to service the assumed debt of US$240 million (D. Hall & 
Lobina, 2006).  
After two years of municipal ownership, during which time the 
operations and management staff remained the same, the Maynilad 
concession was re-awarded in December 2006 to a joint venture of 
DMCI Consunji and Metro Pacific Holdings. The operator became 
immediately profitable and made quick improvements to NRW (a 
reduction from 66% to 42% in five years), service quality, and coverage 
(Xun Wu & Leong, 2013). Manila Water, too, has thrived since its post-
crisis recovery. While initially falling back on promised tariffs, the 
company reduced NRW from 58% in 1997 to 35% in 2005. In 2005, it 
was also the first IPO listed on the Philippine Stock Exchange following 
the Asian Financial Crisis (Xun Wu & Leong, 2013). By the mid 2000s, 
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both concessions were widely cited in industry discourse as examples 
of success in water PSP. 
6.4.1 MWSS-RO limits exposed  
Through the processes of managing the post-Crisis recovery, resultant 
contract amendments, first rate rebasing, and rebidding of the Maynilad 
concession, the RO’s role shifted from contract oversight towards 
discretionary regulation, and the organization became increasingly 
involved in assessments of the efficiency and prudence of investments 
and operations, appropriate terms of measurement, conflict resolution, 
and contract adjustments needed to accommodate changing economic 
and material service conditions (X. Wu et al., 2011). The introduction of 
a continuous monitoring system, the ongoing service of an increasingly 
knowledgeable RO, and clarifications to contract ambiguities through 
rebasing and contract amendments smoothed the way for a relatively 
easy, routine second rebasing in 2008. 
There were no disallowances on operators’ opening cash positions 
(Interview, Alikpala 2013), and the early recommendations of the RO 
were unsurprising, though Maynilad expressed its intentions to dispute 
the RO’s proposed tariffs. The company was dissuaded from action, 
however, when Manila Water orchestrated an extension of contracts, 
which would be more lucrative, long-term. Political activity and attention 
to water supply had ramped up as a national election approached. After 
delays pushed discussions into 2009 and closer to the 2010 elections, 
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President Arroyo announced that tariffs would not be increased. Firms 
countered that it would be impossible to meet targets without either 
tariff increases or an extension of the concessions period.  
Manila Water had previously been denied a requested extension in 
2007, as regulators believed that a term extension would prolong 
performance gains, dilute the competitive pressure that comes during 
through rebidding, and delay the opportunity to revise contracts to 
incorporate learning over time. Nevertheless, Manila Water proposed a 
“stimulus package” that would extend the contracts by an additional 
fifteen years in order to spread costs and defer price hikes. Despite RO 
opposition (especially for the recently re-bid Maynilad), fifteen-year 
extensions were granted to Manila Water in December 2009 and 
Maynilad in April 2010. The experience exposed the RO’s limited 
independence. 
6.5 Instrumental and (tentative) institutional success 
Fortunately, the utilities’ performance improved steadily with respect to 
coverage and efficiency. The two primary areas of weaker performance 
with respect to instrumental success like with NRW and tariff rates. To 
the first issue, in the first operating period, coverage and staff efficiency 
had improved, but NRW targets were missed by sizeable margins. 
Manila Water had only reduced NRW from a pre-PPP level of 61% to 
48.29% in 2001, widely missing its 16% target, and NRW would 
actually grow until 2003, after which time it steadily improved (MWSS-
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RO website, nd). Similarly, Maynilad missed its 31% target in 2001, 
reaching only 66.25% instead, and its NRW actually rose until the 
second concession in 2006. The DCMI-Consunji consortium reversed 
the trend, steadily reducing NRW, but at a much slower rate than 
Manila Water was able to.  
By 2012, Manila Water reduced NRW to just over 11%. While it rose 
again slightly to just over 12% in 2013, the company had proven its 
ability to make major improvements to operational efficiencies. 
Maynilad’s NRW fell to a much improved 43.5% in 2012 and 38.7% in 
2013. While markedly above Manila Water’s levels, Maynilad’s NRW 
reduction was a notable accomplishment, given the rapid improvement 
over a short period: the company reduced NRW from 66% to 42% 
within five years (Maynilad corporate relations website, 2013), 
confirming that the RO was capable of replacing an inefficient operator 
with a more efficient company.  
Labor productivity had also improved tremendously as well. In the first 
ten years of operation, Manila Water and Maynilad cut staff per 1000 
connections from the pre-PPP level of 9.8 to 1.7 and 3.5, respectively 
(Masons, 2012; Negishi, 2010). By 2012, Manila Water and Maynilad 
had further improved labor efficiency to 1 and 2.2 staff members per 
1,000 connections, respectively (Manila Water Annual Report 2012; 
Wu and Leong, 2013).  
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Figure 11. Manila Water Company performance, 1997-2013 
 
Source: MWSS-RO website, retrieved February 2014 
Figure 12. Maynilad Water Services performance, 1997-2013 
 
Source: MWSS-RO website, retrieved February 2014 
Until a contentious tariff ruling in late 2013 (which remained unresolved 
at the time of writing), however, customers did not recoup these 
efficiency gains. Rising tariffs have been a legitimate concern, 
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expressed continuously by civil society groups wary of PSP. By the end 
of 2012, tariffs had leapt four-fold since pre-concession levels, from 
PHP11.14 under MWSS to PHP38.12 for Manila Water and PHP45.5 
for Maynilad. These rates were an even higher increase over bid rates: 
Manila Water’s 2012 was over nine times their PHP4.02 bid in nominal 
pesos, having risen approximately 16.2% each year for fifteen years 
(MWSS Board Resolution No. 13-009-CA, 2013). Maynilad’s 2012 rate 
was over six times the 7.21 bid and had risen 13.1% each year since 
1997 (MWSS Board Resolution No. 13-01-CA, 2013). In hypothetical 
CPI-adjusted real 2012 pesos23, the initial bid rates were approximately 
PHP8.86 for Manila Water and PHP15.90 for Maynilad. Even in real 
terms, this demonstrates a sharp increase of approximately 430% of 
the bid price for Manila Water and 286% for Maynilad.  
Naturally, the large increases over time provoked opposition from some 
segments of the general public and civil society (FDC, 2009). On the 
one hand, increases were likely due to poor forecasting and over-
confidence during the bidding phase. But they were also due, in part, to 
capital expenditures that brought about significant improvements to the 
system and which were facilitated through transparent processes. That 
customers could access information and see marked service quality 
and access gains made later tariff increases politically feasible and 
tolerable to the public. By 2013, however, RO found that the tariff was 
                                            
23 Calculated using 1997 CPI of 59.0 and 2012 CPI of 130.1. 
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reaching the limits of consumer affordability, and they foresaw that the 
third rebasing would be more contentious than the second due to 
increased scrutiny over cost inputs (Interviews, MWSS-RO, 2013).  
Up to the third rebasing, the tariff adjustment system, which allowed 
operators to recoup costs in a timely manner, also kept operators 
satisfied. Particularly beneficial to operators was a controversial shift 
during the second rebasing to allow “advanced collections” – i.e., 
incorporation of planned investments into the tariff rate, which allowed 
direct capital expenditures funding via tariffs as opposed to recouping 
investments paid for via debt and equity financing. Despite opposition 
from NGOs and some legislators, operators and MWSS alike took the 
position that advanced collections would allow for a “smoothing out” of 
tariff increases over the duration of the contracts and prevent sharp 
increases during the final years of the concessions (Interviews, 
Alikpala, Millan and Santos, 2013). This would transfer financing risks 
off the operators and onto the consumer public. Between efficiency 
gains and these beneficial tariff adjustments, the companies have 
become stable and profitable. Manila Water has been profitable since 
1999, and Maynilad since its first year after rebid (as opposed to never 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: MWSS-RO website, retrieved February 2014 
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Service coverage has drastically improved during PSP, though 
operators failed to meet targets in the initial years following the Asian 
Financial Crisis. That said, even Maynilad, prior to its collapse and 
rebid, had made notable improvements to coverage, expanding from 
58 to 84% in its service area between 1997 to 2003 (Finger et al., 
2007). By 2011, it only nearly missed its original bid target of 97.4%, 
reporting coverage at 92.5%. This rose to 94.6% by the following year, 
and 84% had 24-hour continuous service (Maynilad Annual Report, 
2012; Maynilad corporate website, 2014). Manila Water performed well 
also: by 2011, service expansion grew to 99%, exceeding its 
concession-end target by 5%. Both service providers had made 
significant gains in poorer neighborhoods and satisfied MWSS 
expectations for coverage expansion, particularly considering 
population growth of approximately 25% over the same period 
(Interviews, MWSS-RO, 2013).   
Table 36. Maynilad KPIs, 2007-2011 
  2007 2010 2011 (May) 
Billed Volume 
Million liters per 
day 









Million cubic meters 286.90 373.84 160.59 
Billed Services 
EO 703,513  903,682  929,863  
Ave 694,512  856,885  918,424  
Production 
(cubic meter per 
day) 
EO 1.11 1.17 1.20 
Ave 1.12 1.20 1.16 
NRW% EO 67% 51% 48% Ave 66% 53% 51% 
Source: Maynilad, 2013 
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Water availability and quality was also much improved. Manila Water 
reduced the percentage of samples containing fecal coliforms24 from 
7% to .3%, and had increased water availability from an average 16 
hours to 24 hours daily (Kumar & Brock, 2012). By 2013, 97.8% of 
Maynilad customers had 24-hour service (Maynilad corporate website, 
2014), and the company had been providing potable water since 2010 
(Philippine Information Agency, 2012) 
Figure 14. Manila water supply coverage targets and actual performance 
 1997 2001 2006 2011 2016 2021 
Manila Water       
Target - 77.1 94.1 94.1 94.1 94.6 
Actual 26.0 76.0 98.0  99.0 - - 
Maynilad       
Target - 87.4 97.1 97.4 97.7 98.4 
Actual 63.0 79.0 75.0 92.5 - - 
Source: MWSS RO, Service Contracts, Manila Water and Maynilad Annual 
Reports 
6.5.1 Manila’s maturing water market 
By the close of the third operating period, the concessions were in a 
stable equilibrium with steady performance gains and strong financial 
performance. The third rebasing exercise would, however, destabilize 
relationships and put the concessions and regulatory system to new 
tests. Up to the point of field interviews undertaken in February 2013, 
the third rate rebasing exercise had yet to commence. While the 
process was scheduled to conclude by January 2013, the exercise was 
                                            
24 A common water contamination measure.  
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delayed due to a coinciding regulatory board changeover and problems 
with selecting and hiring consultants. In February 2013, the RO 
predicted a six-month delay with a new aim of delivering a 
recommendation for Board approval in July (Interview, Alikpala, 2013). 
Regulators predicted that the third rebasing exercise would be more 
contentious than the second due to a more thorough transaction-level 
capital and operational expenditure audit and full asset valuation 
(MWSS Interview, 2013). Furthermore, MWSS-RO had determined that 
tariffs were increasing to the threshold of willingness to pay for Manila’s 
consumers, and the agency was concerned over the possibility of over-
capitalization (Interview, MWSS-RO, 2013). In a report following the 
rebasing, MWSS-RO stated that concessionaires had not been 
forthcoming with the data required for the more detailed audit (MWSS 
Board Resolution No. 13-009-CA, 2013).  
For the fourth operation period, Manila Water proposed a rate increase 
of PHP5.83 per cubic meter, and Maynilad requested an additional 
PHP8.58, setting off public opposition. Following public consultation 
and completion of lengthy technical and financial review during the 
rebasing exercise, which was facilitated in tandem by MWSS-RO staff 
and advising consultants, the RO announced that the companies’ 
efficiency gains would allow for the imposition of lower tariffs.  
Lengthy Board resolutions were published to explain the decisions, 
which centered largely on the RO’s calculation of Opening Cash 
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Positions [OCP] and the net present value of projected cash flows, but 
also touched on interpretations of the RO’s roles and responsibilities. 
Regarding the technical aspects, RO determined a PHP17.175 billion 
OCP for Manila Water, compared to their claimed PHP41.141 billion, 
and a PHP60.230 billion OCP for Maynilad compared to their claimed 
PHP67.213 billion (MWSS Board Resolution No 2013-100-RO, 2013). 
The ROs also determined net present values of projected cash flows of 
PHP112.097 billion for Manila Water and PHP233.096 billion for 
Maynilad. The RO and MWSS Corporate Office removed several 
capital projects from the roster of plans for the fourth operating period, 
and made disallowances for planned expenses that failed to meet on of 
three tests: the relationship test, which assessed whether expenses 
were incurred in the course of carrying out Concessionaire obligations 
under the CA; the allowable expense test, assessing whether costs 
were allowed to be recovered based on the CA; and the prudence and 
efficiency test. The RO also clarified that claimed costs could be limited 
only to those actually incurred. 
More interesting, however, was the Board’s commentary on the RO’s 
discretionary roles and responsibilities. Resolutions 13-009-CA and 13-
010-CA stated, “all throughout the rebasing process, the Regulatory 
Office has been mindful of its mandate to ensure adherence of the 
parties to the CA and to conduct the exercise in accordance with its 
pertinent provisions. The Regulatory Office is also keenly aware, 
however, that the CA does not exist in isolation – it must be viewed and 
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interpreted alongside applicable provisions of law and in a manner that 
consistently underscores the Concessionaires’ duty to ‘comply with all 
the laws, statues, rules, regulations, orders and directives of any 
governmental authority that may affect the Concession from time to 
time.’” It followed, “It bears stressing that the CA is no ordinary 
contract, but one imbued heavily with public interest, especially in light 
of its critical impact on every individual’s basic human rights to water 
and sanitation services.” Thus, the RO reaffirmed its duty to balance 
Concessionaires’ rights to fair returns with reasonable tariffs for 
consumers. 
Further, the explanatory resolutions accompanying the rebasing 
discontinued the inclusion of a currency exchange rate adjustment 
[CERA] on customer bills, which should have been eliminated following 
the implementation of the FCDA in Contract Amendment 1, and 
disallowed the passing on of corporate income taxes to consumers as 
recoverable expenses (MWSS Board Resolution No 2013-101-RO, 
2013). This last point was intended to redress a previous conflict 
surrounding the legal classification of concessionaires. During the 
second and third rebasing periods, NGOs pointed out that the 
concessionaires had been allowed to pass on corporate income taxes 
to consumers via the tariff – a practice disallowed for public utilities. 
MWSS and the regulators sidestepped the issue by formally recognize 
the concessionaires as contractors rather than utility providers. The RO 
also refused Manila Water’s claim on rewards (introduced recently 
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under a new rewards and penalties framework) for outperforming the 
operational expenditure projections used in the previous rebasing, 
stating that the operator could not claim the rewards without proof that 
the operating expenditure reductions were due to efficiency gains 
(MWSS Board Resolution No. 13-009-CA, 2013). 
In September 2013, the MWSS Board approved the RO’s proposal for 
a large negative adjustment of 29.47% of Manila’s 2012 average tariff 
of PHP24.57 per cubic meter (PHP7.24 by the end of the operating 
period), to be implemented in five equal tranches of -5.89% each year 
until December 2017. Maynilad’s rate would also be cut by 4.82% over 
their 2012 rate of PHP30.28 (a PHP1.46 by 2017), in five equal 
tranches of -.96% each year. It would be the first time that Manila’s 
consumers would recoup the efficiency gains brought about by private 
participation (MWSS RO, 2013). Both companies immediately filed 
disputes, however, in September and October, with the International 
Chamber of Commerce, and the case went to international arbitration. 
The operators would be allowed to charge standing 2012 rates until 
resolution of the dispute. 
6.6 Dynamic inconsistencies (good and bad) and regulatory 
adaptation 
Despite the general experience of instrumental and institutional 
success, several instances demonstrate dynamic inconsistencies in 
Manila. First, initial bids were considered unsustainable by advisors 
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during preparations. Some observers suspect that companies may 
have bid aggressively due to considerations outside of the water 
business, as both Ayala and Benpres had interests in real estate that 
would directly benefit from controlling the water systems (Fabella, 
2006). Retrospectively, anyhow, bids appear to have been sufficiently 
low to suggest that companies may never have intended to uphold 
them.  
Further, after the impact of the Financial Crisis, Manila Water 
successfully negotiated an increased tariff rate based on the higher 
assumed ADR. Only two years later, Maynilad secured contract 
amendments that included an “accelerated” Extraordinary Price 
Adjustment and Foreign Currency Differential Adjustment. Thus, whilst 
base rates were contracted to remain fixed until 2003, they rose to 130-
500% of bid prices by the end of the first operating period in year-end 
2002. Targets for service expansion and investment were also revised 
downwards prior to the scheduled rebasing. Maynilad also stopped 
paying concession fees in 2001, with outstanding fees accumulating to 
somewhere between US$170 to US$200 million when the concession 
was returned to MWSS in 2005. Even after the Maynilad concession’s 
re-award and a steady run of good performance by both 
concessionaires, the companies were able to negotiate contract 
extensions that protected their monopoly positions for another fifteen 
years. 
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On the government side, MWSS allowed concessionaires to revise 
contractual obligations downwards through amendments and 
renegotiations during the first two operating periods. And while the 
government was entitled to cancel contracts if a concessionaire did not 
pay fees, MWSS allowed Maynilad to operate for four years after 
ceasing to pay concession fees. In the second rebasing in 2008, the 
government disallowed the rate increases for apparently political 
reasons. Finally, during the third rebasing, the government appeared to 
have possibly reneged on its own rewards framework, denying Manila 
Water rewards for reduced operational expenditures. 
These inconsistencies have arisen due to external shocks and 
weaknesses in commitment on both sides, but they have not been 
ruinous as in the case of Jakarta. This is largely because the 
concessionaires, MWSS, and RO have all learned over time how to 
adjust the system to balance the multiple interests at hand. In fact, the 
many of the dynamic inconsistencies were arguably preferable to time 
consistency due to the systemic adjustments they allowed which, in 
turn, relieved pressures that may have otherwise led to termination and 
arrested the performance and efficiency accomplishments made 
thereafter. This is particularly true for the early years: during the 
settling-in of the first operational period, Manila Water failed to meet 
obligations wide of the mark. But following reasonable adjustment, the 
company went on to make huge strides with respect to NRW and 
coverage. 
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The very different experience with Maynilad shows us, however, that 
there is a balance to be struck between the ability to adjust (which 
requires sufficient time for learning and development) on the one hand, 
and thwarting inefficiency and opportunism, on the other. Dynamic 
inconsistencies that are brought about by mutual agreement and 
afforded public legitimacy can be hugely beneficial adjustments that 
accommodate learning and external changes. But those related to 
independent maneuvering around commitments are to be restricted via 
good regulation. In Manila’s case, the RO has managed over time to 
hold concessionaires increasingly accountable to both the letter and 
spirit of the contracts, while maintaining a reasonable cushion for 
adjustment, and the operators have seen the legitimacy and financial 
gains associated with good performance. Further, the features of the 
regulatory system that threatened RO independence and technical 
capacity have improved over time. 
6.6.1 Evolving regulation: legitimacy, enforcement, and discretion 
Nevertheless, the Manila case shows that reform follows a non-linear, 
iterative series of adjustments. This is evident in Manila, both in the 
evolution of a working discretionary regulatory system, and in the 
systemic changes facilitated by the RO. Manila’s water story involves a 
regulatory body whose emergent professionalization and credibility 
have developed over time, even considering (and perhaps 
demonstrated by) the early cancellation of the first Maynilad contract. 
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Transparency, ongoing learning and reflection, and public justification 
have allowed the organization to develop an effective and accepted 
hybrid contract-discretion regulatory model and assume an important 
role in navigating conflicts and facilitating adjustment.  
The RO has also been able to deal with what Wu, et al., point out as 
two critical conflicts in water regulation. The first is that, while contracts 
are intended to constrain discretion, incompleteness calls for more 
extensive use of discretionary power. The second is that, although 
renegotiation can undermine efficiency gains through competitive 
bidding, the costs of termination (economic and political) are also high. 
While the RO was initially set up to monitor contract enforcement with 
limited discretionary power, contract incompleteness became evident 
following the Financial Crisis, primarily through the ADR conflict and 
failures to meet overly optimistic bid assumptions (X. Wu et al., 2011). 
The RO’s discretionary role was borne, thus, out of a dire need for 
adjustment post-crisis and during subsequent contract renegotiations. 
In spite of restrictions on RO authority (i.e., the lack of statutory 
independence and financial dependence on the MWSS Board) and 
threats to credibility associated with both enforcing contract and 
changing the rules of the game, the RO’s discretionary role has since 
been bolstered by legitimacy gains as the body held operators, 
particularly Maynilad, to task; maintained transparent processes; and 
secured credible professional assistance. RO discretion allowed 
decision-making and adjustment outside the strict confines of the 
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contracts, which provided a release valve during periods of conflict and 
external shock. 
Of course, regulation has never been perfect. In the years following the 
crisis, there were apparent gaps between RO capacity and their 
growing discretion (Interviews, MWSS-RO, 2013). During the second 
rebasing, KPIs were not highly scrutinized, raising concerns about RO 
ability to pressure efficiency gains. Further, the exercise was subject to 
political pressures the RO was unable to evade. That said, the 
subsequent implementation of a more highly specified continuous 
monitoring and penalties and rewards framework demonstrated RO 
commitment to building technical capacity (Interview, Millan and 
Santos, 2013). Now, the RO is looking to link rewards and penalties 
with service obligation outputs such as water quality and pressure, 
availability, and coverage, versus focusing solely on inputs like NRW 
and operational expenditure (Interview, MWSS-RO, 2013).  
Documentation explaining RO decisions following the contentious third 
rebasing decision of 2013 demonstrated the body’s growth in technical 
capacity and continuing efforts to minimize contract ambiguity. The 
published resolutions clarified RO positions on strict determinants of 
forecasting inputs and definitions, as well as the evolving discretionary 
role of the RO itself it its guiding principles. The documents also 
demonstrated that the RO was attempting to keep up with the 
international expansions of the operators, which would undoubtedly 
make financial regulation more complex. During the third rebasing 
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exercise, the RO made disallowances on expenses related to projects 
and corporate activities outside of Manila and required operators to 
ring-fence their expanding business into local and non-local 
components (MWSS Board Resolution No. 13-009-CA, 2013). 
The RO has demonstrated policy learning since first rebasing. While 
the University of the Philippines consulting team provided key technical 
inputs, the RO became actively involved when weaknesses related to 
financial analysis became apparent, and the RO staff assumed a 
central role in completing the exercise (Interview, MWSS-RO 2013). 
Thereafter, many key members of the RO staff remained in place, 
allowing for a growing of collective knowledge over time. Moving into 
the third rebasing, the RO aimed to make it the last consultant-led 
rebasing exercise (Interviews, MWSS-RO, 2013). While the RO has 
had to deal with restrictions limiting the pool of available regulators and 
limited financial resources (Interview, Alikpala 2013), operators have 
acknowledged that regulation has improved and become more 
demanding over time (Kumar & Brock, 2012).  
Many of the improvements deal with improving the availability and 
quality of information and redressing contract ambiguities. With respect 
to the latter goal, the guiding principals, applicable definitions, 
assumptions, and other terms of the agreements between MWSS and 
its concessionaires have become ever more clear with each round of 
rebasing (and associated conflicts), as have the logics behind rulings. 
With the third rebasing exercise, the RO and its consultants were 
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tasked with better specifying the tests for prudence and efficiency. 
During the first, forecasts and actuals were compared with initial bid 
models. During the second exercise, regulators had more trouble 
deciding the basis of comparisons and ultimately used the operators 
own business plans (Interview, MWRSS 2013). In the third, the RO 
better specified the principals used to determine efficiency and 
prudence. 
Further, RO processes and outcomes have been transparent, with the 
availability of information improving over time. Contracts, amendments, 
RO and Appeals rulings, targets, tariff information, and performance 
data is available online. The organization is also working actively to 
better deal with “related parties transactions” – i.e., the use of 
concessionaire subsidiaries or parent company subsidiaries as 
subcontractors – by implementing new reporting requirements for 
subcontracting (Interview, MWSS 2013). The RO and MWSS 
Corporate Office have also expanded their public outreach via social 
media, road shows, and the distribution of targeted reports to consumer 
groups. The RO also introduced a Public Assessment of Water 
Services [PAWS] program in 2003, which garnered and published 
widespread consumer feedback on water services (MWSS website, 
nd). 
One persistent concern hindering the credibility of the regulatory 
system relates to its provisional independence. While regulators claim 
to function independently, interviews with operators revealed mixed 
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assessments of their independence (Kumar & Brock, 2012). The 
MWSS Board even acknowledges that the RO has been more and less 
political over time, depending on Board relationships with the President 
(Interview, Alikpala 2013). Since the RO’s rulings are technically 
recommendatory, the benefits associated with the professionalism and 
knowledge the regulatory office has nurtured over time will remain 
vulnerable to future political interference. Another constraint is that 
bureaucrats, ever-cognizant of strong anti-graft laws, tend to push 
decision-making upwards, often delaying decisions (Jensen, 2009). 
In order to resolve these issues, there have been concerted efforts over 
the last ten years to create a national regulatory body responsible for 
economic and technical regulation of all service providers. In 1999 and 
2000, the National Economic and Development Authority [NEDA] 
sought technical assistance from The World Bank’s Private 
Participation in Infrastructure Advisory group to develop a national 
policy on water regulation. A draft Water Regulatory Commission 
[WRC] Act was included in the national development plan. Over the 
next two years, agency stakeholders, NGOs, multilateral development 
agency representatives, and political figures deliberated legislation.  
The proposed independent commission would be responsible for 
setting tariffs according to principles of reasonable rate of return, 
efficiency, willingness to pay, equity, and cost recovery and resolving 
disputes. WRC decisions would be final and executory, unless 
appealed to the Court of Appeals (Lazaro, 2002).  
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A long list of unresolved legal issues involving authority over licensing, 
application to existing leases and PPPs, disputes over principles and 
technical issues in tariff setting, organizational issues, selection of 
regulators, limits of jurisdiction, and funding sources impeded 
implementation. Senate records show that the Act was filed by different 
authors in 2004, 2007, 2010, and 2011 – each time resulting in a 
“pending in committee” status (Senate of the Philippines website, 
www.senate.gov.ph/). The Act was also filed in the House of 
Representatives in 2002, 2008, 2010, 2011, and 2012, and were also 
pending in committee at the time of writing (Philippines Congress 
website, www.congress.gov.ph). In 2011, supporters revived the 
national regulatory proposal, but Manila Water and Maynilad lobbies 
effectively blocked legislation. They believed that the outcomes of a 
proposed national body were too unpredictable, would give rise to new 
regulatory risks, and would give rise to a stronger regulatory opponent 
(Interview, Alikpala, 2013). 
6.6.2 Operator competence, culture, and legitimacy 
Whilst regulation has certainly been a critical factor to maintaining the 
imperative credibility of commitments, the Manila PPPs have been also 
successful because of operators’ growing competence and public 
legitimacy. While performance was well below projections in early 
years following the Asian Financial Crisis, Manila Water adapted 
quickly to turn the company around financially and performance-wise 
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by 2002, and both companies had made gains from the beginning with 
respect to coverage and service continuity – the metrics most directly 
observed by the consumer public. Some of the improvements over time 
have also been due to changes within the companies. For example, 
MWSS managers suggested that Suez’ heavy influence in the early 
years of Maynilad were detrimental, as the parent company was too 
“strict” with their operating model (Interview, Alikpala 2013). Further, 
companies have improved their own core business processes.  
That said, Wu and Malaluan have demonstrated that corporate 
governance choices were important to the median-term outcomes for 
Manila Water and the “first” Maynilad (2008). Manila Water was more 
effective at isolating its management from the interests of parent 
companies’ other subsidiaries, whereas Maynilad was too permissive 
of inefficient related party transactions. Manila Water was also much 
better at cultivating a cooperative corporate culture based on honesty, 
customer service, and continuous improvement and decentralized 
service which improved responsiveness and inter-unit competition 
(Chia, Chua, Kim, Teo, & Toh, 2007). Maynilad, on the other hand, 
suffered dissent and low morale due to marginalization of inherited 
MWSS employees, selection of Benpres managers with little water 
sector experience (Xun Wu & Malaluan, 2008), and slow adoption of 
strategies to improve local management (Chia et al., 2007).  
Chia, et al, also point out that Manila Water’s parent, the Ayala 
Corporation, benefited from an engendered corporate culture of market 
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competition, derived from its experiences in the real estate, banking 
and financial services, and manufacturing sectors. While Maynilad’s 
parent had stakes in many of the same sectors, Benpres’ core 
business was the heavily regulated, monopolistic power sector. Thus, 
the company was less conditioned to make strategic choices in the 
early years that might have preserved its financial viability Manila 
Water was also better, in the early years, at developing consumer 
confidence and satisfaction, via implementation of shared pipelines that 
reduced connection fees and quickly but less expensively increased 
connectivity. Maynilad, on the other hand, ineffectively focused on 
penalizing water theft as a strategy for increasing new installations 
(Chia et al., 2007). 
Under the direction of DMCI-Consunji owners, who had established 
themselves as experienced water professionals via their water 
concession in nearby Subic Bay, Maynilad rapidly changed these 
practices and enjoyed rapid improvement following the 2006 rebid. The 
company made major human resource changes, replacing senior 
management, implementing a new performance management system, 
addressing nepotistic hiring, and eliminating redundancies. Consunji 
also implemented a benchmarking program, launched a major NRW-
reduction strategy, and decentralized its operations (Maynilad Annual 
Reports, 2008 and 2009). The improvements to NRW and operational 
performance, post-bid, would demonstrate the benefits of these 
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management changes. Manila Water, too, had continued to make 
consistent improvements to their water services.  
Both companies have also become more comfortable and adept at 
dealing with regulatory requirements. Early meetings between MWSS-
RO and the concessionaires used to involve managers at the highest 
high-levels. By the third operating period, these meetings had been 
relegated to middle management (Interview, MWSS 2013). And over 
time, long-term working relationships have developed between 
members of the MWSS-RO and the operators. 
With public approval of companies for improved performance and 
approval of the regulator for transparency and a track record of 
professional rulings, the only major public concern over concessions at 
the time of writing remained the tariff rate. The move to arbitration 
following the RO’s decision to significantly cut tariffs and reap the 
rewards of efficiency gains showed that the ongoing struggle, even for 
successful PPPs, is in the art of deciding when to be firm in contract 
enforcement and when to make exceptions in order to maintain 
responsiveness to situational change. The unresolved rebasing would 
be yet another test of the system’s capacity to withstand the inherent 
conflicts between operator and public interests and resulting patterns of 





Chapter 7. Selangor: Information and power in PPP 
The Malaysian state of Selangor and its capital city Kuala Lumpur 
entered their water PSP experiment much isolated from other 
privatization movements in Southeast Asia. In this case, the deal was 
ushered in by a select group of influential local businessmen who 
possessed early insights into the latent profitability of privatized 
infrastructure. For nearly twenty years, an elite group of political and 
businesspeople, shrouded by Malaysia’s secrecy laws, maintained a 
stable arrangement involving three large water treatment companies 
and, later, a distribution company. The concessions, which were 
decidedly not awarded via competition for the market, and which were 
suspected to generate super-profits for the protected companies, were 
only disrupted upon the election of an Opposition local government that 
rankled the collusive arrangement. 
The collection of treatment and distribution concessions cover most of 
the state of Selangor, including the federal territories of Kuala Lumpur 
and Putrajaya, an area referred to as Greater Kuala Lumpur or the 
Klang Valley. Greater Kuala Lumpur [KL] is a polycentric urban 
agglomeration with a population of approximately 5.4 million (Jabatan 
Perangkaan Malaysia, 2012). It is Malaysia’s most important region, 
politically and economically, as it is home to Malaysia’s national policy-
making and is also the center of business for the country. The Selangor 
state, in combination with the federal territory of Kuala Lumpur, 
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generates approximately 38% of the nation’s GDP (Jabatan 
Perangkaan Malaysia, 2013). Kuala Lumpur and Putrajaya, the nation’s 
new government capital, are federal territories encompassed by the 
state. As such, the introduction of PPP to Greater KL and its outcomes 
are fully entrenched in Malaysia’s national political space, and the 
concessions have become highly politicized since the 2008 general 
elections created room for opposition at the state and local levels.  
7.1 Political background to the Selangor deals 
Malaysia is a democratic, federal, constitutional monarchy, whose 
political space has been dominated by the powerful Barisan Nasional 
[BN] coalition (formerly called the Alliance Party) since the election of 
the first Federal Legislative Council 1955. The BN coalition is controlled 
by its largest and most powerful party, the United Malays National 
Organization [UMNO], and includes the Malay Indian Congress, the 
Malaysian Chinese Association, and eleven smaller political parties. 
The Prime Ministership has been held by UMNO since Malaysia’s 
independence in 1957, and UMNO party chiefs rank among Malaysia’s 
most powerful businessmen and women. BN’s long-held power position 
at the national and state levels of government was only recently 
challenged in 2008 by growing support for the opposition Pakatan 
Rakyat [PR] coalition – a group formed initially as the Barisan Alternatif 
(Alternative Front) and aimed at directly challenging UMNO’s 
stronghold. The Opposition PR is a looser alliance led primarily by the 
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People's Justice Party, Democratic Action Party, and Pan-Malaysian 
Islamic Party. 
The 2008 national election marked a huge upset in the status quo of 
Malaysian politics, and its wake had direct repercussions for the 
Selangor water contracts. In 2008, UMNO lost a third of its 
parliamentary seats to Pakatan Rakyat as well their hold over several 
state governments – key amongst them, Selangor. This shift unsettled 
the party, and allowed Selangor’s PR-controlled state legislature to 
push questions about the fairness and effectiveness of the contracts. It 
also marked the intensification of conflict between the PR-led state 
government and UMNO-led national government. These conflicts 
centered on allegations of corruption and complaints about lack of 
transparency, as well as struggles over authority for water supply in the 
midst of national-level sector reform. 
With respect to corruption, Malaysia ranks fairly high on TI’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index at 54; however, stark limitations to accessing public 
information, significant blurring of the interests of the public and private 
sectors, and the locus of much corruption at the highest levels of 
government puts corruption at the center of the Selangor water case. 
Transparency International’s research on Malaysia points to a few key 
points that are particularly salient for the water sector in KL. For one, 
campaign donations are unregulated and unlimited, and the ruling 
UMNO party has significantly more funding than any of its competitors, 
with huge reserves accumulating over decades. As such, it maintained 
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control of the national government and (until recently) the Selangor 
government and has the resources to influence public opinion and 
control a large network at all levels of government (Transparency 
International, nd). Furthermore, there is a “revolving door” between 
government and business, wherein people alternatively work for 
government and the private sector. Coupled with the fact that political 
parties can assume ownership of private enterprises, this makes 
regulation problematic (Transparency International, nd). 
A third characteristic of the legal environment of regulation involves the 
limited access to public information. Malaysia’s tightly intertwined 
network of political and business elites have engendered a “culture of 
secrecy” pervasive in all levels of business and government and 
encoded in the 1972 Official Secrets Act (CIJ Malaysia, 2011). There is 
no national Right to Information legislation, and whilst Selangor’s PR 
government passed a Freedom of Information Act in 2010, access to 
information remains limited via exemptions coded in the bill itself.  
Steps towards greater transparency duly suffer from the oft-used and 
hugely detrimental Official Secrets Act loophole25. Under the Act, any 
government document (including contracts to which a government 
agency is party) may be officially classified, exempting it from public, 
                                            
25 From Transparency International on Malaysia: “Additional laws such as the 
Printing Presses and Publications Act, the Sedition Act 1949 (subsequently 
replaced with the National Harmony Act), and the Internal Security Act 1969 
also ban the dissemination of official information and offenders can face fines 
or imprisonment.” 
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judicial, and even governmental review. The broad Schedule to the Act 
lists three types of documents which are always classified as “official 
secret”: Cabinet and Cabinet committee records, decisions and 
deliberations; State Executive Council and committee documents and 
deliberation and decision records; and documents concerning national 
security. Further, document types may be added to this list at any time 
by Ministerial Order (Government of Malaysia, 2006). Selangor’s four 
water concession agreements have been classified under the Official 
Secret Act, and this ruling has prevented even the state legislature 
from reviewing contract terms or concessionaire performance records. 
7.2 Malaysia’s industrial and water policies: Application to 
Selangor 
While water policy frameworks are set at the highest levels of 
government – primarily under the mandate of the Ministry of Energy, 
Green Technology, and Water [KeTTHA] – legal responsibility for 
different functions and components of the supply chain are divided 
amongst public and private partners at local, state, and federal levels. 
The importance of water supply has long been recognized as central to 
economic and social development: the subject has been incorporated 
into all of Malaysia’s national development plans since post-World War 
II independence. Further, privatization and public utility corporatization, 
particularly of water treatment plants, has been a part of the water 
supply sector since the late 1980s, with notable successes in the cities 
of Johor Bahru and Penang. But the wave of PPPs of the early 1990s 
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also ushered in the first of a cluster of highly profitable, and ultimately 
distressed, concessions in Selangor, where local water barons 
leveraged political ties to the highest levels of government to secure 
grossly inflated contract terms.  
Utility privatization was partly motivated by and significantly shaped by 
national development plans of the 1970s and 1980s, including 
Malaysia’s New Economic Policy and Malaysia Incorporated. The 1970 
“New Economic Policy” was a socio-economic restructuring program 
that aimed to improve the economic position of the Bumiputra 
(indigenous Malays) in relation to the Chinese merchant26 class via the 
imposition of rules and subsidization programs that would increase the 
Bumiputra ownership of local enterprise. The policy has been reiterated 
in subsequent national development plans and has encouraged Malay-
focused industrial development and the granting of lucrative 
government contracts to Bumiputra-owned companies – especially 
those linked directly to UMNO (Funston, 2001). This long-standing 
development emphasis and its accompanying rules has given rise to a 
closed system of political patronage and “relationship-based capitalism” 
that closely tightly binds business and government (Fraser, Zhang, & 
Derashid, 2006). 
                                            
26 The goal would be to increase Bumiputra ownership of business to 30% of 
national wealth -  
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As an extension, the “Malaysia Incorporated” policy introduced in 1983 
by the Malaysia Economic Planning Unit [EPU] presented  “a new way 
of approaching the task of national development. Both the public and 
private sectors adopt the idea that the nation is a corporate or business 
entity, jointly owned by both sectors and working together in pursuit of 
a common mission of the nation” (EPU Malaysia, nd). To operationalize 
this concept, the government deregulated many sectors, including 
water, instituted public consultative mechanisms, and actively pursued 
PSP – with a leaning towards developing companies in line with the 
New Economic Policy. And in order to protect domestic industrial 
interests overall, foreign participation in privatized entities would be 
limited to 25% of a company’s capital share (EPU Malaysia, nd).  
Malaysia’s water policies are divided between Peninsular and East 
Malaysia – the former, being the set applicable to the Selangor deals, 
are of interest here. Post-independence, and prior to the introduction of 
privatization, water distribution and raw water supply resource 
management were made the responsibilities of the states, with the 
federal Public Works Department [PWD] providing overall policy 
guidance and technical support, but limited direct control over water 
systems. Over the years, various forms of corporatization, PPP, and 
privatization emerged in some states, and the state water agencies 
began to operate more and more like the private sector. The federal 
government allocated moneys in each of its 5-year “Malaysian Plans” 
to develop water resource infrastructure, and Malaysia – overall – has 
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remained “on track” to meeting the Millennium Development goals for 
universal water supply (Ching, 2012).  
Despite these achievements, in the 1990s, the Malaysian government 
recognized the persistence of problems in the sector associated with 
operational inefficiencies (largely related to high NRW and high levels 
of subsidization), weak regulation, budgetary constraints, and poor 
environmental performance (Ching, 2012). These problems were more 
pronounced in the capital region of Kuala Lumpur, where the pressures 
of rapid population growth over the past decades could not be met by 
the state water agency. Ironically, these problems were later 
exacerbated by PSP arrangements that were introduced for reasons 
outside of the standard efficiency / service quality PPP justifications. 
Under the Seventh Malaysian Plan 1996 – 2000, water supply was to 
receive special attention from the Federal and State Governments as a 
target for increased PSP. The Federal Government foresaw the 
development of many different local regulatory authorities to oversee 
the contracts and appeared confident that the “interests of the general 
public” would be attended to easily via concession contracts specifying 
standards for reliability and quality (Malaysia Office of the Prime 
Minister, 1996).  
In the early to mid-2000s, facing increased attention to water supply 
problems, the national government reformed Peninsular Malaysia’s 
water sector via the imposition of two important pieces of legislation 
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that markedly changed control over and responsibility for raw water 
resources, network operation and maintenance, infrastructure 
expansion, regulation, and tariff setting. In January 2005, the Malaysian 
Parliament held a special session to consider changes to water 
management across Malaysia (SPAN, nd). In early 2005, amendments 
to the Federal Constitution were approved which transferred 
responsibility for water supply and services from states, alone, to 
concurrent responsibility residing with state and federal governments. 
This legislation transferred regulatory responsibility to the Federal 
Government, placed authority over raw water resources with states, 
and left a host of unanswered questions about overall authority and 
coordination responsibility for the integrated water systems.  
Shortly afterward, in mid 2006, Parliament approved two acts that 
aimed to further and more concretely transform the water sector. The 
Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Air Negara [SPAN] Act (Act 654) outlined 
the functions and powers of a new National Water Services 
Commission – SPAN – which would assume responsibility for 
regulation and licensing and also play a role mediating management 
issues arising between the state and federal parties engaged in 
operating, maintaining, and expanding water supply networks. The 
Water Industry Act [WSIA] (Act 655) specified water policy goals of 
attaining universal service, metering, and tariff collection, and also 
established a national water asset holding company called Pengurusan 
Aset Air Berhad [PAAB], which is also licensed for asset ownership by 
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SPAN (Interview, SPAN, 2012). WSIA also established a state-funded 
Water Forum to provide an opportunity for stakeholder consultation 
with water consumers, though it’s independence has become 
questionable (Interview, Santiago, 2012). In doing so, the WSIA 
separated out the ownership of water assets from responsibility for 
water services – allowing privatization in the latter, but mandating state 
ownership of infrastructure.  
In combination, these two laws served to delineate government units’ 
separate roles in policy setting (government), ownership, regulation, 
and service provision. KeTTHA would maintain its dominion over 
setting water policy; ownership and development of assets would be 
assumed by the federal government under its investment arm, PAAB; 
service operations and maintenance would be delegated to the states 
(or their private partners); and licensing and regulation would be 
undertaken at the national level by SPAN.  
The “migration” to the new licensing regime and ownership model 
occurred quickly, with all peninsular states transitioning to the licensing 
system by an implementation due date of 2008, with the exception of 
Perlis, Selangor, and the federal territory of Labuan (Interview, SPAN, 
2012). SPAN termed the new proposed asset management structure 
an “asset light model”, where state governments would be alleviated of 
capital expansion, allowing agencies (or their private concessionaires) 
to focus on improving operational efficiency and reducing NRW. Six 
states have since fully transferred assets to PAAB, Penang and Perak 
 292 
have assumed a “partial asset light” model (retaining ownership of 
paid-up assets), and the remaining have been “temporarily authorized” 
to operate until full transition. The latter set most notably includes 
Selangor, where negotiations are ongoing and apparently inhibited by 
the complex political-business relationships there (Interview, SPAN, 
2012). The concession companies and new opposition government in 
Selangor have both resisted the transition to the asset light model, and 
the opposition state government is pursuing a full government takeover 
of ownership and operations. When asked whether the state would be 
allowed to legally resist transitioning to the reform model, SPAN chief 
Dato’ Teo Yen Hua spoke to the greater conflict at hand: “That is where 
there are differences in understanding the policy between the federal 
and state governments” (Interview, SPAN, 2012). 
Nowadays, Malaysia stands out due to the extent of involvement by 
local private companies, but this has not translated to overall success 
in Selangor, as service quality is still problematic, NRW remains high, 
and the regulatory apparatus and 2005-2006 water reforms have failed 
to overcome strong local political barriers.  Hall and Lobina’s initial 
answer to “what went wrong” in Selangor is that, “the proliferation of 
privatized bulk water BOTs are placing a huge financial burden on the 
distribution companies, which are thus unable to invest in other aspects 
such as reducing leakage; and the profits sought by the companies are 
socially unaffordable” (D. Hall & Lobina, 2004). The story is full 
complex and obscure and involves the intentional inflation of water 
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treatment costs (rather than some kind of inherent technical problem) 
insulated from regulatory oversight, and the capture of public service by 
a political elite with limited intentions to improve water services, outside 
of sustaining just enough political support to remain in office. Further, it 
is a case of mud-slinging, political rhetoric, and extreme limits on the 
availability of verifiable information by which policy-makers and the 
voting public might be able to judge the efficacy of the deals at hand.  
7.3 Overlapping mandates and authority 
In addition to a complete lack of transparency and system-structural 
problems, some of the issues plaguing water supply management in 
Selangor (and Malaysia overall) can be attributed to overlapping and 
oft-disputed allocation of authority and responsibility for components of 
the water supply chain amongst local, state, and federal organizations 
– a problem that lingers even after the recent reforms. The number of 
players in the water supply game and their shifting mandates and 
changing relationships – as well as the corruption apparently involved – 
makes the Selangor water supply management landscape difficult to 
understand. The shift of water supply from the state to the concurrent 
state-federal list of responsibilities during the reform process has only 
served to further confuse the allocation of responsibility and authority, 
and has opened up new turf wars amongst parties already clearly at 
odds. 
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At the federal level, the Ministry of Energy, Green Technology, and 
Water [KeTTHA] is in charge of setting national-level water policies and 
overseeing the national water regulatory organization, SPAN. KeTTHA 
provides some technical guidance via its technical water supply 
agency, Jabatan Bekalan Air [JBA], and also serves a coordination role 
in cross-state water transfers (such as that between Selangor and its 
supplier-neighbor state, Pahang), but is mostly concerned with 
implementing the legal and regulatory functions of the WSIA and SPAN 
Acts. It is to the Minister of KeTTHA that the National Water Services 
(Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Air Negara) [SPAN] Commissioner directly 
reports.  
SPAN, the federal water regulatory agency, which began operations in 
early 2007, is charged with implementing and informing water policies; 
ensuring the “productivity of the water supply and sewerage services 
industry”; monitoring operator compliance with service standards, 
contractual obligations, and relevant laws; making “efforts towards 
improving the operational efficiency of the industry and in particular the 
reduction of non-revenue water”; overseeing water tariff determination; 
engaging in necessary capital works development; and managing the 
implementation of sewerage service plans (SPAN website, nd). SPAN 
licenses every operator – both public and private – as well as owners of 
capital assets (primarily PAAB), and has assumed the prime national-
level leadership role in the water sector. While SPAN was initially 
funded for its first five years with a 50 million Ringgit Federal 
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government grant, the agency is now financially independent via its 
licensing and permit fee income stream (Interview, SPAN, 2012). 
Incorporated in May 2006, Pengurusan Aset Air Berhad [PAAB] is the 
federal government-owned water asset management company, 
reporting directly to Malaysia’s Minster of Finance. After passage of the 
WSIA and SPAN Acts, ownership of the entire water network including 
the pipes connecting dams and reservoirs to water treatment plants, 
treatment plants, balancing and servicing reservoirs, and distribution 
pipelines was turned over to PAAB, who would assume responsibility 
for all capital expenditures and expansion of the water supply network 
thereafter – except in those few states where transition was delayed 
due to special considerations or, in the case of Selangor, political 
problems.  
The rationale behind this transfer was to encourage states to focus 
primarily on improving efficiency and technical capacity in operations 
and maintenance, while transferring responsibility for financing, capital 
expenditure, and network expansion to a centralized federal holding 
company. According to PAAB, “the State Governments will be relieved 
of the burden to fund the construction of new water assets, which 
requires enormous capital.” Further, PAAB published that separating 
service provision and ownership would “enable water operators to 
become pure service providers, focusing solely on providing water 
treatment and distribution services, so that they can concentrate their 
efforts to achieve operational efficiencies” (PAAB website, nd).  
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In the ownership transfer process, states were compensated for their 
assets via transfers of responsibility for existing loans that had 
accumulated to fund construction of water infrastructure. The Federal 
Government had issued water supply loans to those states otherwise 
unable to fund expansions since revenues were historically too meager 
to meet capital expenditure requirements. By year-end 2007, the 
outstanding Federal water supply loans amount reached approximately 
RM 7.6 million (USD 2.5 million), most of which were assumed by 
PAAB. For those few utilities whose asset values exceeded their 
remaining loan amounts, settlement terms were individually negotiated 
to compensate for surplus value (PAAB website). 
Transferred and new water infrastructure assets are leased to State 
governments and state-contracted operators approved and licensed by 
SPAN. PAAB, too, is regulated by SPAN, and must also apply for 
Facility Licenses requisite to prove ownership and permit leasing to 
operators. PAAB's primary responsibility is to develop the nation's 
water infrastructure “using competitive financing sourced and obtained 
from [the] private financial market” (PAAB website). While the Federal 
Government initially provided PAAB with working capital, new 
infrastructure is funded via bond issuance and private borrowing.  
Finally, national-level Parliamentarians from Selangor districts have 
also taken strong positions along party lines in local water politics. The 
70-person Dewan Negara (Senate) is comprise of two elected 
representatives for each State, as well as representatives from federal 
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districts, including two from Kuala Lumpur and one from Putrajaya, and 
forty members directly appointed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (the 
Malaysian monarch / head of state), upon advice of the Prime Minister 
(Funston, 2001). In 2008, both Selangor seats were assumed by Pakat 
Rakyat, while all appointed positions, including the federal territory 
seats and appointed ministry seats went to Barisan Nasional, the party 
of the Prime Minister. The Dewan Rakyat (House) includes 222 
Members of Parliament (MPs), with 22 from Selangor. The 2008 
election put seventeen of those seats into the hands of the Pakatan 
Rakyat, strengthening their political power in national water politics.  
At the state level, three groups are involved in the water supply system: 
the State Assembly (the state-level legislative branch) and Executive 
Council, the state government investment arm, and the former water 
agency. Kumpulan Darul Ehsan Bhd [KDEB], the State investment arm, 
is engaged directly as a stakeholder in two of the concessionaires. In 
addition to capacity and political issues, this conflict of interest 
problematizes the local government’s contract oversight. Jabatan 
Bekalan Air Selangor [JBAS], the former state water agency, was 
corporatized and renamed Perbadanan Urus Air Selangor [PUAS] 
before being altogether privatized in 2004. Today, the state public 
works agency plays a minimal role in the water sector. 
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7.4 Four deals and innumerable spin-offs 
Unfortunately, due to huge data limitations directly related to the culture 
of secrecy and limitation on access to public information, the initiation 
of the concessions deals in Selangor remains shady to anyone outside 
of the deals. For example, the field work for this thesis in Kuala Lumpur 
involved huge efforts to find willing interviewees, the engagement of 
many successive contacts in government and business, several covert 
meetings with private sector informants who insisted on strict 
anonymity, and open meetings with regulators and legislators who 
either skirted around questions over the control of the Selangor PPPs 
(e.g., interviewees tied to UMNO), or openly expressed anger at their 
own lack of information on the deals (e.g., interview subjects 
associated with the opposition PR). 
One confidential informant, who had been closely involved in 
Selangor’s earliest water deals as a partner in a private sector 
engineering firm, ardently claimed, “The problem of Malaysian water all 
began with the inflated construction costs in the first deals. This is the 
crux of the matter. PPP can work, but it must be done correctly, not like 
in Malaysia.”  He asserted that the problems with KL water PSP can be 
traced back largely to inflated construction costs associated with the 
first privatizations of dams and water treatments plants in the late 
1980s (Interview, KL Informant O, 2012) and the maneuverings of a 
few shrewd businessmen and rent-seeking politicians. This assertion is 
corroborated in recent research published by Jeff Tan, who also found 
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evidence of “bloated capital expenditure” that provided easy rents to 
national policy-makers (J. Tan, 2012). 
One of the first water deal makers, Dato’ Lim Geok Bak [LGB], 
established the LGB Group in 1978, and grew the company into one of 
Malaysia’s largest industrial conglomerates with interests in utilities, 
infrastructure, and manufacturing. According to LGB Group’s website, 
“from the very beginning, LGB had a clear vision to specialize in the 
water sector” (LGB Group, nd). Malaysia’s first water concessions were 
made by LGB, who had developed a strategic alliance with French 
company Generale des Eaux (later Veolia) to privatize the water 
systems in several of Malaysia’s growing cities. Together with 
Japanese construction company Hazama and the Japan Bank for 
International Cooperation [JBIC], LGB promoted the idea of a water 
treatment plant concession to the Selangor government in the late 
1980s. LGB maintained very close personal ties to Selangor politicians, 
which smoothed the path for the decision to employ a PPP model and 
to select his company as the winner of a new contract.  The first major 
project would be the Sungai Selangor Water Supply Scheme [SSWSS], 
a major raw water catchment and treatment scheme that would 
ultimately involve three phases to increase the availability of water to 
supply Kuala Lumpur. The first, Phase 1, starting in the early 1990s, 
would be divided into Stage 1 (Stream B) and Stage 2 (Stream A), and 
would mark the start of a web of intertwined business-government 
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relationships and contracts that would loop back on each other in 
subsequent phases and in later contracts. 
7.4.1 Sungai Selangor Water Supply Scheme 
At this point, the account of business-government interactions becomes 
unclear, with contested accounts of how the two stages of SSWSS 
Phase 1 progressed. Sources used by the PPIAF in their PPI database 
research suggest that LGB’s participation was precluded by the 
entrance of Puncak Niaga – a water company established by a senior 
UMNO party chief and business tycoon Tan Sri Rozali Ismail. Puncak 
Niaga (M) Sdn Bhd was established in 1989, with Rozali as Executive 
Chairman. In the PPI account, Puncak Niaga was granted a 26-year, 
RM2 billion (US$790 million) concession contract by JBAS in October 
1994 for the takeover of 27 water treatment plants in Greater KL. The 
terms of the deal required Puncak Niaga to invest RM150 million 
(US$58.6 million) for the upgrading of existing water plants over the 
first three years of the contract. Thereafter, Puncak Niaga awarded 
Taliworks an O&M contract for operating one of the dams and the 
existing treatment plants. 
The alternative story – one supported by my interviews and reviews of 
numerous company reports and presentations – suggests that after 
launching the initial PSP movement, LGB’s subsidiary Taliworks lost its 
foothold on the greater project to Rozali (through Puncak Niaga) due to 
the latter’s superior political maneuvering. Rozali’s status as a 
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Bumiputra and his stronger ties to the UMNO party put him in a prime 
position with respect to the granting of government contracts: Rozali 
was (and still is) treasurer of the UMNO division for which Muhammad 
Muhammad Taib was division chief, and he has served as President of 
the Malay Chamber of Commerce for Selangor, an association which 
aims to develop and promote Bumiputra entrepreneurs’ participation in 
business and industry. From 1986 to 1997, Taib would serve as 
Menteri Besar of Selangor, the State Government that granted Rozali 
the water contract. In the early years, whilst LGB initiated much of the 
impetus for PSP, and despite his own ties to UMNO27, his company 
would be relegated to a lesser role, with Rozali and Puncak Niaga 
assuming the role of primacy in the sector. 
This account suggests that LGB was amidst brokering a lucrative 
closed tender between the French multinational Suez, Japanese 
contractor Hazama, and Selangor state-owned investment holdings 
and development company Kumpulan Perangsan Selangor [KPS] (a 
subsidiary of investment arm KDEB), using past experiences operating 
a small at small treatment plant at Kuala Kubu Bahru to win the first of 
hopefully many WTP contracts. JBIC, who would issue a soft loan, 
imposed strict loan conditions that limited the job to a few potential 
companies and was largely tailored to the selection of Hazama as the 
builder and French company, Suez, as the operator. To serve the 
                                            
27 For example, LGB was a business partner of Abdul Hamid Pawanteh, the 
former Perlis Menteri Besar and a prominent UMNO politician. 
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deals, LGB formed an SPV called Taliworks, a joint venture between 
LGB Group as the controlling partner and Generale des Eaux (later 
Veolia) as the minority owner.  
Following common Malaysian business practice28, LGB colluded with 
the few interested parties to the contract during the closed bidding 
process in order to drive the bid prices upwards (Interviews, 2012). 
Cooperative companies would receive sub-contracts, thus benefiting all 
parties. The basic business model was to inflate construction cost in 
order to generate super profits, and since no information about the 
contracts was made publicly available, and since many government 
officials – including politicians at the highest levels of UMNO – held 
interests in Taliworks and other subcontracting companies, these 
proposed costs were never scrutinized or challenged. Further, they set 
an exaggerated baseline for estimation of future projects – a legacy 
that appears to have held in subsequent deals. At this point, Rozali 
wrested control of the SSWSS Phase 1 project, putting Puncak Niaga 
at the center of the deals as a first party to the contract and relegating 
LGB and Taliworks to a secondary but nevertheless highly profitable 
O&M sub-contract. In May 1995, Puncak Niaga signed a US$50 million 
contract with joint venture CGE Utilities (owned 55% by Generale des 
                                            
28 Not until 2010 did Malaysia legislate competition laws to eradicate anti-
competitive business practices. The 2010 Competition Act also leaves room 
for conduct that might be anti-competitive, if it can be demonstrated that the 
activitiy is in “national interest” – a notion undefined in the Act or its supporting 
implementation guidelines (Kim, 2003). It is not surprise, then, that even 
since, collusion remains commonplace. 
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Eaux and 45% by Taliworks /  LGB Group) to take over O&M until 
December 2020 (PPIAF). By 1998, the Sungai Selangor project’s 
Phase I was complete. 
While these two accounts differ, the apparent outcome is that Puncak 
Niaga signed the first direct concession agreement in 1994. SSWSS 
Phase 1 would develop two dams at Sungai Selangor and Sungai 
Tinggi, as well as refurbish and manage twenty-seven water treatment 
plants, with the capacity to serve 30% of the Klang Valley. The 
exaggerated cost baselines were subsequently used in estimation work 
for costs of future developments (which the same parties were involved 
in somehow), including those of the second and third SSWSS phases. 
Further, high collusion meant that the spoils would be shared amongst 
the tight web of political and business interests involved, as project 
components would be sub-contracted to cronies’ companies who, 
though the multiple levels of ownership and for different project 
components, would also appear in subsequent deals. 
A year after its first 1994 deal, Puncak Niaga won the second Selangor 
PPP contract for SSWSS Phase 2. Phase 2 involved the construction 
and operation of a massive RM1.28 billion (US$337 million) water 
treatment plant, for which a 30-year BOT contract was granted to 
Puncak (Puncak Niaga website, nd), who then engaged the services 
Veolia Water for the two-year construction period (Veolia Water, nd). 
Puncak Niaga would fund the first phase of construction with a 
US$45.6 million loan from Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad and 
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US$40 million from equity. The company also signed an important 
take-or-pay agreement with the Selangor State government, whose 
administrators agreed that JBAS would purchase no less than 
approximately 90% of the capacity from the twenty-seven existing 
water treatment plants and the new SSWSS Phase 2 plant, which 
would produce 950 million liters daily. 
7.4.2 Increasing demand and company profitability: Deal drivers in the 
early 2000s 
Several more PPP contracts in the Selangor cluster were awarded in 
the late 90s and early 2000s, as the sector’s profitability became 
apparent, and as water supply fell short of demand, particularly in the 
face of a high-profile 1998 “water crisis”. In February 1998, the Klang 
Valley suffered a sever water shortage, wherein water levels in the 
state’s main two reservoirs – the Semenyih and Langat dams – fell 
drastically in the early part of the year and remained low for six months. 
The incidence was attributed to the El Niño drought, and a water 
rationing system was implemented from March through September, as 
the water treatment plants at each site were able to produce at only 
50% capacity (Aini, Fakhru'l-Razi, & Suan, 2001). 
In March 1999, a company called Syarikat Pengeluar Air Sungai 
Selangor Sdn Bhd [SPLASH] was granted a 30-year BOT contract for 
the Sungai Selangor Water Supply Scheme Phase 3 [SSWSS 3] 
project from the State government. This project would include the Kuala 
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Kubu Bharu Dam and the construction of two water treatment plants at 
Rasa and Bukit Badong to expand water production by 1.05 million 
cubic meters daily in order to serve 2 million more residents in northern 
Selangor (PPIAF). The project was a direct response to the 1998 water 
crisis and related predictions of following crisis in 2003 driven by rising 
consumption of 8-9% annually in Greater KL. Shortly afterwards, in 
January 2000, Puncak Niaga was offered a 20% stake in SSP3, which 
the company ultimately declined. Under pressure to alleviate the water 
shortage, construction of the SSWSS Phase 2 plant was completed a 
year ahead of schedule in January 2001, with capacity to serve 1.1 
million new customers (PPIAF). 
In 2000, some set of the water facilities of SSWSS Phase 1 were also 
subsumed under SPLASH, who is the specified as the concession 
holder since for SSWSS Phase 1. The terms transition from Puncak 
Niaga to SPLASH are unclear, however. Information is not available to 
the public, as the contract (and all other concessions) falls under the 
protection of the Official Secrets Act, but it appears that Puncak Niaga 
has maintained either the concession contract or at least a prime 
operations contract for the 27 existing treatment plants, which was 
further subcontracted, first to GCE (Taliworks / Generale des Eaux), 
and later to a Taliworks subsidiary. 
What’s notable is the common thread amongst the two primary SSWSS 
concessionaires: strong affiliations with UMNO. SPLASH is tripartitely 
owned by Gamuda Berhad (40%), The Sweet Water Alliance (30%) 
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and the Selangor Government’s Kumpulan Darul Ehsan Berhad 
[KDEB] (30%). Gamuda, a large Malaysian infrastructure construction 
firm, and The Sweet Water Alliance are both owned Tan Sri Wan Azmi 
Wan Hamzah (Interview, Santiago, 2012) – a Malaysian tycoon with 
now-broken ties to UMNO, who was formerly one of the party’s most 
prominent “proxies” (Mauzy & Milne, 2002). Described by Milne and 
Mauzy, “Acting informally for UMNO and visible as directors, the 
proxies managed holding companies and executed takeovers to 
advance the party’s business interests” (2002). Puncak Niaga – and 
more specifically, Rozali – have long enjoyed the patronage of UMNO 
chiefs.  
The SSPSS concessionaires and their subcontractors have certainly 
had no problems securing private finance. For SSPSS 1, Puncak Niaga 
funded rehabilitation of the 27 water treatment plants with a 
combination of a US$45.6 million loan from Bank Bumiputra Malaysia 
Berhad and US$40 million from equity. The SSPSS 2 water treatment 
plant, which was to be one of the largest in south-east Asia, was 
expected to cost RM1.28 billion (US$500 million). In April 1996, Puncak 
Niaga secured full financing to undertake construction from DCB 
Sakura Merchant Bankers Bhd and Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank 
Bhd. It was the largest banking scheme ever arranged for a locally 
owned private entity on a project finance basis Malaysia (PPIAF). In 
early 2000, Puncak Niaga secured an additional RM140 million 
bridging loan from United Overseas Bank [UOB] Bhd Malaysia for the 
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second stage of the new plant. Later the same year, the company 
signed two Islamic financing agreements for a total sum of RM1.37 
billion to refinance existing loans. After the SSWSS Phase 3 award, 
SPLASH was funded via Commerce International Merchant Bankers 
Bhd’s issuance of RM1.407 billion in nominal value bonds and RM435 
million in floating rate notes, with the remaining RM500 million required 
for the project coming from consortium member equity (PPIAF). 
An additional water treatment concession was introduced in 2000. In 
December, Konsortium Aliran Bekalan Air Selangor Selatan [ABASS] 
was awarded a 30-year concession by the Selangor State Government, 
as part of the Sungai Semenyih Privatisation Scheme. The project 
entailed O&M of the Semenyih Dam and Water Treatment Plant, 
Selangor’s fourth largest. The contract also included a take-or-pay 
agreement with JBAS. Previously, the plant had been operated by 
Puncak Niaga, which had held a monthly-renewable O&M contract, 
following an initial one-year contract, since 1997. Whilst investment 
plans were not public, PPIAF found that ABASS was given a volumetric 
minimum demand guarantee with fixed rates that would increase every 
five years until 2030 (PPIAF). The ABASS consortium was initially 
owned by Malaysian companies Zufar Water Services Sdn Bhd (45%) 
and Chemical Waste Management Sdn Bhd [CWM] (25%) and the  
Selangor government-owned via KDEB (30%). In 2005, CWM passed 
its stake onto Titisan Modal Sdn Bhd, an SPV owned by KPS / KDEB 
(55%) and another private Malaysian company (45%). 
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Despite easy access to funding, some concessionaires – particularly 
Puncak Niaga – have failed to make due payments to subcontractors. 
In 2003, CGE Utilities (which carried out O&M work under an SSPSS 
Phase 1 subcontract) sued Puncak Niaga for RM84.4 million (US$21.1 
million) for late payment and late interest charges. In 2003, the parties 
agreed to terminate the O&M contract ahead of schedule at year-end 
2004. Puncak Niaga was to pay CGE approximately RM59.6 million in 
fees in three equal annual parts starting from April 2004. After Puncak 
regained control of the water treatment plants in 2005, the O&M 
contract was then re-awarded to another Taliworks company, Sungai 
Harmoni Sdn Bhd [SHSB]. SHSB is a wholly owned Taliworks 
subsidiary (in turn, majority owned by LGB Group and minority held by 
KPS), and the company remains the operator of SPLASH today. It 
appears, then, that the French company extricated itself from the 
complex web of relationships, leaving Taliworks to serve the O&M 
contracts for the primary concessionaires (Puncak Niaga and SPLASH) 
alone.  
Shortly thereafter, in 2004, it came to light that part of the problem on 
non-payment to sub-contractors lied farther down the purchasing chain: 
the Federal and Selangor state governments owed Puncak Niaga 
RM1.3 billion in arrears for water treatment services – and an additional 
RM 1 billion to ABASS and SPLASH (PPIAF). Much of the problem 
related to high rates of NRW in the state-managed distribution system. 
This problem gave rise to the next interesting turn in Selangor’s water 
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story: the concession of its distribution system and the follow-on 
distress of the entire water PPP cluster as the political system shifted.  
7.4.3 SYABAS: Privatizing distribution 
As early as 1998, Rozali was entertaining the idea of taking over water 
distribution from PUAS. Early that year, however, Puncak Niaga 
announced that it would not take over the distribution of water supply 
from the state water supply agency Jabatan Bekalan Air Selangor 
[JBAS] (later corporatized and renamed Perbadanan Urus Air Selangor 
[PUAS]). It was not until 2004, that the then-distressed state water 
agency would be privatized by the UMNO Selangor and Federal 
government.  
Looking back, JBAS had been a financially viable (if not high-
performing) water agency prior to the early water treatment plant 
privatizations of the late 1990s. Prior to PSP, all collections for utilities 
(water, electricity, etc.) went into government consolidated funds, and 
the costs of water were never ring-fenced (Interview, Santiago 2012). 
While problems abounded and service was poor, the government was 
nevertheless able to cover the costs of distribution from other sources. 
Separating water treatment from distribution created a new problem 
associated with the imbalanced profitability in the two components of 
the supply chain and an inability for the distribution side (first 
JBAS/PUAS, then the private concessionaire) to afford the inflated 
costs of raw water in Selangor. 
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Earlier in 2004, the federal government had suspended the introduction 
of new water PPPs and privatizations. But in the beginning of 
November, the Minister of Energy, Water, and Communications Lim 
Keng Yaik announced that he would approve a multi-billion dollar deal 
to privatize the near-insolvent Perbadanan Urus Air Selangor Bhd 
(PUAS). PUAS was serving approximately 5 million customers with a 
daily amount of 3.6 billion liters of water, but also owed its suppliers RM 
2.3 billion (US$605 million) (GWI, 2004).  
In September 2004, the State Government awarded a 30-year 
concession contract to newly formed company, Syarikat Bekalan Air 
Selangor Sdn. Bhd [SYABAS], for the takeover of PUAS and the water 
distribution system. Puncak Niaga held a 70% stake in the company, 
and state asset holding company KDEB owned the remainder. The 
Federal and State Governments would both be party to the contract, 
which would transfer responsibility for all distribution functions, 
including maintenance and expansion of the piping system, billing, and 
customer service, to SYABAS. SYABAS would have to meet increasing 
consumption, which was expected to rise annually by approximately 
200 million liters per day, and also deal with high water losses of 
approximately 42%, which were costing PUAS some RM600 million per 
year. 
While the contract remains private, some details have come to light. 
The contract apparently implemented a tariff adjustment structure, 
which was tied to the company’s successful performance with respect 
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to reduction of NRW, planned versus actual capital expenditures, and 
collection rates, as well as normal indexing variables such as inflation 
and the cost of inputs. According to PPIAF, Syabas was committed to 
reduce NRW to 37.78% by 2006, 27.98% by 2009, 19.98% by 2012, 
and 15.48% by 2015 (PPIAF), but the stipulated requirements with 
respect to collection rate improvements and the other input variables 
are unknown. Over the 30-year concession period, the total planned 
capex for piping expansion and rehabilitation was RM9.57 billion 
(US$2.52 billion), but company versus government commitments, 
schedules, and expenditure plans are also unknown. Authority for 
judgment of the company’s performance with respect to the terms of 
the contract would lie with the Federal Government. 
For the first operating year, 2005, the company was granted a 15% 
tariff increase. Further, a late 2004 audit report announced immediate, 
significant improvements in NRW – a claim that was decried by critics 
as fabricated, particularly since the company had not yet imposed an 
NRW-reduction program. While the companies activities were 
reportedly audited by a national body (with no experience in the water 
sector), the report held by KeTTHA would remain confidential under the 
Official Secrets Act (Interview, Santiago 2012) 
The government would give a combined RM2.9 billion (US$769 million) 
of financial support for capex, including a set of RM1.864 billion 
(US$491 million) soft loans from government-owned Bank Pertanian & 
Industri Malaysia Berhad, and a federal grant of RM905 million 
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(US$238 million). About RM1.34 billion was to be put towards partially 
settle PUAS' debts to the three private treatment companies to which it 
owned money, including Puncak Niaga (PPIAF). A year into the 
concession, SYABAS signed a deal for a bonding facility for capex of 
RM3.2 billion (US$850 million) in Islamic bonds with a consortium of 
banks including Bank Islam Malaysia Bhd, Commerce International 
Merchant Bankers Bhd (CIMB), and HSBC Malaysia Bhd. 
Following the SYABAS concession, and just before slipping to a 
“distressed” state, a last set of concession contracts was awarded to 
Puncak Niaga. In 2007 and 2008, the Selangor state government, with 
support of the federal government as a third signatory to the contract, 
entered into two additional water treatments plant concessions with 
Puncak Niaga for the Sungai Lolo plant at Hulu Langat (28-year 
contract) and a plant at Sungai Sireh (27-year contract) (PPIAF). 
Puncak Niaga would hold rights to sell bulk treated water to the state 
government or its concessionaires. 
Water Treatment Companies Distribution Company 
Puncak Niaga: 2929 WTPs, two 25-year 
concession contracts in 1994 (SSWSS Phase 1) 
and 1995 (SSWSS Phase 2); 28-year concession 
SYABAS: 70% owned by 
Puncak Niaga, 30% 
owned by KPS/KDEB; 
                                            
29 Puncak started with 27 treatment plants, and added three more BOT 
concessions along the way, but closed one that became obsolete. Thus, the 
sum total of WTP concessions with Puncak Niaga today is 29. 
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in 2007 (Sungai Lolo); 27-year concession in 
2008 (Sungai Sirei) 
SPLASH: 30% owned by KPS; 30-year 
concession in 2000 (SSWSS Phase 3) 
ABASS: 55% owned by KPS; 30-year concession 
in 2001 
30-year concession 
awarded in 2004 
7.4.4 Things fall apart: 2008 election upset and the churning of the 
system 
The last agreement for Sungai Sireh was particularly interesting, as it 
was signed amidst significant political upheaval in Malaysia, just the 
day before the nation’s transformational 12th general election. On 
March 8th, 2008, the long-ruling Barisan Nasional coalition, which had 
enjoyed a strong hold over both the Selangor and Federal governments 
for decades, was surprisingly unseated in Selangor by the opposition 
Pakatan Rakyat coalition and its new incoming Selangor Menteri 
Besar, Khalid Ibrahim. The new Menteri Besar – whose PR coalition 
had made election promises to improve water supply and cut water 
prices – immediately announced that the Selangor government would 
review the Sungai Sirei deal, which he felt unduly favored Puncak 
Niaga, as well as other existing contracts. He reaffirmed his party’s 
promise to make the first twenty cubic meters of water free for all 
Selangor households, and chastised privatization for increasing costs 
without improving service. 
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After a brief two-week review following Khalid Ibrahim’s call for 
investigation, the incoming KeTTHa [Ministry of Energy, Green 
Technology, and Water] minister, Datuk Shaziman Abu Mansor, 
announced that the federal government considered the contracts valid, 
as long as the National Water Services Commission [SPAN] put forth 
no objections. SPAN, whose leaders were or had been affiliated (either 
informally or formerly) with UMNO, did not dispute KeTTHa’s ruling. In 
order to keep taps flowing, the PR Menteri Besar had to allow the 
contracts to stand for the time being, but vowed to continue scrutinizing 
the arrangements. The next month, in April 2008, the Selangor State 
government legislated that the first twenty cubic meters per month 
would be free to all households, putting further pressure on SYABAS to 
make up additional income losses. 
7.5 Contesting PSP: Fighting in the dark 
Following the transition to the Opposition government in 2008, 
Selangor fell into an tumultuous period of protracted disputes and court 
proceedings – a clash whose resolution has been prolonged due to the 
near-total absence of verifiable information available to ardent 
opponents (much less impartial observers) of the contracts and the 
intertwining of political and business interests. Said Klang MY Charles 
Santiago, “As part of water governance, information is crucial. But 
because they’re hiding information, we are unable to figure out what 
exactly is going on” (Interview, 2012). By 2009, the contracts 
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themselves could be classified as “distressed”, as public scrutiny and 
legal disputes mounted. Over the past five years, legislators and 
companies have taken each other to courts in a back-and-forth legal 
game involving law suits for information and accusations including 
slander, corruption, breach of contract, illegal tendering, and 
obstruction. 
In addition to questions about the fairness of the contracts and wisdom 
of employing PPP, the State government was critical of non-
performance in service expansion and quality improvement on the 
distribution end of the value chain. Post-concession, SYABAS’ financial 
viability hinged on the immediate and regular increase of water tariffs. 
Whilst supporters of the PPP claimed that PUAS’ financial problems 
and inefficiencies would be remedied sufficiently to turn the loss-
making company around, SYABAS was unable to do so, and continued 
to operate at a loss. Critics claimed that SYABAS never intended to 
make drastic efficiency improvements30, and that Rozali trusted that, 
with political support from UMNO politicians (notwithstanding their own 
interests as parties to subcontracts), tariffs would be regularly and 
sufficiently increased to make SYABAS a quickly profitable company.  
                                            
30 Said Charles Santiago, reflecting on discussions with past employees, 
“What is a $5 product – when it goes to SYABAS, it becomes a $500 product” 
(Interview, 2012). Allegedly, SYABAS continued the Puncak model of inflated 
related party transactions and conspicuous collusion. 
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When the Opposition government took over Selangor, however, State 
legislators immediately froze water tariff increases and mandated the 
provision of free twenty cubic meters of water, which the Government 
would have to pay directly at a cost of approximately RM130 million per 
year (Interview, SPAN 2012). When SYABAS requested a tariff 
increase in 2008, from an average RM1.39 per m3 to a previously 
agreed-upon RM1.89 per m3 for the third operations period from Jan 1, 
2009, to Dec 31, 2011, the State Government did not respond. 
SYABAS was stuck with inflated bulk water costs and new restrictions 
on revenues that would plunge the company into a pattern of steady 
losses.  
Today, the tariff rates are the same as they were in 2006. The rates fall 
at the high end of those posted for all states. The 2011 average tariff 
for Selangor31 is RM1.50, below only Johor’s, and well above the other 
states (the national average is RM1.02) (Malaysian Water Association, 
2012). Until the Opposition decision to offer free 20 m3 in Selangor, for 
the first 20 m3 in residential segments, the state fell at RM.57 per m3, 
alongside Johor (another previously privatized state), Negeri Sembilan, 
and Melaka; and well above many of the other government-subsidized 
states. The public corporatized success story of Pinang charges, in 
contrast, RM.22 per m3 for the first 20 m3 (Malaysian Water 
                                            
31 The tariff rate structure has been frozen, but reclassifications and shifts in 
consumer segments have increased the average tariff (total revenue / total m3 
sold). 
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Association, 2012). Said MP Santiago in 2012, “If the opposition had 
not taken over, the price of water today would have RM2 higher. The 
cost would have been higher than the price of petrol” (Interview).  
Since 2008, SYABAS’ losses have mounted and service quality has not 
improved (they have arguably regressed, considering a spate of recent 
water service disruptions). NRW for 2010-2011 held at 32.3%, slightly 
below the national average of 36.7%, but 99.8% of the population was 
reported to have service. Nevertheless, customer complaints were high 
for issues such as pipe breaks and leakages, quality, and pressure 
(Malaysian Water Association, 2012). Furthermore, the Federal 
Government has had to support SYABAS operations financially as well 
as the State Government’s own water network expansion during the 
ensuing period of conflict (Interview, SPAN 2012). 
7.5.1 Bailouts, lawsuits, and “manufactured” crises 
In late 2008, discussions began between the new Selangor 
government and the four concessionaires over conditions of an asset 
buy-back plan. ABASS and SPLASH considered the State’s offer, but 
Puncak Niaga and its subsidiary SYABAS did not engage. The State 
government made the first of several offers to buy back the concession 
from SYABAS with an initial offer of RM5.7 billion in 2009. The offer 
was squarely refused, but it set off three years of active but 
unproductive discussion on the potential for remunicipalizing 
Selangor’s waterworks. 
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In 2009, media outlets reported “numerous irregularities” associated 
with the concessions contracts, particularly SYABAS, which fueled the 
State’s moves to pursue ownership of the water system. A 2009 state 
audit report found that 72% of contracts worth RM600 million (US$180 
million) had been awarded without open tender, and also showed 
discrepancies in reported contract award amounts. Further, news 
reports stated that SYABAS spent RM51.2 million (US$15 million) on 
office renovations after Selangor Water Regulatory Department (JKAS) 
approved only RM23.3 million; made huge pay allowances of RM5.1 
million (US$1.5 million) to Chairman Rozali; and maintained a 
management fee agreement with parent company Puncak Niaga 
amounting to RM8.4 million annually – summing to RM32 million 
(US$9.6 million) since 2005 (Koon, 2010). Critics also rehashed an 
earlier 2005 audit, which found that the company had sourced RM325 
million (US$97.5 million) worth of pipes from Indonesia, against 
Ministry of Finance instructions to buy locally. They pointed out that, 
after years of PSP intended to improve water service and efficiency, the 
average tariff charged by SYABAS was RM0.77 per m3, more than 
double that of the corporatized Penang state water agency. These 
allegations fueled a bitter political war, pitting the State Government 
against the concessionaires and the Federal Government, including 
SPAN and PAAB. State administrators accused PAAB and SPAN of 
valuing assets in favor of Puncak Niaga and SYABAS in order to justify 
refusal of buy-out offers.  
 319 
Meanwhile, the concessionaires’ debts grew to approximately RM6.4 
billion leading up to 2010. Whilst they had paid out dividends of 
approximately RM700 million, the companies nevertheless rallied to 
secure Federal financial support. In December 2009, the Federal 
government provided a RM320.8 million back-loaded, interest-free soft 
loan to Puncak Niaga to settle their debts (Koon 2010). They followed 
on with a RM100 million credit to SYABAS in October 2011 and 
assumed SYABAS’ RM2.9 billion outstanding debts to save the 
company from the threat of default (Pua, 2013). 
In late 2010, SYABAS also filed suit against the Selangor Government 
for the revenues lost due to the States refusal to implement the 
previously planned 37% tariff increase. SYABAS COO Lee Miang Koi 
said up to year-end 2010, SYABAS expected RM1 billion 
compensation. He added, “The water tariff had to be adjusted to enable 
Syabas to earn revenue to repay loans it had taken to improve the 
quality of water services. By delaying the adjustments and freezing the 
capex programme, the standard of water services will decline…  This 
year, payments to treatment plant operators had to be reduced to 45% 
compared to 60% last year. Syabas is facing legal actions from 
Syarikat Pengeluar Air Sungai Selangor Sdn Bhd (Splash) and Abass 
for not paying them in full" (Bernama, 2010). 
In late March 2011, SYABAS’ and Puncak Niaga’s corporate bonds 
were downgraded, prompting another government intervention, 
whereby PAAB purchased the bonds in order to rescue the distressed 
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companies (Pigeon, McDonald, Hoedeman, & Kishimoto, 2012). In 
June 2012, a group of Puncak Niaga minority shareholders also put 
pressure on the distribution concession from within, when they asked 
the Board of Directors to sue SYABAS for RM1.09 billion owed to 
Puncak Niaga up to Dec 31, 2011. In 2011, Puncak Niaga recorded 
pre-tax losses of RM75.2 million, and had been unable to pay 
dividends for two years, due largely to SYABAS debt. SYABAS paid for 
only 44% of the treated water supplied by the three water treatment 
consortia (Bernama, 2012). 
A 2010 proposal for the development of a new RM4 billion water 
treatment plant at Sungai Langat only served to further fuel these 
ongoing disputes between Selangor Government and the Federal 
Government. The “Langat 2” project proposed the construction of the 
new plant within a larger RM9 billion cross-state (Pahang to Selangor) 
water transfer project in response to predictions of a worrisome 13-14% 
shortage as early as 2014, reminiscent of the 1998 shortages. The 
proposal was based on a National Water Resources Study for the 
period 2000-2050, prepared by three consultants (SMHB, Ranhill, and 
Sabah Consulting) – two of whom (SMHB and Ranhill) would dubiously 
go on to win the engineering contracts for the plant (Interview, SPAN 
2012). The study, based on contested methods of forecasting 
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demand,32 provoked complaint from the Opposition State Government, 
who claimed that Barisan Nasional was “manufacturing” the crisis. 
They pointed out the high levels of NRW and resisted the project, citing 
it as another expensive, superfluous capital project aimed at further 
enriching private concessionaires and their shareholders.  
The Federal Government, via KeTTHA, gave its approval for the project 
anyhow, and construction for the transfer system began in April 2010 
with support from Japanese development agency, JICA. The treatment 
plant, however, was stalled by the State, whose administrators refused 
to approve land use for transfer of water from the treatment facility into 
the state. I.e., while the Federal Government and PAAB would approve 
construction for a new plant (with costs passed on to Selangor 
consumers via SYABAS), Selangor State would refuse to allow the 
plant to be connected to the distribution network by blocking approval 
for the last fifteen plots of land needed to complete of the transfer 
pipeline (Y. Tan, 2011).  
In a January 2013 speech, Deputy Prime Minister (DPM) Muhyiddin 
Yassin announced,  “The federal government says, approved or not 
approved, we have already offered tenders for contracts to build Langat 
2. In a month or two, we will go ahead with Langat 2 for the benefit of 
                                            
32 Critics claimed that the forecasted demand was too high and was based on 
problematic assumptions about Malaysia’s population growth, labor 
productivity, and other demographic measures (Interview, Santiago 2012). 
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the people, and not for the Menteri Besar or the Opposition.” The 
Langat 2 project has remained a sore point of debate since. 
The last few years of Selangor’s water story are marked also by 
devolution into a string of lawsuits between the State Government and 
the private concessionaires and Federal Government. In June 2012, 
SYABAS again filed suit against Selangor, demanding RM471,600 
compensation for the State’s failure to approve a tariff increase (Ariffin, 
2012). The following month, the Coalition Against Water Privatization 
sued the concessionaires and the Federal Government for access to 
information on the purported water crisis, as well as for information on 
the concessionaire operations (Vinod, 2012). In August, Rozali Ismail 
successfully sued Petaling Jaya MP Tony Pua for slander. Pua had 
denounced Rozali for collecting a salary of RM1.5 million amidst huge 
losses, and was forced to compensate SYABAS RM200,000 on the 
High Court’s judgment (Sun Daily, 2012b; Vinod, 2012).  
Fed up with the back-and-forth disputes, Selangor Menteri Besar 
Khalid Ibrahim announced his intentions to renew his pursuit of re-
municipalization and to “fire” Rozali and SYABAS CEO Ruslan Hassan 
for failure to cooperate with State Secretary Datuk Khusrin Munawi and 
the Selangor Water Service Monitoring Board (Sun Daily, 2012a). He 
further decried the Federal Government’s “interference” as unlawful, 
claiming that the 2006 Water Services Industry Act forbade the Federal 
Government from encroaching on water management (Ariffin, 2012) – 
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a claim that demonstrated lingering ambiguity over the locus of 
authority over water services. 
The issue become so hotly contested, that at the time of fieldwork, 
federal responsibility for dealing with the problems in Selangor water 
had been removed altogether from the KeTTHA Minister’s office and 
was turned over, instead, to the Deputy Prime Minister (Interview, 
Santiago 2012). The Deputy Prime Minister and Cabinet assumed a 
policy of non-interference with respect to the State’s move to acquire 
water assets, playing almost no role in attempting to mediate or resolve 
the conflicts, and essentially washing their hands of the problems. In 
August 2012, Deputy Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin said, “The 
(Ministerial) committee has no plan to interfere with the state 
government’s efforts to take over equity in the concession companies 
since it is a commercial transaction between the two parties that should 
be implemented on a willing buyer-willing seller basis” (Vinod, 2012).  
Headed into 2013, with the political space intensifying as a General 
Election approached, Selangor’s moves to take over became more 
desperate. In January, the State issued notice to the Federal 
Government that it would take over concessions within two weeks. 
Then in February 2013, after the two-week period came and went 
without effect, Selangor’s state investment arm, KDEB, issued a letter 
to SYABAS, Puncak Niaga, ABASS, and SPLASH, offering a RM9.65 
billion buy-out, with an eye to take over distribution first. The company 
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counter-offered with a demand of RM 12 billion, which the State could 
not accept (Interview, Santiago 2012).  
The State Government also attempted to leverage the Water Services 
Industry Act of 2006, which had introduced a new water governance 
regime that returned physical assets to public ownership, in order to 
press companies and the Federal Government to seriously consider 
the purchase offer. SPAN, however, lent almost no weight in pressuring 
the transition of Selangor to the reformed water regime. Nevertheless, 
after Pakatan Rakyat successfully and overwhelmingly held control of 
Selangor’s state assembly and national parliamentary seats in the May 
General Election, and following months of steady protest and scrutiny, 
UMNO Prime Minister Najib issued a July letter to the State, declaring 
that he was “open and ready” to discuss a buy-out plan. 
In the meantime, as the terms of a potential buyout are discussed 
behind closed doors, the Federal Government continues to financially 
bolster SYABAS to keep taps flowing and allow the company to service 
debts to ABASS, SPLASH, and most importantly, perhaps, Puncak 
Niaga. In October 2013, SYABAS was granted two additional loan 
facility agreements with the Ministry of Finance for RM75 million and 
RM76 million, amounting to a RM151 million bailout. The 20-year soft 
loans, aimed at financing NRW reduction, would draw a low three 
percent annual interest, while default interest was set at five percent 
annually. These loans were issued only eight months after a RM120 
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million soft loan was extended in February to carry out similar NRW-
related works (Bernama, 2013).  
Opposition leader and water activist Charles Santiago saw the 
collection of contracting and bailout decisions as the equilibrium 
strategy of an entwined Federal Government and water private sector: 
“What they are doing is they are killing SYABAS but enriching Puncak 
Niaga. That is the strategy that they have” (Interview, 2012). This tactic 
would appear to hold steady through the PPP’s decline. 
At the time of writing, for reasons unknown, the Selangor government 
had recently conceded that the Langat 2 project may, indeed, be 
necessary to alleviating Greater KL’s water woes and agreed “in 
principle” to the project. Nevertheless, the conflict was unresolved over 
questions of ownership and authority, and the project was forty months 
behind schedule. Meanwhile, interruptions remain regular and service 
quality low. NRW holds at around 31% and, whilst down from an 
estimated 42.5% in 2005, it is unlikely that SYABAS – if the company is 
still operational – will be able to bring it to the contract-stipulated 15% 
goal for 2015 (Crowder, Hassan, & Lee, 2012). 
7.6 The limited reach of regulation 
As obvious as the glaring corruption and collusion that defines the 
Selangor water PPP case is the gross insufficiency of the regulatory 
apparatus, which, for all intensive purposes, might be argued virtually 
non-existent. Water resources (river basin, groundwater, coastal areas 
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etc.) have been openly regulated with respect to environment and use 
by the State government via the Selangor water management authority, 
Penubuhan Lembaga Urus Air Selangor [LUAS], since 1999, but the 
oversight of water treatment and supply and the privatized contracts 
delivering them, if it is happening at all, has been quite entirely opaque.  
In 2002, eight years after the first Puncak Niaga deal was signed, 
privatizing 27 state-owned water treatment plants, a regulatory unit was 
finally established under the Selangor water supply agency, PUAS. 
Jabatan Kawalselia Air Selangor [JKAS] (Selangor Water Regulatory 
Department) would be tasked with ensuring that concessionaires 
adhered to contractual agreements and relevant water laws. JKAS 
would report to the State Menteri Besar but also advise KeTTHA on 
Selangor issues (and report to KeTTHA on issues pertaining to the 
Federal Territories of Putrajaya and Kuala Lumpur). Its legal grounding 
was in a 1977 piece of legislation, the Water Supply Enactment 1977, 
amended in 2003, to specify the JKAS director as the regulator of water 
services. JKAS was purportedly intended to assume oversight of the 
concessionaires’ adherence to contracted stipulations with respect to 
service regularity, water quality, and pricing. In practice, however, the 
organization never had any real power to influence the well-insulated 
companies.  
Prior to the 2004/2005 water reforms, JKAS was feeble with respect to 
meaningfully regulating the distribution system for two reasons. First 
and foremost, the political leaders from whom JKAS received funding 
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and authority had financial stakes in the deals. Secondly, because the 
state government itself holds interests in three of the concessions, its 
financial health was tied up in the health of the service companies.  
Upon acceptance of the major national water sector reform in 2004, 
Jabatan Kawalselia Air [JKAS] was dissolved, and regulation was 
poised to transition to the new federal regulatory agency, SPAN. 
Recognizing the extreme fragmentation in the sector, the government 
sought to unite the regulatory regime under one federal agency that 
would oversee tariff setting and performance standards in all states. 
Delays in the adoption of the new regime in Selangor due to disputes 
between KeTTHA, SPAN, and the State Government, however, meant 
that the new system – including its regulatory component – would not 
be implemented there. This left a vacuum in economic and social 
regulation in the State’s water sector that has been conspicuously 
present since. 
The policy theory underpinning the water reforms would require that 
SPAN assume responsibility for social and economic regulation in 
Selangor, as in other states, with responsibility for monitoring service 
performance, enforcing rewards and penalties, and setting tariff rates. 
This reform process also involved the aforementioned transition to an 
“asset light” model of Federal Government (PAAB) asset ownership – a 
sticking point that virtually stalled implementation of the entire reform in 
Selangor since its inception.  
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Post-reform, despite the apparent independence of the new national 
regulator, SPAN, the story is much the same as it was prior. For one, 
SPAN does not appear to have any more of a hold on regulation in 
Selangor than did JKAS. SYABAS is still 30% owned by state 
investment arm KDEB, many of whose senior employees are politically 
engaged. The current Opposition government claims that UMNO-linked 
KDEB officials fail to represent the State government’s interests despite 
explicit instructions from legislators, and that the interests of the “old 
boy network,” which includes KDEB’s senior administrators, trump the 
interests of the consumer-citizens of Selangor (Interview, PR, 2012). 
SPAN’s monitoring plans appear to be suitably focused, but lack depth 
and precision and are weak in detailing modes of enforcement. This is 
somewhat understandable, as the organization and its operations are 
still in a nascent state, and the agency is tasked with unifying highly 
disparate water regulatory systems nationwide. The national framework 
involves a scheme to benchmark utilities across Malaysia with respect 
to NRW, customer service, quality, accessibility, cost, and efficiency, 
which should be helpful for keeping operators on task. Operators must 
supply 30-year master plans and accompanying three-year business 
plans to SPAN, including capital expenditure plans and performance 
goals. Plans for new infrastructure would require the involvement of 
PAAB as the ultimate asset owner. 
While the regulatory framework is taking shape, a few major problems 
with the system are apparent, in addition to the fact that it has yet to be 
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adopted in Selangor and a number of other states. For one, key 
performance indicators [KPI] are only shared internally to SPAN and its 
affiliated state agencies, not to the public (Interviews, SPAN and 
Santiago, 2012), rendering it fairly impotent to serve as a check on 
operators or apply pressure on local agencies and regulators. Further, 
while data on KPIs is regularly supplied to operators, the audit process 
is unclear. Most notably, however, it is unclear what tools, if any, are 
available regulators for motivating low-performing operators to improve 
efficiency and service. 
While SPAN asserts that a clause in SYABAS’ 2005 contract stipulated 
that the company must submit to regulation of capital expenditures 
should a national regulatory regime be adopted, it is unclear whether 
SPAN is, indeed performing this kind of oversight. SPAN asserted in 
vague terms that it is doing so, but will not provide details on how so 
(Interview, SPAN 2012). SPAN does admit that, whilst the agency is 
mandated to regulate tariff-setting nationally, it is not currently doing so 
in Selangor. In the State, the tariffs are apparently set by contract33 and 
approved – in unclear terms – by some party in the Federal 
government. The State’s legislators, who also hold jurisdiction over 
water supply by law, have not been allowed to view the contract, 
                                            
33 SPAN CEO and staff informed me that the formulae for determining tariffs 
are not public, but that they consider forecasted opex and planned capex, 
costs of inputs, revenues, and standard indexing.  Under the new regime, 
tariffs should be processed and set by SPAN, and approved by the KeTTHA 
Minister. 
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operational data, or tariff formulae and inputs, due to protection of the 
contracts under the Official Secrets Act. 
Incidentally, SPAN’s reticence to discuss regulatory activity raises all 
the more mistrust by the Opposition’s claims that SPAN’s senior 
administrators are aligned with national UMNO politicians. Said Klang 
MP Charles Santiago, “All regulators are either former government 
servants or businessmen in the industry who have contacts with 
government. So can they make any independent judgment? This is 
Posner’s notion of regulatory capture” (Interview, Santiago 2012). 
Furthermore, Tan points out another flaw in the asset light reform: 
namely, that it sustains water systems operating below cost-recovery 
levels. While relieving private and public operators of capital 
expenditure pressures, PAAB is also authorized to provide finance for 
operating expenditures for companies operating at a loss (even for 
private operators, as in the Selangor case) and may also lease assets 
below market cost (J. Tan, 2012). This points to the federal 
government’s unwillingness to enforce performance standards and 
limited incentive for operators to improve efficiency. 
To complicate things, there are also questions about the Opposition 
State Government’s capacity and consistency to undo the mess in 
Selangor. While the quality of regular two-year audits performed by 
government-appointed auditors on SYABAS have been met with 
marked skepticism by the State Government, they have also been 
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quick to pounce on any worrisome information published in audit 
reports – a moved that has betrayed a single-mindedness in ending the 
privatizations altogether. For instance, a 2009 audit disclosed that, 
while the SYABAS concession agreement requires open tendering for 
subcontracted work, 80% of sub-contracts had been given out by direct 
negotiation. The audit also showed that planned capital expenditure 
had fallen short and that SYABAS had made large expenditures on 
office refurbishments (over the amount approved by JKAS), large fixed 
management payments to Puncak Niaga, and high payouts to senior 
managers. These reports were played high in the media and served 
only to further cement the Opposition’s decision to deny tariff increases 
and pursue no other course but remunicipalization. 
In a interview with SPAN chief Dato’ Teo Yen Hua, he suggested that 
Malaysia’s mixed experience with privatization can be partly attributed 
to lack of uniformity in laws, regulations, and federal-state responses 
across states, as well as to problems associated with mismatch 
between the financial demands of markets and needs and political 
histories of state financing. To the latter, Dato’ pointed out that some 
projects ran into trouble because of political backlash associated with 
rapidly increasing tariffs in the case of PPP. In comparison, some 
states were able to keep tariffs low because they were not compelled to 
repay federal loans, and were, thus, running systems based on a 
model of high subsidization and low cost recovery. On the other hand, 
states that privatized water supply had to service commercial loans 
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and, thus, necessarily increased tariffs. The tariff disparity between 
publicly supported and privately financed states exacerbated political 
objections to higher tariffs in privatized regions (Interview, SPAN 2012). 
Certainly, the Opposition government has cited comparatively low 
water prices in other subsidized Malaysian states in arguing for a 
reversal of the PPPs. But it is misleading to attribute the problem solely 
to the consumer-public’s railing against comparatively high water costs. 
This explanation also brushes aside the clear technical failure at hand 
– one wherein none of the private operators was incentivized to 
improve operational efficiencies or service performance. The Selangor 
case, more accurately, shows how the absence of meaningful 
regulation and the maintenance of contracts that disproportionately 
benefit one group over another can lead to clear instrumental failure but 
collaborative success – at least until the system is disrupted by some 
kind of political catalyst or change in the composition of collaborators. 
This relates directly to North’s ideas about the sustenance of inefficient 
institutions due to rule sets that preserve the interests of the system’s 
most powerful players (D. North, 1990). In the case of Selangor, the 
gross performance failure was effectively maintained until the 
collaborative dimension was unexpectedly changed, allowing the 
Opposition-led state government to rankle the PPP architecture 
preserving the interests of Rozali and his network of UMNO colluders. 
In time, it will be interesting to see whether changes in the rules that 
currently restrict information, define the regulatory space, and allocate 
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authority amongst state and federal officials will shift sufficiently to push 
this PPP set – currently on the brink of total failure – into a full 
remunicipalization. 
Regardless, Dato’ Teo followed to say that SPAN’s national water 
strategy would be to avoid concessions altogether from here on out, 
limiting PPPs to management contracts for sub-functions in water 
supply, as concessions are now politically untenable (Interview, SPAN 
2012). So then, the Selangor water debacle has apparently eliminated 
the potential for water supply PPPs in Malaysia altogether, also 
alluding to the historical, path-dependent, and multi-level governmental 




Chapter 8. Adaptation and commitment: Analyzing PPP 
failure 
As discussed in Chapter 1, a PPP project’s degree of success or failure 
may be judged along both technical and relational terms. In 
combination, the quantitative and qualitative components of the 
research yield interesting results demonstrating the configurative 
effects of local conditions, rules, participant interests and capacities, 
and external forces on PPP participants’ abilities and proclivities to 
deliver and maintain commitments and adjust PPP settings to deal with 
the inevitable shifts affecting long-term contracts. 
While systemic failure might be thought of as the worst sort upon first 
glance, Kuala Lumpur’s story suggests that instrumental failure coupled 
with institutional success can be as bad, if not worse, as the 
institutional structure and power arrangement sustains an inefficient 
and unproductive service delivery apparatus. In other words, a 
dissolution that should happen is prevented because of the intervention 
of powerful players who make personal gains via the PPP or because 
of the inability to navigate and manage re-municipalization – all to the 
detriment of the citizenry.  
This points to one of the thesis’ strongest contributions: that the 
question “Why are PPPs terminated?” is only as important as the 
question, “Why are not more poorly performing arrangements corrected 
or, where found unworkable, altogether reversed?” The proposal, thus, 
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is that some PPPs fail to fail. This is not intended to be entirely 
pessimistic: the PPP experiment is not futile. Indeed, the technical 
gains in Manila (and even in the troubled Jakarta concessions) 
demonstrate that the private sector can contribute expertise and 
discipline that improves efficiency, service coverage, and quality. The 
cases also demonstrate, however, that companies are quite capable of 
taking advantage of monopoly power where regulation, transparency, 
and direct political access are weak, and that controlling that tendency 
hinges on institutional endowments and technical capacities rare in 
many developing regions. PPPs may nevertheless be preferable 
options for cities with persistently low-performing utilities, but designers 
must carefully customize commitment-enhancing and flexibility-
inducing arrangements to local context and adopt and foster a learning 
and adjustment orientation from the start. 
The projects discussed above can be described as falling within the 
proposed matrix of instrumental and institutional performance, with 
positions moving constantly as performance targets are met or missed 
and as relationships and organizational arrangements are more or less 
productive and cooperative. The challenge left is to synthesize findings 
of the quantitative and qualitative analyses to link outcomes with the 
credibility of commitments, technical faculties, and capacities for 
adjustment. These, in turn, are configuratively dependent on rules, 
participants, context dynamics, and rooted conditions. 
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8.1 Synthesizing major findings 
The quantitative analysis tells part of the story about influence of the 
rooted conditions, project rules, participant profiles, and context 
dynamics on PPP durability. It reveals how participant compositions, 
project forms, institutional endowments, and external financial shocks 
tend to affect early contract termination, and also demonstrates that 
tend to PPPs fail in their early years. Whilst the patterns vary widely, 
indicating multiple causal paths to failure, the quantitative analysis 
offers interesting results that show a proclivity to institutional failure – 
i.e., cancellation or distress – depending on who is involved and within 
particular institutional contexts.  
But a more whole picture of PPP success, especially instrumentally 
and in relation to dynamic factors, demands dual consideration of 
quantitative results and case study. Considering the two-fold goal of 
instrumental and institutional performance as well as a research logic 
that proposes that these are dependent on the system’s capacity to 
balance adaptability and commitment, we look to comparative case 
study. Via case comparison, linkages are drawn between the four 
variable classes and adaptability and credibility, and further with PPP 
performance. 
The cases offer richer pictures of the configurative effects of 
institutional endowments and conditions as well as project- and local-
level rules, conditions, capacities, and interests on PPP failure. Indeed, 
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each displays a unique set of conditions that led to different outcomes 
over time, but uniqueness does not mean that nothing generalizable 
can be said about PPP failure. Further, we are able to see how these 
factors influence to what extent managers can ensure credibility of 
commitments and adjust inevitably incomplete agreements over time 
without making excessive sacrifices on the policy goals that motivated 
PSP. 
The static examination of rules on PPP sustenance in Chapter 3 
showed that selection and participation rules and particular institutional 
endowments make the difference in project sustenance. The cases add 
depth to understanding the influences of corruption, rule clarity, law, 
and actors’ relationships on both sustenance and performance. 
Further, the cases shed light on the institutional changes and learning 
that allow some PPPs to evolve towards efficiency and technical 
aspirations and others to devolve into gridlock, distress, and failure. 
One finding relates to the temporal aspects of failure. Most cancelled 
projects were terminated by the five-year mark. Further, institutional 
endowments and project rules have different effects on early- and mid-
term survival. While none of the contracts in the three case study cities 
were terminated by five years, they do support a tentative proposal 
based on the surprising regression results: some of the factors that 
promote cancellation in the early years can also detrimentally protract 
exit in the long-term.  
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The following discussion synthesizes findings of the cases and 
quantitative analysis on the major themes of Chapter 2 and additional 
factors inductively deemed important during fieldwork. Again, these are 
categorized as follows: 
 
Degree of control 
Under direct control of 
decision-makers 
Decision-makers have 








 Relatively static, 
slow to change 
Project rules and 
participant capacities Rooted conditions 
Dynamic, 
continuous change Regulatory settings Context dynamics 
 
In discussing the influence of each group of variables, one of the most 
important aspects – the rules in use – is left for last, as it warrants a 
longer discussion on regulation as the lynchpin of imperative credibility. 
8.1.1 Participants: Foreign participation, ownership, and bureaucratic 
quality 
The characteristics of participants to the PPP that were found to 
differentiate experiences include the roster and number of participants, 
their organizational cultures and technical and management capacities, 
and their degree of public legitimacy. Both descriptive statistics and 
regression analysis show that the participation of a foreign private 
sector partner tends to promote cancellation. Why this is so is apparent 
via the cases, and hinges on corporate culture, inter-cultural conflict, 
and legitimacy problems. 
The Jakarta case most plainly illustrates this. There, relationships were 
tenuous from the start with both Thames and Palyja. The unwilling 
 339 
agency, PAM Jaya, felt that the two foreign companies regularly 
colluded against the government to avoid the imposition of penalties, 
lower targets, and hamper negotiations that would bring the charge 
closer to the tariff. Agency leaders said, however, that the collusive 
relationship was broken with localization of Aetra, which in turn opened 
the concessions to the benchmarking competition originally intended. 
Further, drawing on their breadth of contracting experience and 
superior legal resources, the multinationals were able to outdo local 
agencies during bidding, contracting, and renegotiation.  
PAM Jaya managers also suggested that Suez was the most “difficult” 
to deal with over the years. The French company was the most 
influential in negotiating the upholding of the contracts after Suharto’s 
resignation, and they also allegedly orchestrated the termination of 
PAM Jaya Chief Napitupulu. In reflecting upon the Manila concessions’ 
history also, MWSS Board Chairman suggested that part of the 
problem with Maynilad I was that it suffered from Suez’ strict 
application of its own operating model without sufficient flexibility to 
deal with local conditions at the time.  
Interestingly, French companies including Suez have had a particularly 
conspicuous record with early termination: 22.64% of concessions 
involving French companies have failed (cancelled or distressed) as 
compared with 9.21% of non-French concessions. This may very well 
be because French concessionaires, with strong experience and a 
large international presence, are willing to take on more difficult PPPs 
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which are naturally more vulnerable to failure. The experiences in 
Jakarta and Manila suggest, however, the possibility that deals may be 
more apt to be terminated due to issues associated with cultural 
misalignment and rigidity. This corroborates Post’s findings in Latin 
America (2012), but the case of KL also demonstrates that a strong 
local partner with entrenched ties to the political system can enjoy an 
established network of relationships that may insulate the partner from 
scrutiny. 




Overall failure rate: 11.64% 
Treatment Control Rate delta Ratio of treatment failure rate to control failure rate  
Foreign partner 16.54% 7.88% 8.66% 2.10 
Multiple operators 20.24% 8.17% 12.07% 2.48 
Big Water 23.94% 7.69% 16.25% 3.11 
French partner 22.64% 9.21% 13.44% 2.46 
UK partner 0.00% 11.97% -11.97% 0.00 
Multilateral support 28.57% 10.33% 18.24% 2.77   
Nationally determined cultural differences aside, the corporate cultures 
of companies have made differences as well. This was first 
demonstrated by Wu and Malaluan (2008) in comparing Maynilad I and 
Manila Water, and also via primary research on TPJ, Aetra, and Palyja 
for this thesis. In its early years, Maynilad was too permissive of 
inefficient related party transactions that benefitted parent companies, 
whereas Manila Water cultivated a corporate culture based on honesty, 
customer service, and continuous improvement. Manila Water’s parent 
company, the Ayala Corporation, was also more oriented to market 
competition, given its experiences in the real estate, banking and 
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financial services, and manufacturing sectors, whereas Benpres’ core 
business was the heavily regulated, monopolistic power sector. In 
Jakarta, the transition to Aetra marked a shift in corporate culture for 
the East concession also, as the new Indonesian parent company, 
Acuatico (and its parent Recapital), was known for corporate 
rehabilitation. The company made major changes to the classification 
and utilization of Indonesian seconded employees that alleviated many 
of TPJ’s staff-related problems.  
The participation of multiple private sector partners is an interesting, 
but undecided factor. Statistics show much higher cancellation rates for 
projects involving multiple partners than those that do not (see 
Appendix 4). The Sigma model corroborates this, but also suggests 
that once multiple players are engaged and survive to the medium-
term, terminating a contract is difficult. This is demonstrated via the 
results that show positive significance to cancellation but also to 10-
year survival. The Kappa models add further uncertainty, as they show 
that inclusion of multiple private partners is positively significant for 5- 
and 10-year concessions survival but insignificant to cancellation 
overall.  
The influence of this factor, thus, is unresolved. But the Kuala Lumpur 
and Jakarta cases reveal one viable explanation: if projects survive the 
settling-in period, the participation of multiple companies precludes exit, 
as negotiating the financial terms of a workable termination becomes 
more difficult. There is a path dependency associated with growing 
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complexity in the supply chain (as in Kuala Lumpur) and the valuation 
of participants’ businesses upon the suggestion of termination (as in 
Jakarta), not to mention the loss of political legitimacy upon the 
admission of failure in experimentation with PSP. Thus, there is a 
tradeoff between the technological and local legitimacy benefits that 
come with engaging multiple private partners, and the imposition of 
greater barriers to exit, should the PPP no longer be desirable. 
As for the participation of a multilateral in PPP, the statistical analysis 
shows higher cancellation rates where development banks are 
financially supportive. This may be because the organizations get 
involved in lower-capacity municipalities more in need of assistance. 
Regression analysis supports this, as the financial involvement of a 
multilateral is positively significant to 10-year concession survival. The 
case studies, however, offer an alternative possibility: that an 
ideological commitment to privatization held by organizations including 
The World Bank and ADB in the 1990s tended to both promote 
adoption of PPP in troubled contexts and support its sustenance, as 
development organizations held a stake in demonstrating the success 
of PPP as an ideological project. 
Finally, the characteristics of the government agency in partnership are 
key. Regression analysis shows that more effective governments are 
likelier to see PPPs survive the early years and less likely to 
experience cancellation. But, government effectiveness can also 
problematize later-term survival – a result which can be explained via 
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all three cases. In Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta, low bureaucratic 
effectiveness (albeit of different kinds) has made efforts at re-
municipalization difficult, as the agencies formerly charged with 
supplying water have hemorrhaged their capacities to do so over years 
of non-practice. Further, agencies have not been able to provide 
convincing assessments (due to information problems and bureaucratic 
quality) to serve as evidence supporting proposals for re-
municipalization.  
In Jakarta, the local government was also overwhelmed in negotiations 
and contract management. PAM Jaya managers suggested that 
operators were able to “bully” the agency via legal tools (Interview, Sri 
Kaderi 2013). In Manila, conversely, MWSS successfully re-
municipalized the failing Maynilad I and rebid the concession to a more 
efficient, effective operator. They have also maintained an engaged, 
larger agency office that makes the possibility of re-municipalization a 
credible threat to operators.  
8.1.2 Rooted conditions: The institutional environment 
The cases assuredly demonstrate that complex networks of nested, 
persistent, and potentially conflicting rules sets and institutional 
conditions make all the difference in mediating participants’ pursuits of 
interests. Of particular importance are the influences of institutional 
endowments upon the goals of contract enforceability and stability of 
government interests. To the former, of clear relevance is the 
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protection of property rights, availability of information, and legal 
authority. And to the latter, the degree of political stability, which 
influences the stability of government-side interests and governance 
structures, matters. Corruption is interesting to both.  
With respect to property rights, the regression analyses confirm that 
property rights protection is significantly positive to survival – a notion 
corroborated by case study. Property rights are assessed as more 
secure (according to both Fraser Institute and Heritage Foundation 
data) in Malaysia and Philippines than in Indonesia, where the most 
contentious Jakarta operation is. But the case comparisons also show 
that property rights security can work in different ways to affect 
instrumental performance.  
In the Philippines, where property rights are stronger, security against 
government opportunism and general preservation of contract rights 
has resulted in fairly good performance outcomes for a better-designed 
contract. But Malaysia scores well also with respect to property rights, 
with much different results: there, the contracts are also wholly opaque, 
corrupt, and beneficial to a small group of elites. Thus, while property 
rights security bolsters survival, where it is coupled with a poorly 
designed contract and limited public exposure, it can exacerbate 
instrumental problems by shielding bad deals from public scrutiny. In 
Indonesia, where the legal structures are less protective, the 
companies have underinvested to deal with the risks of expropriation 
and have pursued bilateral negotiation over legal arbitration.  
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The cases also demonstrate the vital importance of legal authority over 
water supply and the legal structure of information. Legal authority over 
water is unclear and hotly contested in Kuala Lumpur, and information 
is hugely restricted under the Malaysian Official Secrets Act. This has 
made it nearly impossible for the Selangor government to access the 
information and authority it needs to actively regulate the concessions 
or justify and implement termination, respectively. Jakarta’s 
concessions are also subject to contestation over authority: whilst legal 
authority for water supply is not de jure national, the local government 
has been sidelined a number of times with respect to decisions over 
the implementation and management of PPP, particularly as the central 
government responded to supranational investment concerns. There, 
information problems have also insulated the deals from public 
scrutiny, exacerbating agency and regulator attempts to enforce the 
spirit of the contracts and shielding operators from the threats to 
corporate legitimacy that might have otherwise corrected imbalances. 
All three cases suggest that corruption affects PPP viability and 
performance, institutionally and instrumentally. Counter to common 
logic, the regressions show that higher levels of corruption promote 
survival, whereas lower levels are associated with cancellation. That 
said, the cases demonstrate that corruption has deleterious effects on 
instrumental performance. The Jakarta and Maynilad I experiences are 
corroborative, reflecting on problems of related party transactions that 
bled concessions during early years. And Selangor’s PSP story is 
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thoroughly tainted with allegations of corruption and cronyism at every 
level. Water shortages and major political backlash over the deals 
suggest that senior-most political officials supported poor-performing 
arrangements and stalled efforts to build effective regulation due to 
personal interests in the financial performance of project companies.  
Outside of institutional endowments, the broad ideational leanings of a 
polity related to the relative competence and legitimacy of government 
and business affects PPP lastingness. While there are no effects on 
early years, suggesting that early termination is not generally 
dependent on ideology, public confidence in business and government 
is significant to long-term lastingness and cancellation. Countries with 
low levels of confidence in business are less likely to see water PPPs 
last ten years and more likely to experience cancellation – the converse 
is true for confidence in government. This result supports the 
surprisingly lasting PPPs in Jakarta and KL: while the concessions 
have been widely decried in the media as costly and lacking with 
respected to performance gains, both countries also have low levels of 
confidence in their governments to deliver water any more effectively 
than the companies will.  
8.1.3 Strategies, outputs, and decisions 
The comparative cases studies also show the effects of shifting goals 
and interests, changed management processes, trust and reciprocity, 
and intra-period outcomes on the instrumental and institutional 
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performance of the projects under study. Indeed, these PPPs are living, 
constantly changing constructs, simultaneously made of and more than 
the individual actors and organizations comprising them. Institutional 
and instrumental outcomes depend not only on inputs (resources, 
capacities, interests, etc.) and architectures (rules and structures), but 
also on the ideas participants hold about each other, their responses to 
the wider political-economic system, management choices and 
strategies, feedback, and serendipity.  
Research on the early Manila concessions demonstrates that 
performance outcomes differed due to internal factors including 
operational and financial management and corporate oversight. The 
convergence of many management processes and practices between 
the two operators after the Maynilad re-bid to DMCI Consunji, which 
included process decentralization, a carefully cultivated corporate 
culture of teamwork and competitiveness, and internal processes that 
engendered continuous learning, supports this early finding. That 
internal dynamics matter is also evident in Jakarta in comparing Aetra 
and Palyja: whereas the latter indefatigably insisted on the French style 
of contract regulation, the former has shown openness to processes of 
mutual adjustment to deal with challenging local conditions and 
information problems.   
As Kydland and Scott quip, policy-making “is not a game against nature 
but, rather, a game against rational economic agents” (1977). The 
cases show that participants to the PPP certainly acted upon ideas 
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about partners’, competitors’, and enforcers’ future likely actions. They 
also demonstrate that “rational economic agents” do not always behave 
rationally or predictably, due to information problems, ideas, and 
uncertainty.  
In Jakarta and Manila, companies underinvested in order to protect 
themselves from the risk that government might renege on promised 
tariff increases (in both cases, they did). Further, the cases 
demonstrate that availability of information and enforceability of 
contracts is interactive with ideas about others’ future choices, as is the 
history of relations. Where imperative credibility is stronger due to the 
rules in place, supportive institutional endowments, and availability and 
quality of information needed to enforce commitments, participants are 
less likely to expect defection and act accordingly. And where 
relationships have been contentious, the baseline is one of non-
cooperation. The latter point is clear in Jakarta between PAM Jaya and 
Palyja. Corporate culture aside, there is clear path dependence with 
respect to the devolution of relationships. Jakarta and Manila both 
show that reparation of poor relationships is difficult, particularly where 
cultural differences abound, without major changes in ownership or 
structure. 
A final issue related to strategy supported by the cases is that of 
legitimacy. One factor that has not received enough attention is the 
quality and degree of operator and agency outreach to the consumer 
public. In Manila, the most clearly successful PSP, the companies, RO, 
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and MWSS have all expanded public outreach activities, using social 
media, road shows, and targeted reports to communicate the gains of 
PSP. The RO has also engaged the public in evaluation via the Public 
Assessment of Water Services program, building public legitimation of 
PPP. Conversely, a skeptical public and media in Jakarta and Kuala 
Lumpur feeds on the secrecy surrounding the contracts and rebasings, 
decreasing public confidence in both government and companies.  
8.1.4 Context dynamics 
Excepting the incidence of economic shock and political stability, the 
context dynamics – conditions that change quickly and irrespective of 
the interests and machinations of PPP participants – are largely the 
domain of the comparative case study. The statistical analysis 
demonstrates that the occurrence of a financial crisis following project 
commencement is the most consistently significant factor that 
influences water PPP cancellation, with stronger impacts on 
concessions than on projects in general. The cases of Manila and 
Jakarta show why this is so: adjusting to the huge currency and 
demand effects of a major crisis is difficult, especially without parent 
company financial resilience and an authoritative, legitimate, and 
technically capable regulator available to broker adjustments that both 
preserve the performance and efficiency-inducing components of the 
contracts and facilitate adjustments that allow its financial survival. 
Whilst only Maynilad I was terminated, all of the concessions affected 
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by the Asian Financial Crisis saw huge reductions in performance 
targets and unplanned tariff increases. 
The effects of political stability are similarly evident in both quantitative 
and qualitative analysis, but with counterintuitive effects. The 
regression results for political stability are robust and consistent for 10-
year survival, indicating a surprising negative influence of higher 
stability on survival and positive influence on cancellation. The cases 
partly triangulate this result. In Malaysia, (the most politically stable 
country according to World Governance Indicators), the concessions 
were distressed. This partly supports the quantitative analysis, as the 
contracts were not yet terminated at the time of writing. But it also 
stands in partial contrast, as the inception of distress was brought 
about by the sea change in Malaysian politics associated with the 2008 
election of an Opposition local government. Nevertheless, the 
subsequent tumult did, indeed, interfere with the facilitation of a 
workable buy-out plan. Political infighting and local-national political 
conflict complicated the process of organizing a cancellation. 
Furthermore, the national UMNO party behind privatization, had 
interests to preserve the projects, which were, if anything, amplified by 
political opposition as the party dug its heels into status quo policy and 
crafted a narrative suggesting that PSP had saved Selangor water. In 
Jakarta, too, project termination was complicated by politics. While the 
local government came to oppose the deals, conflict between local and 
national and international interests precluded cancellation.  
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A rectification of these results is that political instability can promote 
project sustenance where governments are too unstable to either 
negotiate a termination, or are too busy with more pressing political 
problems to take on water service. Where the deals are corrupt or 
unproductive, however, political change can be the catalyst for distress. 
The case studies revealed the effects of alignment and conflict 
regarding goals and interests of politicians, agencies, and regulators at 
multiple levels of government. In all three case cities, PSP was 
bolstered by support at the highest levels, albeit for different reasons. 
In Selangor, national politicians directly benefited from the deals; in 
Jakarta, the national government responded to diplomatic pressures 
from the French and concerns about Indonesia’s investment climate; in 
Manila, the participation of political family dynasties closely married the 
success of PPPs with high-level political support and national economic 
health. Support from the highest government levels, particularly for 
services in capital economic centers, has been critical.  
Interestingly, however, efforts at nationalizing regulation were largely 
unsuccessful. In Indonesia, the Water Resource Council failed to gain 
traction; in the Philippines, the National Water Regulatory Commission 
was blocked legislatively, and Malaysia’s national regulator, SPAN, has 
been locked out of Selangor water management. This suggests that 
once a regulatory apparatus is in place, it is difficult to change, 
especially with opposition from corporate lobbies. Political support 
wavers, but policy choices are sticky. 
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8.1.5 Project rules: Sticky policy choices  
While categorized along with participant capacities as a variable class 
both under the control of project participants and slow to change, the 
rules in use are the most important factor maintaining imperative 
credibility of commitments. They also comprise the policy choices that 
require continuous adjustment and responsiveness over the duration of 
the PPP. Depending on information conditions, the institutional 
environment, and participant resources, project rules may be more or 
less impactful. While a “good” contract may still yield poor results, a 
poorly constructed one surely will. 
The descriptive statistics show that concessions are cancelled more so 
than projects in general, and they represent an overwhelming 
proportion of cancelled investments. The Sigma regressions show, 
however, that the selection of a concession form is not, by itself, 
significant to cancellation, holding other factors constant. That said, the 
effects of some factors on cancellation are either particularly 
pronounced when applied to concessions, or significant only for 
concessions. Economic shock and government effectiveness are far 
more consistently and strongly impactful on survival and cancellation of 
concessions than on projects in general. Similarly, direct negotiation is 
much more strongly associated with early cancellation of concessions 
than project over all. Some factors, like government effectiveness and 
political stability, are only significant to the cancellation of concessions. 
Likewise, the legal structure of property rights is significant to 
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concession survival to ten years but insignificant for projects in general. 
These results demonstrate that, while the concession form does not 
necessarily cause cancellation, its application in certain institutional 
environments increases the likelihood of failure. 
As for the rules associated with selection, the regressions demonstrate 
that direct negotiation (as opposed to competitive tender) is positively 
significant to cancellation and negatively significant to survival. While 
this holds, on average, the cases show that direct negotiation does not 
necessarily beget cancellation, especially in the short term: indeed, 
Selangor’s and Jakarta’s projects persisted. But they also both suffered 
poor instrumental and political performance, bringing about distress 
and looming cancellation. 
In addition to general effects of contract form and award method, the 
case studies demonstrate four major problems with contract design: 
definitional and measurement ambiguity, significant incompleteness, ill-
conceived incentives with unintended results, and rigidity. To the first 
issue, Jakarta best demonstrates the huge problems that can result 
from contract ambiguity. Competing definitions of targets and 
assumptions used in estimating performance created opportunities for 
conflict time after time, as operators and PAM Jaya reported very 
different performance gains. In Manila, too, the early-term ADR issue 
caused huge problems for the nascent regulator, which nearly allowed 
a larger tariff increase to slide by. Also in Jakarta, contracts were 
grossly incomplete with respect to details including frequency of 
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monitoring and penalty imposition, processes of conflict resolution, 
participant responsibilities, and even performance standards. These 
major oversights only provided opportunities for the companies to 
leverage their superior legal resources to gain favorable resolutions. In 
Kuala Lumpur, it is not known if standards, definitions, or targets were 
specified at all: thus, there was no possibility of legitimizing the 
transition of a profitable public utility into the complex PSP arrangement 
it became.  
Jakarta is also the best demonstration of poorly designed incentives 
yielding unfavorable outcomes. The dual tariff instrument, initially 
conceived to incentivize equal attention to poorer and richer consumer 
segments alike, has proved counterproductive. Once the government 
began accruing mounting deficits, the government was forced to 
promote “balanced expansion”, which discouraged extension into 
poorer neighborhoods, in order to bring overall revenues closer to the 
water charge owed.   
Finally, the contracts have exhibited rigidities that have privileged the 
letter of the agreements over their intentions and hindered adjustments 
that might have been acceptable to both operator and agency. While 
important to maintaining the imperative credibility of commitments, this 
thesis argues that the inclusion of principles guiding the selection of 
PPP, and transparency regarding these principles and the contracts 
themselves can allow for some healthy leeway with respect to contract 
terms, particularly where the value of social legitimacy outweighs the 
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value of adherence to a particular (and potentially ambiguous) contract 
component. This is also particularly important in developing regions, 
where huge information problems make the assumptions upon which 
contracts are based largely uncertain.  
In Jakarta, Palyja has demanded a very strict application of the 
contract, even where it proved entirely untenable, financially, 
technically, and politically. This only exacerbated the deteriorating 
relationship with PAM Jaya and the company’s public legitimacy. The 
lack of transparency, however, allowed parties to spin resultant 
conflicts, which in turn destroyed the legitimacy of PSP overall and 
hindered adjustment of contracts to be more broadly acceptable. 
Manila’s MWSS, on the other hand, adjusted agreements with each 
rebasing and arbitration to create increasingly specific and workable 
arrangements. Aetra, over time, may also accomplish this also, though 
at the time of writing, the Master Agreement was too new to make more 
than an educated guess about its responsiveness and effectiveness. 
While neither case was perfect, Manila benefitted from the assistance 
of a credible regulator and full transparency to counter risks of 
adjustment, and Aetra benefitted from growing norms of cooperation 
between the company and PAM Jaya, born of individual managers’ 
efforts and a shared competitor: Palyja.   
The last component of this variable collection is regulation: it is of such 
importance, however, that it warrants section of its own in relation to 
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the maintenance of credible commitments and adjustment to external 
shocks and changing interests. 
8.2 Credibility and adjustment: Interests, rules, and 
information  
The credibility of any commitment made by a party to a PPP is 
determined by motivational and imperative components and the course 
of event over time. Ensuring the credibility of the set of multiple 
commitments requires one or a combination of two conditions: the 
alignment of mutual interests throughout the duration of the 
commitment, or coercion. The fundamentally disparate motives of the 
private and public sectors necessitate the latter, via contract, law, 
regulation, and supportive organizations and capacities. 
We can see through the cases that the contract design, regulatory 
settings and structure, and rules at higher institutional levels determine 
enforceability, capacity to impose penalties for non-compliance, access 
to reliable information, modes of conflict resolution, and ultimately, the 
incentives facing partners to deliver on promises. The set of principal-
agent problems inherent to PPP may be dealt with via specified, 
enforceable contracts with measurable outputs and credible 
punishments. But creating such contracts (much less enforcing them) 
requires high degrees of technical skill and predictability within the 
operating context, and both are rare in developing regions. It is 
especially difficult to craft effective and administratively and politically 
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feasible discretionary regulation systems in regions characterized by 
low bureaucratic capacity, conflicting law, limited information, unstable 
politics, and corruption.  
Nevertheless, for developing region LTICs, the set of rules that defines 
the water regulatory space is key to striking the delicate balance 
between imperative credibility and responsiveness to political and 
economic shifts and new information. Certainly, the cases demonstrate 
that pure contract-based regulation is also problematic in developing 
region cities. Crafting the best structure possible within the limits of 
political, financial, and administrative feasibility (which will undoubtedly 
diverge from a regulatory ideal) is difficult, for several reasons. For one, 
we have limited examples of success to work from. Further, it is 
unlikely that they would be transferrable, given dependence on the 
fitness of the structure to the political economy in which it is applied. 
The knowledge needed to create working regulatory systems combines 
technical know-how, practice, and emergent local knowledge.  
The cases also show us that sensibly designed regulatory structures 
are only part of ensuring the credibility of commitment. The regulators’ 
relative power to other stakeholders, the particular interests and 
resources of stakeholders, the degree of permeability, and the quality 
of the agreement they are meant to enforce affects to what extent, if 
any, they can ensure imperative commitment. Further, commitment to 
an agreement has a motivational aspect that can either support or 
detract from the regulatory enterprise. 
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Generally, the regulator must be able to constrain both private-sector 
opportunism and government discretion in order to ensure that the 
operator delivers the outcomes PSP was intended to serve. Crafting a 
regulatory apparatus that is both reflexive and enforceable is no easy 
feat, however, due to the contractual, institutional, and capacity 
problems discussed. Nevertheless, we look to what this research tells 
us about securing motivational and imperative credibility. 
8.2.1 Motivational credibility: Interests and alignment 
The cases demonstrate the power of interests and their alignment, 
which in turn determines the motivational credibility. They also show us 
that consistent misalignment can potentially derail otherwise well 
designed plans, particularly when one partner has superior resources. 
Conversely, a pattern of general or loose alignment can partially 
compensate for weak regulatory systems (to both beneficial and 
harmful ends, depending on the particular interests at hand and 
corruption). The Palyja case demonstrates the first, whereas Manila 
Water (positively) and Selangor (negatively) demonstrate the latter. 
More specifically, the allocation of power and alignment of the most 
powerful actors’ goals (as opposed to the rules in place) are important 
factors determining institutional sustainability, though rules and 
institutional endowments can mitigate negative effects of misalignment 
or detrimental alignment. On the other hand, the rules in use and the 
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quality of the contract and regulatory system appear more important to 
instrumental performance.  
Low motivational credibility can frustrate commitment with high 
imperative credibility, and will almost surely overpower coercive 
mechanisms where imperative credibility is tenuous, as evidenced in 
Jakarta. Further, parties’ interests are constantly shifting as material 
and political conditions change, competing obligations intensify or 
disappear, or as they become intertwined, mutated, and made unclear 
in the face of corruption. Thus, alignment depends either on good 
fortune, or on rules and processes that facilitate learning, mutual 
adjustment, and recalibration of participant goals.  
In Manila, the implementation of an ongoing KPI and BEM system, 
whilst not punitive, has allowed for a constant dialogue about operator 
and government priorities for PPP: it has created a learning culture 
amenable to adaptation. In Jakarta, on the other hand, the 
concessionaires and agency communicate infrequently and often 
through legal middlemen. The pattern of distrust and frustration that 
has emerged has precluded any hope of goal alignment in the absence 
of a major structural, management, or ownership shift. 
Political and financial power are key, often over and above the rules at 
hand, to understanding performance outcomes and the sustenance or 
distress of PPP arrangements, particularly where institutional 
endowments are weak and democratization strong. For example, 
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despite the total lack of a regulatory apparatus, the mutual interests of 
a group of intertwined political and economic elites has preserved the 
stability of the Selangor deals, but has done nothing to promote better 
performance. On the other hand, in Jakarta, where attempts were 
made to strengthen the regulatory office, both the operators and 
agency have intervened to preserve the status quo.  
Finally, it is nearly impossible to negotiate the tenuous balance 
between commitment and adjustment when one player does not want 
to participate in the game or its rule setting. In Jakarta, PSP was forced 
upon an unwilling agency, whose staff and management remained 
fairly unchanged in the years following and who harbored opposition to 
the arrangement. Seconded PAM Jaya employees who were put in 
operational and management roles with the concessionaires were 
neither engaged nor motivated to support PPP, harming operator 
productivity. While this was partially repaired in Aetra, it is a persisting 
problem with Palyja. Neither the company nor PAM Jaya has been able 
to create mutually beneficial solutions to their longstanding problems.  
In Manila, on the other hand, MWSS was centrally engaged in the 
selection and oversight of PPP. Further, the companies and operators 
shared mutual (albeit unequal) interests in improving water coverage, 
quality, and efficiency: the company’s other real estate development 
interests made improved water service a priority, as did interests in 
expanding business to other local and international markets. Further, 
Manila Water and Maynilad II benefited from seconded employees who 
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were more engaged and integrated into their new organizations than 
were seconded employees in Jakarta. 
8.2.2 Imperative credibility: design, regulation, and oversight 
Central to the maintenance of imperative credibility is the contract itself 
and the system of supportive regulation, which in Manila and Jakarta 
(as in many developing regions), is both contract-based and 
discretionary. Both cases demonstrate the difficulties, however, in 
creating a hybrid system that is considered fair and acceptable by 
companies, the government, and the public over the long-term. A look 
at both regression analysis and the cases also demonstrates how 
regulation and the quality of regulation affects PPPs, and particularly 
concessions, differently in the early and later phases.  
The regression analysis suggested that strong regulatory capacity may 
promote early cancellation of PPPs, but is positively significant to 
median-term survival. Again, the construct validity of the Quality of 
Regulation indicator itself is cause enough for tentative interpretation, 
but the Manila case demonstrates why this pattern may hold, as it 
supports the proposal that the overall degree of governmental capacity 
for developing coherent regulation and effectively applying regulatory 
tools can evict inefficient operators early on, whereas the public 
legitimacy needs associated with long-term survival requires that 
operators be held to task.  
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In Manila, the young MWSS-RO established itself as a force to be 
reckoned with, denying Maynilad the allowances it needed to survive 
the financial crisis and the company’s own strategic missteps and 
inefficiencies. Early-term regulatory stringency, where overdone, may 
preclude early adjustments that could otherwise yield workable 
concessions. But with MWSS-RO, we see that it can be a way to 
establish a legitimate, respected regulator that is able to enforce 
contracts over the long term. Further, the legitimacy gains associated 
with the RO’s early decisions allowed the organization to practice 
discretionary regulation in later years that adjusted contract terms, 
standards, and modes of enforcement to better serve the PPP over the 
long term.  
In contrast, Jakarta’s RB never had the opportunity to make early 
legitimacy gains: it was only assembled five years into the 
concessions, well after PAM Jaya and the operators had established 
patterns of negotiation and interaction. Further, with low technical 
capacity, the RB was able to do little more than encourage parties to 
“meet in the middle” of their relative positions.  
The regression analysis and cases suggest that there exist tradeoffs 
between enforcing contract terms and allowing adjustments necessary 
to creating long-term working relationships, especially as new 
information becomes available. But to allow room for publicly-
acceptable discretionary regulation, a regulator’s credibility must first 
be tested and confirmed through an event wherein the regulator proves 
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capability and willingness to effectively and fairly assess operator and 
granting agency commitments and performance, and make rulings 
judged legitimate by the citizenry. 
The regressions and cases also demonstrate that, as projects mature, 
capable regulators promote survival by keeping parties accountable to 
commitments and balancing interests over time: as long as 
performance remains within some threshold of public and agency 
acceptability, as long as earnings are sufficient, and as long as the 
PPP retains legitimacy, the PPP can remain healthful. The cases also 
demonstrate, however, how the availability of reliable information 
affects public acceptability: in KL, where virtually nothing about the 
deals is public, the PPPs are distressed, despite nearly 100% service 
coverage. While there is a dearth of information available to prove PPP 
performance failure, there is also a dearth of information available to 
judge success. Coupled with media coverage of neighborhood water 
service stoppages, allegations of high-level corruption, and the steady 
national subsidization of a financially distressed SYABAS, the PPP’s 
viability became seriously compromised. To a lesser but similar degree, 
the dearth of verifiable information and disparities in PAM Jaya and 
operator performance data is a source of public ire in Jakarta. In 
contrast, however, Manila’s data is audited and regularly updated, and 
assessment of service performance directly engages consumers.  
Further, cases show us that the French model of long-term regulation 
by contract is unworkable in areas where government technical and 
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planning capacity is low, information problems abound, and the judicial 
system is weak. In these contexts, due to information deficiencies at 
the planning and contracting stages and political and administrative flux 
over the contract duration, contracts will inevitably be incomplete. As 
such, participants must plan for sensible systems of discretionary 
regulation from the start and prepare regulators to manage the 
associated technical, political, and administrative demands up front.  
Poor preparation and training, high turnover, and a clear lack of 
authority and capacity has led to the marginalization of the JWSRB in 
Jakarta. If a monopoly operator can circumvent an unpredictable 
regulator, they likely will. Further, if rules do not force accountability and 
afford legitimate authority, the value of the regulator depends solely on 
the political connections and coincidental influence of the particular 
regulatory roster at any given time. This is a hugely unstable situation 
that encourages both agency and operator to venue seek for conflict 
resolution.  
In contrast to Jakarta’s small, regularly changing, and term-delinked 
regulatory office, the Manila RO has developed an institutional memory 
and wisdom, coded into procedure and practice, which has garnered 
both public and operator regard. There, the utilization of reputable 
consultants in the early years and commitment to eventually 
internalizing technical regulation has yielded an RO with emergent 
professionalization and credibility. In spite of restrictions on authority, 
transparency, a learning culture, and public engagement have allowed 
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the organization to develop an effective and accepted hybrid regulatory 
model and assume an important role in facilitating adjustment.  
The clearest outcome of comparative case study is the positive 
influence of information and transparency to instrumental and 
institutional performance. The provision of accurate, reliable 
information relies on three factors: capacity to accurately measure and 
verify information related to investment and performance, agreed and 
clear definitions, and rules that mandate provision of information. In 
Jakarta, performance definitions are ill specified and information is both 
sporadically available and unverified. Participants have taken 
advantage of these problems to spin definitions to serve their own 
interests. Further, project documents and regulatory decisions are 
proprietary.  
In Manila, where similar problems (e.g., ADR) were evident in the 
beginning, the clarification of definitions and specified goals has been 
prioritized at every adjustment node with support from third-party 
facilitators, and rulings, rationales, and documents have been 
consistently available to the public. In Kuala Lumpur, in contrast, it is 
unclear what definitions and targets are in use at all or who is 
overseeing their attainment, as the local government party to the 
contract and national regulator are both excluded from oversight, and 
all project information is restricted under the Official Secrets Act. What 
all cases demonstrate is that the reliability and transparency of 
information affords the regulator the power of legitimacy – a resource 
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needed in democratic polities when the inevitability of regulatory 
discretion comes into play. 
Finally, the application of a multiple commitment framework 
demonstrates that the commitment problems inherent to water PPP, 
and policy partnerships in general, are more than the sum of individual 
participants’ slipped commitments: they are exacerbatory and 
exponential in nature. In each case, participants hold multiple sets of 
competing commitments, which change in relative intensity over time 
and affect the likelihood of future cooperation sorely needed, especially 
during adjustment. Further, once the credibility of commitment wavers 
and detrimental dynamic inconsistencies begin, they are difficult to put 
a stop to, especially where regulation is compromised. 
8.2.3 Adjustment and learning in PPP sustainability 
Discretion is required to deal with new information, major operating 
context shocks, and conflict. Its facilitation hinges on the quality of 
information, assessment, learning, and (perhaps most 
underappreciated) normative values and principles including equity and 
justice that serve as a meta-framework for extra-contractual decision-
making. Multiple commitment problems may result from partnerships 
“outgrowing” contracts or failing to adjust to changes that make major 
alteration or even termination preferable to the status quo.  
Jakarta and KL stand in stark contrast to Manila with respect to 
learning and adjustment. In KL, a total lack of information and the 
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limiting of participants in evaluation to a small circle (many of whom 
directly benefited from the lucrative contracts) made learning, outside 
of that related to profit maximization. The only hope for adjusting the 
contracts to meet social goals of equity, justice, and financial prudence, 
lay in exposing contract terms, performance records, and earnings to 
the light of public scrutiny. This would depend on legal changes that 
would likely only occur with a major political shift breaking UMNO’s 
longstanding hold on Malaysian politics and government service or a 
powerful movement focused on freedom of information. 
In Jakarta, clear problems resulted from the partnerships’ low 
adjustment capacities. Because the agreements were insufficiently 
corrected over time, the relationships between frustrated parties 
devolved into unproductive, contentious stasis with minimal 
improvements to service. The dual tariff instrument unexpectedly led to 
huge deficits and weak incentives for the private sector to make 
performance improvements, as the government’s ability to pay became 
increasingly uncertain. Thus, players shifted into defensive modes: 
PAM Jaya relaxed targets in return for deficit concessions, and 
operators restricted capital expenditures on network expansion and 
NRW.  
Rather than finding an amenable middle ground, operators’ (Palyja and 
TPJ) insistence on maintaining a contract that was no longer politically 
or financially feasible shortened the potential contract term and limited 
the possibility of expansion into adjacent markets. On the other hand, 
 368 
the government lost its capacity to negotiate adjustment, as the 
probability of re-municipalization was tenuous, at best, due to the 
immediate costs of termination and lost capacity to deliver water over 
time. Exacerbating these problems, cultural issues, legal bullying, and 
unproductive negotiations frustrated relationships into patterns of 
distrust and non-cooperation. The experience suggests that 
adjustments are nearly impossible when parties start at odds or when 
the arbiter’s capacity is low and power is limited or altogether 
avoidable, even with fairly well thought-out arbitration plans. In Jakarta, 
three problems clearly undermined the possibility of effective 
discretionary regulation: the regulator’s lack of authority, low technical 
capacity, and huge information problems.  
Manila, on the other hand, whilst not perfect, was able to evict an 
inefficient operator, offer concessions to both sides in order to deal with 
the Financial Crisis, and resolve ambiguities over time. Their capacity 
for adjustment depended on increasing RO professionalization, the 
redundancy of appeals, and transparency. This last point is key: 
governments are not the only entities that require socially legitimacy. 
The shifting corporate citizenship landscape and investors’ 
expectations of social responsibility are tools available to developing 
region governments to combat regulatory shortcomings. In Manila, the 
companies’ performance is tied to the reputations of its parent firms, 
which, in turn, are controlled by major family political dynasties. Thus, 
the companies’ performance with respect to efficiency, fairness, and 
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service to the poor is subject to the additional support of public 
pressure. 
Finally, the cases demonstrate that barriers to exit and sound exit plans 
are important: the latter may be needed when adjustment is impossible 
or where agreements become altogether untenable. Workable exit 
strategies also serve as credibility-enhancing tools for contracts. 
Completely removing the threat of termination, especially where the 
imposition of penalties is weak due to poor information conditions, a 
weak judiciary, and low capacity, is eliminating the last line of defense. 
Returning to the notions of exit and voice, Hirschman proposes that 
individuals within organizations (firms, governments, societies, etc.) 
who perceive a decrease in value of their membership may either 
withdraw (exit) or address problems via suggestion or complaint 
(voice). If voice is inhibited due to the problems described above, and 
so too is the possibility of exit, governments have no power to secure 
firm commitment.  
This is apparent in Jakarta and KL, where government capacity to 
provide water service atrophied: the agencies were too out of practice 
to make termination a viable alternative, giving companies the upper 
hand in negotiations over purchase prices for proposed re-
municipalization. While Manila’s situation is far more healthful, it is not 
impervious. In 2005, 70% of shares in Manila Water’s IPO were 
purchased by foreign shareholders, making any consideration of future 
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renationalization complicated (not to mention weakening the local 
public interests Manila Water is serving). 
In the cases of instrumental and systemic failure (i.e., Selangor and 
Palyja), the local agency and the public it serves had neither the 
options of exit nor voice. This is not to say that a clear path of exit 
should be prioritized above other controls: clearly, too free a pathway 
could undermine the credibility of government commitment. A company 
must be sufficiently certain that the government will not walk away 
without sizable penalty: otherwise, the hold-up of sunk investments 
would preclude investment and participation altogether. 
8.3 Configurative effects on performance 
The configurative effects of variable classes on instrumental and 
institutional success demonstrate that there are many pathways to 
failure, but that a few combinations are particularly detrimental, 
especially for developing region concessions. In the following table, I 
summarize the water supply cases according to credibility of 
commitments and adjustment capacities; the lower-level combinations 
of rooted conditions, participant profiles, rules, context dynamics, and 
strategies; and institutional and instrumental performance outcomes.   
In these cases, we can see that low adaptive capacity and weak 
motivational and imperative credibility of commitment leads to at least 
institutional or instrumental failure, if not both, and that systemic 
success appears to depend on both adaptability and strong 
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commitment. The comparative case results are subject, however, to the 
threat of external validity, as not all combinations of adaptability and 
credibility are exhaustively compared.  Future research on additional 
cases wherein credibility is high and adaptability low (and vice versa) 
will shed more light on what happens in PPP systems where 
performance related to assuring credibility and adaptability is mixed. 
Nevertheless, the comparative cases suggest a few courses towards 
institutional and instrumental failure and also lend insight into the 
relationships between the components of the framework applied. 
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Selangor’s long-stable, but corrupt and opaque set of PPPs was 
institutionally secure until the 2008 election rankled the established 
power structure. Until then, the contracts were stable and relationally 
successful, albeit with unknown instrumental performance and 
allegedly low financial performance (e.g., excessively high tariffs, 
inflated costs). The major catalyst for the breakdown was external 
political shock, which in turn brought about political accountability for 
water tariffs that had, until then, been almost completely absent. While 
the distribution system was operating at a loss, lingering political 
support from the national government meant that national finances 
could be used to prop up the deals, and the total lack of regulation 
meant that the operators could carry on without any semblance of 
public accountability. At the time of writing, the only two struts 
tenuously propping up the distressed concessions were the federal 
government’s financial support and tight secrecy. 
In Manila, in contrast, the two concessions demonstrate that intra-
organizational dynamics, management capacities, competitiveness, 
and financial and strategic latitude can make all the difference in the 
case of an external shock. Further, the cases demonstrate the 
importance of good information and the early-term embedding of a 
learning-oriented, technically legitimate regulator. Comparison of 
Maynilad I and II shows that information and capacity can determine 
systemic failure and success, whereas the comparison of Maynilad I 
and Manila Water shows the difference made by competitive 
 375 
orientation and financial latitude. A company without a healthy amount 
of cash flow is a major risk during the early years of a concession due 
to inevitable uncertainties and potential shifts that require liquidity and 
operating cash flow to cover unexpected early losses due to 
forecasting problems. The selection of an operator should not rely 
solely on lowest bid; technical expertise, borrowing capacity, and 
competitive orientation should be similarly prioritized. 
The comparison of Manila, in general, with Jakarta is also revelatory. 
Unlike Manila, Jakarta’s concessions, targets, and the details of 
regulatory decisions are almost entirely private, property rights are 
insecure, and bureaucratic capacity for regulation and contract 
management is low. While both cities were significantly stressed by the 
Asian Financial Crisis, Manila was able to salvage privatization, 
whereas Jakarta reached only a low-level equilibrium. The different 
responses to major external shocks were hinged on three major system 
differences: the degree of inter-governmental alignment, regulatory 
capacity and legitimacy, and the availability and transparency of 
reliable information. Manila’s unified national-local strategy, improving 
regulator, and consistent transparency all played a part in the salvation 
of the PSP experiment, where the converse was true in Jakarta. 
Jakarta also shows us that initial bid rates can be difficult to correct 
without sufficient information, public scrutiny, and capacity for technical 
assessment. While Palyja was underpaid for years, the fees that were 
paid from escrow were sufficient to warrant staying put, and the 
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company remained profitable. The regulator, with low technical 
capacity, no verifiable operational data, and insufficient power to offset 
national- and international- contravening interests, was entirely 
incapacitated with respect to either demanding that performance 
improvements match tariff inputs or reducing tariffs to meet more 
reasonable guarantees of profitability.  
The localization of Aetra after TPJ’s exit, however, brought about this 
very change: the company agreed to a new Master Agreement with a 
lower base charge and amended targets. Whilst it remains to be seen 
whether the company will meet targets at the new charge or simply 
renegotiate, the cultural shift from foreign to local marked a major turn 
in adjustment capacity. The case demonstrates that good privatized 
service may be possible in Jakarta, even with a compromised 
regulatory system, with contravening factors. In Aetra’s case, the factor 
partly neutralizing negative effects of regulatory non-independence and 
low capacity is a growing norm of alignment and reciprocity, nourished 
by the sharing of a competitor and foreign antagonist, Palyja.  
Further, the major ownership changes in Maynilad and TPJ / Aetra 
suggest that the old business adage is true: that if you cannot change 
people, then you must change people. In other words, the only 
recourse for an overly rigid, low-performing, and unresponsive 
company is the selection of an altogether different company. Finally, 
the Jakarta and Selangor cases demonstrate that once the PSP 
decision is made, government bargaining power without a strong, 
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independent regular is minimal. Governments can neither afford 
termination fees nor easily manage utilities after having been out of 
practice with operational aspects of water service over time.  
Considering these summative case comparisons and the synthesized 
analysis, we can see that there are few generalizable conditions that 
lead definitively to instrumental and institutional outcomes. Rather, the 
effects on outcomes are configurative. We can, however, propose 
some hypothesized linkages between framework components and 
several principles that may broadly guide design and implementation to 
solve the commitment and information problems that abound. 
Ex ante, the rules set by law, organization, and contract, determine 
both ex post commitment and adaptability. The quality of definitions 
and the structuring of incentives and accountability determine 
commitment to PPP policy goals, whereas the quality of procedural, 
information, and arbitration rules determines ex post adaptability. 
Furthermore, the strategies and outputs of participants and regulatory 
settings affect commitment and adaptability ex post. The rooted 
conditions and context dynamics, on the other hand, are conditions that 
must be designed for, ex ante, and adapted to, ex post. 
The issue of imperative commitment is largely determined by rules and 
capacities, whereas motivational commitment is determined by the 
profiles of participants and their goal alignment, as well as by strategies 
and context dynamics. Adaptability, on the other hand, is necessitated 
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by context dynamics and determined by procedural rules and 
participants’ strategies and rule changes.  
Figure 15. Relationships between framework components 
 
This framework, the relationships between its components, and the 
lessons drawn from empirics suggest that unknowns in project design 
should be privileged as much as known conditions. Indeed, information 
is the key difference between success and failure in otherwise similar 
situations of major external flux (e.g., Manila and Jakarta). The process 
of adjusting to new information and gathering information continuously 
should be privileged as much as the enforcement of agreements. As 
such, the regulatory agency and PPP partners must be oriented to 




































learning-oriented processes and the selection of partners who can work 
together both culturally and procedurally.  
The results of this study demonstrate that water PPPs are not 
necessarily a failed experiment, but that performance depends on the 
qualities of inputs, commitments, and designed responsiveness. 
Further, the research demonstrates that assessment of PPP 
performance must be considered along institutional and instrumental 
dimensions, and that the attainment of systemic success depends on 
the quality of the plan, capacities to deliver, credibility of commitments, 
and flexibility. In turn, the analysis suggests linkages between 
commitment, adaptation, and capacity with variables under the control 
of decision-makers, which are important policy levers; and variables out 
of the control of decision-makers, which must be adapted to over time. 
8.4 Research contributions: Practice and theory 
This final discussion leads to the summation of the major contributions 
this thesis makes to the empirical record on PPPs, practical insights on 
their successful implementation, and theory on failure and institutional 
fitness. Of the enumerated contributions to follow, four stand out most 
prominently. First, the thesis demonstrates the fallacy of conflating PPP 
termination with PPP failure. In some cases, PPPs fail to fail: 
cancellations that would be preferable to some low-performing or 
economically or politically untenable status quo are restricted. 
Secondly, the research demonstrates that corruption, political 
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instability, and low bureaucratic capacity can, counter-intuitively, 
sustain PPPs, typically with low instrumental performance. Thirdly, the 
research shows that a view of PPP as a multiple commitment problem 
is a critical design input. Systems designed with one-directional 
commitment problems in mind are likely to miss major dynamic effects 
of multi-directional principle-agent relationships and their related 
commitment problems. Finally, the thesis demonstrates the usefulness 
of designing, implement, adjusting, and evaluating PPP within the 
proposed framework, which demands a consistent balance between 
preserving adjustment capacity and credible commitment.    
To the first set of empirical contributions, the thesis provides one of the 
only extensive case studies of Kuala Lumpur’s set of water PPPs and 
builds upon existing academic coverage of the Jakarta and Manila 
cases to offer a more current and expanded account of the dynamics 
characterizing them. Further, the thesis offers the only large-N analysis 
linking water PPP termination to institutional settings and project rules. 
The research demonstrates that PPP survival is particularly contentious 
in early years. A contract’s nascent phase is characterized by relational 
settling-in, accumulation of new information, trial and error, and steep 
learning. Thus, the style of regulation during that period should likely be 
different than in the median- and long-term, especially where there are 
information problems. Over time, as new and better information is 
accumulated, and as contractual ambiguities are rectified, regulators 
should be able to apply more rigid contract oversight, with adjustments 
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limited to those needed to deal with external material, economic, and 
legal changes affecting operations and financial viability. 
The cases suggest that perhaps the timing is often wrong, however, 
and that regulatory systems are not responsive enough in early years 
to rapid accumulation of new information. Jakarta demonstrates the 
perils of introducing a regulator late in the game and well into the 
settling-in period. And the Maynilad story shows that, while there are 
legitimacy gains associated with strong regulation in early years, these 
must be considered against the threat of early termination, should the 
system be incapable of bearing strict contract application. This is 
particularly true where information is limited or of low reliability.  
The two cases that have designed hybrid systems of contract and 
discretionary regulation (Jakarta and Manila) both demonstrate the 
tenuous assumptions used in bids and forecasting for cities with 
incomplete information about their water network’s conditions, 
customer base, costs of inputs, etc. For this reason (and a pattern in 
developing regions worldwide), the early renegotiation of concessions 
should, by now, be expected. But early renegotiation still surprises and 
disappoints stakeholders, revealing that what should be expected is 
not. Companies and governments operating in developing regions are 
too steadfastly holding on to the French model of contract regulation 
when the conditions that underpin it rarely hold. 
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An alternative mode of employing PPP in water utilities might employ a 
phased approach, starting with an initial management or lease contract, 
thus transferring less risk to the private sector by leaving investment 
responsibilities to the public sector. Following the accumulation of 
better information and the trial of regulation and relationship crafting, a 
concession model may be employed to take further advantage of the 
financing capacity and efficiency-reducing possibility of near-total 
ownership of operations by the private sector partner. A phased 
approach should also put learning and the accumulation of sound 
information as a priority: at the cost of compromising some of the 
reliability and strength of commitments, PPP contracts in developing 
regions are necessarily works in progress and should be planned as 
such. 
The cases also suggest that concessions will not necessarily meet the 
fiscal logic of employing PPP. In Manila and Jakarta, the major 
contributions of the private sector were technical and managerial, 
rather than fiscal. As such, expectations that capital expenditures will 
be financed by equity and private borrowing are no longer assured: the 
risk of government inconsistency is too high, and companies’ 
expectations of future government reverses on promised tariff 
increases means that companies insist on short-term recouping of 
investments directly from revenues. The tradeoff is relaxed incentives 
to make efficiency gains that would otherwise boost profitability. 
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The case studies also demonstrate the importance of culture and intent 
on motivational credibility. Whilst models developed and successfully 
implemented in the developed West may be technically sound, this 
research confirms the folly of strict application to other institutional and 
political settings. First off, the material, human resources, political, 
managerial, and economic conditions are different, and usually more 
challenging. Secondly, Jakarta demonstrates the difficulty of forcing 
PSP from the top upon an unwilling local agency. 
The contributions related to regulation demonstrate that the regulator’s 
de facto authority and technical capacity are the lynchpin of imperative 
credibility. But authority and credibility can be shattered by one of many 
shortfalls related to the legal underpinnings of PPP, legal conflicts, low 
technical capacity, corruption, judicial weakness, or restrictions on 
information. Initial design and early engagement is critical, but the 
“right” regulation is also likely to change over time, with respect to 
structure, process, and the calibration of fine settings.  
To the first point, the results demonstrate that the capacity to facilitate 
hybrid contract-discretionary regulation requires a highly specified 
contract and a competent, authoritative regulator. Even if they are 
subsequently changed, the terms of measurement, definitions, 
remuneration, oversight and enforcement, etc. must be specified up 
front, and in precise detail. Doing so forces parties to think through the 
critical details of imperative credibility. Because companies with 
superior resources can take advantage of contract ambiguities later on, 
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government keen on PSP must be willing to invest in the expertise 
needed to craft these contracts rigorously.  
Further, regulators must be engaged at the start and afforded technical 
assistance to perform meaningful assessment of efficiency, planned 
expenditures, and performance, and should be supported by an 
independent audit facility. Capacity and professionalization is key, more 
so than total independence, but authority is critical, nevertheless: a 
regulator that can be altogether circumnavigated is fruitless. If the clout 
required is not local (as in Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta), then regulation 
should reside where power, too, lies. But these cases also demonstrate 
that once a regulatory system is in place, facilitating a shift to other 
levels of government is difficult. 
Finally, a prime concern in contract design should be insulating projects 
from political interference, but not at the expense of new information 
and direct democratic responsiveness. The cases demonstrate that 
responsive regulation depends on linkages between regulators and the 
public, and companies and the public, which give rise to the special 
kind of emergent knowledge required to implement the PPP form in 
unique contexts. Unlike the “syntactic” view of knowledge, which 
assumes that information can be “captured, stored, transferred, and 
managed”, or the semantic, which emphasizes the receipt of 
knowledge and role of interpretation, a pragmatic approach sees 
knowledge as “localized, embedded, and invested in practice” (Weber 
& Khademian, 2008). This practical knowledge, or “metis” (Scott, 
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1998), evolves through practice and is tied to identities, experiences, 
and relationships of those building the knowledge together.  
Metis is particularly key when information needs are unclear or 
problems are interlinked and multifaceted. Participants bring their own 
practice-based knowledge to the network, but this knowledge is difficult 
to transfer and challenging to integrate into a useable compilation. By 
working together over time, however, collaborators can amalgamate 
knowledge and collectively generate new knowledge sets specific to 
the problems at hand. This emergent knowledge serves multiple 
purposes: creating better fitting policies to local context, uniting actors 
under common knowledge, aligning values and interests, and 
developing reasonable accountability systems.  
Certainly, water supply and regulation requires differentiated solutions 
and diverse skills to manage implementation in multiple levels of 
government and specific institutional and cultural contexts. And the 
goals of regulation and supply are intricately linked to other local issues 
including economic growth, health, and social development. Solutions 
must accommodate environmental constraints, customs, prevailing 
laws and institutions, and other policy goals. But solutions also 
incorporate technical components, which can be informed by sector-
wide best practice. Whilst many of the lessons learned through other 
PPPs may be usefully conveyed via technical assistance programs, 
they are likely to be insufficient for building new PPPs. That foreign 
participation makes a difference (as in Palyja versus Aetra) reaffirms 
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the importance of processes that incorporate both local, emergent 
knowledge and sector best practice: both are valuable to long term 
sustenance. As such, continuous input and stable working relationships 
across organizations and with consumers is vital. 
Due to the inevitability of conflict, nevertheless, regulatory processes 
should be subject to redundancy and clear systems of appeal. Because 
sources of conflict cannot be known exhaustively up front, regulators 
and government agencies serving as grantors would do well to publicly 
lay out the principles justifying the selection of PPP and guiding its 
management thereafter. These principles are especially important in 
conflict resolution and discretionary regulation. 
Where good regulation is unlikely due to significant legal and 
institutional gaps, the only option available to contravene these 
weaknesses, at least in part, is the court of public opinion. The 
application of public scrutiny as a lever to control monopoly market 
failure depends on full transparency of contract terms and 
performance. Indeed, this may be the golden ticket for successful 
implementation in developing regions. Transparency is virtually 
imperative where regulatory capacity is untested. 
The last practical contribution relates to the notion of PPP failure. While 
the quantitative analysis suggests impacts of institutional settings on 
lastingness, the Maynilad I and Selangor cases show that, contrary to 
common characterization in the literature, early termination is not 
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necessarily failure: the removal of an inefficient operator or cancellation 
of an unproductive contract is a political and administrative victory. The 
quantitative results suggest that corruption and political instability can 
have sustaining effects on PPP. This counterintuitive result is explained 
in the cases: political turmoil and the intervention of rent-seeking 
politicians can prolong instrumental failure. As such, governments 
should have workable exit strategies, which entail maintaining a base 
level of technical capacity in case re-municipalization is needed.  
This thesis applies a novel research framework based on the multiple 
commitment problem, which puts forth an alternative viewpoint for 
considering the likelihood of a success for policy solutions that entail 
combined market and non-market mechanisms with multiple 
participants in contracted partnership. As applied to transactional PPP, 
this alternative lens requires consideration of institutional endowments, 
contract design, and regulatory rules required to underpin imperative 
commitment; norms and participant interests required to sustain 
motivational commitment; technical, financial, and managerial capacity 
to deliver; and system capacity to adjust to shocks. 
Further, the research points out that policy consistency should not be a 
goal in and of itself, as its desirability depends on the quality of the 
agreement it applies to and how well the plan actually accomplishes its 
goals. Failures, ultimately, must be judged according to instrumental 
performance and values such as justice and democracy. Nevertheless, 
partnership failures combine issues of capacity, coordination, 
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regulation, legitimacy, and value. In PPP, failure is ultimately related to 
whether a PPP creates value (hinged on the policy goals and quality of 
commitments); coordinates the resources and knowledge needed to 
deliver; and preserves the legitimacy required to remain salient. This 
requires a balance over time of internal and external political support, 
regulation, and supportive technologies and institutions.   
Reflecting, then, on the introductory question of how to account for the 
failures that both motivate and result from PPP, we see that failures are 
both institutional (relational and rule-oriented) and instrumental. PPP is 
employed as a creative solution for combined problems of market 
failure (natural monopoly, information asymmetry) and government 
failure (inefficiency, low technical capacity). And the failures of PPPs 
after the decision is made to engage the private sector are combined 
miscarriages in commitment, capacity, legitimacy and responsiveness.  
In looking for a more general theory of institutional failure that accounts 
for both, a useful starting point is the notion of public value (Moore, 
1995), which proposes that policy must stand three tests of substantive 
value; legitimacy; and operational and administrative feasibility. The 
failures to which PPPs are both solutions to and by which they may 
collapse are failures of public value. They are failures of attaining the 
values set out for them, including fiscal efficiency, equitable distribution, 
and reliable service; of securing necessary sources of legitimacy; and 
of employing the operational capabilities and accountability 
mechanisms needed to deliver desired results. 
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8.5 Concluding remarks 
This thesis is but a start to an ongoing, deeper enquiry into the 
appropriateness of PPP as a creative policy solution to mixed market-
government failure under different political-economic and material 
conditions. This research is also, undeniably, limited: it falls short of 
definitively and generally linking meta-level institutional factors, social 
and political factors, and project rules with instrumental success. 
Further, it cannot deliver a concise finite list of X paths to failure. 
Nevertheless, large-N analysis and case study, in combination, suggest 
how factors at micro-, meso-, and meta-levels interact to relationally 
and instrumentally sustain or undermine PPP, depending on factors 
defining capacity, credible commitment, and adjustment and learning. 
Future research should expand comparative case study to examine 
decision nodes and outcomes with respect to changing inputs over 
time, in order to map out and compare paths towards or away from 
instrumental success. Further research is also needed to build an 
empirical base amenable to studying the prevalence, structuring, and 
outcomes of hybrid regulatory arrangements; the timing and design of 
adjustment processes; and the effect of a PPP’s inception at local or 
higher levels of government on instrumental performance. 
Another future line of enquiry includes the role of third parties in PPP 
performance and sustenance. Herein, the role of the regulator as a 
third party of crucial importance has been discussed extensively, but 
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other third parties of import – which may include unions, civil society 
organizations, and suppliers – are only incidentally examined in the 
comparative cases. Nevertheless, third party opportunism, competition, 
resistance, and support are all likely to be important components of 
partnership with respect to both institutional and instrumental 
outcomes. Another useful line of enquiry is in examining further cases 
where failing contracts have been renegotiated and / or entirely 
redefined to save poorly performing PPPs. 
Finally, the issues of culture and relational processes and individual 
entrepreneurship on policy partnership have not yet been thoroughly 
examined. The disciplines of leadership, organizational studies, 
behavioral studies, international management, and anthropology have 
much to offer economic-oriented research on PPP success. To that 
end, more comparative research is needed on the influence of 
corporate and regional cultural orientations of participants to a PPP; 
corporate management, communications, and strategic alliance 
processes; and cross-regional comparisons within the multiple 
commitment and adjustment framework. To that end, future research 
might ask whether some particular set of institutional endowments, 
ideations, or traditions can explain higher rates of termination in Asia: 
over half of the concessions outside of China have either been 
cancelled or are in distress, as compared to a global rate of 8.2%. 
This thesis culminates with a tentatively optimistic attitude towards PPP 
and its application to water supply: it may very well be a promising 
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solution to the developing world’s water crisis. But this cautious 
optimism hinges on grappling with the many inputs and constant 
adjustments needed to keep the right incentives in place, relieve both 
government and business of the overwhelming pressure to altogether 
eschew the occurrence of error in a necessarily experimental process, 
and manage the need to constantly re-legitimize the engagement of the 





Acheson, J. M. (2006). Institutional failure in resource management. 
Annual Review of Anthropology, 35, 117-134.  
Aini, M., Fakhru'l-Razi, A., & Suan, K. S. (2001). Water crisis 
management: Satisfaction level, effect and coping of the 
consumers. Water resources management, 15(1), 31-39.  
Alegre, H. (2006). Performance indicators for water supply services: 
IWA publishing. 
Andrews, C. T., & Yniguez, C. E. (2004). Water in Asian cities: Utilities' 
performance and civil society views. Manila, Philippines: Asian 
Development Bank. 
Araral, E. (2009). The failure of water utilities privatization: Synthesis of 
evidence, analysis and implications. Policy and Society, 27, 221-
228.  
Ariffin, L. (2012, 16 July 2012). Illegal to meddle in Selangor water 
issue, MB tells Putrajaya. Malaysian Insider.  
Arndt, C., & Oman, C. (2006). Uses and abuses of governance 
indicators: OECD Publishing. 
Badan Pusat Statistik. (2011). Population of Indonesia by village 2010.   
Retrieved 23 September 2013, from http://www.bps.go.id 
Bailey, S. (1999). Local government economics: Principles and 
practice: Macmillan. 
Bakker, K. (2003). From public to private to... mutual? Restructuring 
water supply governance in England and Wales. Geoforum, 
34(3), 359-374.  
Bakker, K. J. (2010). Privatizing water: Governance failure and the 
world's urban water crisis. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University 
Press. 
Bakker, V., Kooy, M., Shofiani, N. E., & Martijn, E.-J. (2006). 
Disconnected: poverty, water supply and development in 
Jakarta, Indonesia: Human Development Report Office (HDRO), 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 
Banerjee, S., Oetzel, J., & Ranganathan, R. (2006). Private provision of 
infrastructure in emerging markets: Do institutions matter? 
Development Policy Review, 24(2), 175-202.  
Bardhan, P. (1997). Corruption and development: A review of issues. 
Journal of Economic Literature, 35(3), 1320-1346.  
Barraqué, B. (2010). Urban water conflicts (Vol. 8). Paris: UNESCO. 
 393 
Basar, T., & Olsder, G. J. (1999). Dynamic noncooperative game 
theory. New York: Society for Industrial and Applied 
Mathematics. 
Basuki threatens to report Suez Envrionment. (2013, 20 April 2013). 
Berita Jakarta.  
Bayliss, K. (2002). Privatization and poverty: The distributional impact 
of utility privatization. Annals of Public and Cooperative 
Economics, 73(4), 603-625.  
Berg-Schlosser, D., & De Meur, G. (2009). Comparative research 
design: Case and variable selection. In B. R. a. C. Ragin (Ed.), 
Configurational comparative methods. Qualitative comparative 
Analysis (QCA) and related techniques (pp. 19-32). Los 
Angeles: Sage. 
Bergara, M., Henisz, W., & Spiller, P. (1998). Political institutions and 
electric utility investment: A cross-nation analysis. California 
Management Review, 40, 18-35.  
Bernama. (2010, 29 July 2010). Syabas may take legal action against 
Selangor. Bernama, Free Malaysia Today.  
Bernama. (2012, 26 June 2012). Puncak Niaga shareholders ask 




Bernama. (2013, 22 October 2013). Syabas inks agreements for 2 govt 
loans worth RM151 million. Bernama.  
Berry, W. D., & Feldman, S. (1985). Multiple regression in practice. 
London: Sage. 
Birdsall, N., & Nellis, J. (2003). Winners and losers: Assessing the 
distributional impact of privatization. World Development, 31(10), 
1617-1633.  
Bloomfield, P. (2006). The challenging business of long term public-
private partnerships: Reflections on local experience. Public 
Administration Review, 66(3), 400-411.  
Boehm, F., & Polanco, J. (2003). Corruption and privatization of 
infrastructure in developing countries. Transparency 
International IP and PC Working Paper.  
Boston, J., Martin, J., Pallot, J., & Walsh, P. (1996). Public 
management: The New Zealand model. Auckland: Oxford 
University Press. 
Botero, J., Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, 
A. (2004). The Regulation of Labor. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 119(4), 1339-1382.  
 394 
Bovaird, T. (2004). Public-private partnerships: From contested 
concepts to prevalent practice. International Review of 
Administrative Sciences, 70(2), 199.  
Bovaird, T. (2006). Developing new forms of partnership with the 
market in the procurement of public services. Public 
Administration, 84(1), 81-102.  
Boycko, M., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1996). A theory of privatisation. 
The Economic Journal, 106(435), 309-319.  
Boyne, G. A. (1998). Competitive tendering in local government: A 
review of theory and evidence. Public Administration, 76(4), 695-
712.  
Bozeman, B. (2002). Public value failure: When efficient markets may 
not do. Public Administration Review, 62(2), 145-161.  
Brown, K. (2007). Are public-private transactions the future of 
infrastructure finance? Public Works Management & Policy, 
12(1), 320.  
Buchanan, J. M., & Tullock, G. (1965). The calculus of consent: Logical 
foundations of constitutional democracy. Ann Arbor: University 
of Michigan Press. 
Budds, J., & McGranahan, G. (2003). Are the debates on water 
privatization missing the point? Experiences from Africa, Asia 
and Latin America. Environment and Urbanization, 15(2), 87-
114.  
Bull, B., & McNeill, D. (2007). Development issues in global 
governance: Public-private partnerships and market 
multilateralism. New York: Taylor & Francis. 
Campbell, G. (2001). Public private partnerships - A developing 
market? Melbourne.  
Carroll, T. (2012). Working on, through and around the State: The deep 
marketisation of development in the Asia-Pacific. Journal of 
Contemporary Asia, 42(3), 378-404.  
Chandra, B., Aprilia, E. U., & Megarani, A. M. (2012, 9 January 2012). 
Government admits GDF Suez letter related to Palyja. Tempo.  
Chia, P., Chua, C., Kim, F., Teo, S., & Toh, K. (2007). Water 
privatization in Manila, Philippines: Should water be privatized? 
Economics and management in developing countries: INSEAD. 
Ching, T. K. (2012). Malaysian water sector reform: Policy and 
performance. Environmental Policy Series, 8.  
CIJ Malaysia. (2011). Selangor FOI Enactment a breakthrough amid 




Corduneanu-Huci, C., Hamilton, A., & Ferrer, I. M. (2013). 
Understanding policy change: How to apply political economy 
concepts in practice. Washington, D.C.: International Bank of 
Reconstruction, The World Bank. 
Crowder, G., Hassan, S. S., & Lee, M. (2012). Developing the network 
improvement plan for Selangor state, Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia: Institute of Water Loss: Water Loss Specialist Group. 
Davis, J. (2004). Corruption in public service delivery: Experience from 
South Asia's water and sanitation sector. World Development, 
32(1), 53-71.  
De Palma, A., Leruth, L. E., & Prunier, G. (2009). Towards a principal-
agent based typology of risks in public-private partnerships (Vol. 
9): International Monetary Fund. 
Delerue-Vidot, H. (2006). Opportunism and unilateral commitment: The 
moderating effect of relational capital. Management Decision, 
44(6), 737-751.  
Delmon, J. (2006). Approaches to private participation in water 
services: A toolkit. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Delmon, J. (2011). Public-private partnership projects in infrastructure: 
An essential guide for policy makers. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Dewi, S. (2013, 30 March 2013). City wants water takeover to avoid 
penalties. The Jakarta Post, p. 9. Retrieved from 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/03/30/city-wants-
water-takeover-avoid-penalties.html 
DKI Jakarta. (2012). The official site of Jakarta capital city.   Retrieved 
21 October, 2013, from http://www.jakarta.go.id/english/ 
Dollery, B. (2009). The influence of economic theories of government 
failure on public management reform International handbook of 
public management reform (pp. 18-40). Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar. 
Dollery, B., & Wallis, J. (2001). Local government failure. Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar. 
Dollery, B. E., & Worthington, A. C. (1996). The evaluation of public 
policy: Normative economic theories of government failure. 
Journal of interdisciplinary economics, 7(1), 27-39.  
Domingo, R. (2012, 4 July 2013). Manila Water's Jakarta bid goes 
down the drain. Philippine Daily Inquirer. Retrieved from 
http://business.inquirer.net/130257/manila-waters-jakarta-bid-
goes-down-the-drain 
Dumol, M. (2000). The Manila water concession: Key government 
official's diary of the world's largest water privatization: World 
Bank Publications. 
 396 
Elyda, C., & Dewi, S. W. (2013, 5 June 2013). Water privatization 
challenged after 16 years. The Jakarta Post. Retrieved from 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/06/05/water-
privatization-challenged-after-16-years.html 
EPU Malaysia. (nd). Malaysia Incorporated Policy. from 
http://www.epu.gov.my/en/dasar-pengkorporatan-malaysia 
Erdmann, G., & Engel, U. (2006). Neopatrimonialism revisited: Beyond 
a catch-all concept. GIGA German Institute of Global and Area 
Studies.   
Espanol, D. (2007). The Philippines: Towards significant judicial reform 
Global Corruption Report 2007: Corruption In Judicial Systems 
(pp. 258-262). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,. 
Estache, A. (2006). PPI partnerships vs. PPI divorces in LDCs. Review 
of Industrial Organization, 29(1), 3-26.  
Fabella, R. (2006). Shifting the boundary of the state: The privatization 
and regulation of water service in metropolitan Manila. Centre on 
Regulation and Competition (CRC) working papers.   
FDC. (2009). Recalibrating the meter. Manila, Philippines: Freedom 
from Debt Coalition. 
Finger, M., Allouche, J., & LuÌs-Manso, P. (2007). Water and 
liberalisation: European water scenarios: International Water 
Association. 
Flinders, M. (2005). The politics of public-private partnerships. The 
British Journal of Politics & International Relations, 7(2), 215-
239.  
Foster, V., & Irusta, O. (2003). Does infrastructure reform work for the 
poor? A case study on the cities of La Paz and El Alto in Bolivia. 
World Bank Working Paper.  
Fraser, D. R., Zhang, H., & Derashid, C. (2006). Capital structure and 
political patronage: The case of Malaysia. Journal of Banking & 
Finance, 30(4), 1291-1308.  
Friedman, M. (2009). Capitalism and freedom. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Fuest, V., & Haffner, S. (2007). PPP-policies, practices and problems in 
Ghana's urban water supply. Water Policy, 9(2), 169-192.  
Funston, J. (2001). Developmental state challenged Governments and 
Politics in Southeast Asia (pp. 160). Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies. 
Galiani, S., Gertler, P., Schargrodsky, E., & Sturzenegger, F. (2005). 
The benefits and costs of privatization in Argentina: A 
microeconomic Analysis. In A. Chong & F. Lopez-de-Silanes 
(Eds.), Privatization in Latin America: Myths and reality. 
 397 
Washington, D.C.: International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development. 
Galiani, S., Gonzalez Rozada, M., & Schargrodsky, E. (2009). Water 
expansions in shantytowns: Health and savings. Economica, 
76(304), 607-622.  
Glaeser, E. L., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2004). 
Do institutions cause growth? Journal of Economic Growth, 9(3), 
271-303.  
Gleick, P., Wolff, G., Chalecki, E., & Reyes, R. (2002). The new 
economy of water: The risk and benefits of globalization and 
privatization of fresh water. Oakland, California: Pacific Institute. 
Global Water Intelligence. (2012, March 2012). Managing the 
disconnect in West Jakarta. Global Water Intelligence.  
Gómez-Ibáñez, J. A. (2003). Regulating infrastructure: Monopoly, 
contracts, and discretion. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
Government of Malaysia. (2006). Official Secrets Act of 1972: Act 88, 
Reprint. 
Grimsey, D., & Lewis, M. (2007). Public private partnerships: The 
worldwide revolution in infrastructure provision and project 
finance: Edward Elgar Pub. 
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1986). The costs and benefits of 
ownership: A theory of vertical and lateral integration. The 
Journal of Political Economy, 691-719.  
Guasch, J., Laffont, J., & Straub, S. (2005). Infrastructure concessions 
in Latin America: government-led renegotiations. World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper(3749).  
Gunawansa, A., & Bhullar, L. (2013). Water governance: An evaluation 
of alternative architectures. Singapore: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Gundlach, G. T., Achrol, R. S., & Mentzer, J. T. (1995). The structure of 
commitment in exchange. The Journal of Marketing, 78-92.  
GWI. (2004, November 2004). Selangor jumps the gun. Global Water 
Intelligence. Retrieved from 
http://www.globalwaterintel.com/archive/5/11/general/selangor-
jumps-the-gun.html 
Hadfield, G. K. (2005). Contract law is not enough: The many legal 
institutions that support contractual commitments. In C. Menard 
& M. Shirley (Eds.), Handbook of New Institutional Economics 
(pp. 175-203). Berlin: Springer. 
Hall, D., & Lobina, E. (2004). Private and public interests in water and 
energy. 
 398 
Hall, D., & Lobina, E. (2006). Pipe dreams: the failure of the private 
sector to invest in water services in developing countries. PSIRU 
Reports.  
Hall, D., Lobina, E., & Corral, V. (2010). Replacing failed private water 
contracts. Public Services International Research Unit, January 
2010.  
Hall, D., Lobina, E., & de la Motte, R. (2005). Public Resistance to 
Privatisation in Water and Energy. Development in Practice, 
15(3), 286-301.  
Hall, J. (1998). Private opportunity, public benefit? Fiscal Studies, 
19(2), 121-140.  
Hammami, M., Ruhashyankiko, J., & Yehoue, E. (2006). Determinants 
of public-private partnerships in infrastructure: International 
Monetary Fund. 
Harris, C. (2003). Private participation in infrastructure in developing 
countries: trends, impacts, and policy lessons: World Bank 
Publications. 
Harsono, A. (2003, 10 February 2003). Water and politics in the fall of 
Suharto. The Water Barons. Retrieved from 
http://www.publicintegrity.org/2003/02/10/5725/water-and-
politics-fall-suharto 
Hart, O., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997). The proper scope of 
government: theory and an application to prisons. The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 112(4), 1127-1161.  
Heineman Jr, B., & Heimann, F. (2006). The long war against 
corruption. Foreign Affairs, 85(3), 75-86.  
Hill, C. W., & Jones, T. M. (1992). Stakeholder-agency theory. Journal 
of management studies, 29(2), 131-154.  
Hirschman, A. O. (1970). Exit, voice, and loyalty: Responses to decline 
in firms, organizations, and states: Harvard Univ Pr. 
Hodge, G. (2004). The risky business of public-private partnerships. 
Australian Journal of Public Administration, 63(4), 37-49.  
Hodge, G., & Greve, C. (2005). Public-private partnerships: A policy for 
all seasons? The Challenge of Public-Private Partnerships: 
Learning from International Experience, Edward Elgar: 
Cheltenham, UK, 332-349.  
Hodge, G., Greve, C., & Boardman, A. (2010). Introduction: The PPP 
phenomenon and its evaluation International Handbook on 
Public-Private Partnerships (pp. 3-16). Cheltenham, UK: Edward 
Elgar. 
 399 
Hukka, J. J., & Katko, T. S. (2003). Refuting the paradigm of water 
services privatisation. Paper presented at the Natural Resources 
Forum. 
ICWE. (1992, 26-31 January 1992). The Dublin statement on water and 
sustainable development. Paper presented at the International 
Conference on Water and the Environment, Dublin, Ireland. 
Inglehart, R. (2000). World values surveys and European values 
surveys: 1981-1984, 1990-1993, and 1995-1997: Inter-university 
Consortium for for Political and Social Research. 
Iossa, E., & Martimort, D. (2013). Corruption in public-private 
partnerships. In P. De Vries & E. Yehoue (Eds.), The Routledge 
companion to public private partnerships (pp. 205-255). London: 
Routledge. 
Iwan, R. (2008). Ten Years of Public Private Partnership in Jakarta 
Drinking Water Service (1998-2007): Eastern Jakarta Drinking 
Water Service by Thames PAM Jaya.  
Iwanami, M., & Nickson, A. (2008). Assessing the regulatory model for 
water supply in Jakarta. Public Administration and Development, 
28, 291-300.  
Jabatan Perangkaan Malaysia. (2012). Population Distribution and 
Basic Demographic Characteristics.  Putrajaya, Malaysia. 
Jabatan Perangkaan Malaysia. (2013). GDP by State: National 
Accounts 2005-2012. Department of Statistics, Malaysia. 
Jacobson, C., & Choi, S. (2008). Success factors: public works and 
public-private partnerships. International Journal of Public 
Sector Management, 21(6), 637-657.  
Jacobson, P. (2011, 27 December 2011). In Jakarta, a fight over 
money and water. Jakarta Globe. Retrieved from 
http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/news/jakarta/in-jakarta-a-fight-
over-money-and-water/ 
Jakarta Post. (2013, 25 June 2013). City turns down Palyja offer to sell 
water shares. The Jakarta Post.  
Jamali, D. (2004). Success and failure mechanisms of public private 
partnerships (PPPs) in developing countries: Insights from the 
Lebanese context. International Journal of Public Sector 
Management, 17(5), 414-430.  
Jensen, O. (2005). Troubled partnerships: Problems and coping 
strategies in Jakarta's water concessions. Paper presented at 
the 4th Conference on Applied Infrastructure Research, Berlin.  
Jensen, O. (2009). The Role of Regulatory Agencies in Developing 
Countries: A Game Theoretic Approach to the Regulation of 
Public-Private Contracts. Politics Triumphs Economics?, 162.  
 400 
Johnson, R., McCormally, J., & Moore, A. (2002). Long-term 
contracting for water and wastewater services. Reason 
Foundation: Los Angeles, CA.  
Johnston, J., & Gudergan, S. (2007). Governance of public-private 
partnerships: lessons learnt from an Australian case? 
International Review of Administrative Sciences, 73(4), 569.  
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., & Mastruzzi, M. (2003). Governance matters 
III: Governance indicators for 1996-2002. World Bank.  
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., & Mastruzzi, M. (2007). The worldwide 
governance indicators project: answering the critics (Vol. 4149): 
World Bank Publications. 
Kettl, D. (1993). Sharing power: Public governance and private 
markets: Brookings Institution Press. 
Kim, C. L. H. (2003). Implementing competition policy in Malaysia: Inst. 
of Southeast Asian Studies. 
King, G., Keohane, R. O., & Verba, S. (1994). Designing social inquiry: 
Scientific inference in qualitative research: Princeton University 
Press. 
Klitgaard, R., & Treverton, G. (2004). Assessing Partnerships: New 
Form of Collaboration. Collaboration: Using networks and 
partnerships, 21-60.  
Knack, S. F. (2006). Measuring corruption in Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia: a critique of the cross-country indicators (Vol. 
3968): World Bank Publications. 
Komives, K., Whittington, D., & Wu, X. (2001). Infrastructure coverage 
and the poor: A global perspective (Vol. 2551): World Bank 
Publications. 
Koon, Y. Y. (2010, 8 December 2010). Selangor water impasse: Will 




Koppenjan, J. (2005). The Formation of Public Private Partnerships: 
Lessons from Nine Transport Infrastructure Projects in The 
Netherlands. Public Administration, 83(1), 135-157.  
Kumar, M., & Brock, G. (2012). Developing Credibility in Public-Private 
Partnerships: The Case of Manila Water Supply. Available at 
SSRN 1988530.  
Kurtz, M., & Schrank, A. (2007). Conceptualizing and measuring 
institutions: a view from political science. Paper presented at the 
workshop Measuring Institutions. 
 401 
Kusno, A. (2011). Runaway city: Jakarta Bay, the pioneer and the last 
frontier. Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, 12(4), 513-531.  
Kydland, F. E., & Prescott, E. C. (1977). Rules rather than discretion: 
The inconsistency of optimal plans. The Journal of Political 
Economy, 473-491.  
Laffont, J.-J., & Tirole, J. (1993). A theory of incentives in procurement 
and regulation. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT press. 
Lambert, V., & Hirner, W. (2002). Losses from water supply systems: 
standard terminology and recommended performance 
measures. Voda i sanitarna tehnika, 32(1), 29-38.  
Langbein, L., & Knack, S. (2010). The worldwide governance 
indicators: six, one, or none? The Journal of Development 
Studies, 46(2), 350-370.  
Lanti, A. (2007). A regulatory approach to the Jakarta Water Supply 
concession contracts. International Journal of Water Resources 
Development, 22(2), 255-276.  
Lanti, A., Ali, F., Kretarto, A., Nugroho, R., & Zulfikar, A. (2009). The 
First Ten Years of Implementation of the Jakarta Water Supply 
25-year Concession Agreement (1998-2008). Jakarta Water 
Supply Regulatory Body.  
Lazaro, A. (Producer). (2002). Water sector regulation in the 
Philippines. PowerPoint presentation.  
Le Grand, J. (1991). The theory of government failure. British Journal 
of Political Science, 423-442.  
Levy, B., & Spiller, P. (1994). The institutional foundations of regulatory 
commitment: a comparative analysis of telecommunications 
regulation. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 10(2), 
201.  
Lobina, E. (2005). Problems with private water concessions: A review 
of experiences and analysis of dynamics. International Journal 
of Water Resources Development, 21(1), 55-87.  
Lobina, E., & Hall, D. (2003). Problems with private water concessions: 
a review of experience PSIRU Reports. 
Lobner, L. (2009). How well do Public-Private Partnerships work? , 
University of Vienna.    
Malaysia Office of the Prime Minister. (1996). Seventh Malaysia Plan: 
1996-2000.  Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Percetaka Nasional 
Malaysia Berhad. 
Malaysian Water Association. (2012). Malaysia Water Industry Guide 
2012. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: The Malaysian Water 
Association, the Ministry of Energy, Green Technology, and 
Water, and The National Water Services Commission. 
 402 
Marin, P. (2009). Public-private partnerships for urban water utilities: A 
review of experiences in developing countries. Washington, 
D.C.: World Bank Publications. 
Martimort, D., & Straub, S. (2009). Infrastructure privatization and 
changes in corruption patterns: The roots of public discontent. 
Journal of Development Economics, 90(1), 69-84.  
Masons, P. (2012). Water Yearbook 2012-2013. London: Pinsent 
Masons LLP. 
Mauzy, D. K., & Milne, R. (2002). Malaysian politics under Mahathir 
(Vol. 10). London: Routledge. 
McKenzie, D., Mookherjee, D., Castaneda, G., & Saavedra, J. (2003). 
The distributive impact of privatization in Latin America: 
Evidence from four countries Economia, 3(2), 161-233.  
Megarani, A. M. (2012, 9 January 2012). Jakarta's water contract 
disaster. Koran Tempo.  
Ménard, C. (2011). Is Public-Private Partnership Obsolete? In P. De 
Vries & E. Yehoue (Eds.), The Routledge Companion to Public-
Private Partnerships. London: Routledge. 
Menard, C., & Peeroo, A. (2011). Liberalization in the water sector: 
three leading models. In M. Finger & R. Kunneke (Eds.), 
International handbook of network industries: The liberalisation 
of infrastructure (pp. 310-327). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar 
Publishing. 
Ministry of Federal Territories. (2011). Official website of Greater Kuala 
Lumpur / Klang Valley 
.   Retrieved 23 September 2013, from 
http://app.kwpkb.gov.my/greaterklkv/overview/ 
Mitchell, W. C., & Simmons, R. T. (1994). Beyond politics: markets, 
welfare, and the failure of bureaucracy. Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press  
Moore, M. H. (1995). Creating public value: Strategic management in 
government. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
MWSS RO. (2013). MWSS RO releases water rate adjusments [Press 
release] 
Negishi, T. (2010). Regulatory framework for the Manila Water 
concessions. Yokohama National University working paper.   
Niskanen, W. A. (1971). Bureaucracy and representative government: 
Transaction Books. 
North, D. (1990). Institutions, institutional change, and economic 
performance. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
 403 
North, D. C. (1993). Institutions and credible commitment. Journal of 
Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 11-23.  
Nugroho, R. (2011). Public private partnership as a policy dilemma. 
Bisnis & Birokrasi International Journal of Administrative Science 
and Organization, 18(3).  
Ostrom, E. (2005). Doing institutional analysis: Digging deeper than 
markets and hierarchies. In M. Shirley & C. Menard (Eds.), 
Handbook of New Institutional Economics (pp. 819-848). Berlin: 
Springer. 
Peltzman, S. (1976). Toward a more general theory of regulation. 
Journal of Law and Economics, 19, 211-240.  
Pérard, E. (2008). Private sector participation and regulatory reform in 
water supply: the southern Mediterranean experience. In D. 
Jarvis, M. Ramesh, X. Wu & E. Araral (Eds.), Infrastructure 
regulation: What works, why and how do we know?: Lessons 
from Asia and beyond. Singapore: World Scientific. 
Pérard, E. (2009). Water supply: Public or private?: An approach based 
on cost of funds, transaction costs, efficiency and political costs. 
Policy and Society, 27(3), 193-219.  
Philippine Information Agency. (2012). DOST, DoH say Manila Water 
safe to drink.   Retrieved 7 April 2014, from 
http://ncr.pia.gov.ph/index.php?article=2271336709441 
Pigeon, M., McDonald, D. A., Hoedeman, O., & Kishimoto, S. (2012). 
Remunicipalisation: Putting water back into public hands. 
Amsterdam: Transnational Institute. 
Pigou, A. C. (1924). The economics of welfare, 2nd. edition. London: 
MacMillan. 
Pongsiri, N. (2002). Regulation and public-private partnerships. 
International Journal of Public Sector Management, 15(6), 487-
495.  
Post, A. E. (2009). Liquid assets and fluid contracts: Explaining the 
uneven effects of water and sanitation privatization. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University. 
PPIAF. (2006, September 2006). Did you know: Water and sewerage.   
Retrieved 21 November 2013, 2013, from 
http://ppi.worldbank.org/features/sept2006/didyouknowSept2006
.aspx 
PPIP. (1984-2008). Private Participation in Infrastructure Database. 
Available from World Bank Private Participation in Infrastructure 
Database Retrieved 3 September 2010, from The World Bank 
http://ppi.worldbank.org 
 404 
Prasad, N. (2006). Privatisation results: Private sector participation in 
water services after 15 years. Development Policy Review, 
24(6), 669-692.  
Pua, T. (2013, 23 October 2013). Another RM151 million bailout for 
Syabas: No wonder Najib will never be able to cut national debt. 
Malaysia Chronicle.  
Rihoux, B., & Ragin, C. C. (2008). Configurational comparative 
methods: qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) and related 
techniques. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
Robertson-Snape, F. (1999). Corruption, collusion and nepotism in 
Indonesia. Third World Quarterly, 20(3), 589-602.  
Rose-Ackerman, S. (1999). Corruption and government: Causes, 
consequences, and reform. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Ross, W. T., Anderson, E., & Weitz, B. (1997). Performance in 
principal-agent dyads: The causes and consequences of 
perceived asymmetry of commitment to the relationship. 
Management Science, 43(5), 680-704.  
Ruane, S. (2002). Public-private partnerships - the case of PFI. 
Partnerships, New Labour and the governance of welfare, 199-
211.  
Rubin, P. (2005). Legal systems as frameworks for market exchanges. 
In M. Shirley & C. Menard (Eds.), Handbook of New Institutional 
Economics (pp. 205-228). Berlin: Springer. 
Sakti, A. (2012). The privatisation of public sector: Lessons from 
Jakarta Water. Paper presented at the International Conference 
on Decentralization: How far decentralization goes, Jatinangor, 
Indonesia.  
Savas, E. (2000). Privatization and public-private partnerships. London: 
Chatham House. 
Savenije, H. H. (2002). Why water is not an ordinary economic good, or 
why the girl is special. Physics and Chemistry of the Earth, Parts 
A/B/C, 27(11), 741-744.  
Scanzoni, J. (1979). The centrality of negotiations to the study of social 
organization. Contemporary Sociology, 8(4), 528-530.  
Scott, J. (1998). Seeing like a state. New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press. 
Selznick, P. (1994). The moral commonwealth: Social theory and the 
promise of community. Berkely, CA: University of California 
Press. 
Shepsle, K. A. (1991). Discretion, institutions, and the problem of 
government commitment. In P. Bourdieu & J. Coleman (Eds.), 
 405 
Social theory for a changing society (pp. 245-263). Boulder, CO: 
Westview. 
Sheshinski, E., & Lopez-Calva, L. (2003). Privatization and its benefits: 
theory and evidence. CESifo Economic Studies, 49(3), 429.  
Shirley, M. (2007). Urban water reform: what we know, what we need 
to know: mimeo, Ronald Coase Institute. 
Shirley, M., & Ménard, C. (2002). Cities awash: a synthesis of the 
country cases. Thirsting for efficiency: the economics and 
politics of urban water system reform, 1-42.  
Sicat, G. P. (2007). Legal and constitutional disputes and the Philippine 
economy. Discussion paper. School of Economics, University of 
the Philippines.   
Sihite, E. (2012, 29 April 2012). Water privatization in Jakarta 'not 
working'. Jakarta Globe.  
Skelcher, C. (2005). Public-private partnerships and hybridity. In E. 
Ferlie, L. Lynn & C. Pollitt (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of public 
management (pp. 347-370). Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press. 
Skelcher, C. (2010). Governing partnerships. In G. Hodge, C. Greve & 
A. Boardman (Eds.), International Handbook on Public-Private 
Partnerships (pp. 292-304). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar 
Publishing. 
Sonhadji, I. (2013, 25 June 2013). City turns down Palyja offer to sell 
water shares. The Jakarta Post.  
SPAN. (nd). Water restructuring background. from 
http://www.span.gov.my/index.php?option=com_content&view=a
rticle&id=166&Itemid=116&lang=en 
Stern, J., & Holder, S. (1999). Regulatory governance: criteria for 
assessing the performance of regulatory systems: an application 
to infrastructure industries in the developing countries of Asia. 
Utilities Policy, 8(1), 33-50.  
Stigler, G. J. (1971). The theory of economic regulation. The Bell 
Journal of Economics and Management Science, 3-21.  
Stiglitz, J. (2002). Globalization and its discontents. New York: WW 
Norton. 
Strotz, R. H. (1955). Myopia and inconsistency in dynamic utility 
maximization. The Review of Economic Studies, 23(3), 165-180.  
Sun Daily. (2012a, 23 August 2012). Call to audit Rozali's Puncak 
Niaga. The Sun Daily. Retrieved from http://www.malaysia-
chronicle.com/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=38526:
call-to-audit-rozalis-puncak-
niaga&Itemid=2&tmpl=component&print=1 - .Um3HcBZcnrg 
 406 
Sun Daily. (2012b). Umno's Rozali: My Syabas salary is not RM5.1mil 
. Malaysia Chronicle. Retrieved from http://www.malaysia-
chronicle.com/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=37941:
umnos-rozali-my-syabas-salary-is-not-rm51mil&Itemid=2 
Tan, J. (2012). The pitfalls of water privatization: Failure and reform in 
Malaysia. World Development, 40(12), 2552-2563.  
Tan, Y. (2011, 15 January 2011). Details of Langat 2 project being 
ironed out. The Star.  
Tecco, N. (2008). Financially sustainable investments in developing 
countries water sectors: what conditions could promote private 
sector involvement? International Environmental Agreements: 
Politics, Law and Economics, 8(2), 129-142.  
The World Bank. (2008). Thailand Infrastructure Annual Report 2008.  
Trani, R. (2008). The public-private partnerships: A theoretical 
approach and the case of the water sector (Dottorio di Ricerca in 
Scienze Economiche), Universita'Degli Studi di Napoli Federico 
II.    
Transparency International. (nd). Malaysia: Corruption by Country, 
Country Profile.   Retrieved 9 October 2013, 2013, from 
http://www.transparency.org/country - MYS_Overview 
United Nations, D. o. E. a. S. A., Population Division,. (2012). World 
urbanization prospects: The 2011 revision, CD-ROM edition. 
Van den Berg, C. (2000). Water concessions: Who wins, who loses, 
and what to do about it Public policy for the private sector (Vol. 
217): The World Bank Group Private Sector and Infrastructure 
Network. 
Van Ham, H., & Koppenjan, J. (2001). Building public-private 
partnerships: assessing and managing risks in port 
development. Public Management Review, 3(4), 593-616.  
Vaughn, B. (2011). Indonesia: Domestic politics, strategic dynamics, 
and American interests: Congressional Research Service. 
Veolia Water. (nd). Case Studies: Malaysia.   Retrieved 24 October 
2013, from http://www.veoliawaterst-
sea.com/municipalities/case_studies/ 
Vining, A. R., & Boardman, A. E. (2008). The potential role of public-
private partnerships in the upgrade of port infrastructure: 
normative and positive considerations. Maritime Policy & 
Management, 35(6), 551-569.  
Vinod, G. (2012, 9 August 2012). Water NGO to take Syabas to court. 




Vives, A., Paris, A. M., Benavides, J., Raymond, P. D., Quiroga, D. o., 
& Marcus, J. (2006). Financial structuring of infrastructure 
projects in public-private partnerships: An application to water 
projects: Inter-American Development Bank. 
Weber, E., & Khademian, A. (2008). Wicked problems, knowledge 
challenges, and collaborative capacity builders in network 
settings. Public Administration Review, 68(2), 334-349.  
Weimer, D. L., & Vining, A. R. (2005). Policy analysis: Concepts and 
practice, 4th Edition. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice 
Hall. 
Wettenhall, R. (2003). The rhetoric and reality of public-private 
partnerships. Public Organization Review, 3(1), 77-107.  
Wettenhall, R. (2010). Mixes and partnerships through time 
International Handbook on Public-Private Partnerships (pp. 17-
42). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 
Williamson, O. (1983). Credible commitments: Using hostages to 
support exchange. The American Economic Review, 73(4), 519-
540.  
Williamson, O. E. (1979). Transaction-cost economics: the governance 
of contractual relations. Journal of Law and Economics, 22(2), 
233-261.  
Wolf, C. (1979). A theory of nonmarket failure: framework for 
implementation analysis. Journal of Law and Economics, 22(1), 
107-139.  
World Bank. (2009). World development indicators. The World Bank.  
Wu, X. (2005). Corporate Governance and Corruption: A Cross Country 
Analysis. Governance, 18(2), 151-170.  
Wu, X., Batac, L., & Malaluan, N. A. (2011). Regulatory independence 
and contract incompleteness: Assessing regulatory 
effectiveness in water privatization in Manila Infrastructure 
regulation: What works, why and how do we know?: Lessons 
from Asia and beyond (pp. 361). Singapore: World Scientific 
Publishing. 
Wu, X., & Leong, C. C. (2013). The French model and water challenges 
in developing countries: Evidence from Jakarta and Manila. 
Policy & Society forthcoming.  
Wu, X., & Malaluan, N. A. (2008). A tale of two concessionaires: A 
natural experiment of water privatisation in Metro Manila. Urban 
Studies, 45(1), 207-229.  
Wu, X., & Ramesh, M. (2013). Market imperfections, government 
imperfections, and policy mixes: policy innovations in Singapore. 
Policy sciences, 1-16.  
 408 
Zerbe, R. O., & McCurdy, H. E. (1999). The failure of market failure. 
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 18(4), 558-578.  
Zhang, X. (2005). Critical success factors for public-private 
partnerships in infrastructure development. Journal of 
Construction Engineering and Management, 131, 3.  
Zouggari, M. (2003). Public-Private Partnership: Major Hindrances to 
the Private Sector's Participation in the Financing and 
Management of Public Infrastructures via Delegated 
Management. International Journal of Water Resources 
Development, 19(2), 123-129.  
 
 409 
Appendix 1. List of interviews  
Interview Subject(s) Date Location 
Dato' Teo Yen Hua, Chief Executive Officer, 
National Water Services Commission (SPAN) 
6 Dec 2012 Cyberjaya, 
Malaysia 
Leow Peen Fong, Executive Director, 
National Water Services Commission (SPAN) 
6 Dec 2012 Cyberjaya, 
Malaysia 
Charles Santiago, Minister of Parliament 7 Dec 2012 Kuala Lumpur 
Corporate informants, anonymous34 (2) 7 Dec 2012 Kuala Lumpur 
Ramon “Dondi” Alikpala, Chairman, MWSS 
Board of Trustees  
27 Feb 2013 Manila 
Cristina Millan, Consultant, MWSS  28 Feb 2013 Manila 
Nathaniel Santos, Senior Deputy 
Administrator, MWSS 
28 Feb 2013 Manila 
Emmanuel “Sam” Caparas, MWSS Trustee 28 Feb 2013 Manila 
Darren Fernandez, MWSS-RO Technical 
Assistant, Technical Regulation 
28 Feb 2013 Manila 
Chris Chuegan, MWSS-RO Supervising 
Regulations Officer and Acting Manager, 
Tariff Control and Monitoring Department 
28 Feb 2013 Manila 
Gerry Sullano, MWSS-RO Deputy 
Administrator, Technical Regulation 
28 Feb 2013 Manila 
Marcelino Arreola, Executive Regulator, 
Subic Bay Water Regulatory Board 
1 Mar 2013 Subic Bay, 
Philippines 
Pak Tamin Zakaria Amin, Secretary, BPP-
SPAM  
5 Mar 2013 Jakarta 
Dian Suci Hastuti, Head of Information and 
Management, Dept of Public Works 
5 Mar 2013 Jakarta 
Firdaus Ali, Former Technical Regulator, 
JWSRB, Chair, Jakarta Water Resource 
Council 
5 Mar 2013 Jakarta 
Kris Tetuko, Chair, Jakarta Water Supply 
Regulatory Body (JWSRB) 
6 Mar 2013 Jakarta 
Achmad Lanti, Former Chair, JWSRB 6 Mar 2013 Jakarta 
Harri Baskoro Adiyanto, Technical Regulator, 
JWSRB 
6 Mar 2013 Jakarta 
Tan Sri Widayanto Kaderi, President 
Director, PAM Jaya  
7 Mar 2013 Jakarta 
Henry Limbong, Technical Director, PAM 
Jaya 
7 Mar 2013 Jakarta 
Muhammad Reza, KRuHa (NGO) 7 Mar 2013 Jakarta 
Luc Martin, Operations Director, Palyja 8 Mar 2013 Jakarta 
Lintong Hutasoit, Operations Director, Aetra 8 Mar 2013 Jakarta 
                                            
34 Two informants involved in the earliest of KL’s privatization deals agreed to 
meet on condition of strict anonymity. 
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Appendix 2. Institutional environment variables 






Index combining indicators measuring 
aspects of the political process, civil 
liberties and political rights. These 
measure the extent to which citizens 
are able to participate in selection of 
governments as well as independence 




(Kaufmann et al 
2009) 
1996-2009, n: 2114, 




Index combining several indicators 
which measure perceptions of the 
likelihood that the government in 
power will be destabilized or 
overthrown by unconstitutional or 




(Kaufmann et al 
2009) 
1996-2009, n:2070, 






Index combining into a single grouping 
responses on quality of public service 
provision and the bureaucracy, 
competence and political 
independence of civil servants, and 
credibility of the government’s policy 
commitments. The main focus is on 
“inputs” required for the government to 
be able to produce and implement 




(Kaufmann et al 
2009) 
1996-2009, n:2090, 





Index combining measures of 
incidence of market-unfriendly policies 
such as price controls or inadequate 
bank supervision, and perceptions of 
the burdens imposed by excessive 
regulation in areas such as foreign 




(Kaufmann et al 
2009) 
1996-2009, n:2066, 
N:192, N:148, T:11 
Rule of law 
 
WBGI_RuleLaw 
Index combining indicators measuring 
the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society. These include perceptions of 
the incidence of crime, effectiveness 
and predictability of the judiciary, and 




(Kaufmann et al 
2009) 
1996-2009, n:2077, 






Measures perceptions of corruption, 
conventionally defined as the exercise 
of public power for private gain. 
Aspects measured by various sources 
differ, ranging from frequency of 
“additional payments to get things 
done”, to effects of corruption on 
business, to measuring “grand 




(Kaufmann et al 
2009) 
Time-series: 1996-
2009, n: 2037, N: 




Index focuses on corruption in the 







private gain). The surveys ask 
questions in line with the misuse of 
public power for private benefit, e.g., 
bribe-taking by public officials in public 
procurement. The CPI Score relates to 
perceptions of the degree of corruption 
as seen by business people, risk 
analysts and the general public and 
ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 
0 (highly corrupt). 
Time-series: 1995-
2010, n: 1906, 
N:181, N:119, T:11 




GDP per capita based on purchasing 
power parity in project year’s start, 
current international dollars (an 
international dollar has the same 
purchasing power over GDP as the 







Legal structure and 





Index ranges from 0-10 where 0 
corresponds to ‘no judicial 
independence’, ‘no trusted legal 
framework exists’, ‘no protection of 
intellectual property’, ‘military 
interference in rule of law’, and ‘no 
integrity of the legal system’ and 10 
corresponds to ‘high judicial 
independence’, ‘trusted legal 
framework exists’, ‘protection of 
intellectual property’, ‘no military 
interference in rule of law’, and 
‘integrity of the legal system’. 
Fraser Institute – 
Economic Freedom 




Lawson 2006)  
1970-2004, n:1140, 





Scores degree to which laws protect 
private property rights and the degree 
to which government enforces those 
laws. It accounts for the possibility of 
expropriation, independence of and 
corruption within the judiciary, and the 
ability to enforce contracts. Scores 
range from 0 to100, where 100 
represents the maximum degree of 









Binary variable that denotes whether a 
project was subject to a major financial 
crisis (e.g., Asian Financial Crisis, 
Argentine Dollar Crisis, etc.) after 
financial closure; =1 if so, =0 otherwise 






Measures statutory protection and 
power of unions as average of seven 
dummy variables which equal one: 1) if 
employees have the right to unionize; 
2) if employees have right to collective 
bargaining; 3) if employees are legally 
bound to bargain with unions; 4) if 
collective contracts are extended to 
third parties by law; 5) if the law allows 
closed shops; 6) if workers or unions 
have a right to appoint members to the 
Boards of Directors; and 7) if worker 
councils are mandated. 
Botero, Djankov, La 
Porta, López-de-
Silanes & Shleifer – 
Regulation of Labor 









2002 period, N:84 
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Appendix 3. Central tendencies of cancellation and 
distress 








Projects total 757 50 12 62 6.61% 8.19% 
Concessions 292 25 9 34 8.56% 11.64% 
Mgt/lease contracts 121 8 3 11 6.61% 9.09% 
Greenfields 315 17 2 19 5.40% 6.03% 
Utilities 318 29 5 34 9.12% 10.69% 
Treatment plants 436 21 7 28 4.82% 6.42% 
Projects w sewerage 619 35 6 41 5.65% 6.62% 
Utility concessions 185 18 4 22 9.73% 11.89% 
Utility Mgt/lease  99 9 1 10 9.09% 10.10% 
Utility Greenfields 11 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 
All projects…       
foreign partner 352 35 5 40 9.94% 11.36% 
multiple operators 184 26 4 30 14.13% 16.30% 
"Big Water"  153 29 3 32 18.95% 20.92% 
French operator 111 17 1 18 15.32% 16.22% 
UK operator 23 4 1 5 17.39% 21.74% 
multilateral support 64 11 3 14 17.19% 21.88% 
Utilities…       
foreign partner 143 23 3 26 16.08% 18.18% 
multiple operators 90 18 1 19 20.00% 21.11% 
"Big Water"  84 18 1 19 21.43% 22.62% 
French operator 62 11 1 12 17.74% 19.35% 
UK operator 16 2 0 2 12.50% 12.50% 
multilateral support 49 8 1 9 16.33% 18.37% 
Concessions…        
foreign partner 127 18 3 21 14.17% 16.54% 
multiple operators 84 14 3 17 16.67% 20.24% 
"Big Water"  71 15 2 17 21.13% 23.94% 
French operator 53 10 2 12 18.87% 22.64% 
UK operator 8 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 
multilateral support 21 4 2 6 19.05% 28.57% 
Utility concessions…      
foreign partner 72 15 2 17 20.83% 23.61% 
multiple operators 60 12 1 13 20.00% 21.67% 
"Big Water"  44 12 1 13 27.27% 29.55% 
French operator 29 7 1 8 24.14% 27.59% 
UK operator 7 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 
multilateral support 20 4 1 5 20.00% 25.00% 
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Appendix 4. Comparative failure rate central tendencies  
Projects Overall,  
Failure Rate 
Overall failure rate: 8.19% 
Treatment Control Rate delta 
Ratio of treatment 
failure rate to control 
failure rate 
Foreign partner 11.36% 5.43% 5.93% 2.09 
Multiple operators 16.30% 5.58% 10.72% 2.92 
Big Water 20.92% 4.97% 15.95% 4.21 
French partner 16.22% 6.66% 9.56% 2.44 
UK partner 21.74% 7.77% 13.97% 2.80 
Multilateral support 21.88% 6.93% 14.95% 3.16 
Concessions,  
Failure Rate 
Overall failure rate: 11.64% 
Treatment Control Rate delta 
Ratio of treatment 
failure rate to control 
failure rate  
Foreign partner 16.54% 7.88% 8.66% 2.10 
Multiple operators 20.24% 8.17% 12.07% 2.48 
Big Water 23.94% 7.69% 16.25% 3.11 
French partner 22.64% 9.21% 13.44% 2.46 
UK partner 0.00% 11.97% -11.97% 0.00 
Multilateral support 28.57% 10.33% 18.24% 2.77 
Utilities,  
Failure Rate 
Overall failure rate: 10.69% 
Treatment Control Rate delta 
Ratio of treatment 
failure rate to control 
failure rate  
Foreign partner 18.18% 4.57% 13.61% 3.98 
Multiple operators 21.11% 6.58% 14.53% 3.21 
Big Water 22.62% 6.41% 16.21% 3.53 
French partner 19.35% 8.59% 10.76% 2.25 
UK partner 12.50% 10.60% 1.90% 1.18 
Multilateral support 18.37% 9.29% 9.07% 1.98 
Utility Concessions, 
Failure Rate 
Overall failure rate: 11.89% 
Treatment Control Rate delta 
Ratio of treatment 
failure rate to control 
failure rate  
Foreign partner 23.61% 4.42% 19.19% 5.34 
Multiple operators 21.67% 7.20% 14.47% 3.01 
Big Water 29.55% 6.38% 23.16% 4.63 
French partner 27.59% 8.97% 18.61% 3.07 
UK partner 0.00% 12.36% -12.36% 0.00 
Multilateral support 25.00% 10.30% 14.70% 2.43 
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Appendix 5. Multicollinearity testing: Correlation tables 
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